| Item No. | PPA Article / Section | Issue Description | Seller's Position (CBR / Saguaro Flats Solar LLC) | Buyer's Position (Meridian DataCore Solutions Inc.) | C&H Recommendation | Financial Impact / Notes | Priority | Status | Date Last Updated | Responsible C&H Attorney |
| 1 | Article 1 — Definitions | Definition of 'Facility' — DC vs. AC capacity specification | Facility defined as 195 MWdc / 150 MWac ground-mounted single-axis tracking solar PV; DC:AC ratio ≈ 1.30 | Buyer requests express reference to minimum DC capacity and minimum inverter capacity | Accept Buyer's request with minor conforming edits; no material commercial impact | Aligns with Exhibit A (Facility Description). Nameplate 195 MWdc / 150 MWac. | Low | Agreed | 2025-08-02 | David Stanton |
| 2 | Article 1 — Definitions | Definition of 'Commercial Operation Date' (COD) — conditions and testing requirements | COD upon satisfaction of conditions: (i) interconnection energized at Ft. Stockton 345 kV Substation per LGIA (ERCOT-GI-2024-0437), (ii) all permits obtained (incl. CUP-2025-012), (iii) completion of performance test, (iv) Independent Engineer (Gresham Engineering Advisors Inc.) certificate | Buyer proposes additional COD condition: minimum 30-day continuous operation period at ≥ 90% availability before COD declaration | Resist 30-day continuous operation requirement — not market standard for solar PPAs; propose 5-day reliability run as compromise | Extended COD testing could delay COD beyond April 1, 2027 and impact construction loan conversion timeline (target loan closing Oct 1, 2025; NTP Oct 15, 2025) | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 3 | Article 1 — Definitions | Definition of 'Expected Energy' — P50 vs. P75 baseline for performance calculations | Expected Energy based on P50 annual generation estimate of 350,000 MWh/yr (Heliograph Energy Consulting LLC estimate, post-losses) | Buyer proposes P75 estimate as baseline for Expected Energy to protect against underperformance | Retain P50 as Expected Energy baseline — P50 is market standard; P75 would create systematic shortfall penalties. Offer to share Heliograph resource assessment report. | P50 = 350,000 MWh/yr. P75 would be materially lower (~310,000-320,000 MWh). Using P75 could inflate availability shortfalls and trigger LDs prematurely. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 4 | Article 1 — Definitions | Definition of 'Settlement Hub' and settlement mechanics | Settlement at ERCOT West Hub per virtual PPA / contract for differences (CfD) structure | Agreed | No action needed — agreed in term sheet | CfD structure: net settlement = Contract Price ($20.00/MWh) minus ERCOT West Hub spot price; difference paid by owing party | Low | Agreed | 2025-07-14 | David Stanton |
| 5 | Article 3 — Term | PPA term and extension options | 20-year term from COD (April 1, 2027 to March 31, 2047); no automatic extension; mutual option to negotiate extension on mutually agreed terms | Buyer requests two 5-year extension options at Buyer's sole election at then-prevailing market price | Reject unilateral Buyer extension options — Seller needs flexibility post-term. Offer mutual right of first negotiation for extension, 12 months before expiration. | Unilateral Buyer extension at market price could undervalue asset; impacts Ridgepoint Capital Partners LP (68% equity in CBR) exit planning and project residual value | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 6 | Article 4 — Contract Price | Initial contract price and escalation mechanism | $20.00/MWh fixed for years 1–5; 1.50% per annum compounding escalator years 6–20 (Year 6: $20.30; Year 10: ~$21.55; Year 15: ~$23.22; Year 20: ~$25.02) | Agreed to price and escalator structure | No action needed — commercial terms agreed per term sheet | Total contracted volume at P50: 7,000,000 MWh over 20 years. Blended average price ~$20.00/MWh. Aggregate nominal value $140,000,000. | Low | Agreed | 2025-07-14 | Brett Callahan |
| 7 | Article 6 — Availability Guarantee | Guaranteed availability threshold — rolling 12-month basis | ≥ 95.0% on a rolling 12-month basis (measured as Available Hours ÷ Period Hours × 100, excluding Force Majeure, curtailment, and scheduled maintenance up to 200 hrs/yr) | ≥ 97.0% on a rolling 12-month basis | Compromise at 96.0% — consistent with market range for utility-scale solar PPAs; manageable under single-axis tracking technology with standard O&M | 97.0% is aggressive for solar and may be difficult to achieve consistently. 95.0% is conservative. 96.0% is supportable per Gresham Engineering Advisors Inc. design review and bankable per Tralvendo National Bank DSCR modeling. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 8 | Article 6 — Availability Guarantee | Availability liquidated damages rate per 1.0% shortfall below guarantee threshold | 0.50% of trailing 12-month revenue per 1.0% shortfall (at P50, Year 1: 350,000 MWh × $20.00/MWh = $7,000,000 revenue; 0.50% = ~$35,000 per 1.0% shortfall) | 1.00% of trailing 12-month revenue per 1.0% shortfall (~$70,000 per 1.0% shortfall at Year 1) | Compromise at 0.75% of trailing 12-month revenue per 1.0% shortfall (~$52,500 per 1.0% shortfall at Year 1) | Doubling the LD rate per Buyer's proposal significantly increases downside exposure. 0.75% is a balanced middle ground and should not impair DSCR covenant (minimum 1.30x; projected ~1.35x at P50). | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 9 | Article 6 — Availability Guarantee | Availability LD cap (annual maximum) | 5.0% of trailing 12-month revenues (~$350,000 at Year 1 pricing) | 10.0% of trailing 12-month revenues (~$700,000 at Year 1 pricing) | Compromise at 7.5% of trailing 12-month revenues (~$525,000 at Year 1 pricing) | 10.0% cap creates significant cash flow risk. 7.5% cap provides Buyer meaningful protection while preserving project economics. Must be coordinated with Tralvendo's DSCR requirements. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 10 | Article 6 — Availability Guarantee | Buyer termination right trigger for chronic availability failure | Buyer may terminate only if availability falls below 85.0% in any two consecutive 12-month periods (uncured); Buyer receives Termination Payment | Buyer may terminate if availability falls below 90.0% in any single 12-month period | Compromise at < 87.5% in any two consecutive 12-month periods — maintains two-period cure opportunity while tightening floor | Single-period trigger at 90.0% is excessively hair-trigger for solar assets subject to weather variability. Two consecutive periods at 87.5% gives Seller reasonable cure opportunity while protecting Buyer against chronic underperformance. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 11 | Article 6 — Availability Guarantee | Scheduled maintenance exclusion allowance | Up to 200 hours/year of scheduled maintenance excluded from availability calculation | Buyer proposes cap of 150 hours/year and requires 60-day advance notice of scheduled maintenance windows | Retain 200 hours/year — standard for solar PV facilities with tracker maintenance; accept 60-day advance notice requirement as reasonable | 200 hrs/yr is industry standard. Reducing to 150 hrs could force Seller to defer critical maintenance or face availability shortfalls. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| 12 | Article 7 — Curtailment | Curtailment risk allocation — economic curtailment vs. reliability curtailment | Seller bears risk of economic curtailment (negative pricing at ERCOT West Hub); Buyer bears risk of reliability/transmission curtailment by ERCOT or West Texas Wires LLC (transmission provider) | Buyer proposes Seller bears all curtailment risk regardless of cause, with curtailed hours excluded from availability calculation but Seller receives no deemed generation credit | Resist Buyer's position — allocate reliability/transmission curtailment risk to Buyer with deemed generation credit. Seller bears economic curtailment risk. This allocation is market standard for Texas solar PPAs. | ERCOT West Hub has experienced congestion and curtailment. Unhedged curtailment risk could materially reduce revenue below projections. Lender (Tralvendo) will likely require curtailment allocation favorable to Seller for bankability. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 13 | Article 7 — Curtailment | Curtailment cap / deemed generation credit methodology | Deemed generation for curtailed periods based on expected generation profile from Heliograph Energy Consulting LLC resource assessment (pro rata P50 hourly profile) | No deemed generation credit; curtailment treated as zero production | Insist on deemed generation credit for Buyer-risk curtailment events; methodology per Heliograph hourly profile is defensible and market-standard | Without deemed generation credit, Seller bears 100% curtailment downside. Impacts projected revenue and DSCR. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 14 | Article 8 — Force Majeure | Scope of force majeure definition — inclusion of grid events and pandemic | Broad FM definition including acts of God, government action, grid emergencies, pandemic, and equipment manufacturer force majeure affecting supply chain | Buyer proposes narrowing FM to exclude pandemic, supply chain disruption, and equipment failures (even if due to manufacturer FM); Buyer also proposes excluding ERCOT grid emergencies from FM | Resist exclusion of grid emergencies (ERCOT-directed curtailment should qualify as FM). Accept exclusion of pandemic and general supply chain disruption (these are pre-COD construction risks, not operational FM). Equipment manufacturer FM should be limited to events beyond Seller's reasonable control. | FM definition directly affects availability calculation (FM hours excluded from denominator). Overly narrow FM exposes Seller to LD liability for events outside its control. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| 15 | Article 8 — Force Majeure | Force majeure termination right — duration threshold | Either party may terminate if FM event continues for 18 consecutive months or 24 cumulative months | Buyer proposes 12 consecutive months or 18 cumulative months | Compromise at 15 consecutive months or 21 cumulative months | Shorter FM termination threshold increases risk that a prolonged but recoverable event (e.g., major grid upgrade by West Texas Wires LLC) triggers premature PPA termination. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| 16 | Article 9 — Change of Control (Seller) | Change of control definition and consent mechanism — Seller side | A 'change of control' of Seller defined as transfer of >50% direct or indirect equity in Saguaro Flats Solar LLC to a non-affiliate. Requires 30-day prior written notice to Buyer. Buyer may terminate only if successor fails Minimum Credit Threshold (tangible net worth ≥ $100M or investment-grade rating from Pinnacle Ratings Group or equivalent). | Any change of control requires Buyer's prior written consent (not to be unreasonably withheld), plus $1,500,000 consent fee per event. Buyer may terminate within 60 days of notice if Buyer does not consent. | Compromise: Notice plus objective creditworthiness test (TNW ≥ $100M or IG rating); no consent fee; Buyer consent required only if successor fails credit threshold. Reject $1,500,000 consent fee as non-market and economically unjustified. | Consent fee of $1,500,000 per event is unusual for solar PPAs. Ridgepoint Capital Partners LP (68% equity in CBR) may seek exit during PPA term — consent requirement could impede asset sales. Lender (Tralvendo) also requires prior written consent to any change of control per credit agreement — coordinate to avoid conflicting consent regimes. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 17 | Article 9 — Change of Control (Buyer) | Reciprocal change of control protections — Buyer side | If Buyer undergoes change of control and successor's credit rating falls below BBB− (Pinnacle Ratings Group or equivalent), Seller may demand additional credit support (LC equal to 12 months' estimated payments, ~$7,000,000) or terminate | Buyer rejects reciprocal change of control provisions; asserts publicly-traded status (Nasdaq: MDCS) provides adequate transparency | Insist on reciprocal protections — Meridian's BBB rating from Pinnacle Ratings Group supports creditworthiness now, but 20-year term creates meaningful successor credit risk. At minimum, require notice and credit support trigger if successor falls below BBB−. | Meridian market cap ~$8.2B (June 2025); 2024 revenue ~$2.1B; EBITDA ~$740M. Current credit is strong but 20-year horizon requires protection. Asymmetric change of control provisions are not market-standard. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 18 | Article 10 — Credit Support (Seller) | Seller letter of credit — amount and step-down | Irrevocable standby LC from Tralvendo National Bank, N.A. in amount of $7,000,000 (= 1 year estimated PPA revenue), reducing to $3,500,000 after 5th anniversary if no Seller default is outstanding | Buyer proposes no reduction in LC amount (maintain $7,000,000 throughout PPA term) and requests LC from bank with minimum credit rating of A− | Accept Buyer's minimum bank rating requirement (Tralvendo should satisfy). Resist removal of step-down — $3,500,000 post-Year 5 is adequate given 5-year performance track record. Alternatively, tie step-down to availability performance (e.g., no shortfall below guarantee in any 12-month period during years 1–5). | LC posting cost to Seller (typically 1.0–1.5% per annum of face amount). Maintaining $7M for 20 years vs. stepping down to $3.5M after Year 5 represents meaningful incremental cost. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| 19 | Article 10 — Credit Support (Buyer) | Buyer corporate guaranty — requirement and cap amount | Meridian DataCore Solutions Inc. to provide corporate guaranty capped at $14,000,000 (= 2 years estimated PPA revenue) guaranteeing Buyer's payment and performance obligations | Buyer rejects guaranty requirement; asserts investment-grade credit rating (BBB, Pinnacle Ratings Group) and public company status make guaranty unnecessary | Insist on Buyer guaranty — 20-year term creates meaningful credit risk. $14,000,000 cap is reasonable (< 0.2% of Meridian market cap; < 0.7% of 2024 revenue). If Buyer resists, propose alternative: guaranty triggered only if Buyer's credit rating falls below BBB−. | Meridian 2024 revenue ~$2.1B; EBITDA ~$740M; market cap ~$8.2B. Guaranty cap of $14M is de minimis relative to Buyer's balance sheet. Without guaranty, Seller's recourse is limited to the operating entity under the PPA. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 20 | Article 11 — Lender Provisions | Consent to collateral assignment and lender step-in rights | PPA includes Lender Consent Agreement (Exhibit F) providing Tralvendo National Bank (Administrative Agent for $108M construction-to-term facility) with: consent to collateral assignment, cure rights (60-day cure period), step-in rights, and right to enter replacement PPA upon Seller event of default | Buyer accepts concept of lender consent but proposes: (i) cure period limited to 30 days, (ii) step-in entity must satisfy Minimum Credit Threshold, (iii) replacement PPA must be on substantially same terms | Accept requirement that step-in entity meet credit threshold. Negotiate cure period to 60 days (lender requirement — Tralvendo and Whitfield Stroval & Cade LLP will insist). Accept replacement PPA on substantially same terms. | Lender consent is a condition to construction loan closing (target Oct 1, 2025). Tralvendo requires 60-day cure period and full step-in rights per credit agreement. Coordinate with Helen Nakamura and Whitfield Stroval & Cade LLP (Philip Thornton). | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Helen Nakamura |
| 21 | Article 11 — Lender Provisions | Lender consent to change of control | Tralvendo credit agreement requires lender's prior written consent to any change of control of Seller or assignment of PPA | Buyer not directly involved; issue is between Seller and lenders | Ensure PPA change of control provisions are consistent with Tralvendo credit agreement requirements. Include carve-out in PPA permitting collateral assignment to lenders without Buyer consent. | Must coordinate lender and Buyer consent regimes to avoid conflicting requirements. Lender consent is non-negotiable per credit agreement. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Helen Nakamura |
| 22 | Article 12 — Representations and Warranties | Scope of Seller's representations — inclusion of tax credit representations | Seller makes standard reps (due organization, authority, no conflicts, permits, compliance with law). No rep regarding ITC eligibility or tax credit qualification. | Buyer requests Seller represent that the project qualifies for the ITC under IRC § 48 at 30% and that the virtual PPA / CfD structure does not jeopardize ITC eligibility | Resist ITC representation to Buyer — ITC is Seller's benefit (estimated ~$42,750,000 at 30% × $142.5M EPC cost). Buyer has no direct interest in Seller's tax credits under the CfD structure. Per Samuel Reeves' memo (July 18, 2025), CfD structure does not jeopardize ITC eligibility, but this is Seller's internal tax analysis, not a Buyer-facing warranty. | ITC qualification is Seller's risk and benefit. Providing a rep could create indemnity exposure if IRS challenges ITC. Samuel Reeves (C&H Tax) has confirmed CfD structure is compatible with ITC but recommends no Buyer-facing warranty. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Samuel Reeves |
| 23 | Article 13 — Insurance | Insurance requirements — minimum coverages and additional insured status | Seller to maintain insurance per Exhibit E (builder's risk/property via Commonwealth Mutual Insurance Co., GL via Ridgeway Casualty Group Inc., brokered by Fieldstone Risk Advisors LLC). Buyer named as additional insured on GL and property policies. | Buyer proposes specific minimum coverage amounts and requires Buyer approval of any change in insurance carrier | Accept minimum coverage amounts (standard for 150 MWac solar facility). Resist Buyer approval right over carrier changes — offer notice requirement (30 days) and minimum carrier rating (A.M. Best A− or equivalent). | Insurance program is also subject to lender requirements under Tralvendo credit agreement. Carrier changes may require lender consent. | Low | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| 24 | Article 14 — Indemnification | Indemnification scope and cap | Mutual indemnification for third-party claims arising from a party's breach, negligence, or willful misconduct. Indemnification cap equal to aggregate PPA contract value ($140,000,000). Excludes consequential, punitive, and speculative damages. | Buyer proposes uncapped indemnification for environmental and personal injury claims; consequential damages waiver to exclude lost profits only (not lost revenue) | Accept uncapped indemnification for personal injury / death (standard). Resist uncapped environmental indemnity — cap at $14,000,000 (2x annual revenue). Maintain broad consequential damages waiver (including lost revenue and lost profits). | Uncapped environmental indemnity could expose Seller to disproportionate liability on a solar project (relatively low environmental risk). Consequential damages waiver is critical for lender bankability. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 25 | Article 15 — Default and Termination | Events of default — cure periods | Seller proposes 30-day cure period for monetary defaults; 60-day cure period for non-monetary defaults (extendable by additional 60 days if Seller is diligently pursuing cure) | Buyer proposes 10 business days for monetary defaults; 30 days for non-monetary defaults with no extension | Compromise: 15 business days for monetary defaults; 45 days for non-monetary defaults, extendable by 30 days if cure is being diligently pursued and Seller provides written notice of cure plan | Cure periods must be coordinated with lender step-in cure rights (Tralvendo requires 60-day lender cure period running after expiration of Seller cure period). Overly short Seller cure periods could force lender step-in. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 26 | Article 15 — Default and Termination | Termination payment methodology | Termination payment by defaulting party = present value of remaining contracted revenue at discount rate of 7.0%, based on P50 generation and applicable contract price schedule | Buyer proposes termination payment = present value at discount rate of 4.0% (higher termination payment) and mark-to-market adjustment based on replacement PPA pricing | Compromise on discount rate of 5.5%. Resist mark-to-market adjustment — creates valuation disputes and is not appropriate for 20-year solar PPA. If mark-to-market is included, use independent appraiser. | Discount rate materially affects termination payment. At Year 10, remaining 10 years of revenue at ~$21.55/MWh × 350,000 MWh = ~$7.5M/yr; PV at 7% ≈ $52.7M vs. PV at 4% ≈ $60.8M. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 27 | Article 16 — Assignment | Permitted assignments and restrictions | Seller may assign PPA to any affiliate without Buyer consent; assignment to non-affiliate requires notice and assignee meeting Minimum Credit Threshold. Collateral assignment to lenders (Tralvendo and syndicate) permitted without Buyer consent. | Buyer proposes all assignments (including affiliate assignments) require Buyer's prior written consent (not to be unreasonably withheld) | Resist consent requirement for affiliate assignments and collateral assignments — these are market standard carve-outs. Accept consent requirement for non-affiliate, non-lender assignments subject to objective credit test. | Affiliate assignment carve-out is essential for internal restructuring (CBR is managed entity; Saguaro Flats Solar LLC is 100% subsidiary). Collateral assignment to lenders is a condition of the $108M credit facility. | High | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 28 | Article 17 — Governing Law and Dispute Resolution | Governing law and arbitration | New York law; binding arbitration under AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules; panel of 3 arbitrators; seat in New York, NY. Injunctive relief in Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, or U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. | Buyer proposes Texas law (project location); agrees to arbitration but prefers single arbitrator for disputes under $5M | Maintain New York governing law — standard for project finance transactions and required by Tralvendo credit agreement for consistency with credit facility. Accept single-arbitrator threshold for disputes under $1M as compromise (not $5M). | New York law is well-developed for CfD / derivatives-style agreements. Texas law acceptable but creates inconsistency with credit facility (governed by NY law). | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | Brett Callahan |
| 29 | Article 5 — Metering and Measurement | Revenue-grade metering specifications and dispute resolution for metering errors | Seller installs and maintains ERCOT-compliant revenue-grade meters at the point of interconnection (Ft. Stockton 345 kV Substation). Meter data used for settlement. Metering errors > 0.5% corrected retroactively for 6 months. | Buyer proposes independent meter verification by Buyer-selected third party annually; retroactive correction for 12 months for errors > 0.25% | Accept annual third-party meter verification (at Buyer's cost). Compromise on retroactive correction: 9 months for errors > 0.5%; 6 months for errors > 1.0%. | Metering accuracy directly affects settlement amounts. Overly broad retroactive correction periods create cash flow uncertainty. | Low | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| 30 | Article 18 — Confidentiality | Confidentiality carve-outs for disclosures to lenders, rating agencies, and investors | Confidentiality with carve-outs for disclosures to: (i) lenders and their counsel (Tralvendo, syndicate, Whitfield Stroval & Cade LLP), (ii) equity investors (Ridgepoint Capital Partners LP), (iii) rating agencies (Pinnacle Ratings Group), (iv) tax advisors, (v) potential acquirers under NDA, (vi) regulatory/governmental bodies | Buyer proposes tighter confidentiality — limits disclosures to lenders and regulators only; no carve-out for potential acquirers or equity investors without Buyer consent | Insist on carve-outs for existing equity investors, rating agencies, and potential acquirers under NDA — these are essential for capital markets and M&A activity. Accept requirement that potential acquirer disclosures require execution of NDA in form reasonably acceptable to Buyer. | Ridgepoint Capital Partners LP (68% equity in CBR) and Pinnacle Ratings Group require access to PPA terms for ongoing credit assessment. Restricting potential-acquirer disclosure could impede future asset sales. | Medium | Open | 2025-08-04 | David Stanton |
| Party / Organization | Role | Key Contact | Title | Email Placeholder | Phone Placeholder |
| Calloway-Briggs Renewables Inc. | Client — Seller (parent) | Rachel Muñoz | General Counsel | [email] | [phone] |
| Calloway-Briggs Renewables Inc. | Client — Commercial | Janet Okafor | SVP, Origination & Commercial | [email] | [phone] |
| Calloway-Briggs Renewables Inc. | Client — Finance | Derek Engstrom | VP, Project Finance & Treasury | [email] | [phone] |
| Saguaro Flats Solar LLC | Seller (Project Co) | Rachel Muñoz (Manager: CBR) | General Counsel, CBR | [email] | [phone] |
| Meridian DataCore Solutions Inc. | Buyer | Nathan Gilroy | SVP, Energy & Sustainability | [email] | [phone] |
| Meridian DataCore Solutions Inc. | Buyer — Legal | Victor Langford | Deputy General Counsel | [email] | [phone] |
| Meridian DataCore Solutions Inc. | Buyer — Procurement | Amara Osei | VP, Procurement & Contracts | [email] | [phone] |
| Calderwood & Harkness LLP | Seller's Counsel — Lead | Patricia Dunmore | Partner, Energy & Infrastructure | [email] | [phone] |
| Calderwood & Harkness LLP | Seller's Counsel — Lead Associate | Brett Callahan | Associate, Energy & Infrastructure | [email] | [phone] |
| Calderwood & Harkness LLP | Seller's Counsel — Working Associate | David Stanton | Associate, Energy & Infrastructure | [email] | [phone] |
| Calderwood & Harkness LLP | Seller's Counsel — Project Finance | Helen Nakamura | Of Counsel, Project Finance | [email] | [phone] |
| Calderwood & Harkness LLP | Seller's Counsel — Tax | Samuel Reeves | Associate, Tax | [email] | [phone] |
| Hargrove & Linden LLP | Buyer's Counsel — Lead | Evelyn Crumveth | Partner, Energy & Commercial Transactions | [email] | [phone] |
| Hargrove & Linden LLP | Buyer's Counsel — Associate | Ryan Matsuda | Associate | [email] | [phone] |
| Tralvendo National Bank, N.A. | Lead Lender / Admin Agent | Diane Roessler | Director, Project Finance | [email] | [phone] |
| Whitfield Stroval & Cade LLP | Lender's Counsel | Philip Thornton | Partner | [email] | [phone] |