PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE / ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
REPORT OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP
CONCERNING POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF U.S. SANCTIONS LAWS AND EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS
BY DUNMORE ENERGY HOLDINGS LTD. AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES
Prepared by:
Victoria Chambers — Responsible Partner Jasmine Thornton — Lead Associate Conrad Reeves — Senior Counsel, Export Controls & Sanctions Liam Donahue — Working Associate
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 555-4100 Facsimile: (202) 555-4101
Date: May 15, 2023
Matter No.: 1016-00009
Submitted to:
U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division Counterintelligence and Export Control Section
Assistant United States Attorney Meredith Calloway Trial Attorney Samuel Kovacs Trial Attorney Diana Pressman
Report Length: 176 Pages (including Appendices)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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SECTION I — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I.A. Purpose and Scope of the Investigation
Calderwood & Harkness LLP ("Calderwood & Harkness" or the "Firm") was retained by Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. ("Dunmore," "DEH," or the "Company") on April 14, 2022, at the direction of the Company's General Counsel, Marcus Wellbourne, Esq., to conduct a comprehensive internal investigation into potential violations of U.S. sanctions laws administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") and U.S. export control regulations administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") (collectively, the "Investigation"). The engagement was authorized by the Board of Directors of Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. on the same date, as reflected in Board Resolution No. 2022-BR-017. This Report sets forth the findings and recommendations resulting from the Investigation.
The Investigation was precipitated by two closely related events. First, on April 11, 2022, Dunmore's then-Chief Compliance Officer, Gerald Fisk, conducted a routine OFAC screening refresh following OFAC's April 6, 2022 addition of Volkhov Industrial Group JSC ("Volkhov" or "VIG") to the Specially Designated Nationals and blocked Persons List (the "SDN List") pursuant to Executive Order 14024 ("E.O. 14024"). During the course of that screening refresh, Fisk identified potential historical exposure arising from Dunmore's trading subsidiary's relationship with Petronova Trading FZE ("Petronova"), a Dubai-based trading entity that appeared to have connections to Volkhov Industrial Group. Fisk notified General Counsel Wellbourne of these findings on the same date. Second, on April 19, 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section (the "NSD") issued grand jury subpoena GJ No. 22-418 from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Grand Jury 22-2, seeking records relating to Dunmore's trading activities involving certain Russian-connected entities. The confluence of these events confirmed the seriousness of the potential exposure and prompted Dunmore to engage outside counsel immediately.
The scope of the Investigation focused principally on the activities of the Dubai-based trading desk operated by Dunmore Trading International Ltd. ("DTI"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. licensed in the Dubai International Financial Centre ("DIFC"), DIFC License No. CL-4827. The relevant period under investigation spans approximately March 2020 through April 2022 (the "Relevant Period"). Within this scope, the Investigation examined three principal categories of activity:
(a) Crude oil swap transactions executed by DTI's trading desk with Petronova Trading FZE and Zenith Petroleum DMCC ("Zenith Petroleum"), and the potential connections between these counterparties and Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, an entity designated under OFAC sanctions programs targeting the Russian Federation's energy sector;
(b) Oilfield equipment exports facilitated by DTI through Caspian Logistik GmbH ("Caspian Logistik"), a Hamburg-based logistics company, to end users in Russia, potentially in violation of the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR") and OFAC prohibitions; and
(c) Payment structuring through intermediary accounts maintained at Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC ("Crescent Bank" or "Crescent Commercial Bank"), a Dubai-based financial institution, which may have been designed to obscure the beneficial ownership of Volkhov-connected entities as the ultimate recipients of Dunmore-originated payments.
The Investigation was conducted in anticipation of, and in parallel with, the government's investigation. Calderwood & Harkness has maintained ongoing communications with the NSD throughout the Investigation, including proffer sessions, rolling document productions, and the provision of witness access. This Report is being submitted to the NSD as a component of Dunmore's cooperation and in furtherance of the Company's efforts to achieve a favorable resolution consistent with the DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy.
The Investigation was led by Victoria Chambers, Partner, with the assistance of Jasmine Thornton, Lead Associate; Conrad Reeves, Senior Counsel specializing in export controls and sanctions law; and Liam Donahue, Working Associate. Additional team members contributing to the Investigation included Amara Osei (London office), Nicholas Ferreira (Houston office), Elena Vasquez (Paralegal Manager), and Thomas Bradshaw (e-discovery Lead). The Investigation further involved the engagement of specialized external advisors, as described in Section I.D and Section IV below.
I.B. Summary of Key Findings
The Investigation yielded the following principal findings, each of which is addressed in greater detail in the substantive sections of this Report:
Crude Oil Swap Transactions. Between June 2020 and February 2022, DTI's Dubai-based trading desk executed fourteen (14) crude oil swap transactions with an aggregate notional value of approximately $218.7 million. The counterparties to these transactions were Petronova Trading FZE and Zenith Petroleum DMCC. Forensic analysis conducted by Ridgeline Advisory Group LLC ("Ridgeline"), as detailed in Section V and Appendix H, determined that at least nine (9) of the fourteen (14) transactions, with an aggregate notional value of approximately $156.3 million, involved crude oil ultimately sourced from or destined for entities controlled by Volkhov Industrial Group JSC. These nine transactions constitute potential violations of Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662 ("E.O. 13662"), which imposed sectoral sanctions on the energy sector of the Russian Federation. Volkhov Industrial Group was designated under Directive 2 effective November 15, 2019, and all nine tainted transactions occurred after that date. The remaining five transactions, with an aggregate notional value of approximately $62.4 million, involved counterparty relationships that did not present the same level of Volkhov connectivity, although certain of these transactions warrant continued scrutiny.
Petronova Trading FZE as Volkhov Front Entity. The Investigation determined, through analysis of corporate records, beneficial ownership structures, financial flows, and documentary communications, that Petronova Trading FZE was effectively controlled by Arkady Volkhov, the Chairman of Volkhov Industrial Group JSC. Petronova was managed by Sergei Volkov, a Russian national resident in the UAE, who maintained close personal and business ties to the Volkhov family. Under OFAC's 50% Rule, Petronova was owned in excess of fifty percent (50%) by Volkhov-connected persons, rendering it blocked under OFAC regulations upon VIG's SDN designation and subject to Directive 2 restrictions during the entire Relevant Period. These findings are detailed in Section VI.A of this Report.
Oilfield Equipment Exports. Between August 2020 and January 2022, DTI facilitated the export of oilfield drilling equipment and components valued at approximately $12.4 million. These items were classified under EAR Export Control Classification Numbers ("ECCNs") 2B350 and 2B999. The shipments were routed from U.S. and European sources through Caspian Logistik GmbH in Hamburg, Germany, to end users in Russia. No export licenses were obtained for these shipments, in potential violation of EAR §746.5 (Russia/Belarus sanctions). Furthermore, end-user certificates for at least four shipments contained materially false statements, listing purported end users in Kazakhstan and Turkey when the actual delivery destinations were in Russia, specifically in the cities of Samara, Tyumen, and Nizhnevartovsk. These findings are detailed in Section VII of this Report.
Payment Structuring. The Investigation identified approximately $34.2 million in payments, encompassing 127 individual transactions conducted between March 2020 and March 2022, that were routed through a series of intermediary accounts at Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC in Dubai. The forensic accounting analysis by Ridgeline revealed a layering pattern in which payments flowed from DTI through Petronova and then through multiple intermediary accounts before ultimately reaching Volkhov-connected entities. Certain transactions appeared to have been structured below thresholds that would trigger enhanced bank reporting. This payment structuring was designed to obscure the beneficial ownership of Volkhov-connected entities as the ultimate recipients of Dunmore-originated payments, consistent with sanctions evasion techniques. These findings are detailed in Section VIII of this Report.
Individual Responsibility. The Investigation identified two individuals as primarily responsible for the conduct at issue: Derek Hargrave, President of DTI, and Natasha Sorokin, Senior Trader at DTI. The evidence supports the conclusion that Hargrave had knowledge of, or was willfully blind to, the Volkhov connections of Petronova, approved and directed the suspect transactions, and dismissed internal concerns raised by subordinates. The evidence further supports the conclusion that Sorokin had actual knowledge of the Volkhov connections, served as the direct conduit to Sergei Volkov, and maintained personal communications reflecting awareness of sanctions risks. In addition, the Investigation identified supervisory and compliance failures attributable to Gerald Fisk, the former Chief Compliance Officer, whose failure to implement adequate compliance controls and to escalate identified red flags contributed materially to the Company's exposure.
Compliance Program Deficiencies. Dunmore's pre-existing sanctions and export controls compliance program contained material deficiencies across multiple dimensions, including OFAC screening frequency and methodology, escalation procedures, training, third-party due diligence, export control classification, tone at the top, and recordkeeping. These deficiencies are discussed in detail in Section X of this Report.
I.C. Summary of Cooperation and Remediation
From the outset of the Investigation, Dunmore has pursued a strategy of full cooperation with the Department of Justice and other relevant government agencies. The Company has also undertaken significant remedial measures to address the identified deficiencies and to prevent the recurrence of similar conduct. The principal elements of Dunmore's cooperation and remediation are summarized below:
Cooperation with DOJ. Dunmore has provided full cooperation to the NSD throughout the Investigation. This cooperation has included multiple proffer meetings, beginning with an initial proffer to AUSA Meredith Calloway on July 15, 2022, and a supplemental proffer on November 20, 2022, at which forensic findings were presented. The Company has submitted comprehensive written materials to the NSD, including a white paper on the application of the DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy (submitted March 1, 2023) and this 176-page investigation report (submitted May 15, 2023). All witnesses requested by the NSD have been made available, and Dunmore has not engaged in any conduct intended to obstruct or impede the government's investigation.
Document Collection and Production. Calderwood & Harkness, with the assistance of Nexagen Analytics Inc. ("Nexagen"), collected 2,347,812 documents across six jurisdictions (the Cayman Islands, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Germany, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom). Following technology-assisted review, 438,916 documents were identified as responsive to the grand jury subpoena and the Investigation. These documents were produced to the NSD in two rolling productions: the first production of 287,412 documents on November 1, 2022 (Bates DEH-DOJ-000001 through DEH-DOJ-287412), and the second production of 151,504 documents on January 30, 2023 (Bates DEH-DOJ-287413 through DEH-DOJ-438916). An additional 12,847 documents were withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protection, and detailed privilege logs were maintained and provided to the NSD.
Witness Interviews. A total of forty-seven (47) witnesses were interviewed across three rounds of interviews conducted between May 2022 and March 2023. All interviews were conducted pursuant to the Upjohn corporate Miranda protocol, advising each witness that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the Company, that the Company could choose to waive or maintain the privilege, and that individuals should consider retaining personal counsel if their interests might diverge from those of the Company. Omar Al-Rashidi was identified as a cooperating witness and was made available for a follow-up interview with AUSA Calloway and Trial Attorney Kovacs on July 12, 2023 at Calderwood & Harkness's Washington, D.C. office.
Personnel Actions. Dunmore took prompt and decisive personnel actions upon identification of the individuals primarily responsible for the conduct at issue. Natasha Sorokin was placed on administrative leave on May 16, 2022, and her employment was terminated effective September 15, 2022. Derek Hargrave was placed on administrative leave on July 1, 2022, and his employment was terminated effective October 1, 2022. Gerald Fisk departed the Company on June 10, 2022, under internal pressure following the identification of his compliance failures. Priya Nayar was appointed as the new Chief Compliance Officer effective August 1, 2022, with a direct reporting line to the Board of Directors.
Enhanced Compliance Program. Dunmore retained Pemberton Investors Solutions LLC ("Marlowe Asset Management") on December 15, 2022, to design and assist in implementing a comprehensive Enhanced Sanctions & Export Controls Compliance Program (the "Enhanced Program"). Marlowe Asset Management delivered its remediation report and compliance program framework on September 15, 2023, and the Dunmore Board of Directors formally adopted the Enhanced Program on October 1, 2023. The Enhanced Program addresses each of the deficiencies identified in the Investigation and is designed to meet or exceed all elements of the DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (March 2023 update). Key elements of the Enhanced Program are described in Section XIV.
Voluntary Disgorgement. Dunmore voluntarily disgorged $8.75 million, representing the estimated net profits from the nine tainted crude oil swap transactions, by payment to the U.S. Treasury on November 30, 2023. The disgorgement calculation was based on the forensic analysis conducted by Ridgeline Advisory Group and is detailed in Section XII.
OFAC Voluntary Self-Disclosure. Dunmore filed a voluntary self-disclosure ("VSD") with OFAC on June 1, 2023, disclosing the apparent violations identified in the Investigation. Supplemental information was provided to OFAC Compliance Analyst Erin Matsuda on August 30, 2023. On April 15, 2024, OFAC issued a Cautionary Letter (Ref. OCA-2024-11587), citing the mitigating factors present in the case, including Dunmore's cooperation, remediation, and voluntary disgorgement.
I.D. Methodology
The Investigation employed a multi-faceted approach encompassing document review, forensic accounting analysis, witness interviews, legal analysis, and compliance program assessment. The methodology was designed to be thorough, systematic, and defensible, and to produce a complete factual record upon which the legal conclusions and recommendations in this Report are based.
Calderwood & Harkness engaged the following external advisors to assist with specialized aspects of the Investigation:
(a) Nexagen Analytics Inc. (Project No. NX-DEH-2204; Project Manager Brian Cavanaugh) — engaged for electronic discovery services, including the collection, processing, hosting, and technology-assisted review ("TAR") of electronically stored information ("ESI"). Nexagen's platform was used to process and review the 2,347,812 documents collected across six jurisdictions, resulting in the identification of 438,916 responsive documents.
(b) Ridgeline Advisory Group LLC (Engagement No. RAG-2022-0319; Engagement Lead Dr. Margaret Liu, CPA, CFE) — engaged for forensic accounting services, including the tracing of transaction flows, identification and analysis of crude oil swap transactions, payment flow analysis through Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC intermediary accounts, and net profit margin calculation for purposes of voluntary disgorgement. Ridgeline delivered its final forensic accounting report on April 1, 2023.
(c) Pemberton Investors Solutions LLC (Lead Consultant Dr. Anton Bremer) — engaged on December 15, 2022, for compliance program assessment and remediation design, including benchmarking Dunmore's pre-existing compliance program against DOJ and OFAC guidance, identifying specific deficiencies, and designing the Enhanced Sanctions & Export Controls Compliance Program adopted by the Board on October 1, 2023. Marlowe Asset Management delivered its remediation report on September 15, 2023.
In addition to the core team of Victoria Chambers, Jasmine Thornton, Conrad Reeves, and Liam Donahue, the following Calderwood & Harkness team members contributed to the Investigation: Amara Osei (London office), who conducted witness interviews in Dubai and London and contributed to the analysis of Petronova's beneficial ownership structure; Nicholas Ferreira (Houston office), who conducted witness interviews of Houston-based personnel and contributed to the forensic accounting oversight; Elena Vasquez (Paralegal Manager), who managed the privilege review process, compiled the Witness Interview Index, and coordinated document productions; and Thomas Bradshaw (e-discovery Lead), who oversaw the Nexagen engagement, managed data collection across six jurisdictions, and supervised the TAR review protocol.
The Investigation was conducted under the direction of the Company's General Counsel, Marcus Wellbourne, and subject to the oversight of the Board of Directors. All work product generated in connection with the Investigation was created in anticipation of litigation and for the purpose of providing legal advice, and is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The Company's decision to submit this Report to the NSD and to share certain materials with OFAC constitutes a selective waiver that does not extend to third parties.
SECTION II — BACKGROUND
II.A. Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. — Corporate Overview
Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. ("Dunmore," "DEH," or the "Company") is an exempted company incorporated with limited liability in the Cayman Islands, Registration No. MC-334821. The Company's registered office is located at Harbour Place, 4th Floor, 103 South Church Street, George Town, Grand Cayman KY1-1002, Cayman Islands. The Company's operational headquarters, from which its senior management team directs global operations, is located at 1200 McKinney Street, Suite 3400, Houston, Texas 77010, United States.
Dunmore operates in the global oil and gas industry, with principal activities spanning upstream exploration and production, commodity trading, and renewable energy development. The Company holds exploration and production interests in multiple jurisdictions, operates a global commodity trading platform primarily through its Dubai-based subsidiary, and has an emerging renewables business centered in Europe. For fiscal year 2021, Dunmore reported consolidated revenue of approximately $4.87 billion, as reflected in the Company's audited financial statements prepared by Ashford & Whitmore LLP, with engagement partner Kenneth Ashford serving as the lead audit partner. As of the date of this Report, the Company employs approximately 3,200 individuals across its global operations.
Dunmore is a privately held company and does not have publicly traded securities. The Company's capital structure and ownership are described in Section II.C below. The Company is governed by a Board of Directors consisting of representatives of the Company's equity holders and independent directors, with operational management delegated to the senior executive team led by Chief Executive Officer Callum Renshaw.
II.B. Corporate Structure and Key Subsidiaries
Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. serves as the ultimate parent company of a group of operating subsidiaries organized across multiple jurisdictions. The following subsidiaries are relevant to the Investigation:
Dunmore Trading International Ltd. ("DTI"). DTI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DEH, licensed and operating in the Dubai International Financial Centre ("DIFC"), DIFC License No. CL-4827. DTI's principal office is located at Level 14, Gate Building 3, DIFC, P.O. Box 506774, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. DTI operates Dunmore's global commodity trading platform and maintains the Dubai-based trading desk that is the primary subject of this Investigation. During the Relevant Period, DTI employed approximately 45 individuals, including traders, logistics and shipping personnel, finance and accounting staff, and compliance and administrative personnel. DTI's trading operations generated a substantial portion of Dunmore's consolidated revenues, with DTI contributing approximately $1.2 billion in trading revenues during fiscal year 2021. The trading desk operated under the supervision of Derek Hargrave (President, DTI) with day-to-day trading conducted principally by a team of approximately eight traders, of whom Natasha Sorokin was the most senior.
Dunmore upstream Americas LLC ("DUA"). DUA is a Delaware limited liability company, EIN 84-2937561, with its registered agent located at 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, and its principal office co-located with Dunmore's operational headquarters at 1200 McKinney Street, Suite 3400, Houston, Texas 77010. DUA conducts Dunmore's upstream exploration and production activities in the Americas, including operations in the Permian Basin, the Gulf of Mexico, and certain Latin American concessions. DUA is not directly implicated in the conduct under investigation but houses certain corporate support functions, including the Houston-based compliance team, that had oversight responsibilities relevant to this Investigation.
Dunmore Renewables GmbH. Dunmore Renewables GmbH is a German limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) with its registered office at Überseeallee 12, 20457 Hamburg, Germany. Dunmore Renewables is responsible for the Company's European renewable energy development activities, including offshore wind and solar projects. Tobias Engel serves as Managing Director. As described in Section VII.D, Dunmore Renewables GmbH was tangentially involved in one equipment procurement transaction facilitated by Caspian Logistik GmbH.
Dunmore Exploration West Africa Ltd. ("DEWA"). DEWA is a Nigerian-registered entity with its principal office at 14B Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria Island, Lagos, Nigeria. DEWA conducts Dunmore's upstream exploration and production activities in West Africa, including interests in several offshore blocks in the Niger Delta region. DEWA has no direct involvement in the transactions under investigation, and interviews of DEWA personnel during the Investigation yielded information of limited relevance.
A corporate structure chart depicting Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. and its subsidiaries, including ownership percentages and key personnel, is attached as Appendix E.
II.C. Ownership Structure
Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. is privately held by three categories of equity holders:
Greystone Capital Partners Fund IV, L.P. Greystone Capital Partners Fund IV, L.P. ("Greystone Fund IV") is a Delaware limited partnership that serves as the majority shareholder of Dunmore, holding 62.5% of the Company's equity interests. The general partner of Greystone Fund IV is Greystone Capital Management LLC, a Delaware limited liability company managed by Richard Fairbanks as Managing Partner. Greystone Fund IV is a 2016-vintage buyout fund with a total fund size of $8.3 billion. Greystone Capital Management LLC maintains its principal offices in New York, New York. Greystone has designated representatives to the Dunmore Board of Directors and has been actively involved in the Company's response to the Investigation. Greystone retained Harwood & Pennington LLP (Arthur Pennington III, Partner) as its own counsel in connection with the Investigation.
Management Equity. Dunmore's senior management team collectively holds 22.5% of the Company's equity interests through a management equity incentive program. The largest individual holders within the management equity pool are CEO Callum Renshaw, CFO Sandra Whitfield, and General Counsel Marcus Wellbourne. The management equity pool is subject to vesting schedules and other customary terms and conditions set forth in the Company's equity incentive plan documents.
Thornbury Infrastructure Fund II, L.P. Thornbury Infrastructure Fund II, L.P. ("Thornbury Fund II") is a Cayman Islands limited partnership that holds a 15% minority equity interest in Dunmore. The general partner of Thornbury Fund II is Thornbury Asset Management Ltd., a London-based asset management firm managed by Helen Cresswell as Managing Director. Thornbury Fund II's investment in Dunmore was made in 2019 as a co-investment alongside Greystone Fund IV.
The aggregate equity ownership of the Company is thus: Greystone Fund IV (62.5%) + Management Equity (22.5%) + Thornbury Fund II (15.0%) = 100%.
II.D. Key Dunmore Personnel
The following individuals are relevant to the Investigation and are referenced throughout this Report:
Callum Renshaw — Chief Executive Officer. Renshaw has served as CEO of Dunmore since 2018, having previously served as the Company's Chief Operating Officer from 2015 to 2018. He is based at Dunmore's operational headquarters in Houston, Texas. In his capacity as CEO, Renshaw has overall responsibility for the management of the Company's global operations, subject to the oversight of the Board of Directors. Renshaw's knowledge of and involvement in the transactions at issue are discussed in Section IX.A.
Derek Hargrave — President, Dunmore Trading International Ltd. Hargrave served as President of DTI from 2017 until his separation from the Company on October 1, 2022. He was based in Dubai and managed the DTI trading desk with significant operational autonomy. Hargrave reported to CEO Renshaw but exercised broad authority over DTI's day-to-day trading operations, counterparty relationships, and commercial strategy. Hargrave was placed on administrative leave effective July 1, 2022, following the identification of evidence linking him to the suspect transactions. His employment was terminated effective October 1, 2022. Hargrave retained James Overstreet of Overstreet & McClain PLLC (Dallas, Texas) as personal counsel, who entered an appearance on July 5, 2022. Hargrave's role in the conduct at issue and his credibility assessment are discussed in detail in Sections V, VII, VIII, IX.B, and XI.C.
Natasha Sorokin — Senior Trader, Dunmore Trading International Ltd. Sorokin served as a Senior Trader at DTI throughout the Relevant Period. She is a dual citizen of the United States and the Russian Federation, having been born in Moscow and naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 2012. Sorokin was the primary point of contact between DTI and Petronova Trading FZE and maintained a personal relationship with Sergei Volkov, Petronova's Managing Director, that predated her employment at DTI. Sorokin was placed on administrative leave effective May 16, 2022, upon the initial identification of her central role in the suspect transactions. Her employment was terminated effective September 15, 2022. Sorokin retained Philip Keane of Wexford Keane LLP (Washington, D.C.) as personal counsel, who entered an appearance on September 20, 2022. Sorokin's role in the conduct at issue and her credibility assessment are discussed in detail in Sections V, VI, VIII, IX.C, and XI.C.
Omar Al-Rashidi — Head of Middle East Operations, Dunmore Trading International Ltd. Al-Rashidi served as Head of Middle East Operations at DTI throughout the Relevant Period, overseeing DTI's regional business development and client relationships. He is based in Dubai. During the Investigation, Al-Rashidi provided detailed and candid testimony regarding the operations of the DTI trading desk, Hargrave's management style, and Sorokin's relationship with Sergei Volkov. Al-Rashidi was identified as a cooperating witness and was made available for a follow-up interview with the NSD on July 12, 2023. His testimony is discussed in Section IX.F.
Yves Leclerc — Director of Logistics & Shipping, Dunmore Trading International Ltd. Leclerc is a French national based in Dubai who served as DTI's Director of Logistics and Shipping throughout the Relevant Period. In that capacity, Leclerc managed the logistics arrangements for oilfield equipment shipments, including those facilitated by Caspian Logistik GmbH. His role in the equipment exports at issue and his credibility assessment are discussed in Sections VII and IX.E.
Gerald Fisk — Former Chief Compliance Officer. Fisk served as Dunmore's Chief Compliance Officer from 2016 until his departure from the Company on June 10, 2022. He was based at Dunmore's operational headquarters in Houston, Texas, and reported to General Counsel Marcus Wellbourne. Fisk was responsible for the design, implementation, and oversight of Dunmore's global sanctions and export controls compliance program during the Relevant Period. As discussed in detail in this Report, the Investigation identified significant deficiencies in the compliance program under Fisk's tenure, including failures in screening, escalation, training, and third-party due diligence. Fisk departed the Company under internal pressure shortly after the Investigation commenced. He retained Catherine Blackthorn of Blackthorn & Associates LLP (Houston, Texas) as personal counsel, who was present during his interview on June 8, 2022. Fisk's role and credibility assessment are discussed in Sections IX.D, X, and XI.C.
Priya Nayar — Chief Compliance Officer (appointed August 1, 2022). Nayar was appointed as Dunmore's CCO effective August 1, 2022, replacing Gerald Fisk. Prior to joining Dunmore, Nayar served as Deputy Chief Compliance Officer at a major international energy company, where she oversaw sanctions compliance for global trading operations. Nayar reports directly to the Board of Directors and the CEO, and has been granted full budget authority and hiring autonomy for the compliance function. She has played a central role in the development and implementation of the Enhanced Compliance Program described in Section XIV.
Marcus Wellbourne — General Counsel. Wellbourne has served as Dunmore's General Counsel since 2017, based at the Company's operational headquarters in Houston. Wellbourne is responsible for the Company's legal affairs globally and was the individual who directed the retention of Calderwood & Harkness to conduct the Investigation upon being notified by Fisk of the potential OFAC exposure on April 11, 2022. Wellbourne has served as the Company's primary point of contact with Calderwood & Harkness throughout the Investigation and has facilitated full cooperation with the NSD.
Sandra Whitfield — Chief Financial Officer. Whitfield has served as Dunmore's CFO since 2016, based in Houston. She oversees the Company's consolidated financial reporting, treasury, and finance functions. Whitfield's knowledge of the DTI trading desk's operations was limited to the aggregate financial results reported through the consolidated financial statements, and she did not have visibility into individual transaction-level activity at DTI. Her testimony is discussed in Section IX.H.
Rajesh Malhotra — Controller, Dunmore Trading International Ltd. Malhotra served as DTI's Controller throughout the Relevant Period, based in Dubai. In that capacity, he was responsible for processing payments, maintaining financial records, and overseeing DTI's accounting function. His role in the suspect payment flows and his credibility assessment are discussed in Sections VIII.C and IX.G.
Tobias Engel — Managing Director, Dunmore Renewables GmbH. Engel serves as Managing Director of Dunmore Renewables GmbH in Hamburg, Germany. He was tangentially involved in one equipment procurement transaction facilitated by Caspian Logistik GmbH, as discussed in Section VII.D. The Investigation concluded that Engel did not have knowledge of the ultimate Russian end use of the equipment and is not culpable.
II.E. Banking Relationships
The following banking relationships are relevant to the Investigation:
Meridian National Bank, N.A. (New York). Meridian National Bank serves as Dunmore's primary lender, providing a $750 million senior secured revolving credit facility to the Company. The banking relationship is managed by Gregory Stanhope, Managing Director, within Meridian's Energy Finance Group. The credit facility agreement contains customary representations, warranties, and covenants, including covenants requiring compliance with applicable laws. The potential implications of the Investigation for covenant compliance and required notifications are addressed in Section XV.D.
Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC (Dubai). Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC is a UAE-based commercial bank that served as DTI's primary trade finance bank in Dubai throughout the Relevant Period. The banking relationship was managed by Khalid Mansour, who served as the designated relationship manager for the DTI account. As discussed in detail in Section VIII, the Investigation identified approximately $34.2 million in payments routed through intermediary accounts maintained at Crescent Commercial Bank, which were structured to obscure the beneficial ownership of Volkhov-connected entities. The extent of Crescent Bank's knowledge of or complicity in the payment structuring scheme is beyond the scope of this Investigation but has been reported to the NSD.
Commonwealth Trust Company (Wilmington, Delaware). Commonwealth Trust Company served as the escrow agent for employee separation payments in connection with the terminations of Hargrave and Sorokin. These escrow arrangements were established on the advice of counsel to ensure compliance with applicable employment laws while preserving Dunmore's rights with respect to potential clawback of separation benefits in the event of adjudicated misconduct.
II.F. D&O Insurance
Dunmore maintains a directors and officers ("D&O") liability insurance policy issued by Garrison Mutual Insurance Co., a Bermuda-domiciled insurer. The policy details are as follows:
• Carrier: Garrison Mutual Insurance Co. (Hamilton, Bermuda)
• Claims Adjuster: Patricia Holbrook
• Policy No.: GM-DO-2021-08734
• Coverage Limits: $50 million aggregate / $10 million per claim
• Retention: $2.5 million
• Coverage Scope: Defense costs only; the policy does not cover disgorgement, penalties, or fines
Dunmore tendered notice of the Investigation to Garrison Mutual on April 25, 2022. Following negotiations regarding coverage, Garrison Mutual agreed to advance defense costs subject to the $2.5 million retention. As of the date of this Report, Dunmore has recovered $7.2 million under the policy for defense costs incurred in connection with the Investigation, after application of the $2.5 million retention. The Company continues to pursue additional recovery for ongoing defense costs. The D&O policy does not provide coverage for the $8.75 million voluntary disgorgement payment, which was funded directly by the Company.
II.G. The Counterparties
The following third-party entities are central to the transactions under investigation. Each entity is described in detail below, with additional analysis of their roles and connections set forth in the substantive findings sections of this Report.
II.G.1. Petronova Trading FZE
Petronova Trading FZE ("Petronova") is a Free Zone Establishment registered with the Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority ("JAFZA") in the Emirate of Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The entity's Managing Director and sole authorized signatory is Sergei Volkov, a Russian national who has been a resident of the UAE since approximately 2015. Petronova's registered address is Office 1407, Al Shafar Tower, Dubai Internet City, Dubai, UAE.
Petronova was established in 2018 and holds itself out as a commodities trading company specializing in crude oil, refined products, and petrochemical feedstocks. During the Relevant Period, Petronova served as DTI's primary counterparty for crude oil swap transactions in the Russian-origin crude oil market. As established through the Investigation's beneficial ownership analysis (Section VI.A), Petronova functioned as an intermediary and front entity for Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, facilitating transactions that would otherwise have been directly subject to OFAC sanctions restrictions.
The trading relationship between DTI and Petronova was established through Natasha Sorokin's pre-existing personal relationship with Sergei Volkov. Documentary evidence reviewed during the Investigation, including email communications, encrypted messaging records, and financial transaction records, establishes that Petronova's operations were directed by and for the benefit of Arkady Volkhov, the Chairman of Volkhov Industrial Group JSC.
II.G.2. Volkhov Industrial Group JSC
Volkhov Industrial Group JSC ("Volkhov," "VIG") is a Russian industrial conglomerate organized as a Joint Stock Company (Акционерное Общество) under the laws of the Russian Federation, with its headquarters located at 12 Kutuzovsky Prospekt, Moscow 121248, Russia. VIG is chaired by Arkady Volkhov, a prominent Russian industrialist with extensive interests in the energy, metals, and mining sectors.
VIG has been the subject of escalating OFAC designations during the Relevant Period. On November 15, 2019, VIG was designated under Directive 2 of Executive Order 13662, which imposed sectoral sanctions on entities operating in the energy sector of the Russian Federation. Under Directive 2, U.S. persons were prohibited from engaging in certain transactions involving new debt with a maturity of greater than 60 days and new equity issued by or on behalf of VIG and its designated subsidiaries. On April 6, 2022, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, OFAC designated VIG on the SDN List under Executive Order 14024, imposing a comprehensive property-blocking regime that prohibits virtually all transactions by U.S. persons involving VIG or its property or interests in property. The SDN designation also triggered the OFAC 50% Rule, which extended the blocking prohibitions to any entity owned fifty percent or more, directly or indirectly, by VIG.
Prior to its OFAC designations, VIG was a well-known Russian industrial conglomerate that had been the subject of extensive media reporting regarding its connections to the Russian government and its role in Russia's energy sector. Publicly available databases and media sources should have identified VIG as a high-risk counterparty for any company engaged in transactions with a nexus to the Russian energy sector.
II.G.3. Caspian Logistik GmbH
Caspian Logistik GmbH ("Caspian Logistik") is a German limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) with its registered address at Mönckebergstraße 22, 20095 Hamburg, Germany. The company's Managing Director is Klaus Weidemann, a German national. Caspian Logistik holds itself out as a freight forwarding and logistics company specializing in the transport of industrial equipment and materials to destinations in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the broader Commonwealth of Independent States ("CIS") region.
During the Relevant Period, DTI engaged Caspian Logistik to facilitate the shipment of oilfield drilling equipment and components from U.S. and European sources to purported end users in Kazakhstan and Turkey. As detailed in Section VII, the Investigation determined that at least four of these shipments were actually delivered to end users in Russia, specifically in the cities of Samara, Tyumen, and Nizhnevartovsk. End-user certificates prepared in connection with these shipments contained materially false statements regarding the final destination of the goods. Klaus Weidemann coordinated directly with Yves Leclerc, DTI's Director of Logistics and Shipping, and evidence reviewed during the Investigation indicates that Weidemann received instructions from Hargrave and Sorokin regarding routing. Corporate records obtained during the Investigation do not establish a formal ownership link between Caspian Logistik and Volkhov Industrial Group, but shipment records document deliveries to addresses associated with VIG subsidiary operations in Russia. Caspian Logistik is understood to be under separate investigation by German authorities for potential dual-use export control violations under European Union regulations.
II.G.4. Zenith Petroleum DMCC
Zenith Petroleum DMCC ("Zenith Petroleum") is a company registered with the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre ("DMCC") in Dubai, UAE. The company's Managing Director is Farhan Qureshi, a Pakistani national who has been a resident of the UAE since approximately 2010. Zenith Petroleum's registered address is Unit 2201, Jumeirah Bay Tower X2, Cluster X, Jumeirah Lakes Towers, Dubai, UAE.
Zenith Petroleum served as the counterparty to two of the fourteen flagged crude oil swap transactions identified in the Investigation. The Investigation found less direct evidence of a Volkhov connection for Zenith Petroleum than for Petronova Trading FZE. No ownership link between Zenith Petroleum and VIG was established through the corporate records reviewed. However, the forensic evidence indicates that Zenith Petroleum facilitated at least one transaction in which Volkhov-origin crude oil was involved, acting as a co-intermediary alongside Petronova in a layered transaction structure. The assessment of Zenith Petroleum is discussed further in Sections V.D and VI.D.
SECTION III — APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
III.A. U.S. Sanctions Laws — IEEPA and OFAC-Administered Programs
The U.S. sanctions programs relevant to this Investigation are administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), a component of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. OFAC derives its principal enforcement authority from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706, which authorizes the President to regulate or prohibit transactions involving property in which a foreign country or national thereof has an interest, where the President has declared a national emergency with respect to a particular threat.
Executive Order 13662 and Directive 2 (Sectoral Sanctions on the Energy Sector of the Russian Federation). On March 20, 2014, President Obama issued Executive Order 13662, which authorized the imposition of sectoral sanctions on certain sectors of the Russian economy. OFAC subsequently issued a series of Directives under E.O. 13662, each targeting specific categories of transactions with designated entities in the Russian financial services, energy, and defense sectors. Directive 2, as amended, targets the energy sector and prohibits U.S. persons from transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt with a maturity of greater than 60 days, or new equity, of persons determined to be subject to the Directive, their property, or their interests in property. Entities identified under Directive 2 are placed on OFAC's Sectoral Sanctions Identifications ("SSI") List.
Volkhov Industrial Group JSC was designated under Directive 2 effective November 15, 2019, and was identified on the SSI List. From that date forward, U.S. persons were prohibited from engaging in the transactions described above involving VIG. The scope of Directive 2 prohibitions is narrower than a full SDN blocking designation, as it targets specific categories of financial transactions rather than imposing a comprehensive asset freeze. However, the prohibitions are significant and require careful analysis of whether particular transactions fall within the scope of the Directive's restrictions.
Executive Order 14024 (Full SDN blocking Designation). On April 15, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14024, which declared a national emergency with respect to the Russian Federation's harmful foreign activities and authorized comprehensive blocking sanctions against designated Russian persons and entities. On April 6, 2022, OFAC designated Volkhov Industrial Group JSC on the SDN List pursuant to E.O. 14024. Under the SDN designation, all property and interests in property of VIG that are in the United States, that come within the United States, or that are in the possession or control of any U.S. person are blocked, and U.S. persons are broadly prohibited from engaging in any transactions involving VIG or its property or interests in property.
Implementing Regulations. The Russia-related sanctions programs are implemented through regulations codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 589, which set forth the prohibitions, licensing policy, interpretive guidance, and reporting obligations applicable to U.S. persons.
OFAC 50% Rule. OFAC's 50% Rule, set forth in 31 C.F.R. § 589.406 and OFAC's Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in Property Are blocked (August 13, 2014), provides that any entity owned fifty percent (50%) or more, directly or indirectly, by one or more blocked persons is itself considered a blocked person, and all property and interests in property of such entity are blocked, regardless of whether the entity has been separately designated on the SDN List. This rule is of central importance to the analysis of Petronova Trading FZE's status, as the Investigation determined that Petronova was owned in excess of 50% by Volkhov-connected persons, rendering it subject to the same sanctions restrictions as VIG itself. The 50% Rule also applies in the context of sectoral sanctions, such that entities meeting the ownership threshold are treated as identified persons under the relevant Directive.
Penalties. Violations of IEEPA-based sanctions programs carry both criminal and civil penalties. Criminal penalties under IEEPA, as amended by the International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act, include fines of up to $1 million per violation and imprisonment for up to 20 years per violation for willful violations. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c). Civil penalties are assessed in accordance with OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A, which establish a framework for the calculation of base penalty amounts based on factors including the nature of the violation, the amount of the transaction, the egregiousness of the conduct, and the presence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The maximum civil penalty for a sanctions violation is the greater of approximately $356,579 per violation (as adjusted for inflation) or twice the value of the transaction giving rise to the violation.
III.B. Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
The Export Administration Regulations ("EAR"), codified at 15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774, are administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") within the U.S. Department of Commerce. The EAR regulate the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, including items of U.S. origin, items containing more than a de minimis level of U.S.-origin content, and items that are the direct product of certain U.S.-origin technology or software.
Russia/Belarus Sanctions under EAR §746.5. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, BIS implemented comprehensive export controls targeting Russia and Belarus, codified principally at EAR §746.5. These controls impose license requirements on the export, reexport, and transfer of a broad range of items to Russia and Belarus, with a general policy of denial for license applications. The controls cover items classified on the Commerce Control List ("CCL") as well as certain items designated as EAR99 when destined for specific end uses or end users.
ECCN 2B350 and 2B999. The oilfield drilling equipment and components at issue in this Investigation are classified under two Export Control Classification Numbers:
(a) ECCN 2B350 — This classification covers certain equipment that may be used in the production of chemical and biological agents, including specific types of pumps, valves, and related components. While the primary focus of ECCN 2B350 is on chemical/biological weapons precursor production equipment, certain oilfield drilling components share overlapping classifications due to their dual-use nature, particularly certain high-pressure pumps, specialized valves, and flow control equipment. Items classified under ECCN 2B350 require a license for export to Russia under multiple license requirements, including those imposed by EAR §746.5.
(b) ECCN 2B999 — This is a catch-all classification under EAR Category 2 (Materials Processing) that encompasses items specifically controlled for Russia/Belarus sanctions purposes. ECCN 2B999 captures certain types of drilling and oilfield equipment, measuring instruments, and related components that are subject to license requirements when destined for Russia or Belarus.
Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 ("ECRA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852, provides the statutory framework for the EAR and establishes criminal enforcement authority for violations of export control regulations. Under ECRA, any person who willfully violates, or conspires to or attempts to violate, any provision of ECRA or any regulation, order, or license issued thereunder may be subject to criminal penalties of up to $1 million per violation and imprisonment for up to 20 years. 50 U.S.C. § 4819(b). Civil penalties are also available, with maximum amounts adjusted for inflation.
End-User/End-Use Controls and False Statements. The EAR impose end-use and end-user controls that restrict exports to certain end users and for certain end uses, regardless of the classification of the item. In addition, the provision of false or misleading information on end-user certificates or other export documentation constitutes a violation of the EAR and may also give rise to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) and 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (fraud in connection with identification documents), as well as conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The evidence of false end-user certifications in this case is discussed in Section VII.C.
III.C. U.S. Person Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Reach
A threshold legal question in this Investigation is whether the activities of DTI, a Dubai-based subsidiary of a Cayman Islands holding company, fall within the jurisdictional reach of U.S. sanctions laws and export control regulations. The Investigation concludes that U.S. jurisdiction is established through multiple independent bases.
Definition of "U.S. Person." Under IEEPA and OFAC's implementing regulations, the term "U.S. person" is defined to include: (i) any United States citizen or permanent resident alien, wherever located; (ii) any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches); and (iii) any person in the United States. 31 C.F.R. § 589.312.
Jurisdictional Nexus Analysis. The following factors establish the jurisdictional nexus between DTI's activities and U.S. sanctions laws:
(a) U.S. Operational Headquarters. Although DTI is a DIFC-licensed entity and DEH is a Cayman Islands exempted company, Dunmore's operational headquarters are located in Houston, Texas, and the Company's senior management team, including the CEO, CFO, General Counsel, and (formerly) CCO, are based in the United States. Strategic decisions regarding DTI's operations, including the approval of the compliance program applicable to DTI, were made from the United States.
(b) U.S.-Dollar-Denominated Transactions. The crude oil swap transactions at issue were denominated in U.S. dollars and were cleared through U.S. correspondent banking channels. Specifically, wire transfers associated with the suspect transactions traversed the U.S. financial system through correspondent accounts maintained by Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC at U.S. financial institutions. Under established legal principles, the clearing of U.S.-dollar-denominated transactions through the U.S. financial system establishes a jurisdictional nexus for OFAC enforcement purposes.
(c) Presence of U.S. Persons among DTI Personnel. Natasha Sorokin, the Senior Trader at DTI who was directly involved in the suspect transactions, is a dual citizen of the United States and the Russian Federation. As a U.S. citizen, Sorokin is a "U.S. person" subject to OFAC sanctions prohibitions regardless of her physical location. Her involvement in the transactions independently establishes U.S. jurisdiction.
(d) Parent Company Control. DTI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DEH, which in turn is operationally headquartered in the United States. Under OFAC guidance, U.S. persons, including entities with U.S. operational centers, are responsible for ensuring that entities they own or control do not engage in activities that would violate U.S. sanctions if undertaken directly by a U.S. person.
EAR "Reexport" Jurisdiction. With respect to the oilfield equipment exports, EAR jurisdiction extends to items of U.S. origin or containing more than a de minimis level of U.S.-origin controlled content. The equipment at issue included items of U.S. origin shipped from the United States to Dubai and subsequently reexported through Caspian Logistik GmbH to Russia without the required export licenses. Additionally, certain items sourced from European suppliers contained U.S.-origin components or were produced using U.S.-origin technology, triggering EAR reexport controls under the de minimis and direct product rules.
III.D. DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy
The DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy, most recently updated in September 2022, sets forth the Department's framework for addressing corporate criminal conduct, including the factors the Department considers in determining whether to seek a declination, a deferred prosecution agreement, a non-prosecution agreement, or an indictment. The Policy establishes a presumption of declination where a company: (i) voluntarily self-discloses misconduct; (ii) fully cooperates with the Department's investigation; and (iii) timely and appropriately remediates, including disgorgement of profits from the misconduct.
While the DOJ inquiry in this matter was initiated by grand jury subpoena rather than by voluntary self-disclosure, the Company's full cooperation and proactive remediation efforts are relevant under the Policy's cooperation and remediation prongs. The DOJ Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, updated in March 2023, provides additional criteria for assessing the adequacy of a company's compliance program, both at the time of the offense and at the time of resolution. The Investigation has evaluated Dunmore's pre-existing compliance program and its Enhanced Compliance Program against the criteria set forth in these DOJ guidance documents.
The factors relevant to a potential declination in this case include: the Company's full cooperation from the outset, including proffer sessions, rolling document productions, and witness availability; the Company's timely and appropriate remediation, including personnel actions, the appointment of a new CCO, the adoption of an Enhanced Compliance Program, and voluntary disgorgement of $8.75 million; and the Company's good faith efforts to identify and address the root causes of the misconduct. These factors are discussed in detail in Sections XIII and XIV of this Report.
SECTION IV — INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY
IV.A. Investigation Timeline
The Investigation was conducted over approximately thirteen months, from April 2022 through May 2023, with certain remediation activities continuing beyond the date of this Report. The following timeline sets forth the key milestones of the Investigation:
Subsequent to the date of this Report, the following additional events occurred and are referenced herein for completeness: OFAC voluntary self-disclosure filed June 1, 2023; supplemental information provided to OFAC August 30, 2023; DOJ follow-up interview of Omar Al-Rashidi on July 12, 2023; Marlowe Asset Management remediation report delivered September 15, 2023; Enhanced Compliance Program adopted by Board October 1, 2023; voluntary disgorgement of $8.75 million paid to U.S. Treasury November 30, 2023; supplemental remediation report submitted to DOJ January 15, 2024; OFAC Cautionary Letter issued April 15, 2024 (Ref. OCA-2024-11587).
IV.B. Document Collection and Review
Calderwood & Harkness engaged Nexagen Analytics Inc. (Project No. NX-DEH-2204; Project Manager Brian Cavanaugh) to provide electronic discovery services for the Investigation, including the collection, processing, hosting, and technology-assisted review of electronically stored information.
Document Collection. Working with Dunmore's IT department and the Calderwood & Harkness e-discovery team led by Thomas Bradshaw, Nexagen collected documents from data sources across six jurisdictions: the Cayman Islands, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Germany, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom. Data sources included:
• Corporate email systems (Strathmore Data Systems/Outlook)
• DTI trading platform records (proprietary system and Vireo Technologies)
• Financial records, including general ledgers, accounts payable/receivable records, and bank statements
• Shipping and logistics databases, including bills of lading, customs documentation, and freight records
• Personal devices (mobile phones and laptops) of key individuals, collected pursuant to the litigation hold and with consent or, where applicable, employer access rights
• Encrypted and standard messaging applications (Meridian Services Inc., Signal, Kestrel Data Systems)
• Shared network drives and cloud storage repositories
• Paper files from DTI's Dubai office and Dunmore's Houston office, which were scanned and processed electronically
Collection Statistics. The total number of documents collected across all data sources was 2,347,812. This figure includes native electronic files, emails and attachments, instant messages and chat records, scanned paper documents, and metadata records.
Technology-Assisted Review. Nexagen processed the collected documents using a technology-assisted review ("TAR") protocol designed in consultation w