1017-00004 · Entities. Aurelius Global Media Group · Pleadings/Class Action

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CONFIDENTIAL — DRAFT FOR FILING

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP Devon Archer (SBN 301462) darcher@calderwoodharkness.com Katherine M. Reyes (SBN 287915) kreyes@calderwoodharkness.com 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-7800 Facsimile: (213) 443-7801

Attorneys for Defendant AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT

DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES — CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 *ET SEQ.*)

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. ("AMA") hereby demurs to the Seventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the "UCL Claim") set forth in the Complaint of Plaintiff Marisol Fuentes ("Plaintiff" or "Fuentes"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). This Demurrer is brought pursuant to section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, on the grounds set forth below.

This Demurrer is brought on the following grounds:

1. The UCL Claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against AMA, in that the claim is entirely derivative of the first six causes of action — all of which arise under the California Labor Code — and alleges no independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that would support a standalone UCL claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)

2. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the UCL Claim because they have not alleged with specificity that they suffered "injury in fact" and "lost money or property" as a result of any unfair business practice independent of the Labor Code violations alleged in the predicate causes of action. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)

3. The UCL Claim is uncertain and ambiguous in that it fails to specify whether it is brought under the "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" prong of section 17200 and fails to allege facts specific to any prong, thereby depriving AMA of fair notice of the theory or theories it must defend against. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).)

This Demurrer is based on this notice of motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities to be filed concurrently herewith, the Declaration of Gregory Tanaka to be filed concurrently herewith, the Complaint and all exhibits thereto, the complete files and records of this action, and such other matters as may be presented to the Court at or before the hearing on this Demurrer.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. THE UCL CLAIM FAILS TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION (CODE CIV. PROC. § 430.10, SUBD. (e))

A. The UCL Claim Is Entirely Derivative of the Labor Code Causes of Action and Adds Nothing to the Litigation

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the Court accepts as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) A cause of action that merely restates factual allegations already set forth in other causes of action, without identifying any independent basis for relief, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is properly subject to demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).

Plaintiffs' UCL Claim is wholly derivative of the first six causes of action alleged in the Complaint. Each of those predicate causes of action arises exclusively under the California Labor Code and addresses specific wage-and-hour violations. The six predicate causes of action are as follows:

First Cause of Action: Failure to provide compliant meal periods in violation of California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512. The Complaint alleges that AMA failed to provide Plaintiff and the putative class with timely, uninterrupted, duty-free meal periods of not less than thirty (30) minutes, and that AMA's timekeeping system automatically deducted meal period time from employee records regardless of whether compliant meal periods were actually provided.

Second Cause of Action: Failure to provide compliant rest periods in violation of California Labor Code section 226.7. The Complaint alleges that AMA failed to authorize and permit Plaintiff and the putative class to take rest periods of not less than ten (10) minutes for every four hours worked, or major fraction thereof, and that AMA's production schedules and staffing levels made it impracticable for employees to take compliant rest periods.

Third Cause of Action: Failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of California Labor Code sections 510 and 1194. The Complaint alleges that AMA required Plaintiff and the putative class to perform work in excess of eight hours per day and/or forty hours per week without paying overtime compensation at the rates required by law, including by failing to account for off-the-clock work performed during pre-production and wrap periods.

Fourth Cause of Action: Failure to pay minimum wage in violation of California Labor Code sections 1197 and 1197.1. The Complaint alleges that, when all hours actually worked — including off-the-clock time — are taken into account, AMA failed to compensate certain class members at or above the applicable minimum wage rate.

Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of California Labor Code section 226. The Complaint alleges that AMA's wage statements did not accurately reflect total hours worked, the applicable rates of pay, gross wages earned, or net wages paid, due to the systematic underreporting of hours and the automatic meal period deduction practices alleged above.

Sixth Cause of Action: Waiting time penalties under California Labor Code sections 201 through 203. The Complaint alleges that AMA willfully failed to pay all wages due to Plaintiff and other class members upon separation from employment, thereby triggering the penalty provisions of Labor Code section 203.

The Seventh Cause of Action — the UCL Claim at issue in this Demurrer — does not allege any independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that is separate and distinct from the wage-and-hour violations described in the first six causes of action. Instead, the UCL Claim incorporates by reference the entirety of the preceding allegations and then states, in a single conclusory paragraph, that AMA's practices constitute "unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent" business acts within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. This is precisely the sort of derivative UCL pleading that courts have recognized adds nothing to the litigation.

The California Supreme Court has made clear that a UCL claim predicated on violations of other statutes is derivative in nature and is subject to the same defenses as the underlying statutory claims. In Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 178, the Court explained that a UCL claim based on Labor Code violations does not create independent substantive rights, but rather provides an additional procedural vehicle through which violations of other laws may be remedied — and that such a claim necessarily rises or falls with the predicate statutory violations. Where, as here, the Complaint identifies no business practice that is independently actionable under the UCL apart from the same conduct already challenged under the Labor Code, the UCL Claim is duplicative and should be dismissed.

Similarly, in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 182, the California Supreme Court emphasized that a UCL claim must identify an independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent act or practice. The Court recognized that the UCL's broad scope does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to allege facts establishing that the defendant's conduct falls within one of the statute's three prongs. A plaintiff may not simply allege violations of other statutes and then conclusorily assert that those same violations also constitute unfair business practices under the UCL without articulating some independent basis for the claim.

Here, Plaintiffs have done nothing more than repackage their Labor Code claims under the UCL umbrella. The Complaint does not identify any separate business practice — whether related to AMA's marketing, pricing, competitive conduct, consumer-facing representations, or any other aspect of its operations — that would independently support a UCL claim. The UCL Claim is, in every material respect, a duplication of the first six causes of action.

Furthermore, the Labor Code provisions cited in the first six causes of action provide comprehensive statutory remedies for the very same conduct that Plaintiffs challenge under the UCL. Those remedies include: meal and rest period premium pay under Labor Code section 226.7; overtime and minimum wage recovery under Labor Code sections 510, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; wage statement penalties under Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e); and waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203. These statutory remedies are specifically tailored to address the precise types of wage-and-hour violations alleged in the Complaint and provide Plaintiffs with a comprehensive framework for recovery.

The UCL adds only one potential additional remedy beyond those already available under the Labor Code: restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17203. Critically, however, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that restitution would provide relief that is different from, or in addition to, the statutory damages, premiums, and penalties already available under the Labor Code. The statutory schemes invoked in the first six causes of action already contemplate the return of unpaid wages, the payment of premium wages for meal and rest period violations, and the imposition of penalties for noncompliance. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek the return of wages owed, those amounts are fully recoverable under the Labor Code itself. The UCL Claim thus provides no independent or additional avenue of recovery.

Because the UCL Claim is entirely derivative, does not allege any independent basis for liability, and does not offer any remedy beyond what is already available under the Labor Code, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and should be dismissed.

B. No Independent Theory of Liability or Factual Basis Supports the UCL Claim

Beyond its derivative character, the UCL Claim fails because the Complaint does not allege any independent factual basis that would support UCL liability apart from the Labor Code violations. A review of the specific factual allegations incorporated into the UCL Claim confirms this deficiency.

The Complaint's factual allegations supporting the UCL Claim are identical to those underlying the first six causes of action. They consist principally of the following:

(a) AMA's use of the "TimeTrack Pro" automated timekeeping system, which the Complaint alleges was configured to automatically deduct thirty (30) minutes from each employee's daily time record for a meal period, regardless of whether the employee actually received a compliant, uninterrupted, duty-free meal break. The Complaint alleges that this auto-deduction feature resulted in underreporting of hours worked and, consequently, underpayment of wages.

(b) AMA's meal and rest break practices, which the Complaint alleges failed to provide employees with timely, compliant meal periods and authorized rest periods, particularly during high-volume production periods.

(c) Alleged off-the-clock work performed by employees during pre-production setup and post-production wrap periods, which the Complaint alleges was not recorded in the TimeTrack Pro system and was not compensated.

(d) Alleged failure to pay overtime compensation at the required rates for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day and/or forty hours per week, resulting from the underreporting of hours described above.

(e) Alleged inaccuracies in wage statements provided to employees, which the Complaint alleges failed to reflect total hours actually worked, applicable rates of pay, and accurate gross and net wage figures.

Each of these factual allegations is already fully incorporated into, and forms the basis of, one or more of the first six causes of action. No separate business practice is identified anywhere in the Complaint that would constitute an independent basis for UCL liability. The Complaint does not allege, for example, that AMA engaged in deceptive advertising, misleading consumer-facing conduct, anticompetitive practices, or any other business activity that would be independently actionable under the UCL. The factual predicate for the UCL Claim is, in all material respects, coextensive with the factual predicate for the Labor Code claims.

AMA is a Delaware corporation qualified to do business in the State of California, with its principal office located at 8500 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 1400, West Hollywood, California 90069. AMA employs approximately 2,400 employees in California across seven production facilities. While these facts establish the scope and nature of AMA's operations in California, they do not support any independent UCL theory. The mere fact that AMA is a large employer conducting business in California does not, standing alone, give rise to UCL liability. Rather, a plaintiff must identify specific conduct that constitutes an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice. Plaintiffs have not done so.

The derivative nature of the UCL Claim is further confirmed by the identity of the putative class definition. The Complaint defines the putative class as approximately 1,850 non-exempt, hourly employees who worked at AMA's California facilities during the relevant period. This class is defined identically for both the Labor Code causes of action and the UCL Claim. The same class of employees, the same time period, the same conduct, and the same injuries form the basis of both sets of claims. This overlap confirms that the UCL Claim is not premised on any independent theory of liability, but is merely a restatement of the Labor Code claims under a different statutory heading.

Because no independent theory of liability or factual basis supports the UCL Claim, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and should be dismissed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).

II. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING UNDER THE UCL (BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204)

Even if the UCL Claim were not deficient as a derivative pleading, it must be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue it. Following the passage of Proposition 64 in November 2004, the California electorate substantially restricted standing to bring private UCL actions. As amended by Proposition 64, Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides that a private plaintiff may bring a UCL claim only if she "has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition." (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.) This standing requirement has two components: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" — that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized; and (2) the plaintiff must have "lost money or property" — that is, she must have been deprived of money or property to which she had a cognizable claim, or must have parted with money or property in reliance on the defendant's unfair practices. (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322-323.)

Named Plaintiff Marisol Fuentes was employed by AMA as a Production Coordinator in AMA's Unscripted Programming Division from approximately March 14, 2019 through August 5, 2022, at an hourly rate of $28.50 per hour at the time of her separation. The Complaint alleges that Fuentes was subject to the same meal period, rest period, timekeeping, and wage payment practices described above, and that she suffered wage losses as a result. However, Plaintiff Fuentes has not alleged with the requisite specificity that she "lost money or property" as a direct result of any unfair business practice that is independent of the Labor Code violations alleged in the first six causes of action.

To satisfy the standing requirements of section 17204, a plaintiff must do more than merely recite the statutory language of the UCL standing provision. She must allege facts demonstrating that she suffered a cognizable economic injury that is causally connected to the specific unfair business practice challenged under the UCL. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 322.) Here, the only economic injuries alleged in the Complaint are the same wage losses — unpaid meal and rest period premiums, unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages, wage statement penalties, and waiting time penalties — that form the basis of the first through sixth causes of action. To the extent Plaintiffs' UCL Claim is predicated solely on these same wage losses, the UCL Claim is duplicative and unnecessary. It provides no independent basis for recovery and does not identify any separate economic injury that would independently confer standing under section 17204.

Standing under the UCL requires a causal connection between the alleged unfair business practice and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 326-327.) Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating that AMA engaged in any business practice — apart from the payroll and scheduling practices already challenged under the Labor Code — that independently caused them to lose money or property. The Complaint does not allege, for example, that AMA made misrepresentations that induced Plaintiffs to accept employment, that AMA engaged in deceptive practices that caused Plaintiffs to forgo alternative employment opportunities, or that AMA's conduct caused any economic harm beyond the wage losses already captured by the Labor Code claims. Absent such allegations, Plaintiffs cannot establish the causal nexus required for standing under section 17204.

While AMA acknowledges that the standing standard under the UCL following Proposition 64 is not onerous and does not require the same degree of specificity as standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, Plaintiffs must nevertheless allege some injury attributable to the allegedly unfair business practice as such, rather than merely restating the identical injury alleged in the predicate statutory claims. (See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 322-323 [noting that the "lost money or property" requirement, while not demanding a showing of "specific damage," does require that the plaintiff identify money or property that she lost as a result of the unfair competition].) Plaintiffs have failed to meet even this threshold requirement with respect to the UCL Claim.

Because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing standing independent of their Labor Code claims, the UCL Claim should be dismissed for lack of standing under Business and Professions Code section 17204.

III. THE UCL CLAIM IS UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS (CODE CIV. PROC. § 430.10, SUBD. (f))

Independently of the foregoing grounds, the UCL Claim is subject to demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), because it is uncertain and ambiguous. A demurrer for uncertainty lies where a pleading is so unintelligible or ambiguous that the responding party cannot reasonably determine the issues to be addressed or the theories of liability being advanced. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) While the standard for sustaining a demurrer on grounds of uncertainty is strict, it is satisfied where the pleading fails to apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful response.

Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines "unfair competition" to include "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." These three prongs — unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent — establish distinct and independent bases for liability, each with its own elements, standards, and defenses. (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 180.) A plaintiff bringing a UCL claim must identify which prong or prongs form the basis of the claim and must allege facts specific to each prong invoked. (Id. at pp. 180-182.)

Plaintiffs' UCL Claim fails to specify whether it is brought under the "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" prong of section 17200. Instead, the Complaint alleges in a single conclusory paragraph that AMA's practices were "unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent" — invoking all three prongs simultaneously — without identifying which prong supports the claim or alleging facts specific to any prong. This "kitchen sink" approach to UCL pleading renders the claim uncertain and ambiguous and fails to provide AMA with fair notice of the theory or theories it must defend against.

A. Analysis of Each Prong Demonstrates the Deficiency of the Pleading

A prong-by-prong analysis of the UCL Claim confirms that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support the claim under any of the three statutory prongs, and that the failure to specify the operative prong renders the pleading fatally uncertain.

The "Unlawful" Prong. A UCL claim brought under the "unlawful" prong must identify a violation of some other law — whether statutory, regulatory, or common law — that serves as the predicate for the UCL violation. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) The "unlawful" prong "borrows" violations of other laws and treats them as independently actionable under the UCL. (Id.) Here, the only predicate violations identified in the Complaint are the Labor Code violations alleged in the first six causes of action. To the extent the UCL Claim is predicated on the "unlawful" prong, it is entirely derivative — it "borrows" the same violations already alleged in the first through sixth causes of action and repackages them as UCL violations, but adds no independent content or theory of liability. As discussed in Section I above, a purely derivative UCL claim that merely restates the predicate statutory violations fails to state an independent cause of action. The "unlawful" prong, therefore, does not provide an independent basis for the UCL Claim.

The "Unfair" Prong. A UCL claim brought under the "unfair" prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged practice violates an established public policy or is "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." (South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 886.) The "unfair" prong requires an inquiry that is distinct from, and broader than, the "unlawful" prong: a practice may be "unfair" even if it does not violate any specific statute, so long as it contravenes established public policy or meets the other criteria identified in the case law. (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187.) Conversely, however, a plaintiff invoking the "unfair" prong must identify the specific practice that is allegedly unfair and must allege facts supporting the conclusion that the practice meets the applicable standard. Plaintiffs have not done so here. The Complaint does not identify any practice that is separately "unfair" apart from the specific wage-and-hour violations already challenged under the Labor Code. No separate allegation of a practice that violates public policy, or that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious, is set forth in the Complaint. The "unfair" prong therefore provides no independent basis for the UCL Claim.

The "Fraudulent" Prong. A UCL claim brought under the "fraudulent" prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged practice is "likely to deceive" members of the public. (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211.) The "fraudulent" prong does not require proof of common law fraud elements such as actual reliance or intent to defraud, but it does require allegations that the challenged practice involves some form of deception — that is, conduct that is likely to mislead a reasonable person. (Id. at pp. 211-212.) Here, no allegations of deception appear anywhere in the Complaint. The UCL Claim is based entirely on payroll practices, timekeeping systems, and meal and rest break scheduling — not on any affirmative misrepresentation, omission, or deceptive conduct directed at the public or at AMA's employees. The Complaint does not allege that AMA made any false or misleading statements, that AMA concealed material information, or that AMA's conduct was likely to deceive any person or entity. The "fraudulent" prong therefore provides no basis whatsoever for the UCL Claim.

B. The Failure to Specify the Operative Prong Deprives AMA of Fair Notice

By invoking all three prongs of section 17200 without specifying which prong or prongs form the basis of the claim, Plaintiffs force AMA to defend against three distinct legal theories — each with its own elements, standards, and defenses — with no guidance as to which theory is actually operative. This is precisely the type of vague and uncertain pleading that a demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), is designed to address.

The Court of Appeal's decision in Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, is directly on point. In Khoury, the court sustained a demurrer to a UCL claim that failed to identify the specific "unfair" practice with sufficient particularity. The court emphasized that a plaintiff bringing a UCL claim must provide the defendant with fair notice of the theory of liability being asserted, and that a pleading that merely recites the statutory language of section 17200 without alleging facts specific to the operative prong is deficient.

The same deficiency is present here. The Complaint's conclusory allegation that AMA's practices were "unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent" does not provide AMA with fair notice of the theory or theories it must defend against. It does not identify whether Plaintiffs contend that the challenged practices are independently "unlawful" (and if so, what law beyond the Labor Code they violate), independently "unfair" (and if so, what public policy they contravene or how they are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious), or independently "fraudulent" (and if so, what deceptive conduct is alleged). The uncertainty created by this pleading approach renders the UCL Claim deficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), and warrants sustaining the Demurrer on that independent ground.

IV. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. respectfully requests that this Court sustain the Demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. without leave to amend. The UCL Claim is entirely derivative of the Labor Code causes of action alleged in the first six causes of action of the Complaint, alleges no independent theory of liability or factual basis, and cannot be cured by amendment because the fundamental deficiency — the absence of any independent unfair business practice apart from the predicate wage-and-hour violations — is inherent in the structure of the Complaint.

In the alternative, if the Court is inclined to grant leave to amend, AMA respectfully requests that such leave be limited to twenty (20) days from the date of the Court's order, and that any amended pleading be required to specify the particular prong or prongs of section 17200 under which the UCL Claim is brought and to allege facts specific to each such prong.

Defendant respectfully refers the Court to the concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Gregory Tanaka, which are being filed as companion documents in support of this Demurrer.

AMA is represented in this action by Calderwood & Harkness LLP, 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017.

DATED: December 19, 2022

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

By: ________

Devon Archer (SBN 301462) Katherine M. Reyes (SBN 287915) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-7800

Attorneys for Defendant AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.

INTERNAL DRAFT NOTATION — NOT FOR FILING

This is a working draft for internal review and client comment and has not yet been filed with the Court. The Demurrer was prepared in anticipation of filing following service of the Complaint. The companion Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Document 28) and Declaration of Gregory Tanaka (Document 29) are being prepared concurrently and will be circulated for review under separate cover. Filing is to be coordinated with the overall pleading strategy, including the timeline for the Answer, the anticipated consolidation motion, and any meet-and-confer obligations under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. All comments and revisions should be directed to D. Archer or K. Reyes by December 16, 2022.

MARISOL FUENTES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	Case No.: 22STCV38214
Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES — CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 ET SEQ.)

Hearing Date: To Be Determined

AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Dept.: 34

Defendants.

Complaint Filed: October 12, 2022

CONFIDENTIAL — DRAFT FOR FILING
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP Devon Archer (SBN 301462) darcher@calderwoodharkness.com Katherine M. Reyes (SBN 287915) kreyes@calderwoodharkness.com 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-7800 Facsimile: (213) 443-7801
Attorneys for Defendant AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES — CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 *ET SEQ.*)
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. ("AMA") hereby demurs to the Seventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (the "UCL Claim") set forth in the Complaint of Plaintiff Marisol Fuentes ("Plaintiff" or "Fuentes"), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). This Demurrer is brought pursuant to section 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, on the grounds set forth below.
This Demurrer is brought on the following grounds:
1. The UCL Claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against AMA, in that the claim is entirely derivative of the first six causes of action — all of which arise under the California Labor Code — and alleges no independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that would support a standalone UCL claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)
2. Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the UCL Claim because they have not alleged with specificity that they suffered "injury in fact" and "lost money or property" as a result of any unfair business practice independent of the Labor Code violations alleged in the predicate causes of action. (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)
3. The UCL Claim is uncertain and ambiguous in that it fails to specify whether it is brought under the "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" prong of section 17200 and fails to allege facts specific to any prong, thereby depriving AMA of fair notice of the theory or theories it must defend against. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).)
This Demurrer is based on this notice of motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities to be filed concurrently herewith, the Declaration of Gregory Tanaka to be filed concurrently herewith, the Complaint and all exhibits thereto, the complete files and records of this action, and such other matters as may be presented to the Court at or before the hearing on this Demurrer.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE UCL CLAIM FAILS TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION (CODE CIV. PROC. § 430.10, SUBD. (e))
A. The UCL Claim Is Entirely Derivative of the Labor Code Causes of Action and Adds Nothing to the Litigation
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) In evaluating a demurrer, the Court accepts as true all material facts properly pleaded, but does not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) A cause of action that merely restates factual allegations already set forth in other causes of action, without identifying any independent basis for relief, fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is properly subject to demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
Plaintiffs' UCL Claim is wholly derivative of the first six causes of action alleged in the Complaint. Each of those predicate causes of action arises exclusively under the California Labor Code and addresses specific wage-and-hour violations. The six predicate causes of action are as follows:
First Cause of Action: Failure to provide compliant meal periods in violation of California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512. The Complaint alleges that AMA failed to provide Plaintiff and the putative class with timely, uninterrupted, duty-free meal periods of not less than thirty (30) minutes, and that AMA's timekeeping system automatically deducted meal period time from employee records regardless of whether compliant meal periods were actually provided.
Second Cause of Action: Failure to provide compliant rest periods in violation of California Labor Code section 226.7. The Complaint alleges that AMA failed to authorize and permit Plaintiff and the putative class to take rest periods of not less than ten (10) minutes for every four hours worked, or major fraction thereof, and that AMA's production schedules and staffing levels made it impracticable for employees to take compliant rest periods.
Third Cause of Action: Failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of California Labor Code sections 510 and 1194. The Complaint alleges that AMA required Plaintiff and the putative class to perform work in excess of eight hours per day and/or forty hours per week without paying overtime compensation at the rates required by law, including by failing to account for off-the-clock work performed during pre-production and wrap periods.
Fourth Cause of Action: Failure to pay minimum wage in violation of California Labor Code sections 1197 and 1197.1. The Complaint alleges that, when all hours actually worked — including off-the-clock time — are taken into account, AMA failed to compensate certain class members at or above the applicable minimum wage rate.
Fifth Cause of Action: Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of California Labor Code section 226. The Complaint alleges that AMA's wage statements did not accurately reflect total hours worked, the applicable rates of pay, gross wages earned, or net wages paid, due to the systematic underreporting of hours and the automatic meal period deduction practices alleged above.
Sixth Cause of Action: Waiting time penalties under California Labor Code sections 201 through 203. The Complaint alleges that AMA willfully failed to pay all wages due to Plaintiff and other class members upon separation from employment, thereby triggering the penalty provisions of Labor Code section 203.
The Seventh Cause of Action — the UCL Claim at issue in this Demurrer — does not allege any independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that is separate and distinct from the wage-and-hour violations described in the first six causes of action. Instead, the UCL Claim incorporates by reference the entirety of the preceding allegations and then states, in a single conclusory paragraph, that AMA's practices constitute "unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent" business acts within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. This is precisely the sort of derivative UCL pleading that courts have recognized adds nothing to the litigation.
The California Supreme Court has made clear that a UCL claim predicated on violations of other statutes is derivative in nature and is subject to the same defenses as the underlying statutory claims. In Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 178, the Court explained that a UCL claim based on Labor Code violations does not create independent substantive rights, but rather provides an additional procedural vehicle through which violations of other laws may be remedied — and that such a claim necessarily rises or falls with the predicate statutory violations. Where, as here, the Complaint identifies no business practice that is independently actionable under the UCL apart from the same conduct already challenged under the Labor Code, the UCL Claim is duplicative and should be dismissed.
Similarly, in Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 182, the California Supreme Court emphasized that a UCL claim must identify an independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent act or practice. The Court recognized that the UCL's broad scope does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to allege facts establishing that the defendant's conduct falls within one of the statute's three prongs. A plaintiff may not simply allege violations of other statutes and then conclusorily assert that those same violations also constitute unfair business practices under the UCL without articulating some independent basis for the claim.
Here, Plaintiffs have done nothing more than repackage their Labor Code claims under the UCL umbrella. The Complaint does not identify any separate business practice — whether related to AMA's marketing, pricing, competitive conduct, consumer-facing representations, or any other aspect of its operations — that would independently support a UCL claim. The UCL Claim is, in every material respect, a duplication of the first six causes of action.
Furthermore, the Labor Code provisions cited in the first six causes of action provide comprehensive statutory remedies for the very same conduct that Plaintiffs challenge under the UCL. Those remedies include: meal and rest period premium pay under Labor Code section 226.7; overtime and minimum wage recovery under Labor Code sections 510, 1194, 1197, and 1197.1; wage statement penalties under Labor Code section 226, subdivision (e); and waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203. These statutory remedies are specifically tailored to address the precise types of wage-and-hour violations alleged in the Complaint and provide Plaintiffs with a comprehensive framework for recovery.
The UCL adds only one potential additional remedy beyond those already available under the Labor Code: restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17203. Critically, however, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing that restitution would provide relief that is different from, or in addition to, the statutory damages, premiums, and penalties already available under the Labor Code. The statutory schemes invoked in the first six causes of action already contemplate the return of unpaid wages, the payment of premium wages for meal and rest period violations, and the imposition of penalties for noncompliance. To the extent that Plaintiffs seek the return of wages owed, those amounts are fully recoverable under the Labor Code itself. The UCL Claim thus provides no independent or additional avenue of recovery.
Because the UCL Claim is entirely derivative, does not allege any independent basis for liability, and does not offer any remedy beyond what is already available under the Labor Code, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and should be dismissed.
B. No Independent Theory of Liability or Factual Basis Supports the UCL Claim
Beyond its derivative character, the UCL Claim fails because the Complaint does not allege any independent factual basis that would support UCL liability apart from the Labor Code violations. A review of the specific factual allegations incorporated into the UCL Claim confirms this deficiency.
The Complaint's factual allegations supporting the UCL Claim are identical to those underlying the first six causes of action. They consist principally of the following:
(a) AMA's use of the "TimeTrack Pro" automated timekeeping system, which the Complaint alleges was configured to automatically deduct thirty (30) minutes from each employee's daily time record for a meal period, regardless of whether the employee actually received a compliant, uninterrupted, duty-free meal break. The Complaint alleges that this auto-deduction feature resulted in underreporting of hours worked and, consequently, underpayment of wages.
(b) AMA's meal and rest break practices, which the Complaint alleges failed to provide employees with timely, compliant meal periods and authorized rest periods, particularly during high-volume production periods.
(c) Alleged off-the-clock work performed by employees during pre-production setup and post-production wrap periods, which the Complaint alleges was not recorded in the TimeTrack Pro system and was not compensated.
(d) Alleged failure to pay overtime compensation at the required rates for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day and/or forty hours per week, resulting from the underreporting of hours described above.
(e) Alleged inaccuracies in wage statements provided to employees, which the Complaint alleges failed to reflect total hours actually worked, applicable rates of pay, and accurate gross and net wage figures.
Each of these factual allegations is already fully incorporated into, and forms the basis of, one or more of the first six causes of action. No separate business practice is identified anywhere in the Complaint that would constitute an independent basis for UCL liability. The Complaint does not allege, for example, that AMA engaged in deceptive advertising, misleading consumer-facing conduct, anticompetitive practices, or any other business activity that would be independently actionable under the UCL. The factual predicate for the UCL Claim is, in all material respects, coextensive with the factual predicate for the Labor Code claims.
AMA is a Delaware corporation qualified to do business in the State of California, with its principal office located at 8500 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 1400, West Hollywood, California 90069. AMA employs approximately 2,400 employees in California across seven production facilities. While these facts establish the scope and nature of AMA's operations in California, they do not support any independent UCL theory. The mere fact that AMA is a large employer conducting business in California does not, standing alone, give rise to UCL liability. Rather, a plaintiff must identify specific conduct that constitutes an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice. Plaintiffs have not done so.
The derivative nature of the UCL Claim is further confirmed by the identity of the putative class definition. The Complaint defines the putative class as approximately 1,850 non-exempt, hourly employees who worked at AMA's California facilities during the relevant period. This class is defined identically for both the Labor Code causes of action and the UCL Claim. The same class of employees, the same time period, the same conduct, and the same injuries form the basis of both sets of claims. This overlap confirms that the UCL Claim is not premised on any independent theory of liability, but is merely a restatement of the Labor Code claims under a different statutory heading.
Because no independent theory of liability or factual basis supports the UCL Claim, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and should be dismissed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).
II. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING UNDER THE UCL (BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204)
Even if the UCL Claim were not deficient as a derivative pleading, it must be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue it. Following the passage of Proposition 64 in November 2004, the California electorate substantially restricted standing to bring private UCL actions. As amended by Proposition 64, Business and Professions Code section 17204 provides that a private plaintiff may bring a UCL claim only if she "has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition." (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204.) This standing requirement has two components: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" — that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized; and (2) the plaintiff must have "lost money or property" — that is, she must have been deprived of money or property to which she had a cognizable claim, or must have parted with money or property in reliance on the defendant's unfair practices. (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322-323.)
Named Plaintiff Marisol Fuentes was employed by AMA as a Production Coordinator in AMA's Unscripted Programming Division from approximately March 14, 2019 through August 5, 2022, at an hourly rate of $28.50 per hour at the time of her separation. The Complaint alleges that Fuentes was subject to the same meal period, rest period, timekeeping, and wage payment practices described above, and that she suffered wage losses as a result. However, Plaintiff Fuentes has not alleged with the requisite specificity that she "lost money or property" as a direct result of any unfair business practice that is independent of the Labor Code violations alleged in the first six causes of action.
To satisfy the standing requirements of section 17204, a plaintiff must do more than merely recite the statutory language of the UCL standing provision. She must allege facts demonstrating that she suffered a cognizable economic injury that is causally connected to the specific unfair business practice challenged under the UCL. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 322.) Here, the only economic injuries alleged in the Complaint are the same wage losses — unpaid meal and rest period premiums, unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages, wage statement penalties, and waiting time penalties — that form the basis of the first through sixth causes of action. To the extent Plaintiffs' UCL Claim is predicated solely on these same wage losses, the UCL Claim is duplicative and unnecessary. It provides no independent basis for recovery and does not identify any separate economic injury that would independently confer standing under section 17204.
Standing under the UCL requires a causal connection between the alleged unfair business practice and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 326-327.) Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating that AMA engaged in any business practice — apart from the payroll and scheduling practices already challenged under the Labor Code — that independently caused them to lose money or property. The Complaint does not allege, for example, that AMA made misrepresentations that induced Plaintiffs to accept employment, that AMA engaged in deceptive practices that caused Plaintiffs to forgo alternative employment opportunities, or that AMA's conduct caused any economic harm beyond the wage losses already captured by the Labor Code claims. Absent such allegations, Plaintiffs cannot establish the causal nexus required for standing under section 17204.
While AMA acknowledges that the standing standard under the UCL following Proposition 64 is not onerous and does not require the same degree of specificity as standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, Plaintiffs must nevertheless allege some injury attributable to the allegedly unfair business practice as such, rather than merely restating the identical injury alleged in the predicate statutory claims. (See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 322-323 [noting that the "lost money or property" requirement, while not demanding a showing of "specific damage," does require that the plaintiff identify money or property that she lost as a result of the unfair competition].) Plaintiffs have failed to meet even this threshold requirement with respect to the UCL Claim.
Because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing standing independent of their Labor Code claims, the UCL Claim should be dismissed for lack of standing under Business and Professions Code section 17204.
III. THE UCL CLAIM IS UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS (CODE CIV. PROC. § 430.10, SUBD. (f))
Independently of the foregoing grounds, the UCL Claim is subject to demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), because it is uncertain and ambiguous. A demurrer for uncertainty lies where a pleading is so unintelligible or ambiguous that the responding party cannot reasonably determine the issues to be addressed or the theories of liability being advanced. (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) While the standard for sustaining a demurrer on grounds of uncertainty is strict, it is satisfied where the pleading fails to apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful response.
Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines "unfair competition" to include "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice." These three prongs — unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent — establish distinct and independent bases for liability, each with its own elements, standards, and defenses. (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 180.) A plaintiff bringing a UCL claim must identify which prong or prongs form the basis of the claim and must allege facts specific to each prong invoked. (Id. at pp. 180-182.)
Plaintiffs' UCL Claim fails to specify whether it is brought under the "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" prong of section 17200. Instead, the Complaint alleges in a single conclusory paragraph that AMA's practices were "unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent" — invoking all three prongs simultaneously — without identifying which prong supports the claim or alleging facts specific to any prong. This "kitchen sink" approach to UCL pleading renders the claim uncertain and ambiguous and fails to provide AMA with fair notice of the theory or theories it must defend against.
A. Analysis of Each Prong Demonstrates the Deficiency of the Pleading
A prong-by-prong analysis of the UCL Claim confirms that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support the claim under any of the three statutory prongs, and that the failure to specify the operative prong renders the pleading fatally uncertain.
The "Unlawful" Prong. A UCL claim brought under the "unlawful" prong must identify a violation of some other law — whether statutory, regulatory, or common law — that serves as the predicate for the UCL violation. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) The "unlawful" prong "borrows" violations of other laws and treats them as independently actionable under the UCL. (Id.) Here, the only predicate violations identified in the Complaint are the Labor Code violations alleged in the first six causes of action. To the extent the UCL Claim is predicated on the "unlawful" prong, it is entirely derivative — it "borrows" the same violations already alleged in the first through sixth causes of action and repackages them as UCL violations, but adds no independent content or theory of liability. As discussed in Section I above, a purely derivative UCL claim that merely restates the predicate statutory violations fails to state an independent cause of action. The "unlawful" prong, therefore, does not provide an independent basis for the UCL Claim.
The "Unfair" Prong. A UCL claim brought under the "unfair" prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged practice violates an established public policy or is "immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers." (South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 861, 886.) The "unfair" prong requires an inquiry that is distinct from, and broader than, the "unlawful" prong: a practice may be "unfair" even if it does not violate any specific statute, so long as it contravenes established public policy or meets the other criteria identified in the case law. (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187.) Conversely, however, a plaintiff invoking the "unfair" prong must identify the specific practice that is allegedly unfair and must allege facts supporting the conclusion that the practice meets the applicable standard. Plaintiffs have not done so here. The Complaint does not identify any practice that is separately "unfair" apart from the specific wage-and-hour violations already challenged under the Labor Code. No separate allegation of a practice that violates public policy, or that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious, is set forth in the Complaint. The "unfair" prong therefore provides no independent basis for the UCL Claim.
The "Fraudulent" Prong. A UCL claim brought under the "fraudulent" prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the challenged practice is "likely to deceive" members of the public. (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211.) The "fraudulent" prong does not require proof of common law fraud elements such as actual reliance or intent to defraud, but it does require allegations that the challenged practice involves some form of deception — that is, conduct that is likely to mislead a reasonable person. (Id. at pp. 211-212.) Here, no allegations of deception appear anywhere in the Complaint. The UCL Claim is based entirely on payroll practices, timekeeping systems, and meal and rest break scheduling — not on any affirmative misrepresentation, omission, or deceptive conduct directed at the public or at AMA's employees. The Complaint does not allege that AMA made any false or misleading statements, that AMA concealed material information, or that AMA's conduct was likely to deceive any person or entity. The "fraudulent" prong therefore provides no basis whatsoever for the UCL Claim.
B. The Failure to Specify the Operative Prong Deprives AMA of Fair Notice
By invoking all three prongs of section 17200 without specifying which prong or prongs form the basis of the claim, Plaintiffs force AMA to defend against three distinct legal theories — each with its own elements, standards, and defenses — with no guidance as to which theory is actually operative. This is precisely the type of vague and uncertain pleading that a demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), is designed to address.
The Court of Appeal's decision in Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616, is directly on point. In Khoury, the court sustained a demurrer to a UCL claim that failed to identify the specific "unfair" practice with sufficient particularity. The court emphasized that a plaintiff bringing a UCL claim must provide the defendant with fair notice of the theory of liability being asserted, and that a pleading that merely recites the statutory language of section 17200 without alleging facts specific to the operative prong is deficient.
The same deficiency is present here. The Complaint's conclusory allegation that AMA's practices were "unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent" does not provide AMA with fair notice of the theory or theories it must defend against. It does not identify whether Plaintiffs contend that the challenged practices are independently "unlawful" (and if so, what law beyond the Labor Code they violate), independently "unfair" (and if so, what public policy they contravene or how they are immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious), or independently "fraudulent" (and if so, what deceptive conduct is alleged). The uncertainty created by this pleading approach renders the UCL Claim deficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f), and warrants sustaining the Demurrer on that independent ground.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. respectfully requests that this Court sustain the Demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. without leave to amend. The UCL Claim is entirely derivative of the Labor Code causes of action alleged in the first six causes of action of the Complaint, alleges no independent theory of liability or factual basis, and cannot be cured by amendment because the fundamental deficiency — the absence of any independent unfair business practice apart from the predicate wage-and-hour violations — is inherent in the structure of the Complaint.
In the alternative, if the Court is inclined to grant leave to amend, AMA respectfully requests that such leave be limited to twenty (20) days from the date of the Court's order, and that any amended pleading be required to specify the particular prong or prongs of section 17200 under which the UCL Claim is brought and to allege facts specific to each such prong.
Defendant respectfully refers the Court to the concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the Declaration of Gregory Tanaka, which are being filed as companion documents in support of this Demurrer.
AMA is represented in this action by Calderwood & Harkness LLP, 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017.
DATED: December 19, 2022
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP
By: ________
Devon Archer (SBN 301462) Katherine M. Reyes (SBN 287915) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 443-7800
Attorneys for Defendant AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.
INTERNAL DRAFT NOTATION — NOT FOR FILING
This is a working draft for internal review and client comment and has not yet been filed with the Court. The Demurrer was prepared in anticipation of filing following service of the Complaint. The companion Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Document 28) and Declaration of Gregory Tanaka (Document 29) are being prepared concurrently and will be circulated for review under separate cover. Filing is to be coordinated with the overall pleading strategy, including the timeline for the Answer, the anticipated consolidation motion, and any meet-and-confer obligations under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. All comments and revisions should be directed to D. Archer or K. Reyes by December 16, 2022.
MARISOL FUENTES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, | Case No.: 22STCV38214
Plaintiff, | DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES — CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 *ET SEQ.*)
v.
Hearing Date: To Be Determined
AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, | Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: 34
Defendants. | Judge: Hon. Raymond Escobedo
Complaint Filed: October 12, 2022

CONFIDENTIAL — DRAFT FOR FILING

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

IV. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

Record

Parties

Dates

Amounts