Contract analysis

I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS A. Identity and Professional Background

1. My name is Dr. Henrik Sørensen. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and am competent to make this declaration. I am a citizen and resident of the Kingdom of Denmark. My business address is Amaliegade 33, 1256 Copenhagen K, Denmark. I am the Principal and founding partner of Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS ("NMCG"), a maritime engineering consulting firm headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark, which I establish

2. I have been retained by Calderwood & Harkness LLP, counsel for defendants Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL") and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL" and, together with TSL, "Defendants"), to provide expert opinions in connection with the above-captioned action. My engagement letter with Calderwood & Harkness LLP is dated February 1, 2024, and my retention commenced on that date.

3. I submit this declaration in support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Northwind Maritime Corporation's ("Northwind" or "Plaintiff") claims arising from the turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 ("Incident 1") on the ground that the failure was caused by a latent defect and that Defendants exercised due diligence in the maintenance

4. I hold a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Marine Engineering from the Technical University of Denmark (Danmarks Tekniske Universitet), which I was awarded in 1997. My doctoral thesis concerned the fatigue failure mechanisms of rotating components in marine propulsion systems, with a particular focus on turbocharger and turbine blade metallurgy. I also hold a Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree in Mechanical Engineerin

5. My areas of specialization include vessel propulsion systems, marine machinery failure analysis, classification society standards and survey protocols, planned maintenance system design and assessment, and the identification and characterization of latent defects in marine machinery. Over the course of my career, spanning more than twenty-seven (27) years, I have provided consulting services in connection with mor

6. Prior to founding NMCG in 2006, I served for nine (9) years as a machinery surveyor and subsequently as a senior surveyor with Det Norske Veritas (now DNV), one of the world's leading classification societies. During my tenure at DNV, from 1997 to 2006, I conducted annual, intermediate, and special surveys on a range commercial vessels, including dry bulk carriers, crude oil and product tankers, container vessels,

7. My experience encompasses extensive work with Supramax and Handymax dry bulk carriers, including vessels of similar vintage and specifications to the M/V Aegean Fortuna. I have investigated and analyzed turbocharger failures on dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels on more than forty (40) occasions throughout my career, including failures involving the same manufacturer and model line as the turbocharg

8. I have been qualified as an expert witness and provided testimony in maritime disputes in courts and arbitration proceedings in Denmark, the United Kingdom (London Maritime Arbitrators Association proceedings and the English High Court, Admiralty Division), Norway, the United States (including the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the Distri

9. I have authored or co-authored twenty-one (21) peer-reviewed articles in marine engineering journals, including the Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Marine Structures, Ocean Engineering, and the Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA). Among my publications are articles directly relevant to the opinions expressed in this declaration, including: "Subsurface Inclusion-Initiated

10. A true and correct copy of my current curriculum vitae, which sets forth my complete educational background, professional experience, publications, and prior expert testimony, is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein. D. Compensation.

11. I am being compensated for my work in this matter through Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS at my customary hourly consulting rate. My hourly rate for expert consulting and report preparation is €475 per hour, and my hourly rate for deposition and trial testimony is €575 per hour. These rates are consistent with the rates I charge in other engagements of comparable complexity.

12. Through the date of this declaration, the total professional fees billed by NMCG in connection with this engagement are approximately $285,000 (United States Dollars), inclusive of report preparation, document review, travel, and time spent in consultation with counsel. My compensation is in no way contingent upon the outcome of this litigation or the substance of my opinions.

II. SCOPE OF ASSIGNMENT A. Engagement Scope

13. I have been retained by counsel for Defendants to provide expert opinions on the following issues: (a) Whether the turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 (Incident 1) constituted a latent defect within the meaning of the charter-party and applicable maritime law—that is, a defect that was not discoverable by the exercise of due diligence on the part of the vessel owner and its crew;

14. In forming the opinions expressed in this declaration, I have reviewed and considered the following documents and materials, among others: (a) The Charter-Party dated December 3, 2020 (Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203), based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended, between Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. (as Owner), including all riders, addenda, and amendments theret

15. The opinions expressed in this declaration are consistent with, and are supported by, the more detailed analyses set forth in my full expert report served on August 5, 2024, and my rebuttal report served on September 9, 2024, which together contain over one hundred and seventy-five (175) pages of technical analysis, figures, and supporting references. This declaration summarizes my principal opinions for purposes

III. VESSEL BACKGROUND AND MAINTENANCE FRAMEWORK A. Vessel Particulars

16. The M/V Aegean Fortuna (IMO Number 9847231) is a Supramax dry bulk carrier with a deadweight tonnage of 58,200 DWT. The vessel was constructed in 2016 at the Dalian Prosperity Shipyard Co. in Dalian, People's Republic of China. The vessel is flagged under the Republic of Liberia and is classed with the Global Maritime Classification Bureau (GMCB). The registered owner is Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL"),

17. The vessel is powered by a slow-speed, two-stroke marine diesel main engine, coupled with a turbocharger system designed to supply pressurized air to the main engine's combustion cylinders. The turbocharger is a critical component of the vessel's propulsion system; its failure renders the main engine inoperable or operable only at severely reduced capacity, necessitating repair before the vessel can resume normal

18. At the time of the charter-party's commencement on January 15, 2021, the vessel was approximately five (5) years old—a relatively modern vessel by industry standards. The vessel held a clean GMCB class designation with no outstanding conditions of class, no deferred items, and no Port State Control detentions. The vessel's most recent annual survey prior to the charter commencement had been completed in September

19. The charter-party at issue in this proceeding is dated December 3, 2020, Reference Number NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203, and is based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended by the parties. Under the charter-party, the vessel was time-chartered by Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) from Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. (as Owner) for a period of thirty-six (36) months, commencing January 15, 2021 and expiring January 1

20. Clause 6 of the charter-party, consistent with the standard NYPE 2015 form, imposes upon the Owner the obligation to "maintain the vessel in a thoroughly efficient state of hull, machinery, and equipment" throughout the charter period. This clause further requires the Owner to maintain the vessel's classification with GMCB and to comply with all classification society requirements. The Owner's obligation under Cl

21. The foregoing understanding of the Owner's obligations is material to the opinions expressed in this declaration. The question is not whether the turbocharger failed—it plainly did—but whether the failure was caused by a defect that was discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, or whether it was a latent defect that eluded detection despite the Owner's reasonable efforts to maintain the vessel in accordance

22. Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA operates a fleet of approximately thirty-four (34) commercial vessels, including dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels. TSL's technical management department, headquartered in Piraeus, Greece, maintains a comprehensive fleet-wide planned maintenance system (PMS) that is applied uniformly across all vessels under TSL's management. The PMS system used by TSL is a commerc

23. The PMS records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, which I have reviewed in their entirety for the charter period, demonstrate that TSL implemented and maintained a systematic and documented maintenance program for the vessel. The PMS records reflect that maintenance tasks were scheduled in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended service intervals for the main engine and all ancillary machinery, including the tur

24. The regular GMCB surveys for the M/V Aegean Fortuna were completed on schedule throughout the charter period. The vessel underwent its annual survey in August 2021, its intermediate survey in September 2022, and additional condition-of-class-related inspections as directed by GMCB. At no point during the charter period was the vessel's GMCB class suspended, withdrawn, or made subject to conditions of class relati

25. Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos, who served aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna from December 2020 through September 2022, provided deposition testimony on June 28, 2024, in which he confirmed, under oath, that he and his engine room crew adhered to the PMS schedule and the manufacturer's maintenance manual with respect to all main engine and turbocharger maintenance tasks. Chief Engineer Vlahos further testified that dai

IV. INCIDENT 1 — MAIN ENGINE TURBOCHARGER FAILURE (MARCH 12 – APRIL 2, 2022): LATENT DEFECT ANALYSIS A. Factual Summary

26. On March 12, 2022, at approximately 0342 hours (ship time), while the M/V Aegean Fortuna was transiting the Indian Ocean en route from the port of Paradip, India to the port of Mombasa, Kenya, laden with a cargo of approximately 53,800 metric tonnes of iron ore fines, the vessel's main engine turbocharger suffered a catastrophic failure. The failure was sudden and without warning. Chief Engineer Vlahos testified

27. As a result of the turbocharger failure, the main engine could not operate at its normal service output. The vessel's Master, Captain Nikolaos Giannopoulos, made the determination, in consultation with the Chief Engineer and the TSL technical management department, to divert the vessel to the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, which was the nearest port equipped with adequate repair facilities for a turbocharger replace

28. The vessel arrived in Colombo on March 16, 2022. Emergency repairs were conducted by a qualified repair facility in Colombo, which included the removal of the failed turbocharger, disassembly and inspection of the failed components, procurement and installation of a replacement turbocharger, and sea trials. The repair was completed on April 1, 2022, and the vessel departed Colombo and resumed her voyage on April

29. In connection with the repair at Colombo, the failed turbocharger was disassembled, and the failed components were subjected to visual and metallurgical examination by the repair facility's engineering staff. The repair facility prepared a detailed inspection report and a metallurgical analysis report, copies of which were provided to me for review. Additionally, high-resolution photographs of the failed turbocha

30. Based on my review of the available evidence—including the metallurgical analysis report, the photographs of the failed components, the repair facility's inspection report, the engine room logbook entries, and the PMS records—I have determined that the failure mode was as follows: The turbocharger failure was initiated by a fracture of the internal bearing race of the turbocharger's main bearing assembly. The fra

31. The metallurgical analysis report from the Colombo repair facility, prepared by a metallurgist with experience in marine component failure analysis, confirmed the presence of the subsurface non-metallic inclusion at the fracture initiation site. The report characterized the inclusion as consistent with a manufacturing-origin defect—that is, an impurity introduced during the steel-making or forging process used to

32. It is critical to understand the nature and detectability of this type of defect. A subsurface non-metallic inclusion located approximately 2 millimeters below the surface of a turbocharger bearing race is not detectable through any of the standard non-destructive testing ("NDT") methods that are available to, or used by, vessel owners, crews, or classification society surveyors during routine maintenance inspect

33. Moreover, the subsurface inclusion and the fatigue crack propagating from it did not produce any externally observable symptoms prior to the catastrophic failure event. Specifically, the defect did not manifest through abnormal vibration, elevated bearing temperatures, anomalous turbocharger RPM fluctuations, unusual noise, or measurable degradation in turbocharger or main engine performance. The absence of precu

34. I have reviewed the engine room logbook entries for the M/V Aegean Fortuna for the period from January 1, 2022 through March 12, 2022. The entries record turbocharger exhaust gas temperatures, turbocharger RPM, bearing temperatures, and lubricating oil pressures at regular intervals, consistent with standard watchkeeping practice. I found no anomalous or abnormal readings for any turbocharger parameter in the wee

35. I have reviewed the GMCB classification records and survey reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna from the vessel's construction in 2016 through 2024. Relevant excerpts of the GMCB survey reports are attached hereto as Exhibit E.

36. The GMCB conducted all required annual and intermediate surveys on the vessel's main engine and turbocharger during the period in question. The annual survey conducted in August 2021—approximately seven (7) months prior to the turbocharger failure—included an examination of the turbocharger in accordance with GMCB's applicable survey requirements. The GMCB surveyor's report from the August 2021 annual survey refl

37. It is significant that the GMCB survey protocols applicable to turbochargers on dry bulk carriers of this type and age (built 2016, approximately six years old at the time of the failure) do not require invasive disassembly of the turbocharger bearing assembly, metallurgical testing of bearing race components, or specialized subsurface NDT of turbocharger bearings as part of routine annual or intermediate surveys

38. The GMCB class for the M/V Aegean Fortuna was maintained continuously throughout the relevant period. No conditions of class were imposed relating to the turbocharger or main engine prior to the Incident 1 failure. This is a strong indication that the GMCB—an independent third-party classification society—found the vessel's machinery to be maintained in accordance with its rules and requirements. D. Due Diligence

39. The PMS records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, which I have reviewed in their entirety, demonstrate that all manufacturer-recommended maintenance and inspection tasks for the turbocharger were performed on schedule throughout the charter period. Excerpts from the PMS records pertaining to the turbocharger maintenance history are attached hereto as Exhibit D. The manufacturer's maintenance manual specifies a series o

40. Excerpts from the turbocharger manufacturer's maintenance manual are attached hereto as Exhibit F. The manufacturer's recommended inspection and service intervals do not include subsurface metallurgical testing of bearing race components. The manufacturer's manual directs that bearing clearances be measured at specified intervals, that bearing surfaces be visually inspected for signs of wear, pitting, or discolor

41. Chief Engineer Vlahos's deposition testimony (June 28, 2024) corroborates the PMS records. Chief Engineer Vlahos testified that he personally supervised and, in many cases, performed the scheduled turbocharger maintenance tasks, and that he followed the manufacturer's maintenance manual and the PMS schedule in doing so. He testified that the most recent turbocharger maintenance activity prior to the failure was a

42. Based on the foregoing, it is my professional opinion that the type of subsurface metallurgical defect identified as the root cause of the March 12, 2022 turbocharger failure is, by definition, a latent defect. A latent defect is one that could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence using reasonable means of inspection available to the vessel owner and crew. The defect in this case was subsurfa

43. Based on my review of the evidence described above and my professional training, education, and experience, it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that: (1) The turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 was caused by a latent defect—specifically, a subsurface non-metallic inclusion in the turbocharger bearing race material, originating from the manufacturing

44. I have reviewed the expert report of Captain Julian Blackmore (Ret.), of Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., served on behalf of Plaintiff on August 19, 2024 ("Blackmore Report"). Captain Blackmore opines that the turbocharger failure could have been prevented through more frequent inspections of the turbocharger bearing assembly than were in fact performed by TSL, and that continuous vibration monitoring equipment

45. First, as to Captain Blackmore's opinion that more frequent inspections would have prevented the failure: Captain Blackmore suggests that the turbocharger bearing assembly should have been inspected at intervals of every 4,000 running hours, rather than the manufacturer-recommended interval of every 8,000 running hours. Captain Blackmore provides no engineering basis for this proposed inspection frequency. The ma

46. Moreover, even if the turbocharger bearing assembly had been inspected at 4,000-hour intervals—or even more frequently—such inspections would have consisted of the standard procedures: visual examination of the bearing surfaces and measurement of bearing clearances. These procedures would not have detected the subsurface non-metallic inclusion that caused the failure. The defect was located approximately 2 millim

47. Second, as to Captain Blackmore's opinion regarding vibration monitoring: Captain Blackmore suggests that the installation of continuous vibration monitoring equipment on the turbocharger would have detected precursor vibration signatures indicative of the developing fatigue crack. This opinion is not supported by the engineering evidence or the published literature. As discussed above, and as I have demonstrated

48. Furthermore, the installation of continuous vibration monitoring on turbochargers is not a standard requirement for Supramax dry bulk carriers built in 2016. While continuous vibration monitoring is increasingly common on certain types of high-value or critical rotating machinery (such as main turbines on LNG carriers or gas turbines in offshore installations), it is not yet standard practice on the turbochargers

49. Finally, I note that Captain Blackmore's professional background is as a retired Master Mariner—a maritime operations expert rather than a marine engineer specializing in machinery failure analysis and metallurgy. While I do not question Captain Blackmore's competence in matters of vessel navigation, maritime operations, and maritime safety management, the opinions he offers regarding turbocharger failure mechani

V. THALASSA'S OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS A. Assessment of the Maintenance Regime Across the Charter Period

50. While the primary focus of this declaration is the latent defect analysis pertaining to Incident 1, I have also been asked to assess, and have assessed, the overall adequacy of TSL's maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna across the full charter period (January 15, 2021 through January 14, 2024). This assessment is relevant to Defendants' motion insofar as Plaintiff has alleged that the turbocharger failur

51. Based on my comprehensive review of the PMS records, GMCB survey records, engine room logbooks, repair records, Port State Control inspection reports, and correspondence between TSL and GMCB for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period, it is my professional opinion that TSL maintained a systematic and documented maintenance program that was consistent with industry best practices for a fleet operator of

52. The vessel's GMCB class was maintained throughout the charter period without suspension or withdrawal. At no point during the charter period was the vessel's class suspended for failure to comply with classification society survey or maintenance requirements.

53. During the charter period, the M/V Aegean Fortuna was subjected to Port State Control inspections at multiple ports. While individual Port State Control inspections occasionally identified minor deficiencies—as is common for virtually all commercial vessels operating in international trade—no Port State Control inspection during the charter period identified systemic maintenance deficiencies, and the vessel was n

54. While the primary focus of this declaration is Incident 1, I briefly address Incident 2 for completeness and to rebut Plaintiff's contention that Incident 2 reflects a pattern of maintenance neglect by TSL.

55. Incident 2 occurred on or about July 8, 2022, when the vessel's ballast water treatment system ("BWTS") malfunctioned while the vessel was alongside at Richards Bay, South Africa. The BWTS malfunction prevented the vessel from conducting required ballast water exchange operations, resulting in a delay. Additionally, during the same port call, the vessel's auxiliary boiler experienced a failure requiring repair.