1016-00009 · Dunmore Energy Holdings · Subpoena Response & DOJ Correspondence

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PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — SUBJECT TO SELECTIVE WAIVER PROTOCOL NOT A WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AS TO THIRD PARTIES

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006

Telephone: (202) 555-7400 Facsimile: (202) 555-7401

Victoria Chambers Partner, White Collar Defense & Investigations Direct: (202) 555-7418

Email: vchambers@calderwoodharkness.com

May 15, 2023

VIA HAND DELIVERY AND ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

Meredith Calloway, Esq. Assistant United States Attorney National Security Division Counterintelligence and Export Control Section U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20530

Re: Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. — Grand Jury Subpoena No. GJ No. 22-418; Transmittal of Internal Investigation Report

Calderwood & Harkness Matter No.: 1016-00009

Dear Ms. Calloway:

As you know, this firm represents Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. ("Dunmore" or "DEH"), a Cayman Islands exempted company with limited liability (Registration No. MC-334821), with operational headquarters at 1200 McKinney Street, Suite 3400, Houston, Texas 77010, in connection with the inquiry opened by the Department of Justice, National Security Division, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section ("CES" or the "Department") on April 19, 2022, and the grand jury subpoena bearing number GJ No. 22-418 issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Grand Jury 22-2). We write to transmit the results of the comprehensive internal investigation that Dunmore, through this firm, has undertaken over the past thirteen months.

I. Purpose of This Letter

The purpose of this letter is to transmit, on behalf of Dunmore, the comprehensive internal investigation report (the "Report"), dated May 15, 2023, consisting of one hundred seventy-six (176) pages, together with the exhibits and appendices referenced therein. The Report is enclosed herewith in hard copy (two bound copies, marked "Copy 1 of 2" and "Copy 2 of 2," respectively) and in searchable PDF format on an encrypted USB drive. The decryption password for the USB drive has been communicated to you separately through secure channels, consistent with the protocol previously established between our offices.

The Report was prepared by the undersigned, Victoria Chambers (Responsible Partner), together with Jasmine Thornton (Lead Associate), Conrad Reeves (Senior Counsel, Export Controls & Sanctions), and Liam Donahue (Working Associate) of Calderwood & Harkness LLP. The investigation team also engaged forensic accounting experts and e-discovery professionals, whose work is described in greater detail below and whose findings are fully integrated into the Report.

This transmittal is made consistent with Dunmore's ongoing voluntary cooperation with the Department and reflects the company's unwavering commitment to full transparency regarding the conduct identified during the course of the internal investigation. As discussed during our meetings with your office on multiple occasions throughout this process, Dunmore has sought to conduct its internal investigation with the thoroughness and rigor necessary to provide the Department with a complete and accurate picture of the relevant facts and circumstances.

II. Background and Context of the Investigation

A. Origins of the Inquiry

The Department's inquiry arose in connection with potential violations of United States sanctions laws, including programs administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and U.S. export control regulations. The potential violations involve activities conducted at the overseas trading desk of Dunmore Trading International Ltd. ("DTI"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Dunmore, holding DIFC License No. CL-4827 and based at Level 14, Gate Building 3, Dubai International Financial Centre, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Calderwood & Harkness was retained by Dunmore on April 14, 2022 — five days before the issuance of the grand jury subpoena — following the identification of potential legal exposure by then-Chief Compliance Officer Gerald Fisk on April 11, 2022. Upon discovering certain irregularities in DTI's counterparty screening records and trade documentation, Mr. Fisk notified Dunmore's General Counsel, Marcus Wellbourne, Esq., who promptly escalated the matter to the Board of Directors and authorized the retention of outside counsel. The decision to engage Calderwood & Harkness was made at a special session of the Board's Audit and Compliance Committee on April 13, 2022, and the formal engagement letter was executed the following day.

B. Applicable Legal Framework

The Report addresses potential violations arising under the following legal authorities, each of which is discussed in detail within the body of the Report:

1. International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706, which provides the statutory basis for the imposition of economic sanctions by the President of the United States;

2. Export Control Reform Act ("ECRA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852, which governs the control of exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations;

3. OFAC Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662, which imposes sectoral sanctions on the energy sector of the Russian Federation. Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, the entity of central relevance to this investigation, was designated under Directive 2 as a person operating in the energy sector of the Russian Federation on November 15, 2019 (OFAC List of Sectoral Sanctions Identifications);

4. Executive Order 14024 (April 15, 2021, as amended), "Blocking Property With Respect to Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation," under which OFAC imposed a full Specially Designated Nationals ("SDN") blocking designation on Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, effective April 6, 2022;

5. Export Administration Regulations ("EAR"), 15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774, including, in particular, § 746.5 (Russia/Belarus), which imposes license requirements on the export, reexport, and transfer of specified items to Russia and Belarus; and

6. Related executive orders, OFAC guidance, and Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") rulings applicable during the period under review.

The interplay of these authorities is significant because the conduct at issue spans a period during which the sanctions landscape applicable to Russia-connected entities underwent substantial and rapid evolution — from the sectoral sanctions regime under E.O. 13662 through the comprehensive blocking regime under E.O. 14024 — and the Report carefully analyzes the relevant conduct against the specific prohibitions in effect at the time each transaction was executed.

III. Scope of the Internal Investigation

The internal investigation covered the period from approximately January 1, 2019 through the present date, matching the temporal scope of Grand Jury Subpoena No. GJ No. 22-418. The scope of the investigation encompassed the following principal areas:

(a) All transactions between Dunmore entities — primarily DTI, but also including Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. (Cayman Islands), Dunmore Energy Trading Inc. (Houston), Dunmore Renewables GmbH (Hamburg), and Dunmore West Africa Ltd. (Lagos) — and the following counterparties: Petronova Trading FZE, Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, Zenith Petroleum DMCC, and Caspian Logistik GmbH;

(b) Crude oil and refined petroleum product trading activity conducted by or through DTI during the relevant period, including spot transactions, term contracts, and swap arrangements;

(c) Oilfield equipment exports classified under Export Control Classification Numbers ("ECCNs") 2B350 and 2B999, including analysis of end-user certifications, shipping documentation, and licensing determinations;

(d) Payment flows through intermediary accounts maintained at Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC (Dubai), including analysis of wire transfer records, account opening documentation, and beneficial ownership representations;

(e) A comprehensive assessment of Dunmore's pre-existing sanctions and export controls compliance program, including its policies, procedures, screening tools, training programs, escalation mechanisms, and governance structures as they existed during the period under review; and

(f) Individual conduct and knowledge assessments for key personnel, including an evaluation of the roles, responsibilities, and states of mind of individuals involved in or aware of the transactions and activities at issue.

The investigation was global in scope, requiring the collection and analysis of evidence located in six jurisdictions and the coordination of legal analysis under the laws of multiple countries. Calderwood & Harkness engaged local counsel in the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands to assist with jurisdictional and procedural matters, including compliance with local data protection requirements and blocking statutes.

IV. Summary of Investigation Activities

A. Document Collection and Review

Nexagen Analytics Inc. ("Nexagen"), a nationally recognized e-discovery and forensic data collection firm, was retained under engagement Project No. NX-DEH-2204, under the supervision of Nexagen project manager Brian Cavanaugh and Calderwood & Harkness's e-discovery lead, Thomas Bradshaw, Esq. Nexagen was engaged to collect, process, host, and produce electronically stored information ("ESI") and hard-copy documents relevant to the investigation.

Over the course of the investigation, Nexagen collected and processed a total of 2,347,812 documents across six jurisdictions (Cayman Islands, United Arab Emirates, United States, Germany, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom). Sources included email archives, instant messaging platforms, shared network drives, local hard drives, mobile devices, physical trading books, and hard-copy files maintained at DTI's Dubai offices and at Dunmore's Houston headquarters.

Following initial processing and de-duplication, the Calderwood & Harkness review team employed technology-assisted review ("TAR"), utilizing a continuous active learning ("CAL") protocol validated through iterative quality control sampling. The TAR process identified 438,916 documents as responsive to the scope of the investigation and the grand jury subpoena.

A total of 12,847 documents were withheld from production on the grounds of attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or both. These withholdings are reflected in the detailed privilege logs previously provided to your office, which were organized by custodian and date and include document-by-document descriptions of the basis for each privilege assertion.

As you are aware, Calderwood & Harkness has made two substantial document productions to the Department during the course of the investigation:

• First Production (November 1, 2022): 287,412 documents, bearing Bates numbers DEH-DOJ-000001 through DEH-DOJ-287412, produced in TIFF format with extracted text, native files (where applicable), and associated metadata load files.

• Second Production (January 30, 2023): 151,504 documents, bearing Bates numbers DEH-DOJ-287413 through DEH-DOJ-438916, produced in the same format.

Together, these productions comprise the entirety of the responsive, non-privileged document universe. Calderwood & Harkness remains prepared to address any questions the Department may have regarding specific documents or to supplement the productions should additional responsive materials be identified.

B. Witness Interviews

The investigation team conducted interviews of forty-seven (47) current and former employees of Dunmore and its subsidiaries across three rounds, conducted in six jurisdictions:

Round 1 (May 18 – June 30, 2022): Twenty-two (22) interviews were conducted in Houston, Texas; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and London, United Kingdom. This initial round focused on individuals with direct involvement in or oversight of DTI's trading operations, compliance functions, and senior management.

Round 2 (August 5 – September 30, 2022): Fifteen (15) additional interviews were conducted, broadening the scope to include finance and accounting personnel, logistics and shipping staff, and individuals in supporting roles who may have had knowledge of or exposure to the relevant transactions.

Round 3 (February 15 – March 15, 2023): Ten (10) interviews were conducted, consisting of re-interviews of certain key witnesses in light of additional evidence developed during the document review and forensic accounting analyses, as well as interviews of newly identified witnesses whose relevance became apparent during the second phase of the investigation.

Key witnesses interviewed during the course of the investigation included, among others:

• Callum Renshaw, Chief Executive Officer, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.

• Derek Hargrave, former President, Dunmore Trading International Ltd.

• Natasha Sorokin, former Senior Trader, Dunmore Trading International Ltd.

• Gerald Fisk, former Chief Compliance Officer, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.

• Omar Al-Rashidi, Head of Middle East Operations, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.

• Yves Leclerc, Director of Logistics & Shipping, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.

• Sandra Whitfield, Chief Financial Officer, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.

• Rajesh Malhotra, Controller, Dunmore Trading International Ltd.

• Tobias Engel, Managing Director, Dunmore Renewables GmbH

All interviews were conducted pursuant to Upjohn corporate counsel warnings, consistent with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and applicable guidance. Each interviewee was advised at the outset of the interview that: (i) Calderwood & Harkness represented Dunmore, not the individual; (ii) the purpose of the interview was to gather facts in connection with the company's internal investigation; (iii) the communications during the interview were protected by the attorney-client privilege, but the privilege belonged to Dunmore, not to the individual; and (iv) Dunmore could choose to waive the privilege and disclose the substance of the interview to third parties, including the government.

We note that certain individuals retained separate counsel during the course of the investigation, as was their right:

• Gerald Fisk retained Catherine Blackthorn of Blackthorn & Associates LLP, Houston, Texas.

• Natasha Sorokin retained Philip Keane of Wexford Keane LLP, Washington, D.C.

• Derek Hargrave retained James Overstreet of Overstreet & McClain PLLC, Dallas, Texas.

The investigation team coordinated with individual counsel as appropriate to facilitate the interview process, and individual counsel were present during certain interviews at their clients' request.

C. Forensic Accounting

Ridgeline Advisory Group LLC ("Ridgeline"), a forensic accounting and financial advisory firm, was retained under Engagement No. RAG-2022-0319 on May 2, 2022. The engagement was led by Dr. Margaret Liu, CPA, CFE, a principal of Ridgeline with extensive experience in sanctions-related financial investigations and cross-border transaction tracing.

Ridgeline was tasked with conducting a comprehensive forensic accounting analysis of the suspect transaction flows, including: (i) tracing payments through intermediary accounts and correspondent banking channels; (ii) reconstructing the economic substance and commercial logic (or lack thereof) of the identified transactions; (iii) calculating the gross revenues, costs, and net profits attributable to the suspect trading activity; and (iv) analyzing bank records, invoices, contracts, and shipping documentation to identify the ultimate sources and destinations of commodities and funds.

Ridgeline delivered its final forensic accounting report to Calderwood & Harkness on April 1, 2023. Ridgeline's findings have been fully integrated into the Report and are referenced throughout the relevant sections. Where appropriate, the Report includes Ridgeline's supporting schedules, flow-of-funds diagrams, and analytical workpapers as appendices.

V. Summary of Key Findings Presented in the Report

The Report details findings across three principal categories of conduct occurring between approximately March 2020 and April 2022. The evidence indicates that this conduct was carried out under the supervision and direction of Derek Hargrave (President, DTI) and with the direct involvement of Natasha Sorokin (Senior Trader, DTI). While a full recitation of the findings is contained within the Report itself, the following summary is provided for the convenience of the Department.

A. Crude Oil Swap Transactions

The investigation identified fourteen (14) crude oil swap transactions with a total notional value of approximately $218.7 million, executed between June 2020 and February 2022 with two counterparties: Petronova Trading FZE (managed by Sergei Volkov, a Russian national with a residential address in Dubai) and Zenith Petroleum DMCC (managed by Farhan Qureshi, a Pakistani national also based in Dubai).

Forensic analysis conducted by both the Calderwood & Harkness investigation team and Ridgeline Advisory Group determined that at least nine (9) of the fourteen (14) transactions, representing an aggregate notional value of approximately $156.3 million, involved crude oil that was ultimately sourced from or destined for entities controlled by or affiliated with Volkhov Industrial Group JSC (chaired by Arkady Volkhov). These transactions were structured through intermediary entities and layered contractual arrangements apparently designed to obscure the involvement of Volkhov-connected parties, in potential violation of OFAC Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662 (sectoral sanctions on the energy sector of the Russian Federation).

The evidence further indicates that Hargrave and Sorokin were aware of the Volkhov connection and took affirmative steps to conceal it from Dunmore's compliance function, including by providing incomplete or misleading counterparty information in connection with the company's sanctions screening process. The Report discusses this evidence in detail at Sections IV.A through IV.D.

B. Oilfield Equipment Exports

Between approximately August 2020 and January 2022, DTI facilitated the export of oilfield drilling equipment and components classified under EAR Export Control Classification Numbers ECCN 2B350 (chemical manufacturing equipment and components, certain of which were dual-use) and ECCN 2B999 (items subject to the EAR but not elsewhere specified on the Commerce Control List, for which a license requirement existed under § 746.5), with a total value of approximately $12.4 million. These items were shipped to end users in the Russian Federation via Caspian Logistik GmbH, a freight forwarding and logistics company managed by Klaus Weidemann, based in Hamburg, Germany.

The investigation found that these shipments potentially violated EAR § 746.5 (Russia/Belarus sanctions) and applicable OFAC prohibitions. In addition, the evidence indicates that the export transactions may have involved false or materially misleading end-user certifications, in which the declared final destination of the equipment was identified as Kazakhstan or Turkey rather than Russia. Documentary and testimonial evidence regarding these false certifications is set forth in detail at Section V of the Report.

C. Payment Structuring

Ridgeline's forensic accounting analysis identified approximately $34.2 million in payments routed through a series of intermediary accounts maintained at Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC (Dubai), with relationship manager Khalid Mansour serving as the primary banking contact. These payments were structured in a manner that appears designed to obscure the ultimate beneficial ownership of, and connections to, Volkhov-affiliated entities.

Wire transfer records examined by Ridgeline documented 127 individual transactions between March 2020 and March 2022. The payment flows involved a complex web of intermediary entities, multiple currency conversions, and the use of vague or generic payment references. Ridgeline's flow-of-funds analysis, including detailed diagrams tracing the movement of funds through the intermediary account structure, is included as Appendix C to the Report.

D. Compliance Program Deficiencies

The Report includes, at Section VII, a detailed assessment of Dunmore's pre-existing sanctions and export controls compliance program as it existed on or about April 2022. The investigation identified significant deficiencies in the following areas, among others:

(i) OFAC Screening Protocols: The company's sanctions screening tool was not configured to screen counterparties against the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List or certain non-U.S. sanctions lists, and manual screening procedures were inconsistently applied to DTI's Dubai-based trading activity;

(ii) Counterparty Due Diligence: DTI's know-your-counterparty procedures were inadequate, particularly with respect to the identification of beneficial ownership and the assessment of counterparty risk in connection with newly onboarded trading partners;

(iii) Escalation Mechanisms: The compliance function lacked effective mechanisms for escalating potential sanctions or export control concerns identified by front-line trading personnel, and there was no mandatory hold or review process for transactions flagged as potentially involving sanctioned parties or controlled items; and

(iv) Employee Training: Sanctions and export controls training was infrequent, insufficiently tailored to the specific risks presented by DTI's trading activities, and not consistently documented.

These deficiencies permitted the suspect transactions described above to proceed without detection by Dunmore's compliance infrastructure for an extended period. The Report includes specific recommendations for remediation, which are discussed further below.

VI. Personnel Actions Taken

In response to the findings of the internal investigation as they developed over the course of 2022, Dunmore took the following personnel actions:

• Gerald Fisk (former Chief Compliance Officer): Mr. Fisk departed Dunmore on June 10, 2022. The circumstances of his departure and the company's assessment of his role are discussed at Section VI.A of the Report.

• Natasha Sorokin (former Senior Trader, DTI): Ms. Sorokin was placed on administrative leave on May 16, 2022, and was formally separated from Dunmore on September 15, 2022.

• Derek Hargrave (former President, DTI): Mr. Hargrave was placed on administrative leave on July 1, 2022, and was formally separated from Dunmore on October 1, 2022.

• Priya Nayar was appointed as Dunmore's new Chief Compliance Officer, effective August 1, 2022. Ms. Nayar brings over fifteen years of experience in sanctions and export controls compliance, including prior service at a major international financial institution and a leading energy trading company.

VII. Cooperation and Remediation

A. Voluntary Cooperation

Dunmore wishes to emphasize its full and timely voluntary cooperation with the Department throughout the pendency of this investigation. From the outset, Dunmore has been committed to cooperation consistent with the principles articulated in the DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy (as updated in September 2022), including by providing timely disclosure of relevant facts, not concealing evidence, and making witnesses available for interviews by the Department. The company self-identified the potential issues and retained outside counsel before the issuance of the grand jury subpoena, and it has voluntarily produced all responsive, non-privileged documents in an organized and timely manner.

As the Department is aware, Calderwood & Harkness provided an initial proffer to AUSA Calloway and the CES investigation team on July 15, 2022, outlining the preliminary findings of the internal investigation and identifying the principal categories of concern. A supplemental proffer was provided on November 20, 2022, updating the Department on additional findings developed during the second phase of the document review and the second round of witness interviews. The present transmittal of the Report represents the culmination of this cooperative process.

B. Remediation Efforts

Dunmore has undertaken substantial remediation efforts, which are ongoing. On December 15, 2022, the company retained Pemberton Investors Solutions LLC, an independent compliance consulting firm led by Dr. Anton Bremer, a recognized expert in sanctions and export controls compliance program design and implementation, to design an enhanced sanctions and export controls compliance program tailored to the specific risk profile of Dunmore's global operations.

Marlowe Asset Management's engagement encompasses a comprehensive reassessment of Dunmore's compliance architecture, including: organizational structure and governance; policies and procedures; sanctions screening and counterparty due diligence tools and processes; trade compliance and export licensing procedures; training and awareness programs; internal audit and testing protocols; and whistleblower and escalation mechanisms. Marlowe Asset Management's remediation report and the enhanced compliance program framework are expected to be completed in the near term, and Dunmore intends to deliver them to the Department in a subsequent submission.

C. Forthcoming Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Disgorgement

Dunmore further intends to file a voluntary self-disclosure with OFAC regarding the transactions identified in the Report. The VSD is currently being prepared by Calderwood & Harkness and is expected to be filed in the coming weeks. The company believes that its voluntary self-disclosure, combined with its full cooperation with the Department and its remediation efforts, reflects the seriousness with which Dunmore regards the identified conduct.

In addition, Dunmore is prepared to discuss with the Department the voluntary disgorgement of profits derived from the tainted transactions identified in the Report. Ridgeline's forensic accounting analysis includes a calculation of the net profits attributable to the suspect trading activity, and Calderwood & Harkness is available to discuss the methodology and figures with the Department at its convenience.

VIII. Privilege Reservation

The Report is provided to the Department pursuant to the selective waiver protocol established in Calderwood & Harkness's memorandum to AUSA Calloway dated July 1, 2022, and acknowledged by the Department in correspondence dated July 8, 2022. That protocol provides that the disclosure of privileged materials to the Department in connection with this investigation is made on a limited and selective basis and does not operate as a general waiver of privilege.

Accordingly, Dunmore and Calderwood & Harkness wish to make clear that the transmittal of the Report to the Department does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine as to any third party. Dunmore expressly reserves all privileges and protections, including but not limited to the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, vis-à-vis all third parties, including but not limited to:

(a) private litigants and potential civil claimants;

(b) regulatory agencies other than the Department and OFAC;

(c) foreign governmental authorities and regulators, including authorities in the UAE, Germany, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands; and

(d) any other persons or entities not party to the selective waiver protocol.

Nothing in the Report or in this transmittal letter shall be construed as a waiver, in whole or in part, of any applicable privilege or protection, except as expressly set forth in the selective waiver protocol.

IX. Confidentiality Request

Dunmore respectfully requests that the Department treat the Report and all of its contents as confidential in accordance with the Department's standard practices for the handling of materials provided by cooperating parties. The Report contains proprietary business information of Dunmore and its subsidiaries, including commercially sensitive trading data, financial information, counterparty details, and internal operational information that constitutes trade secrets.

In addition, the Report contains personal data and information that may be subject to data protection and privacy regulations in multiple jurisdictions, including the United Arab Emirates (Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data), the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz and the EU General Data Protection Regulation), the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria Data Protection Regulation 2019), and the United Kingdom (UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018).

Dunmore respectfully requests that the Report not be disclosed to any third party — including other government agencies, foreign authorities, or private parties — without prior written notice to Calderwood & Harkness, so that Dunmore may have the opportunity to assert any applicable privileges, protections, or objections.

X. Availability for Discussion

The undersigned, together with Jasmine Thornton, Conrad Reeves, and other members of the Calderwood & Harkness investigation team, are available to discuss the Report's findings, methodology, and conclusions at the Department's convenience. We would welcome the opportunity to arrange a detailed presentation or walkthrough of the Report for AUSA Calloway, Trial Attorney Kovacs, Trial Attorney Pressman, and Special Agent Paul Reinhardt (FBI Counterintelligence Division), at a time and place convenient to the Department.

We are also prepared to address any follow-up questions, to facilitate additional witness interviews as the Department may request, and to discuss the remediation and disgorgement matters referenced above.

I can be reached directly at the contact information set forth in the letterhead above, and our offices are located at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006. Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.

XI. Enclosures

The following materials are enclosed with this letter:

1. Internal Investigation Report of Calderwood & Harkness LLP Regarding Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. — Comprehensive Findings and Recommendations (176 pages; two bound hard copies, marked "Copy 1 of 2" and "Copy 2 of 2");

2. Encrypted USB drive containing a searchable PDF version of the Report (decryption password transmitted separately); and

3. Index of Exhibits and Appendices referenced in the Report, including a master table of exhibits, appendices, and supporting schedules.

We wish to express our sincere appreciation for the professionalism, thoroughness, and constructive engagement that you, Trial Attorney Kovacs, Trial Attorney Pressman, and the entire CES investigation team have demonstrated throughout this process. Dunmore values the opportunity to cooperate with the Department and is committed to continued cooperation and full remediation of the identified conduct. The company remains resolved to ensure that its global operations are conducted in strict compliance with all applicable U.S. sanctions and export control laws.

We look forward to discussing the Report with you and your colleagues at your earliest convenience.

Respectfully submitted,

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

By: ________

Victoria Chambers Partner, White Collar Defense & Investigations Calderwood & Harkness LLP 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 555-7418

Email: vchambers@calderwoodharkness.com

Matter No. 1016-00009

cc: Samuel Kovacs, Trial Attorney, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice (via electronic transmission)

Diana Pressman, Trial Attorney, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice (via electronic transmission)

Enclosures (as noted above)

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — SUBJECT TO SELECTIVE WAIVER PROTOCOL NOT A WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AS TO THIRD PARTIES
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 555-7400 Facsimile: (202) 555-7401
Victoria Chambers Partner, White Collar Defense & Investigations Direct: (202) 555-7418
Email: vchambers@calderwoodharkness.com
May 15, 2023
VIA HAND DELIVERY AND ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
Meredith Calloway, Esq. Assistant United States Attorney National Security Division Counterintelligence and Export Control Section U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20530
Re: Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. — Grand Jury Subpoena No. GJ No. 22-418; Transmittal of Internal Investigation Report
Calderwood & Harkness Matter No.: 1016-00009
Dear Ms. Calloway:
As you know, this firm represents Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. ("Dunmore" or "DEH"), a Cayman Islands exempted company with limited liability (Registration No. MC-334821), with operational headquarters at 1200 McKinney Street, Suite 3400, Houston, Texas 77010, in connection with the inquiry opened by the Department of Justice, National Security Division, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section ("CES" or the "Department") on April 19, 2022, and the grand jury subpoena bearing number GJ No. 22-418 issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Grand Jury 22-2). We write to transmit the results of the comprehensive internal investigation that Dunmore, through this firm, has undertaken over the past thirteen months.
I. Purpose of This Letter
The purpose of this letter is to transmit, on behalf of Dunmore, the comprehensive internal investigation report (the "Report"), dated May 15, 2023, consisting of one hundred seventy-six (176) pages, together with the exhibits and appendices referenced therein. The Report is enclosed herewith in hard copy (two bound copies, marked "Copy 1 of 2" and "Copy 2 of 2," respectively) and in searchable PDF format on an encrypted USB drive. The decryption password for the USB drive has been communicated to you separately through secure channels, consistent with the protocol previously established between our offices.
The Report was prepared by the undersigned, Victoria Chambers (Responsible Partner), together with Jasmine Thornton (Lead Associate), Conrad Reeves (Senior Counsel, Export Controls & Sanctions), and Liam Donahue (Working Associate) of Calderwood & Harkness LLP. The investigation team also engaged forensic accounting experts and e-discovery professionals, whose work is described in greater detail below and whose findings are fully integrated into the Report.
This transmittal is made consistent with Dunmore's ongoing voluntary cooperation with the Department and reflects the company's unwavering commitment to full transparency regarding the conduct identified during the course of the internal investigation. As discussed during our meetings with your office on multiple occasions throughout this process, Dunmore has sought to conduct its internal investigation with the thoroughness and rigor necessary to provide the Department with a complete and accurate picture of the relevant facts and circumstances.
II. Background and Context of the Investigation
A. Origins of the Inquiry
The Department's inquiry arose in connection with potential violations of United States sanctions laws, including programs administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and U.S. export control regulations. The potential violations involve activities conducted at the overseas trading desk of Dunmore Trading International Ltd. ("DTI"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Dunmore, holding DIFC License No. CL-4827 and based at Level 14, Gate Building 3, Dubai International Financial Centre, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Calderwood & Harkness was retained by Dunmore on April 14, 2022 — five days before the issuance of the grand jury subpoena — following the identification of potential legal exposure by then-Chief Compliance Officer Gerald Fisk on April 11, 2022. Upon discovering certain irregularities in DTI's counterparty screening records and trade documentation, Mr. Fisk notified Dunmore's General Counsel, Marcus Wellbourne, Esq., who promptly escalated the matter to the Board of Directors and authorized the retention of outside counsel. The decision to engage Calderwood & Harkness was made at a special session of the Board's Audit and Compliance Committee on April 13, 2022, and the formal engagement letter was executed the following day.
B. Applicable Legal Framework
The Report addresses potential violations arising under the following legal authorities, each of which is discussed in detail within the body of the Report:
1. International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706, which provides the statutory basis for the imposition of economic sanctions by the President of the United States;
2. Export Control Reform Act ("ECRA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852, which governs the control of exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations;
3. OFAC Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662, which imposes sectoral sanctions on the energy sector of the Russian Federation. Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, the entity of central relevance to this investigation, was designated under Directive 2 as a person operating in the energy sector of the Russian Federation on November 15, 2019 (OFAC List of Sectoral Sanctions Identifications);
4. Executive Order 14024 (April 15, 2021, as amended), "Blocking Property With Respect to Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation," under which OFAC imposed a full Specially Designated Nationals ("SDN") blocking designation on Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, effective April 6, 2022;
5. Export Administration Regulations ("EAR"), 15 C.F.R. Parts 730–774, including, in particular, § 746.5 (Russia/Belarus), which imposes license requirements on the export, reexport, and transfer of specified items to Russia and Belarus; and
6. Related executive orders, OFAC guidance, and Bureau of Industry and Security ("BIS") rulings applicable during the period under review.
The interplay of these authorities is significant because the conduct at issue spans a period during which the sanctions landscape applicable to Russia-connected entities underwent substantial and rapid evolution — from the sectoral sanctions regime under E.O. 13662 through the comprehensive blocking regime under E.O. 14024 — and the Report carefully analyzes the relevant conduct against the specific prohibitions in effect at the time each transaction was executed.
III. Scope of the Internal Investigation
The internal investigation covered the period from approximately January 1, 2019 through the present date, matching the temporal scope of Grand Jury Subpoena No. GJ No. 22-418. The scope of the investigation encompassed the following principal areas:
(a) All transactions between Dunmore entities — primarily DTI, but also including Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. (Cayman Islands), Dunmore Energy Trading Inc. (Houston), Dunmore Renewables GmbH (Hamburg), and Dunmore West Africa Ltd. (Lagos) — and the following counterparties: Petronova Trading FZE, Volkhov Industrial Group JSC, Zenith Petroleum DMCC, and Caspian Logistik GmbH;
(b) Crude oil and refined petroleum product trading activity conducted by or through DTI during the relevant period, including spot transactions, term contracts, and swap arrangements;
(c) Oilfield equipment exports classified under Export Control Classification Numbers ("ECCNs") 2B350 and 2B999, including analysis of end-user certifications, shipping documentation, and licensing determinations;
(d) Payment flows through intermediary accounts maintained at Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC (Dubai), including analysis of wire transfer records, account opening documentation, and beneficial ownership representations;
(e) A comprehensive assessment of Dunmore's pre-existing sanctions and export controls compliance program, including its policies, procedures, screening tools, training programs, escalation mechanisms, and governance structures as they existed during the period under review; and
(f) Individual conduct and knowledge assessments for key personnel, including an evaluation of the roles, responsibilities, and states of mind of individuals involved in or aware of the transactions and activities at issue.
The investigation was global in scope, requiring the collection and analysis of evidence located in six jurisdictions and the coordination of legal analysis under the laws of multiple countries. Calderwood & Harkness engaged local counsel in the United Arab Emirates, Germany, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands to assist with jurisdictional and procedural matters, including compliance with local data protection requirements and blocking statutes.
IV. Summary of Investigation Activities
A. Document Collection and Review
Nexagen Analytics Inc. ("Nexagen"), a nationally recognized e-discovery and forensic data collection firm, was retained under engagement Project No. NX-DEH-2204, under the supervision of Nexagen project manager Brian Cavanaugh and Calderwood & Harkness's e-discovery lead, Thomas Bradshaw, Esq. Nexagen was engaged to collect, process, host, and produce electronically stored information ("ESI") and hard-copy documents relevant to the investigation.
Over the course of the investigation, Nexagen collected and processed a total of 2,347,812 documents across six jurisdictions (Cayman Islands, United Arab Emirates, United States, Germany, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom). Sources included email archives, instant messaging platforms, shared network drives, local hard drives, mobile devices, physical trading books, and hard-copy files maintained at DTI's Dubai offices and at Dunmore's Houston headquarters.
Following initial processing and de-duplication, the Calderwood & Harkness review team employed technology-assisted review ("TAR"), utilizing a continuous active learning ("CAL") protocol validated through iterative quality control sampling. The TAR process identified 438,916 documents as responsive to the scope of the investigation and the grand jury subpoena.
A total of 12,847 documents were withheld from production on the grounds of attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or both. These withholdings are reflected in the detailed privilege logs previously provided to your office, which were organized by custodian and date and include document-by-document descriptions of the basis for each privilege assertion.
As you are aware, Calderwood & Harkness has made two substantial document productions to the Department during the course of the investigation:
• First Production (November 1, 2022): 287,412 documents, bearing Bates numbers DEH-DOJ-000001 through DEH-DOJ-287412, produced in TIFF format with extracted text, native files (where applicable), and associated metadata load files.
• Second Production (January 30, 2023): 151,504 documents, bearing Bates numbers DEH-DOJ-287413 through DEH-DOJ-438916, produced in the same format.
Together, these productions comprise the entirety of the responsive, non-privileged document universe. Calderwood & Harkness remains prepared to address any questions the Department may have regarding specific documents or to supplement the productions should additional responsive materials be identified.
B. Witness Interviews
The investigation team conducted interviews of forty-seven (47) current and former employees of Dunmore and its subsidiaries across three rounds, conducted in six jurisdictions:
Round 1 (May 18 – June 30, 2022): Twenty-two (22) interviews were conducted in Houston, Texas; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and London, United Kingdom. This initial round focused on individuals with direct involvement in or oversight of DTI's trading operations, compliance functions, and senior management.
Round 2 (August 5 – September 30, 2022): Fifteen (15) additional interviews were conducted, broadening the scope to include finance and accounting personnel, logistics and shipping staff, and individuals in supporting roles who may have had knowledge of or exposure to the relevant transactions.
Round 3 (February 15 – March 15, 2023): Ten (10) interviews were conducted, consisting of re-interviews of certain key witnesses in light of additional evidence developed during the document review and forensic accounting analyses, as well as interviews of newly identified witnesses whose relevance became apparent during the second phase of the investigation.
Key witnesses interviewed during the course of the investigation included, among others:
• Callum Renshaw, Chief Executive Officer, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.
• Derek Hargrave, former President, Dunmore Trading International Ltd.
• Natasha Sorokin, former Senior Trader, Dunmore Trading International Ltd.
• Gerald Fisk, former Chief Compliance Officer, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.
• Omar Al-Rashidi, Head of Middle East Operations, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.
• Yves Leclerc, Director of Logistics & Shipping, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.
• Sandra Whitfield, Chief Financial Officer, Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd.
• Rajesh Malhotra, Controller, Dunmore Trading International Ltd.
• Tobias Engel, Managing Director, Dunmore Renewables GmbH
All interviews were conducted pursuant to Upjohn corporate counsel warnings, consistent with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), and applicable guidance. Each interviewee was advised at the outset of the interview that: (i) Calderwood & Harkness represented Dunmore, not the individual; (ii) the purpose of the interview was to gather facts in connection with the company's internal investigation; (iii) the communications during the interview were protected by the attorney-client privilege, but the privilege belonged to Dunmore, not to the individual; and (iv) Dunmore could choose to waive the privilege and disclose the substance of the interview to third parties, including the government.
We note that certain individuals retained separate counsel during the course of the investigation, as was their right:
• Gerald Fisk retained Catherine Blackthorn of Blackthorn & Associates LLP, Houston, Texas.
• Natasha Sorokin retained Philip Keane of Wexford Keane LLP, Washington, D.C.
• Derek Hargrave retained James Overstreet of Overstreet & McClain PLLC, Dallas, Texas.
The investigation team coordinated with individual counsel as appropriate to facilitate the interview process, and individual counsel were present during certain interviews at their clients' request.
C. Forensic Accounting
Ridgeline Advisory Group LLC ("Ridgeline"), a forensic accounting and financial advisory firm, was retained under Engagement No. RAG-2022-0319 on May 2, 2022. The engagement was led by Dr. Margaret Liu, CPA, CFE, a principal of Ridgeline with extensive experience in sanctions-related financial investigations and cross-border transaction tracing.
Ridgeline was tasked with conducting a comprehensive forensic accounting analysis of the suspect transaction flows, including: (i) tracing payments through intermediary accounts and correspondent banking channels; (ii) reconstructing the economic substance and commercial logic (or lack thereof) of the identified transactions; (iii) calculating the gross revenues, costs, and net profits attributable to the suspect trading activity; and (iv) analyzing bank records, invoices, contracts, and shipping documentation to identify the ultimate sources and destinations of commodities and funds.
Ridgeline delivered its final forensic accounting report to Calderwood & Harkness on April 1, 2023. Ridgeline's findings have been fully integrated into the Report and are referenced throughout the relevant sections. Where appropriate, the Report includes Ridgeline's supporting schedules, flow-of-funds diagrams, and analytical workpapers as appendices.
V. Summary of Key Findings Presented in the Report
The Report details findings across three principal categories of conduct occurring between approximately March 2020 and April 2022. The evidence indicates that this conduct was carried out under the supervision and direction of Derek Hargrave (President, DTI) and with the direct involvement of Natasha Sorokin (Senior Trader, DTI). While a full recitation of the findings is contained within the Report itself, the following summary is provided for the convenience of the Department.
A. Crude Oil Swap Transactions
The investigation identified fourteen (14) crude oil swap transactions with a total notional value of approximately $218.7 million, executed between June 2020 and February 2022 with two counterparties: Petronova Trading FZE (managed by Sergei Volkov, a Russian national with a residential address in Dubai) and Zenith Petroleum DMCC (managed by Farhan Qureshi, a Pakistani national also based in Dubai).
Forensic analysis conducted by both the Calderwood & Harkness investigation team and Ridgeline Advisory Group determined that at least nine (9) of the fourteen (14) transactions, representing an aggregate notional value of approximately $156.3 million, involved crude oil that was ultimately sourced from or destined for entities controlled by or affiliated with Volkhov Industrial Group JSC (chaired by Arkady Volkhov). These transactions were structured through intermediary entities and layered contractual arrangements apparently designed to obscure the involvement of Volkhov-connected parties, in potential violation of OFAC Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662 (sectoral sanctions on the energy sector of the Russian Federation).
The evidence further indicates that Hargrave and Sorokin were aware of the Volkhov connection and took affirmative steps to conceal it from Dunmore's compliance function, including by providing incomplete or misleading counterparty information in connection with the company's sanctions screening process. The Report discusses this evidence in detail at Sections IV.A through IV.D.
B. Oilfield Equipment Exports
Between approximately August 2020 and January 2022, DTI facilitated the export of oilfield drilling equipment and components classified under EAR Export Control Classification Numbers ECCN 2B350 (chemical manufacturing equipment and components, certain of which were dual-use) and ECCN 2B999 (items subject to the EAR but not elsewhere specified on the Commerce Control List, for which a license requirement existed under § 746.5), with a total value of approximately $12.4 million. These items were shipped to end users in the Russian Federation via Caspian Logistik GmbH, a freight forwarding and logistics company managed by Klaus Weidemann, based in Hamburg, Germany.
The investigation found that these shipments potentially violated EAR § 746.5 (Russia/Belarus sanctions) and applicable OFAC prohibitions. In addition, the evidence indicates that the export transactions may have involved false or materially misleading end-user certifications, in which the declared final destination of the equipment was identified as Kazakhstan or Turkey rather than Russia. Documentary and testimonial evidence regarding these false certifications is set forth in detail at Section V of the Report.
C. Payment Structuring
Ridgeline's forensic accounting analysis identified approximately $34.2 million in payments routed through a series of intermediary accounts maintained at Crescent Commercial Bank PJSC (Dubai), with relationship manager Khalid Mansour serving as the primary banking contact. These payments were structured in a manner that appears designed to obscure the ultimate beneficial ownership of, and connections to, Volkhov-affiliated entities.
Wire transfer records examined by Ridgeline documented 127 individual transactions between March 2020 and March 2022. The payment flows involved a complex web of intermediary entities, multiple currency conversions, and the use of vague or generic payment references. Ridgeline's flow-of-funds analysis, including detailed diagrams tracing the movement of funds through the intermediary account structure, is included as Appendix C to the Report.
D. Compliance Program Deficiencies
The Report includes, at Section VII, a detailed assessment of Dunmore's pre-existing sanctions and export controls compliance program as it existed on or about April 2022. The investigation identified significant deficiencies in the following areas, among others:
(i) OFAC Screening Protocols: The company's sanctions screening tool was not configured to screen counterparties against the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List or certain non-U.S. sanctions lists, and manual screening procedures were inconsistently applied to DTI's Dubai-based trading activity;
(ii) Counterparty Due Diligence: DTI's know-your-counterparty procedures were inadequate, particularly with respect to the identification of beneficial ownership and the assessment of counterparty risk in connection with newly onboarded trading partners;
(iii) Escalation Mechanisms: The compliance function lacked effective mechanisms for escalating potential sanctions or export control concerns identified by front-line trading personnel, and there was no mandatory hold or review process for transactions flagged as potentially involving sanctioned parties or controlled items; and
(iv) Employee Training: Sanctions and export controls training was infrequent, insufficiently tailored to the specific risks presented by DTI's trading activities, and not consistently documented.
These deficiencies permitted the suspect transactions described above to proceed without detection by Dunmore's compliance infrastructure for an extended period. The Report includes specific recommendations for remediation, which are discussed further below.
VI. Personnel Actions Taken
In response to the findings of the internal investigation as they developed over the course of 2022, Dunmore took the following personnel actions:
• Gerald Fisk (former Chief Compliance Officer): Mr. Fisk departed Dunmore on June 10, 2022. The circumstances of his departure and the company's assessment of his role are discussed at Section VI.A of the Report.
• Natasha Sorokin (former Senior Trader, DTI): Ms. Sorokin was placed on administrative leave on May 16, 2022, and was formally separated from Dunmore on September 15, 2022.
• Derek Hargrave (former President, DTI): Mr. Hargrave was placed on administrative leave on July 1, 2022, and was formally separated from Dunmore on October 1, 2022.
• Priya Nayar was appointed as Dunmore's new Chief Compliance Officer, effective August 1, 2022. Ms. Nayar brings over fifteen years of experience in sanctions and export controls compliance, including prior service at a major international financial institution and a leading energy trading company.
VII. Cooperation and Remediation
A. Voluntary Cooperation
Dunmore wishes to emphasize its full and timely voluntary cooperation with the Department throughout the pendency of this investigation. From the outset, Dunmore has been committed to cooperation consistent with the principles articulated in the DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy (as updated in September 2022), including by providing timely disclosure of relevant facts, not concealing evidence, and making witnesses available for interviews by the Department. The company self-identified the potential issues and retained outside counsel before the issuance of the grand jury subpoena, and it has voluntarily produced all responsive, non-privileged documents in an organized and timely manner.
As the Department is aware, Calderwood & Harkness provided an initial proffer to AUSA Calloway and the CES investigation team on July 15, 2022, outlining the preliminary findings of the internal investigation and identifying the principal categories of concern. A supplemental proffer was provided on November 20, 2022, updating the Department on additional findings developed during the second phase of the document review and the second round of witness interviews. The present transmittal of the Report represents the culmination of this cooperative process.
B. Remediation Efforts
Dunmore has undertaken substantial remediation efforts, which are ongoing. On December 15, 2022, the company retained Pemberton Investors Solutions LLC, an independent compliance consulting firm led by Dr. Anton Bremer, a recognized expert in sanctions and export controls compliance program design and implementation, to design an enhanced sanctions and export controls compliance program tailored to the specific risk profile of Dunmore's global operations.
Marlowe Asset Management's engagement encompasses a comprehensive reassessment of Dunmore's compliance architecture, including: organizational structure and governance; policies and procedures; sanctions screening and counterparty due diligence tools and processes; trade compliance and export licensing procedures; training and awareness programs; internal audit and testing protocols; and whistleblower and escalation mechanisms. Marlowe Asset Management's remediation report and the enhanced compliance program framework are expected to be completed in the near term, and Dunmore intends to deliver them to the Department in a subsequent submission.
C. Forthcoming Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Disgorgement
Dunmore further intends to file a voluntary self-disclosure with OFAC regarding the transactions identified in the Report. The VSD is currently being prepared by Calderwood & Harkness and is expected to be filed in the coming weeks. The company believes that its voluntary self-disclosure, combined with its full cooperation with the Department and its remediation efforts, reflects the seriousness with which Dunmore regards the identified conduct.
In addition, Dunmore is prepared to discuss with the Department the voluntary disgorgement of profits derived from the tainted transactions identified in the Report. Ridgeline's forensic accounting analysis includes a calculation of the net profits attributable to the suspect trading activity, and Calderwood & Harkness is available to discuss the methodology and figures with the Department at its convenience.
VIII. Privilege Reservation
The Report is provided to the Department pursuant to the selective waiver protocol established in Calderwood & Harkness's memorandum to AUSA Calloway dated July 1, 2022, and acknowledged by the Department in correspondence dated July 8, 2022. That protocol provides that the disclosure of privileged materials to the Department in connection with this investigation is made on a limited and selective basis and does not operate as a general waiver of privilege.
Accordingly, Dunmore and Calderwood & Harkness wish to make clear that the transmittal of the Report to the Department does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine as to any third party. Dunmore expressly reserves all privileges and protections, including but not limited to the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, vis-à-vis all third parties, including but not limited to:
(a) private litigants and potential civil claimants;
(b) regulatory agencies other than the Department and OFAC;
(c) foreign governmental authorities and regulators, including authorities in the UAE, Germany, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands; and
(d) any other persons or entities not party to the selective waiver protocol.
Nothing in the Report or in this transmittal letter shall be construed as a waiver, in whole or in part, of any applicable privilege or protection, except as expressly set forth in the selective waiver protocol.
IX. Confidentiality Request
Dunmore respectfully requests that the Department treat the Report and all of its contents as confidential in accordance with the Department's standard practices for the handling of materials provided by cooperating parties. The Report contains proprietary business information of Dunmore and its subsidiaries, including commercially sensitive trading data, financial information, counterparty details, and internal operational information that constitutes trade secrets.
In addition, the Report contains personal data and information that may be subject to data protection and privacy regulations in multiple jurisdictions, including the United Arab Emirates (Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 on the Protection of Personal Data), the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz and the EU General Data Protection Regulation), the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Nigeria Data Protection Regulation 2019), and the United Kingdom (UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018).
Dunmore respectfully requests that the Report not be disclosed to any third party — including other government agencies, foreign authorities, or private parties — without prior written notice to Calderwood & Harkness, so that Dunmore may have the opportunity to assert any applicable privileges, protections, or objections.
X. Availability for Discussion
The undersigned, together with Jasmine Thornton, Conrad Reeves, and other members of the Calderwood & Harkness investigation team, are available to discuss the Report's findings, methodology, and conclusions at the Department's convenience. We would welcome the opportunity to arrange a detailed presentation or walkthrough of the Report for AUSA Calloway, Trial Attorney Kovacs, Trial Attorney Pressman, and Special Agent Paul Reinhardt (FBI Counterintelligence Division), at a time and place convenient to the Department.
We are also prepared to address any follow-up questions, to facilitate additional witness interviews as the Department may request, and to discuss the remediation and disgorgement matters referenced above.
I can be reached directly at the contact information set forth in the letterhead above, and our offices are located at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006. Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.
XI. Enclosures
The following materials are enclosed with this letter:
1. Internal Investigation Report of Calderwood & Harkness LLP Regarding Dunmore Energy Holdings Ltd. — Comprehensive Findings and Recommendations (176 pages; two bound hard copies, marked "Copy 1 of 2" and "Copy 2 of 2");
2. Encrypted USB drive containing a searchable PDF version of the Report (decryption password transmitted separately); and
3. Index of Exhibits and Appendices referenced in the Report, including a master table of exhibits, appendices, and supporting schedules.
We wish to express our sincere appreciation for the professionalism, thoroughness, and constructive engagement that you, Trial Attorney Kovacs, Trial Attorney Pressman, and the entire CES investigation team have demonstrated throughout this process. Dunmore values the opportunity to cooperate with the Department and is committed to continued cooperation and full remediation of the identified conduct. The company remains resolved to ensure that its global operations are conducted in strict compliance with all applicable U.S. sanctions and export control laws.
We look forward to discussing the Report with you and your colleagues at your earliest convenience.
Respectfully submitted,
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP
By: ________
Victoria Chambers Partner, White Collar Defense & Investigations Calderwood & Harkness LLP 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 555-7418
Email: vchambers@calderwoodharkness.com
Matter No. 1016-00009
cc: Samuel Kovacs, Trial Attorney, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice (via electronic transmission)
Diana Pressman, Trial Attorney, Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice (via electronic transmission)
Enclosures (as noted above)

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — SUBJECT TO SELECTIVE WAIVER PROTOCOL NOT A WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE AS TO THIRD PARTIES

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