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Contract analysis / renewal-period-lost-profits-memo.docx
renewal-period-lost-profits-memo.docx
High · 3
Medium · 2
Standard · 2
I. Executive Summary
Medium
⚑ Forum / governing law
I. Executive Summary This memorandum analyzes the legal and factual basis for the €27.15 million renewal-period lost profits claim asserted by Kestrel Dynamics GmbH ("Kestrel" or "Claimant") against our client, Whitmore Aerospace LLC ("WAL" or "Respondent"), in the pending ICC arbitration styled as Case No. 27914/MHM. The claim relates to two optional one-year renewal periods under the Master Supply Agreement for Tit
II. Factual Background
High
⚑ Non-compete / exclusivity restraint
II. Factual Background A. The MSA and Its Renewal Provisions The MSA was executed on June 15, 2018, between WAL (as Buyer) and Kestrel (as Seller). The agreement is referenced internally as WAL-KDG-MSA-2018-0615 and bears Kestrel's corresponding reference number KDG-MSA-0618-WAL. The MSA was negotiated over a period of approximately nine months following WAL's issuance of a Request for Proposal (RFP No. WAL-RFP-2017-
III. Legal Analysis
III. Legal Analysis A. Nature of the Renewal Options Under New York Law
1. Unilateral Option vs. Bilateral Obligation
1. Unilateral Option vs. Bilateral Obligation The threshold question in evaluating Kestrel's renewal-period lost profits claim is the legal character of the renewal provisions in Section 3.2. As set forth above, Section 3.2 grants WAL the right to "at its sole discretion, extend the term of this Agreement for up to two (2) additional periods of one (1) year each." This language unambiguously creates a unilateral opti
2. No Implied Obligation to Renew
2. No Implied Obligation to Renew Kestrel may attempt to circumvent the plain language of Section 3.2 by invoking the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, arguing that WAL was impliedly obligated to exercise the renewal options in good faith or that WAL's decision-making process regarding renewal was subject to judicial or arbitral review for reasonableness. This argument fails under New York law. The New
Section 3.2 of the MSA grants WAL the right to renew "at its sole discretion." Any implied
Section 3.2 of the MSA grants WAL the right to renew "at its sole discretion." Any implied obligation to exercise that discretion in good faith — or, a fortiori, to exercise it at all — would be flatly inconsistent with the express language of the contract. The implied covenant is a gap-filler, not a trump card. It operates to ensure that parties do not act in a manner that deprives the other party of the benefits of
1. Standard for Lost-Profit Damages Under New York Law
Standard
⚑ Commercial term
1. Standard for Lost-Profit Damages Under New York Law Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that the renewal provisions could theoretically support a damages claim, Kestrel would still be required to prove its lost profits with "reasonable certainty." New York law is unequivocal on this point: lost profits are recoverable only if they are proven with reasonable certainty; they must not be remote, speculative, or
2. Renewal-Period Profits Are Inherently Speculative
2. Renewal-Period Profits Are Inherently Speculative Kestrel's renewal-period lost profits claim is precisely the kind of speculative, multi-contingency claim that the reasonable certainty standard is designed to exclude. The claim depends on the resolution of a chain of contingencies, each of which introduces an additional layer of uncertainty: (a) WAL's exercise of the first renewal option. The first and most funda
3. No Historical Pattern of Renewal to Support Inference
3. No Historical Pattern of Renewal to Support Inference A claimant seeking to recover lost profits on a hypothetical contract renewal may attempt to establish reasonable certainty by pointing to a historical pattern of renewals from which the trier of fact could infer that renewal was likely. Such an inference might be supportable where, for example, a supplier and buyer had a long-standing relationship involving mu
Section 8.7 of the MSA provides:
High
⚑ Non-compete / exclusivity restraint
Section 8.7 of the MSA provides: "Section 8.7 — Limitation of Liability. IN NO EVENT SHALL EITHER PARTY BE LIABLE TO THE OTHER PARTY FOR ANY INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOST PROFITS, LOST REVENUES, LOSS OF BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY, OR COST OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES, WHETHER BASED ON WARRANTY, CONTRACT, T
IV. Impact on Damages Quantification
Medium
⚑ Forum / governing law
IV. Impact on Damages Quantification Exclusion of the €27.15 million renewal-period lost profits claim would have a transformative effect on the overall damages landscape of this arbitration. Kestrel's total claimed damages of €47.3 million break down as follows: If the renewal-period claim is excluded, Kestrel's total claimed damages drop from €47.3 million to approximately €20.15 million — a reduction of approximat
V. Recommendations
Standard
⚑ Commercial term
V. Recommendations A. Pleading Strategy In the Statement of Defense and Counterclaim, which is due to be filed on June 30, 2023, we recommend including a dedicated section — prominently positioned and fully briefed — arguing that the €27.15 million renewal-period lost profits claim should be dismissed or excluded on the following grounds: (1) Lack of reasonable certainty. The renewal-period claim is impermissibly spe
VI. Conclusion
High
⚑ Non-compete / exclusivity restraint
VI. Conclusion Kestrel's €27.15 million renewal-period lost profits claim is both its largest single damages component and its weakest. The claim rests on the untenable premise that WAL was obligated — rather than merely entitled — to renew the MSA for two additional years. Under New York law, the discretionary renewal options in Section 3.2 create no cognizable expectation interest for Kestrel. WAL had the unilatera