1019-00001 · Haber Reinhardt Schlosser Partners · Hearing Preparation

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MEMORANDUM

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

TO: Theodore Langston, Partner; Vivienne St. Claire, Partner

FROM: Jeffrey Park, Associate

DATE: December 18, 2023

RE: Witness Preparation — Dr. Ingrid Vollmer, SVP Engineering & Manufacturing, Whitmore Aerospace LLC

MATTER: Defense of Whitmore Aerospace LLC in ICC Arbitration — ICC Case No. 27914/MHM

ENGAGEMENT NO.: 1019-00001

This memorandum is protected by the attorney-client privilege and constitutes attorney work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. It is intended solely for the use of the attorneys and authorized personnel of Sternfeld & Calloway LLP engaged in the above-referenced matter. Any unauthorized disclosure, copying, or distribution of this memorandum or its contents is strictly prohibited.

I. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

This memorandum outlines the preparation strategy for the direct examination and anticipated cross-examination of Dr. Ingrid Vollmer at the evidentiary hearing currently scheduled for January 8–12, 2024, at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Hearing Centre, New York, New York. The purpose of this memorandum is to ensure that Dr. Vollmer's testimony is thorough, consistent, and effectively positioned within the broader framework of Whitmore Aerospace LLC's ("WAL") defense in ICC Case No. 27914/MHM.

Dr. Vollmer serves as Senior Vice President of Engineering & Manufacturing at Whitmore Aerospace LLC, headquartered at 4200 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1100, Arlington, Virginia 22203. In that capacity, she oversees all quality-control inspection processes at WAL's primary manufacturing and receiving facility located at 8500 Coppermine Road, Manassas, Virginia 20110. Dr. Vollmer has held this role throughout the period relevant to the disputed events and possesses direct, personal knowledge of the facts and technical matters at the center of this arbitration.

Dr. Vollmer's testimony is critical to establishing the technical justification for WAL's rejection of fourteen (14) lots of Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings delivered by Kestrel Dynamics GmbH ("Kestrel") between March and September 2022. These rejections formed the factual predicate for WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause dated October 3, 2022, which Kestrel challenges as wrongful in this proceeding. Dr. Vollmer's testimony will demonstrate that each rejection was grounded in documented, objectively verifiable non-conformance with the contractual porosity specification set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3 — a specification that was published, incorporated into the Master Supply Agreement (the "MSA"), and consistently applied to all suppliers throughout the contract term.

Specifically, Dr. Vollmer will testify to the integrity and consistency of WAL's incoming inspection procedures under WAL-QCP-100, the engineering rationale underlying the porosity specifications set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, the inspection results for each of the fourteen rejected lots, and the cure process that preceded WAL's termination decision. Her testimony is intended to rebut Kestrel's central narrative — that WAL applied an unpublished, artificially stringent porosity tolerance of ≤0.15% to engineer pretextual rejections and manufacture a basis for termination.

Cross-examination of Dr. Vollmer will be conducted by Dr. Maximilian Haber (Lead Partner) and/or Katrin Schäfer (Senior Associate) of Haber Reinhardt Schlosser Partnerschaft mbB ("HRS"), counsel for Kestrel. Both are experienced international arbitration practitioners, and Dr. Haber in particular is known for a methodical and at times confrontational approach to technical witnesses. We should anticipate a well-prepared and aggressive cross-examination.

The Tribunal for this proceeding comprises:

• Prof. Dame Eleanor Fitzwilliam — Presiding Arbitrator

• Dr. Hans-Ulrich Perren — Claimant's co-arbitrator

• Hon. Robert A. Castillo — Respondent's co-arbitrator

This memorandum addresses Dr. Vollmer's background and qualifications, the key testimony topics for direct examination, anticipated cross-examination lines and suggested responses, key documentary exhibits, coordination with other witnesses, preparation logistics, and general witness guidelines.

II. WITNESS BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

A. Professional Background

Dr. Ingrid Vollmer holds a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Materials Science and Metallurgical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where her doctoral research focused on fatigue-life prediction models for titanium alloys used in aerospace propulsion systems. She also holds a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University and a Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Her academic credentials are well-established and directly relevant to the technical subject matter at issue in this proceeding.

Dr. Vollmer has approximately twenty-two years of professional experience in aerospace manufacturing, quality assurance, and engineering specification development. Prior to joining WAL, she held senior engineering positions at two major aerospace manufacturers, where she was responsible for materials qualification, incoming inspection protocol design, and supplier quality management. Her professional experience encompasses both military and commercial aerospace applications, and she has published peer-reviewed articles on titanium alloy microstructural analysis and non-destructive testing methodologies, though she will be testifying as a fact witness — not an expert witness — in this proceeding.

Dr. Vollmer joined Whitmore Aerospace LLC in 2014 in a senior engineering capacity, initially serving as Vice President of Engineering. She was promoted to her current role as Senior Vice President of Engineering & Manufacturing in 2017, approximately one year prior to the execution of the MSA with Kestrel. In her current role, she is directly responsible for the development and maintenance of WAL's engineering specifications — specifically, the WAL-SPEC-TH-401 through WAL-SPEC-TH-410 series governing turbine housing components — as well as the quality control procedures codified in WAL-QCP-100, WAL's comprehensive incoming inspection protocol. She oversees a team of approximately forty-five engineers, quality inspectors, and laboratory technicians at the Manassas facility.

Dr. Vollmer personally oversaw the quality-control disputes at issue in this arbitration. She has firsthand knowledge of the inspection procedures, the testing results, the rejection decisions, the cure correspondence with Kestrel, and the engineering assessments that informed WAL's termination decision. She is, in short, the individual within WAL who is best positioned to testify to the technical merits of WAL's position.

B. Role in the Disputed Events

Dr. Vollmer supervised the incoming inspection process for all of Kestrel's deliveries of Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings at the Manassas facility throughout the term of the MSA. During Contract Years 1 through 3 (CY1–CY3, approximately June 2018 through June 2021), the deliveries were generally compliant with WAL's specifications, and the commercial relationship between the parties proceeded without significant dispute. The quality failures that give rise to this arbitration emerged during Contract Year 4 (CY4, approximately June 2021 through the termination date of October 3, 2022).

Dr. Vollmer authorized or personally reviewed the rejection notices for the fourteen lots at issue in this proceeding, totaling 1,680 individual turbine housing units. These lots were delivered between March 7, 2022 (the first rejected lot, designated Lot KDG-2022-0307) and September 19, 2022 (the final rejected lot, designated Lot KDG-2022-0919). For each lot, Dr. Vollmer reviewed the incoming inspection data generated under WAL-QCP-100, confirmed that the lot failed to meet the contractual porosity specification, and authorized the issuance of a formal rejection notice accompanied by a detailed non-conformance report.

Dr. Vollmer was also intimately involved in the technical assessment leading to WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause, issued on October 3, 2022. The termination was invoked under Section 14.2(b) of the MSA, which permits termination for "Persistent Quality Failure," defined as three or more uncured rejections in any rolling twelve-month period. As discussed in greater detail below, seven of the fourteen rejected lots remained uncured after the expiration of the contractual cure period, well exceeding the Persistent Quality Failure threshold.

Throughout the relevant period, Dr. Vollmer coordinated closely with Gerald Huang, WAL's Vice President of Global Supply Chain Operations, on the rejection and cure process, as well as on communications with Kestrel. While Mr. Huang managed the commercial and procurement aspects of the supplier relationship, Dr. Vollmer provided the technical assessments and engineering judgments that informed WAL's quality decisions. Their testimony should be understood as complementary: Dr. Vollmer addresses the engineering and inspection dimensions, while Mr. Huang addresses supply-chain management, procurement strategy, and commercial communications.

III. KEY TESTIMONY TOPICS — DIRECT EXAMINATION

This section outlines the principal topics to be covered during Dr. Vollmer's direct examination, along with the key points she should convey on each topic. The order of topics below reflects the anticipated sequence of direct examination, though the examining attorney may adjust the order based on hearing dynamics and the Tribunal's preferences.

A. WAL's Quality Control Process Under WAL-QCP-100

Dr. Vollmer should begin by explaining WAL-QCP-100, which is WAL's standard incoming inspection procedure for all supplier-furnished components received at the Manassas facility. WAL-QCP-100 is a comprehensive quality control protocol that governs the receipt, inspection, testing, acceptance, and rejection of incoming materials and components across WAL's entire supply chain. It is not a document created specifically for the Kestrel relationship, and it was not modified at any time to target Kestrel's products specifically.

Dr. Vollmer should walk the Tribunal through the inspection methodology as applied to the turbine housings supplied by Kestrel. Under the MSA, each lot of turbine housings was subject to incoming inspection within fifteen (15) business days of delivery at the Manassas facility. This fifteen-business-day window is specified in Section 8.2 of the MSA and was not disputed by the parties during the performance of the contract. Upon receipt, each lot was logged into WAL's materials receiving system, assigned an internal lot tracking number, and queued for inspection in accordance with the procedures set forth in WAL-QCP-100.

The testing protocols employed under WAL-QCP-100 for titanium alloy turbine housings include both non-destructive testing (NDT) and metallurgical sampling. Non-destructive testing methods include ultrasonic inspection, radiographic inspection, and dye penetrant inspection, all of which are standard methods for detecting subsurface and surface defects in aerospace-grade titanium components. In addition to NDT, WAL-QCP-100 requires metallurgical sampling — the extraction and analysis of sample cross-sections from randomly selected units within each lot — to assess microstructural characteristics including grain size, phase distribution, and, critically, volumetric porosity. Porosity is measured through image analysis of polished metallographic cross-sections using calibrated optical microscopy in accordance with ASTM E1920 and internal WAL procedures.

It is important for Dr. Vollmer to emphasize that WAL-QCP-100 had been in place well prior to the execution of the MSA with Kestrel. The procedure was originally developed in 2012, with revisions issued periodically to reflect evolving industry standards and regulatory requirements. The version of WAL-QCP-100 in effect during the relevant period (Revision F, effective March 1, 2021) was the same version applied to all suppliers furnishing titanium alloy turbine housings to WAL during that period. No revisions were made to WAL-QCP-100 for the purpose of altering the inspection criteria applicable to Kestrel's deliveries.

Dr. Vollmer should also note that under the MSA, Kestrel was required to maintain AS9100 Revision D certification as a contractual prerequisite. AS9100 Rev D is the internationally recognized quality management system standard for the aerospace industry, published by the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG). This certification requirement was set forth in Section 6.1(c) of the MSA and was a condition of Kestrel's ongoing eligibility to serve as a qualified supplier. WAL's expectation was that Kestrel's AS9100 Rev D-certified quality management system would produce components that consistently met WAL's published engineering specifications — an expectation that was met during CY1–CY3 but not during CY4.

B. The Porosity Specification — WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3

Dr. Vollmer's testimony on the porosity specification is the linchpin of WAL's technical defense and must be presented with precision and clarity. The contractual porosity limit for Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings is less than or equal to 0.25% (≤0.25%) by volume. This limit is expressly stated in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, which is titled "Microstructural Acceptance Criteria for Ti-6Al-4V ELI Turbine Housing Components." Table 3 sets forth acceptance criteria for multiple microstructural parameters, including grain size, alpha-phase morphology, beta-phase fraction, and volumetric porosity. The ≤0.25% porosity limit is stated in clear, unambiguous terms in the "Maximum Allowable Porosity" row of Table 3.

WAL-SPEC-TH-401 is one of a suite of engineering specifications — numbered WAL-SPEC-TH-401 through WAL-SPEC-TH-409 — that were incorporated by reference into the MSA executed on June 15, 2018, between Whitmore Aerospace LLC and Kestrel Dynamics GmbH. These specifications were listed in Exhibit B to the MSA ("Applicable Engineering Specifications") and were made available to Kestrel prior to execution of the MSA as part of the supplier qualification process. An additional specification, WAL-SPEC-TH-410, was subsequently added to the suite via Amendment No. 1, dated February 10, 2020, which also increased the maximum annual order volume from 2,500 to 4,000 units. Importantly, the ≤0.25% porosity limit in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, was not modified by either Amendment No. 1 or Amendment No. 2; it has remained unchanged since the original execution of the MSA.

Dr. Vollmer should explain to the Tribunal the engineering rationale for the ≤0.25% porosity limit. Turbine housings are safety-critical aerospace components that operate under extreme conditions, including high temperatures, high pressures, and cyclic mechanical loading. Ti-6Al-4V ELI (Extra Low Interstitial) titanium alloy is selected for this application precisely because of its superior fatigue resistance and fracture toughness. However, volumetric porosity — the presence of microscopic voids within the material's microstructure — compromises these properties by acting as stress concentration sites that can initiate fatigue cracks under cyclic loading. Porosity above the ≤0.25% threshold has been shown, through both WAL's internal engineering analysis and published literature, to reduce the fatigue life of Ti-6Al-4V ELI components to below the minimum acceptable service-life threshold for safety-critical turbine applications. The ≤0.25% limit is thus not an arbitrary or commercially motivated threshold; it is an engineering requirement grounded in the physics of fatigue failure and the safety imperatives of aerospace turbine design.

Dr. Vollmer should confirm, clearly and without equivocation, that the ≤0.25% standard was a published, contractual specification — not an unpublished, ad hoc, or informally applied requirement. This point is essential because it directly addresses Kestrel's central allegation that WAL applied an unpublished ≤0.15% porosity tolerance to engineer pretextual rejections. Dr. Vollmer should state affirmatively that the acceptance/rejection decisions for all fourteen lots were based on the ≤0.25% threshold set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, and on no other porosity criterion.

During her direct examination, Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to walk the Tribunal through the relevant page and section of WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, which will be presented as a demonstrative exhibit. She should be comfortable identifying the specific row and column of Table 3 that sets forth the ≤0.25% porosity limit, explaining the other microstructural parameters listed in the table, and confirming that the document as presented is a true and accurate copy of the specification as incorporated into the MSA. The examining attorney will ensure that the exhibit is properly introduced and admitted into evidence, but Dr. Vollmer's familiarity with the document should be evident to the Tribunal.

C. The 14 Rejected Lots — Technical Justification

Dr. Vollmer should testify to each of the fourteen rejected lots delivered by Kestrel between March 2022 and September 2022. These fourteen lots collectively comprised 1,680 individual turbine housing units — each lot containing 120 units, consistent with the standard lot size specified in Section 7.3 of the MSA. The first rejected lot was Lot KDG-2022-0307, delivered on March 7, 2022. The final rejected lot was Lot KDG-2022-0919, delivered on September 19, 2022. Each of the fourteen lots was assigned a unique lot identification number by Kestrel (using the prefix "KDG" followed by the year and date of shipment) and was tracked through WAL's receiving and inspection system under a corresponding internal lot tracking number.

For each lot, the incoming inspection conducted under WAL-QCP-100 identified porosity levels exceeding the contractual ≤0.25% limit established in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. The specific porosity readings for each lot are documented in the non-conformance reports that were issued in connection with each rejection, and these reports will be among the documentary exhibits supporting Dr. Vollmer's testimony. In addition, independent metallurgical testing performed by Arclight Materials Science Inc., under the direction of Dr. Raymond Chow, confirmed porosity levels ranging between 0.19% and 0.38% across the rejected lots. Dr. Chow's findings are set forth in his expert report, which has been submitted to the Tribunal as part of WAL's evidentiary submissions.

An important nuance that Dr. Vollmer must be prepared to address — both on direct and on cross-examination — concerns lots for which the average porosity reading fell below 0.25% (e.g., lots with an average porosity of 0.19%). Dr. Vollmer should clarify that the lot-level assessment under WAL-QCP-100 does not rely solely on the arithmetic mean of porosity readings across sampled units. Rather, the lot-level conformance determination considers the distribution of porosity readings across the sampled units within the lot. Under WAL-QCP-100's sampling methodology, if any individual unit within the statistically selected sample exhibits porosity above the ≤0.25% threshold, the lot is classified as non-conforming. This is a standard practice in aerospace quality control, where the safety-critical nature of the components requires that every unit within a lot meet specification — not merely that the lot average fall within the acceptable range.

Accordingly, Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to explain that lots with an average porosity of 0.19% were not uniformly compliant. Within those lots, individual units exhibited porosity levels above 0.25%, which triggered lot-level rejection under WAL-QCP-100. The presence of even a small number of non-conforming units within the sample indicates that the lot as a whole cannot be relied upon to meet the required specification, because the non-sampled units within the lot may also be non-conforming. This is a fundamental principle of acceptance sampling in aerospace quality assurance, and Dr. Vollmer's engineering background qualifies her to explain it to the Tribunal in clear, accessible terms.

Dr. Vollmer should present this testimony in a structured, lot-by-lot manner if directed by the examining attorney, or in a summary fashion that highlights the overall pattern of non-conformance, depending on the preferred approach for the direct examination. We will make this determination during the preparation sessions based on the Tribunal's procedural directives and the time allocated for Dr. Vollmer's testimony.

D. The Cure Process and Kestrel's Failure to Cure

Under Section 8.4 of the MSA, upon issuance of a rejection notice for a non-conforming lot, Kestrel was afforded a cure period during which it could either replace the non-conforming lot with conforming units or rework the non-conforming units to bring them into compliance with the applicable engineering specifications. As originally drafted, the cure period was thirty (30) calendar days from the date of Kestrel's receipt of the rejection notice. This cure period was subsequently extended to forty-five (45) calendar days by Amendment No. 2 to the MSA, dated September 3, 2021. Amendment No. 2 was negotiated in recognition of COVID-related disruptions to international logistics and supply chains, which had made the original thirty-day cure period impracticable for certain categories of remedial action, including the international shipping of replacement units from Kestrel's Stuttgart manufacturing facility to WAL's Manassas facility.

Dr. Vollmer should testify that of the fourteen lots rejected between March and September 2022, seven (7) lots remained uncured after the expiration of the forty-five-day cure period. For some of these lots, Kestrel submitted replacement units that themselves failed to meet the ≤0.25% porosity specification upon re-inspection. For other lots, Kestrel did not submit any replacement or rework within the cure period. The specific status of each lot — whether uncured due to non-submission of replacement units, or uncured due to the failure of submitted replacement units to meet specification — is documented in the cure correspondence and in WAL's internal tracking records.

The significance of seven uncured rejections lies in Section 8.4's definition of "Persistent Quality Failure." The MSA provides that Persistent Quality Failure occurs when there are three (3) or more uncured rejections in any rolling twelve-month period. Seven uncured rejections — more than double the contractual threshold — far exceeded the Persistent Quality Failure trigger. Under Section 14.2(b) of the MSA, Persistent Quality Failure constitutes grounds for termination for cause. WAL's Notice of Termination, issued on October 3, 2022, expressly invoked this provision.

Dr. Vollmer should testify to WAL's communications with Kestrel regarding the rejection notices and cure opportunities. In particular, she communicated directly with Dr. Stefan Voss, Kestrel's Head of Quality, regarding the technical basis for each rejection and the requirements for acceptable cure. These communications were typically conducted by email, with supporting technical documentation attached, and copies were provided to Gerald Huang and, on the Kestrel side, to Luisa Erdmann (Kestrel's Account Manager for the WAL relationship). Dr. Vollmer should confirm that WAL provided Kestrel with detailed non-conformance reports for each rejected lot, including the specific porosity data that formed the basis for the rejection. WAL's position is that Kestrel was fully informed of the grounds for each rejection and was given every reasonable opportunity to cure.

E. Consistency of WAL's Inspection Standards

Dr. Vollmer should testify that WAL applied the same ≤0.25% porosity standard to all suppliers of titanium alloy turbine housings throughout the period relevant to this arbitration, including during the earlier contract years (CY1–CY3, approximately June 2018 through June 2021) when Kestrel's deliveries were generally compliant with WAL's specifications. The ≤0.25% threshold was not introduced, modified, or selectively applied in CY4. It was a constant, published requirement from the inception of the MSA.

Dr. Vollmer should further explain that the quality failures giving rise to this dispute began in CY4 (commencing approximately June 2021, with the first rejected lot arriving in March 2022). During CY1–CY3, Kestrel's lots were subjected to the same incoming inspection procedures under WAL-QCP-100 and assessed against the same ≤0.25% porosity limit, and Kestrel's deliveries during that period generally met the specification. The fact that the quality failures are concentrated in CY4 strongly suggests that the change occurred on Kestrel's side — in Kestrel's manufacturing process, raw material sourcing, or quality management — rather than on WAL's side in the form of a changed or artificially tightened acceptance criterion.

This testimony is specifically designed to address Kestrel's core allegation that WAL applied an unpublished porosity tolerance of ≤0.15% in CY4 to engineer pretextual rejections. If WAL had changed its acceptance criteria — as Kestrel alleges — one would expect to see rejections not only of Kestrel's lots but also of lots from WAL's other titanium alloy turbine housing suppliers during the same period. Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to testify that WAL's other suppliers continued to meet the ≤0.25% specification in CY4, and that the non-conformance pattern was unique to Kestrel's deliveries.

F. The Decision to Onboard Valkyr Precision Components Inc.

Dr. Vollmer should confirm that the evaluation of Valkyr Precision Components Inc. ("Valkyr"), based in Tucson, Arizona, as a potential alternative supplier of titanium alloy turbine housings commenced only after Kestrel's quality failures became persistent and it became apparent that WAL faced a risk of supply-chain disruption for a safety-critical component. The engineering qualification process for Valkyr's turbine housings — including first-article inspection, metallurgical analysis, and design review — was initiated as a prudent supply-chain continuity measure, consistent with WAL's obligation to ensure an uninterrupted supply of flight-critical components for its own customers.

Dr. Vollmer should make clear that the Valkyr qualification process was not a pretext to replace Kestrel. Kestrel's position in this arbitration is that WAL sought to terminate the MSA in order to switch to a lower-cost domestic supplier, and that the quality rejections were manufactured to create a basis for termination. This theory is contradicted by the economics of the Valkyr arrangement. Valkyr's unit price for equivalent turbine housings is €8,432.92 per unit, compared to Kestrel's CY4 contract price of €5,222.92 per unit — a difference of €3,210.00 per unit, representing a price premium of approximately 61.5%. WAL thus paid a substantial premium to secure an alternative source of supply, a fact that is entirely inconsistent with the theory that cost savings motivated the switch.

Dr. Vollmer should note that while she was involved in the engineering qualification of Valkyr's products — because that process falls within her engineering and quality oversight responsibilities — the commercial decision to onboard Valkyr, including the negotiation of pricing and contractual terms, was managed by Gerald Huang and the Global Supply Chain Operations team. Questions regarding WAL's supply-chain strategy, vendor selection criteria, and procurement decision-making should accordingly be deferred to Mr. Huang's testimony.

IV. ANTICIPATED CROSS-EXAMINATION — HRS STRATEGY AND SUGGESTED RESPONSES

Based on Kestrel's Statement of Claim, its subsequent written submissions, and the expert reports submitted on Kestrel's behalf, we anticipate that HRS will pursue the following lines of cross-examination with Dr. Vollmer. For each anticipated line of attack, this section sets forth the likely approach, the underlying objective, and the preparation points that Dr. Vollmer should internalize in advance of the hearing.

A. Anticipated Line 1: WAL Applied an Unpublished ≤0.15% Porosity Standard

This is the centerpiece of Kestrel's case, and it will almost certainly be the primary focus of Dr. Vollmer's cross-examination. HRS will likely argue that WAL's actual testing practice — as distinct from its contractual specification — applied a stricter, unpublished standard of ≤0.15% porosity, and that the contractual ≤0.25% threshold was not the operative criterion used to make acceptance/rejection decisions. Kestrel's theory is that WAL internally tightened its porosity requirements in CY4, without notifying Kestrel, in order to create a basis for rejections that would not have occurred under the contractual standard.

Preparation points:

• Dr. Vollmer should firmly and unequivocally state that the applicable standard was and always has been ≤0.25% as stated in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. She should not hedge, qualify, or express uncertainty on this point. The contractual specification is clear, and the rejection decisions were made on the basis of that specification.

• HRS may attempt to introduce internal WAL documents — such as internal engineering memoranda, email exchanges among WAL quality engineers, or internal quality dashboards — that reference a ≤0.15% "target," "preferred specification," or "internal quality goal." If shown such documents, Dr. Vollmer should distinguish clearly between an internal aspirational quality target and the contractual acceptance/rejection criterion. It is standard practice in aerospace engineering for organizations to maintain internal quality targets that are more stringent than contractual minimums. An internal target of ≤0.15% reflects WAL's aspiration to produce and procure components of the highest possible quality; it does not establish a contractual obligation on the part of suppliers, nor was it ever communicated to Kestrel as the applicable acceptance criterion.

• Dr. Vollmer should emphasize that all rejection decisions were made solely on the basis of the contractual ≤0.25% threshold, not on any internal preference or aspiration. If HRS presses on this point, Dr. Vollmer should reiterate that the rejection notices and non-conformance reports issued for each lot identify the contractual specification — ≤0.25% — as the basis for rejection, and that no rejection was issued for a lot that met the ≤0.25% standard.

• As a factual matter, the porosity data from the rejected lots supports WAL's position. Readings across the rejected lots ranged from 0.19% to 0.38%, with many readings clearly above even a ≤0.25% standard. If WAL were applying a ≤0.15% standard, one would expect rejections of lots with porosity readings in the 0.16%–0.24% range where no units exceeded 0.25%. That is not the pattern reflected in the data.

B. Anticipated Line 2: WAL's Inspection Methodology Was Flawed or Biased

HRS may challenge the sampling methodology employed under WAL-QCP-100, arguing that it was statistically inadequate, improperly implemented, or selectively applied to Kestrel's lots in a manner designed to produce rejections. This line of attack may be supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Martina Kessler (Director, Albrecht Prüftechnik GmbH), Kestrel's designated expert on metallurgical testing methodology.

Preparation points:

• Dr. Vollmer should explain that WAL-QCP-100 conforms to industry-standard aerospace incoming inspection protocols, including the sampling plans set forth in AQL (Acceptable Quality Level) standards derived from AS9138 and analogous aerospace quality standards. The sampling methodology is not a novel or bespoke creation of WAL; it reflects established practices widely used throughout the aerospace supply chain.

• The procedure was applied consistently to all lots from all suppliers of titanium alloy turbine housings, not selectively to Kestrel. Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to confirm that the same sample sizes, selection criteria, and testing protocols were used for Kestrel's lots as for lots received from WAL's other qualified suppliers.

• Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to discuss, at a general level, the sample sizes used for each lot (consistent with WAL-QCP-100's sampling tables), the random selection methodology for identifying units within the lot to be sampled, and the calibration and maintenance records for the testing equipment used in the Manassas laboratory. She should not, however, attempt to provide expert-level statistical analysis; if pressed on statistical methodology questions, she should note that Dr. Raymond Chow's expert report addresses the statistical validity of WAL's sampling approach and that she concurs with his conclusions as a matter of engineering judgment.

• Dr. Vollmer should cross-reference Dr. Chow's independent analysis, which utilized separate samples drawn from the same lots and was conducted using independent laboratory equipment and procedures. Dr. Chow's results corroborated WAL's internal findings, confirming that the porosity exceedances identified by WAL were not artifacts of testing error or methodological bias.

C. Anticipated Line 3: Earlier Contract Years Show WAL Accepted Similar Quality Levels

HRS may attempt to demonstrate that WAL accepted lots during CY1–CY3 with porosity levels comparable to those of the rejected CY4 lots, thereby suggesting that WAL changed its standards — not Kestrel's quality. This line of attack would involve presenting historical lot inspection data from the earlier contract years and comparing it to the CY4 rejection data.

Preparation points:

• Dr. Vollmer should testify that the historical acceptance records for CY1–CY3 show that Kestrel's lots during those periods generally met the ≤0.25% porosity specification. The lots accepted during CY1–CY3 were accepted because they were compliant — not because WAL was applying a more lenient standard.

• If confronted with specific historical lot data purporting to show CY1–CY3 lots with porosity levels similar to those of the rejected CY4 lots, Dr. Vollmer should carefully review each data point presented to her before responding. She should distinguish between lots that met the ≤0.25% specification (which would have been properly accepted) and any marginal cases. If HRS identifies specific lots from CY1–CY3 with porosity readings in the 0.20%–0.25% range, Dr. Vollmer should confirm that those lots met the specification and were properly accepted, and that there is no inconsistency between accepting a lot at 0.24% porosity and rejecting a lot with individual units at 0.27% or 0.32% porosity.

• Dr. Vollmer should not concede, under any circumstances, that WAL "relaxed" its standards during the earlier contract years. The standard was ≤0.25% from the inception of the MSA, and it was applied consistently. If CY1–CY3 lots met that standard and CY4 lots did not, the explanation lies in a change in Kestrel's manufacturing quality — not in a change in WAL's acceptance criteria.

• If HRS presses on the existence of any CY1–CY3 lots that were accepted despite marginal porosity readings, Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to note that the lot-level conformance determination considers the entire distribution of readings within the sample, and that a lot with all units at or below 0.25% — even if some are close to the threshold — is properly accepted under WAL-QCP-100.

D. Anticipated Line 4: Dr. Vollmer's Role in the Valkyr Decision Reveals Pretext

HRS may probe Dr. Vollmer's involvement in the evaluation and qualification of Valkyr Precision Components Inc. to suggest that the termination of the Kestrel MSA was pretextual — motivated not by genuine quality concerns but by WAL's desire to replace Kestrel with a domestic supplier. This line of cross-examination is likely to focus on the timeline of Valkyr's qualification and on Dr. Vollmer's personal involvement in the process.

Preparation points:

• Dr. Vollmer should clarify the timeline of Valkyr's engagement with precision. Valkyr was not approached or evaluated as a potential supplier until after Kestrel's quality failures had become persistent — specifically, not until multiple lots had been rejected and the uncured rejections had begun to accumulate beyond the Persistent Quality Failure threshold. The engineering qualification process for Valkyr was initiated as a supply-chain continuity measure, undertaken to ensure that WAL could continue to receive flight-critical turbine housings in the event that the Kestrel relationship was terminated or further disrupted.

• Dr. Vollmer should note — and this point cannot be overemphasized — that Valkyr's unit price of €8,432.92 is substantially higher than Kestrel's CY4 contract price of €5,222.92. This price differential of approximately €3,210.00 per unit, or roughly 61.5%, directly contradicts any theory that cost savings motivated WAL's decision to transition away from Kestrel. WAL's decision to onboard Valkyr at a significant cost premium is consistent with a company facing a genuine supply-chain emergency, not with a company seeking to reduce procurement costs.

• If questioned about the commercial or strategic rationale for the Valkyr onboarding — as distinct from the engineering qualification of Valkyr's products — Dr. Vollmer should appropriately defer to Gerald Huang, who has primary responsibility for procurement, vendor management, and supply-chain strategy within WAL's organizational structure. Dr. Vollmer's role was limited to the engineering evaluation of Valkyr's turbine housings to determine whether they met WAL's engineering specifications. The commercial decision to engage Valkyr was Mr. Huang's.

E. Anticipated Line 5: Technical Challenges to Porosity Testing Results

HRS may, with the support of Dr. Martina Kessler's expert testimony, challenge the reliability of specific porosity measurements obtained by WAL's internal laboratory and/or by Dr. Chow's independent analysis. Dr. Kessler, who serves as Director of Albrecht Prüftechnik GmbH, a German materials testing laboratory, may critique the testing methodology, sample preparation techniques, image analysis parameters, or equipment calibration underlying the porosity measurements.

Preparation points:

• Dr. Vollmer should be mindful of the distinction between her role as a fact witness and Dr. Chow's role as an expert witness. When confronted with challenges to specific metallurgical methodology points — such as the selection of magnification levels for image analysis, the polishing protocols used in sample preparation, or the statistical treatment of measurement uncertainty — Dr. Vollmer should defer to Dr. Chow's expert opinion. She is not being presented as a metallurgical testing expert, and she should not attempt to provide expert-level rebuttals to Dr. Kessler's methodology critiques.

• That said, Dr. Vollmer can and should confirm that WAL's internal testing results were consistent with and corroborated by Dr. Chow's independent findings. This is a powerful point: two independent testing processes — WAL's internal laboratory and Arclight Materials Science's external laboratory — both identified porosity exceedances in the same lots. The consistency of these results substantially undermines any suggestion that WAL's internal testing was flawed or biased.

• Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to explain, at a general level, the difference between WAL's internal testing process (conducted by WAL's Manassas laboratory as part of the incoming inspection under WAL-QCP-100) and Dr. Chow's independent re-testing (conducted at Arclight's facilities using separate samples drawn from the same lots). Both processes identified porosity exceedances, and both concluded that the lots failed to meet the ≤0.25% contractual specification.

• Dr. Vollmer should not overreach into areas of pure expert metallurgical opinion. If asked a question that calls for specialized expertise beyond her knowledge as an engineering executive, she should state that the question is better addressed by Dr. Chow's expert report and testimony, and that she is not in a position to offer an expert opinion on that particular methodology point.

F. Anticipated Line 6: Amendment No. 2 and COVID Disruptions

HRS may argue that Amendment No. 2 to the MSA, dated September 3, 2021, which extended the cure period from thirty (30) to forty-five (45) calendar days and added a force majeure carve-out for pandemic-related delays, implicitly acknowledged that quality issues during the CY4 period were attributable to pandemic disruptions rather than to deficiencies in Kestrel's manufacturing process. Under this theory, the quality failures were a foreseeable consequence of COVID-related supply-chain disruptions that both parties recognized and addressed through Amendment No. 2, and WAL's subsequent reliance on those quality failures as grounds for termination was inconsistent with the intent of the amendment.

Preparation points:

• Dr. Vollmer should explain clearly and firmly that Amendment No. 2 addressed logistics and delivery timing — not quality standards. The extension of the cure period from thirty to forty-five days was intended to accommodate delays in international shipping and rework logistics caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. It recognized that the physical process of shipping replacement units from Stuttgart to Manassas, or of reworking units and re-shipping them, might take longer than thirty days during a period of global logistics disruption. It did not modify, relax, or otherwise alter any of WAL's engineering specifications, including the ≤0.25% porosity limit in WAL-SPEC-TH-401.

• Dr. Vollmer should draw a clear distinction between COVID-related disruptions to shipping, logistics, and delivery timing — which Amendment No. 2 addressed — and the quality of Kestrel's manufacturing process at its Stuttgart facility. The porosity of a turbine housing is determined by the manufacturing process (casting, forging, heat treatment, etc.) at Kestrel's Stuttgart facility, not by the logistics of delivering the finished product to Manassas. There is no plausible mechanism by which COVID-related shipping delays would cause an increase in the porosity of components manufactured at Kestrel's Stuttgart plant.

• The force majeure carve-out added by Amendment No. 2 applied to delivery delays — i.e., delays in Kestrel's ability to deliver lots to WAL's Manassas facility by the scheduled delivery dates set forth in the MSA's delivery schedule. It did not apply to non-conformance with technical specifications. A component that arrives late due to pandemic-related shipping disruptions is subject to the force majeure carve-out; a component that arrives on time but fails to meet the porosity specification is not.

• Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to note that the negotiation of Amendment No. 2 was led by Gerald Huang on WAL's behalf and by Luisa Erdmann on Kestrel's behalf. Dr. Vollmer was consulted on the engineering implications of the amendment — specifically, to confirm that the extended cure period would not create safety or scheduling risks for WAL's production program — but she was not the primary negotiator. If detailed questions arise about the negotiation history or commercial intent of Amendment No. 2, they should be deferred to Mr. Huang.

V. KEY DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS FOR DR. VOLLMER'S TESTIMONY

The following documents are anticipated to be used in connection with Dr. Vollmer's direct examination and/or cross-examination. Dr. Vollmer should review each of these documents thoroughly in advance of the preparation sessions and should be comfortable locating and discussing relevant provisions, data points, and entries within each document.

Dr. Vollmer should be particularly familiar with Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4, as these are the documents most likely to be the subject of detailed questioning during both direct and cross-examination. She should be able to locate specific entries, explain the structure and format of each document, and confirm the accuracy of the information contained therein based on her personal knowledge and involvement.

In addition to the documents listed above, HRS may introduce internal WAL documents not listed here during cross-examination — including internal emails, engineering memoranda, or quality dashboard reports that reference the ≤0.15% internal quality target. Dr. Vollmer should be prepared for this possibility and should respond to such documents in accordance with the preparation points set forth in Section IV.A above.

VI. COORDINATION WITH OTHER WITNESSES

A. Coordination with Gerald Huang

Gerald Huang, Vice President of Global Supply Chain Operations at WAL, will testify on matters relating to supply-chain management, commercial communications with Kestrel regarding the rejection and cure process, and the decision to evaluate and onboard Valkyr Precision Components Inc. as an alternative supplier. Mr. Huang's testimony covers the commercial, procurement, and logistics dimensions of the disputed events, while Dr. Vollmer's testimony covers the technical, engineering, and quality-control dimensions.

Dr. Vollmer's testimony should be carefully delineated to focus on technical and engineering aspects. When questions arise during her testimony — particularly during cross-examination — that touch on commercial strategy, procurement decision-making, pricing negotiations, or supply-chain management, Dr. Vollmer should appropriately defer to Mr. Huang. This delineation serves two purposes: it ensures that each witness testifies within his or her area of direct knowledge and responsibility, and it avoids potential inconsistencies that could arise if both witnesses offer independent recollections of events outside their primary functional areas.

It is essential to ensure consistency between Dr. Vollmer's and Mr. Huang's accounts of the rejection and cure timeline and the internal WAL communications surrounding those events. During the preparation sessions, we will cross-reference Dr. Vollmer's recollection of key dates, communications, and decisions against Mr. Huang's anticipated testimony to identify and resolve any discrepancies. Particular attention should be paid to the following points of overlap:

• The dates on which rejection notices were issued and received by Kestrel

• The content and timing of cure-related communications with Dr. Voss and Ms. Erdmann

• The internal WAL decision-making process leading to the Notice of Termination

• The timeline of Valkyr's evaluation and qualification

B. Coordination with Expert Witnesses

Dr. Raymond Chow, Arclight Materials Science Inc. — Dr. Chow will testify as WAL's designated metallurgical expert. His expert report presents the results of his independent metallurgical analysis of samples drawn from the rejected lots, including porosity measurements, microstructural characterization, and an assessment of the statistical validity of WAL's sampling methodology. Dr. Vollmer's testimony on WAL's internal testing results should be consistent with and supported by Dr. Chow's independent findings. During the preparation sessions, we will review the key data points and conclusions in Dr. Chow's report alongside WAL's internal non-conformance reports to confirm alignment. Where Dr. Vollmer is asked questions on cross-examination that call for expert-level metallurgical opinion, she should defer to Dr. Chow.

Dr. Nadia Ostrovsky, Ridgeline Economic Consulting LLC — Dr. Ostrovsky will testify as WAL's designated damages expert. Her report addresses the quantification of damages (or, more precisely, the rebuttal of Kestrel's claimed damages) and the economic reasonableness of WAL's termination decision. There is no need for direct coordination between Dr. Vollmer and Dr. Ostrovsky, as their testimony addresses distinct subject matters. However, it should be noted that Dr. Vollmer's testimony on the nature, severity, and persistence of Kestrel's quality failures — and on the engineering justification for WAL's rejection decisions — provides the factual foundation that supports the reasonableness of WAL's termination, which in turn underpins Dr. Ostrovsky's damages rebuttal. Dr. Vollmer's credibility on the technical issues is thus critical to the overall effectiveness of WAL's damages defense.

VII. PREPARATION SCHEDULE AND LOGISTICS

The following preparation schedule is proposed for Dr. Vollmer's witness preparation. All sessions will be held at the offices of Sternfeld & Calloway LLP, unless otherwise indicated.

Initial Preparation Session:

Participants: Dr. Ingrid Vollmer; Jeffrey Park (Associate); Simone Laroche (Senior Associate)

Timing: To be scheduled for the week of December 26–29, 2023

Agenda: Review of key testimony topics for direct examination (Section III); initial walkthrough of anticipated cross-examination lines (Section IV); review of key documentary exhibits (Section V); identification of any factual gaps or areas requiring further investigation.

Follow-Up Session with Theodore Langston:

Participants: Dr. Ingrid Vollmer; Theodore Langston (Partner); Jeffrey Park (Associate)

Timing: To be scheduled for the first week of January 2024 (January 2–5), prior to the commencement of the evidentiary hearing

Agenda: Refinement of direct examination testimony; review of anticipated cross-examination with Partner-level input on strategy; finalization of exhibit order and demonstrative materials; discussion of Tribunal dynamics and procedural considerations.

Mock Cross-Examination Session:

Participants: Dr. Ingrid Vollmer; Simone Laroche (conducting mock cross-examination); Jeffrey Park (observing and providing feedback)

Timing: To be scheduled in conjunction with or immediately following the follow-up session with Theodore Langston (January 2–5, 2024)

Agenda: Simone Laroche will simulate HRS's anticipated cross-examination approach, testing Dr. Vollmer's responses to the lines of questioning identified in Section IV. The session will focus on maintaining composure under adversarial questioning, avoiding overstatement and speculation, and appropriately deferring questions outside Dr. Vollmer's areas of direct knowledge.

Pre-Hearing Document Review:

Dr. Vollmer should independently review all key exhibits listed in Section V in advance of the preparation sessions. She should flag any documents with which she is unfamiliar, any entries or data points that she cannot confirm from personal knowledge, and any potential issues or questions that should be addressed during the preparation sessions.

Hearing Logistics:

The evidentiary hearing is scheduled to take place at the ICC Hearing Centre, New York, New York, from January 8 through January 12, 2024. Dr. Vollmer's testimony is tentatively scheduled in accordance with Respondent's Pre-Hearing Organizational Submission filed in December 2023. The precise date and time of her testimony will be confirmed based on the Tribunal's procedural timetable, which may be adjusted during the hearing.

The language of arbitration is English. Dr. Vollmer is fully comfortable testifying in English, and no interpreter will be required. Travel and accommodation arrangements for Dr. Vollmer will be coordinated separately.

VIII. GENERAL WITNESS GUIDELINES

The following guidelines should be reviewed with Dr. Vollmer during each preparation session and reinforced prior to her testimony at the hearing:

1. Testify truthfully and precisely. Dr. Vollmer must testify truthfully at all times. She should answer each question as precisely as possible, providing the information requested without volunteering additional information beyond the scope of the question. Volunteering information on cross-examination can open new lines of inquiry and create unnecessary risk.

2. Acknowledge uncertainty rather than speculate. If Dr. Vollmer is uncertain about a specific data point, date, document, or technical detail, she should say so clearly. Responses such as "I do not recall the specific figure, but it is documented in the non-conformance report" or "I would need to review the document to confirm" are preferable to guesses or approximations that could later be shown to be inaccurate.

3. Defer expert metallurgical opinions to Dr. Chow. Dr. Vollmer is testifying as a fact witness — as the engineering executive who designed and administered WAL's inspection protocols and who authorized the rejection decisions at issue. She is not being presented as a metallurgical testing expert. When cross-examination questions call for expert-level opinions on metallurgical testing methodology, statistical analysis of porosity measurements, or other specialized technical matters, she should defer to Dr. Chow's expert report and testimony. She may, however, offer her engineering judgment on matters within her role and experience, such as the engineering rationale for the ≤0.25% porosity specification.

4. Remain composed during cross-examination. Dr. Maximilian Haber and Katrin Schäfer are experienced international arbitration advocates who may adopt a confrontational or adversarial tone during cross-examination. This is a deliberate tactic designed to unsettle the witness and elicit imprecise or emotional responses. Dr. Vollmer should remain calm, measured, and professional throughout. She should take her time before responding, listen to each question carefully and in its entirety before answering, and request clarification if a question is ambiguous or compound.

5. Avoid characterizing Kestrel's conduct as intentional or fraudulent. WAL's legal position in this arbitration is that Kestrel failed to meet its contractual specifications and failed to cure the resulting non-conformances within the contractual cure period. WAL does not allege fraud, intentional misconduct, or bad faith on Kestrel's part. Dr. Vollmer should not characterize Kestrel's quality failures as deliberate, intentional, or fraudulent. The appropriate framing is that the delivered lots did not conform to the contractual specification, and that Kestrel failed to cure the non-conformances — regardless of Kestrel's intent or the reasons for the quality degradation.

6. Use proper contractual references. When referring to the Master Supply Agreement, Dr. Vollmer should use the full reference on first mention: "the Master Supply Agreement dated June 15, 2018, between Whitmore Aerospace LLC and Kestrel Dynamics GmbH." Thereafter, she may refer to it as "the MSA." Similarly, she should use the full designation for engineering specifications (e.g., "WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3") and quality control procedures (e.g., "WAL-QCP-100") to ensure clarity in the hearing record.

7. Listen to objections. If either party's counsel raises an objection during Dr. Vollmer's testimony, she should stop speaking immediately and wait for the Tribunal to rule on the objection before continuing. She should not attempt to finish her answer while an objection is pending.

8. Do not discuss testimony with other witnesses. During the course of the hearing, Dr. Vollmer should not discuss the substance of her testimony — or the testimony of any other witness — with Gerald Huang, Dr. Chow, Dr. Ostrovsky, or any other witness in the proceeding. This restriction applies both before and after Dr. Vollmer's testimony, until the evidentiary hearing has concluded.

This memorandum will be supplemented as necessary following the initial preparation session and in light of any additional submissions or procedural developments prior to the evidentiary hearing. Please direct any questions to Jeffrey Park at x4817.

— END OF MEMORANDUM —

No.	Document Description	Relevance
1	WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3 (Microstructural Acceptance Criteria — Porosity Specification: ≤0.25%)	Establishes the contractual porosity limit; central to WAL's defense
2	WAL-QCP-100, Revision F (Incoming Inspection Procedure, effective March 1, 2021)	Establishes the inspection methodology; demonstrates consistent application
3	Rejection Notices for all 14 lots (Lot KDG-2022-0307 through Lot KDG-2022-0919)	Documents each rejection and the stated basis
4	Non-Conformance Reports with porosity data for each rejected lot	Provides the specific porosity measurements supporting each rejection
5	Cure correspondence between WAL (Dr. Vollmer / Gerald Huang) and Kestrel (Dr. Stefan Voss / Luisa Erdmann)	Documents the cure process and Kestrel's failure to cure 7 lots
6	WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause dated October 3, 2022	Documents WAL's invocation of § 14.2(b) for Persistent Quality Failure
7	Amendment No. 1 (February 10, 2020) — Addition of WAL-SPEC-TH-410; volume increase to 4,000 maximum units	Demonstrates evolution of contractual scope without change to porosity spec
8	Amendment No. 2 (September 3, 2021) — Cure period extension to 45 days; force majeure carve-out	Addresses COVID-related modifications; confirms no change to quality specs
9	Dr. Raymond Chow's Expert Report (Arclight Materials Science Inc.) — Metallurgical analysis confirming porosity levels of 0.19%–0.38%	Corroborates WAL's internal testing results through independent analysis
10	Historical lot acceptance records for CY1–CY3 (June 2018 – June 2021)	Demonstrates consistent application of ≤0.25% standard in prior years

MEMORANDUM
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO: Theodore Langston, Partner; Vivienne St. Claire, Partner
FROM: Jeffrey Park, Associate
DATE: December 18, 2023
RE: Witness Preparation — Dr. Ingrid Vollmer, SVP Engineering & Manufacturing, Whitmore Aerospace LLC
MATTER: Defense of Whitmore Aerospace LLC in ICC Arbitration — ICC Case No. 27914/MHM
ENGAGEMENT NO.: 1019-00001
This memorandum is protected by the attorney-client privilege and constitutes attorney work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. It is intended solely for the use of the attorneys and authorized personnel of Sternfeld & Calloway LLP engaged in the above-referenced matter. Any unauthorized disclosure, copying, or distribution of this memorandum or its contents is strictly prohibited.
I. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW
This memorandum outlines the preparation strategy for the direct examination and anticipated cross-examination of Dr. Ingrid Vollmer at the evidentiary hearing currently scheduled for January 8–12, 2024, at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Hearing Centre, New York, New York. The purpose of this memorandum is to ensure that Dr. Vollmer's testimony is thorough, consistent, and effectively positioned within the broader framework of Whitmore Aerospace LLC's ("WAL") defense in ICC Case No. 27914/MHM.
Dr. Vollmer serves as Senior Vice President of Engineering & Manufacturing at Whitmore Aerospace LLC, headquartered at 4200 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1100, Arlington, Virginia 22203. In that capacity, she oversees all quality-control inspection processes at WAL's primary manufacturing and receiving facility located at 8500 Coppermine Road, Manassas, Virginia 20110. Dr. Vollmer has held this role throughout the period relevant to the disputed events and possesses direct, personal knowledge of the facts and technical matters at the center of this arbitration.
Dr. Vollmer's testimony is critical to establishing the technical justification for WAL's rejection of fourteen (14) lots of Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings delivered by Kestrel Dynamics GmbH ("Kestrel") between March and September 2022. These rejections formed the factual predicate for WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause dated October 3, 2022, which Kestrel challenges as wrongful in this proceeding. Dr. Vollmer's testimony will demonstrate that each rejection was grounded in documented, objectively verifiable non-conformance with the contractual porosity specification set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3 — a specification that was published, incorporated into the Master Supply Agreement (the "MSA"), and consistently applied to all suppliers throughout the contract term.
Specifically, Dr. Vollmer will testify to the integrity and consistency of WAL's incoming inspection procedures under WAL-QCP-100, the engineering rationale underlying the porosity specifications set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, the inspection results for each of the fourteen rejected lots, and the cure process that preceded WAL's termination decision. Her testimony is intended to rebut Kestrel's central narrative — that WAL applied an unpublished, artificially stringent porosity tolerance of ≤0.15% to engineer pretextual rejections and manufacture a basis for termination.
Cross-examination of Dr. Vollmer will be conducted by Dr. Maximilian Haber (Lead Partner) and/or Katrin Schäfer (Senior Associate) of Haber Reinhardt Schlosser Partnerschaft mbB ("HRS"), counsel for Kestrel. Both are experienced international arbitration practitioners, and Dr. Haber in particular is known for a methodical and at times confrontational approach to technical witnesses. We should anticipate a well-prepared and aggressive cross-examination.
The Tribunal for this proceeding comprises:
• Prof. Dame Eleanor Fitzwilliam — Presiding Arbitrator
• Dr. Hans-Ulrich Perren — Claimant's co-arbitrator
• Hon. Robert A. Castillo — Respondent's co-arbitrator
This memorandum addresses Dr. Vollmer's background and qualifications, the key testimony topics for direct examination, anticipated cross-examination lines and suggested responses, key documentary exhibits, coordination with other witnesses, preparation logistics, and general witness guidelines.
II. WITNESS BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS
A. Professional Background
Dr. Ingrid Vollmer holds a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Materials Science and Metallurgical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where her doctoral research focused on fatigue-life prediction models for titanium alloys used in aerospace propulsion systems. She also holds a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering from Stanford University and a Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Her academic credentials are well-established and directly relevant to the technical subject matter at issue in this proceeding.
Dr. Vollmer has approximately twenty-two years of professional experience in aerospace manufacturing, quality assurance, and engineering specification development. Prior to joining WAL, she held senior engineering positions at two major aerospace manufacturers, where she was responsible for materials qualification, incoming inspection protocol design, and supplier quality management. Her professional experience encompasses both military and commercial aerospace applications, and she has published peer-reviewed articles on titanium alloy microstructural analysis and non-destructive testing methodologies, though she will be testifying as a fact witness — not an expert witness — in this proceeding.
Dr. Vollmer joined Whitmore Aerospace LLC in 2014 in a senior engineering capacity, initially serving as Vice President of Engineering. She was promoted to her current role as Senior Vice President of Engineering & Manufacturing in 2017, approximately one year prior to the execution of the MSA with Kestrel. In her current role, she is directly responsible for the development and maintenance of WAL's engineering specifications — specifically, the WAL-SPEC-TH-401 through WAL-SPEC-TH-410 series governing turbine housing components — as well as the quality control procedures codified in WAL-QCP-100, WAL's comprehensive incoming inspection protocol. She oversees a team of approximately forty-five engineers, quality inspectors, and laboratory technicians at the Manassas facility.
Dr. Vollmer personally oversaw the quality-control disputes at issue in this arbitration. She has firsthand knowledge of the inspection procedures, the testing results, the rejection decisions, the cure correspondence with Kestrel, and the engineering assessments that informed WAL's termination decision. She is, in short, the individual within WAL who is best positioned to testify to the technical merits of WAL's position.
B. Role in the Disputed Events
Dr. Vollmer supervised the incoming inspection process for all of Kestrel's deliveries of Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings at the Manassas facility throughout the term of the MSA. During Contract Years 1 through 3 (CY1–CY3, approximately June 2018 through June 2021), the deliveries were generally compliant with WAL's specifications, and the commercial relationship between the parties proceeded without significant dispute. The quality failures that give rise to this arbitration emerged during Contract Year 4 (CY4, approximately June 2021 through the termination date of October 3, 2022).
Dr. Vollmer authorized or personally reviewed the rejection notices for the fourteen lots at issue in this proceeding, totaling 1,680 individual turbine housing units. These lots were delivered between March 7, 2022 (the first rejected lot, designated Lot KDG-2022-0307) and September 19, 2022 (the final rejected lot, designated Lot KDG-2022-0919). For each lot, Dr. Vollmer reviewed the incoming inspection data generated under WAL-QCP-100, confirmed that the lot failed to meet the contractual porosity specification, and authorized the issuance of a formal rejection notice accompanied by a detailed non-conformance report.
Dr. Vollmer was also intimately involved in the technical assessment leading to WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause, issued on October 3, 2022. The termination was invoked under Section 14.2(b) of the MSA, which permits termination for "Persistent Quality Failure," defined as three or more uncured rejections in any rolling twelve-month period. As discussed in greater detail below, seven of the fourteen rejected lots remained uncured after the expiration of the contractual cure period, well exceeding the Persistent Quality Failure threshold.
Throughout the relevant period, Dr. Vollmer coordinated closely with Gerald Huang, WAL's Vice President of Global Supply Chain Operations, on the rejection and cure process, as well as on communications with Kestrel. While Mr. Huang managed the commercial and procurement aspects of the supplier relationship, Dr. Vollmer provided the technical assessments and engineering judgments that informed WAL's quality decisions. Their testimony should be understood as complementary: Dr. Vollmer addresses the engineering and inspection dimensions, while Mr. Huang addresses supply-chain management, procurement strategy, and commercial communications.
III. KEY TESTIMONY TOPICS — DIRECT EXAMINATION
This section outlines the principal topics to be covered during Dr. Vollmer's direct examination, along with the key points she should convey on each topic. The order of topics below reflects the anticipated sequence of direct examination, though the examining attorney may adjust the order based on hearing dynamics and the Tribunal's preferences.
A. WAL's Quality Control Process Under WAL-QCP-100
Dr. Vollmer should begin by explaining WAL-QCP-100, which is WAL's standard incoming inspection procedure for all supplier-furnished components received at the Manassas facility. WAL-QCP-100 is a comprehensive quality control protocol that governs the receipt, inspection, testing, acceptance, and rejection of incoming materials and components across WAL's entire supply chain. It is not a document created specifically for the Kestrel relationship, and it was not modified at any time to target Kestrel's products specifically.
Dr. Vollmer should walk the Tribunal through the inspection methodology as applied to the turbine housings supplied by Kestrel. Under the MSA, each lot of turbine housings was subject to incoming inspection within fifteen (15) business days of delivery at the Manassas facility. This fifteen-business-day window is specified in Section 8.2 of the MSA and was not disputed by the parties during the performance of the contract. Upon receipt, each lot was logged into WAL's materials receiving system, assigned an internal lot tracking number, and queued for inspection in accordance with the procedures set forth in WAL-QCP-100.
The testing protocols employed under WAL-QCP-100 for titanium alloy turbine housings include both non-destructive testing (NDT) and metallurgical sampling. Non-destructive testing methods include ultrasonic inspection, radiographic inspection, and dye penetrant inspection, all of which are standard methods for detecting subsurface and surface defects in aerospace-grade titanium components. In addition to NDT, WAL-QCP-100 requires metallurgical sampling — the extraction and analysis of sample cross-sections from randomly selected units within each lot — to assess microstructural characteristics including grain size, phase distribution, and, critically, volumetric porosity. Porosity is measured through image analysis of polished metallographic cross-sections using calibrated optical microscopy in accordance with ASTM E1920 and internal WAL procedures.
It is important for Dr. Vollmer to emphasize that WAL-QCP-100 had been in place well prior to the execution of the MSA with Kestrel. The procedure was originally developed in 2012, with revisions issued periodically to reflect evolving industry standards and regulatory requirements. The version of WAL-QCP-100 in effect during the relevant period (Revision F, effective March 1, 2021) was the same version applied to all suppliers furnishing titanium alloy turbine housings to WAL during that period. No revisions were made to WAL-QCP-100 for the purpose of altering the inspection criteria applicable to Kestrel's deliveries.
Dr. Vollmer should also note that under the MSA, Kestrel was required to maintain AS9100 Revision D certification as a contractual prerequisite. AS9100 Rev D is the internationally recognized quality management system standard for the aerospace industry, published by the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG). This certification requirement was set forth in Section 6.1(c) of the MSA and was a condition of Kestrel's ongoing eligibility to serve as a qualified supplier. WAL's expectation was that Kestrel's AS9100 Rev D-certified quality management system would produce components that consistently met WAL's published engineering specifications — an expectation that was met during CY1–CY3 but not during CY4.
B. The Porosity Specification — WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3
Dr. Vollmer's testimony on the porosity specification is the linchpin of WAL's technical defense and must be presented with precision and clarity. The contractual porosity limit for Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings is less than or equal to 0.25% (≤0.25%) by volume. This limit is expressly stated in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, which is titled "Microstructural Acceptance Criteria for Ti-6Al-4V ELI Turbine Housing Components." Table 3 sets forth acceptance criteria for multiple microstructural parameters, including grain size, alpha-phase morphology, beta-phase fraction, and volumetric porosity. The ≤0.25% porosity limit is stated in clear, unambiguous terms in the "Maximum Allowable Porosity" row of Table 3.
WAL-SPEC-TH-401 is one of a suite of engineering specifications — numbered WAL-SPEC-TH-401 through WAL-SPEC-TH-409 — that were incorporated by reference into the MSA executed on June 15, 2018, between Whitmore Aerospace LLC and Kestrel Dynamics GmbH. These specifications were listed in Exhibit B to the MSA ("Applicable Engineering Specifications") and were made available to Kestrel prior to execution of the MSA as part of the supplier qualification process. An additional specification, WAL-SPEC-TH-410, was subsequently added to the suite via Amendment No. 1, dated February 10, 2020, which also increased the maximum annual order volume from 2,500 to 4,000 units. Importantly, the ≤0.25% porosity limit in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, was not modified by either Amendment No. 1 or Amendment No. 2; it has remained unchanged since the original execution of the MSA.
Dr. Vollmer should explain to the Tribunal the engineering rationale for the ≤0.25% porosity limit. Turbine housings are safety-critical aerospace components that operate under extreme conditions, including high temperatures, high pressures, and cyclic mechanical loading. Ti-6Al-4V ELI (Extra Low Interstitial) titanium alloy is selected for this application precisely because of its superior fatigue resistance and fracture toughness. However, volumetric porosity — the presence of microscopic voids within the material's microstructure — compromises these properties by acting as stress concentration sites that can initiate fatigue cracks under cyclic loading. Porosity above the ≤0.25% threshold has been shown, through both WAL's internal engineering analysis and published literature, to reduce the fatigue life of Ti-6Al-4V ELI components to below the minimum acceptable service-life threshold for safety-critical turbine applications. The ≤0.25% limit is thus not an arbitrary or commercially motivated threshold; it is an engineering requirement grounded in the physics of fatigue failure and the safety imperatives of aerospace turbine design.
Dr. Vollmer should confirm, clearly and without equivocation, that the ≤0.25% standard was a published, contractual specification — not an unpublished, ad hoc, or informally applied requirement. This point is essential because it directly addresses Kestrel's central allegation that WAL applied an unpublished ≤0.15% porosity tolerance to engineer pretextual rejections. Dr. Vollmer should state affirmatively that the acceptance/rejection decisions for all fourteen lots were based on the ≤0.25% threshold set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, and on no other porosity criterion.
During her direct examination, Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to walk the Tribunal through the relevant page and section of WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, which will be presented as a demonstrative exhibit. She should be comfortable identifying the specific row and column of Table 3 that sets forth the ≤0.25% porosity limit, explaining the other microstructural parameters listed in the table, and confirming that the document as presented is a true and accurate copy of the specification as incorporated into the MSA. The examining attorney will ensure that the exhibit is properly introduced and admitted into evidence, but Dr. Vollmer's familiarity with the document should be evident to the Tribunal.
C. The 14 Rejected Lots — Technical Justification
Dr. Vollmer should testify to each of the fourteen rejected lots delivered by Kestrel between March 2022 and September 2022. These fourteen lots collectively comprised 1,680 individual turbine housing units — each lot containing 120 units, consistent with the standard lot size specified in Section 7.3 of the MSA. The first rejected lot was Lot KDG-2022-0307, delivered on March 7, 2022. The final rejected lot was Lot KDG-2022-0919, delivered on September 19, 2022. Each of the fourteen lots was assigned a unique lot identification number by Kestrel (using the prefix "KDG" followed by the year and date of shipment) and was tracked through WAL's receiving and inspection system under a corresponding internal lot tracking number.
For each lot, the incoming inspection conducted under WAL-QCP-100 identified porosity levels exceeding the contractual ≤0.25% limit established in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. The specific porosity readings for each lot are documented in the non-conformance reports that were issued in connection with each rejection, and these reports will be among the documentary exhibits supporting Dr. Vollmer's testimony. In addition, independent metallurgical testing performed by Arclight Materials Science Inc., under the direction of Dr. Raymond Chow, confirmed porosity levels ranging between 0.19% and 0.38% across the rejected lots. Dr. Chow's findings are set forth in his expert report, which has been submitted to the Tribunal as part of WAL's evidentiary submissions.
An important nuance that Dr. Vollmer must be prepared to address — both on direct and on cross-examination — concerns lots for which the average porosity reading fell below 0.25% (e.g., lots with an average porosity of 0.19%). Dr. Vollmer should clarify that the lot-level assessment under WAL-QCP-100 does not rely solely on the arithmetic mean of porosity readings across sampled units. Rather, the lot-level conformance determination considers the distribution of porosity readings across the sampled units within the lot. Under WAL-QCP-100's sampling methodology, if any individual unit within the statistically selected sample exhibits porosity above the ≤0.25% threshold, the lot is classified as non-conforming. This is a standard practice in aerospace quality control, where the safety-critical nature of the components requires that every unit within a lot meet specification — not merely that the lot average fall within the acceptable range.
Accordingly, Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to explain that lots with an average porosity of 0.19% were not uniformly compliant. Within those lots, individual units exhibited porosity levels above 0.25%, which triggered lot-level rejection under WAL-QCP-100. The presence of even a small number of non-conforming units within the sample indicates that the lot as a whole cannot be relied upon to meet the required specification, because the non-sampled units within the lot may also be non-conforming. This is a fundamental principle of acceptance sampling in aerospace quality assurance, and Dr. Vollmer's engineering background qualifies her to explain it to the Tribunal in clear, accessible terms.
Dr. Vollmer should present this testimony in a structured, lot-by-lot manner if directed by the examining attorney, or in a summary fashion that highlights the overall pattern of non-conformance, depending on the preferred approach for the direct examination. We will make this determination during the preparation sessions based on the Tribunal's procedural directives and the time allocated for Dr. Vollmer's testimony.
D. The Cure Process and Kestrel's Failure to Cure
Under Section 8.4 of the MSA, upon issuance of a rejection notice for a non-conforming lot, Kestrel was afforded a cure period during which it could either replace the non-conforming lot with conforming units or rework the non-conforming units to bring them into compliance with the applicable engineering specifications. As originally drafted, the cure period was thirty (30) calendar days from the date of Kestrel's receipt of the rejection notice. This cure period was subsequently extended to forty-five (45) calendar days by Amendment No. 2 to the MSA, dated September 3, 2021. Amendment No. 2 was negotiated in recognition of COVID-related disruptions to international logistics and supply chains, which had made the original thirty-day cure period impracticable for certain categories of remedial action, including the international shipping of replacement units from Kestrel's Stuttgart manufacturing facility to WAL's Manassas facility.
Dr. Vollmer should testify that of the fourteen lots rejected between March and September 2022, seven (7) lots remained uncured after the expiration of the forty-five-day cure period. For some of these lots, Kestrel submitted replacement units that themselves failed to meet the ≤0.25% porosity specification upon re-inspection. For other lots, Kestrel did not submit any replacement or rework within the cure period. The specific status of each lot — whether uncured due to non-submission of replacement units, or uncured due to the failure of submitted replacement units to meet specification — is documented in the cure correspondence and in WAL's internal tracking records.
The significance of seven uncured rejections lies in Section 8.4's definition of "Persistent Quality Failure." The MSA provides that Persistent Quality Failure occurs when there are three (3) or more uncured rejections in any rolling twelve-month period. Seven uncured rejections — more than double the contractual threshold — far exceeded the Persistent Quality Failure trigger. Under Section 14.2(b) of the MSA, Persistent Quality Failure constitutes grounds for termination for cause. WAL's Notice of Termination, issued on October 3, 2022, expressly invoked this provision.
Dr. Vollmer should testify to WAL's communications with Kestrel regarding the rejection notices and cure opportunities. In particular, she communicated directly with Dr. Stefan Voss, Kestrel's Head of Quality, regarding the technical basis for each rejection and the requirements for acceptable cure. These communications were typically conducted by email, with supporting technical documentation attached, and copies were provided to Gerald Huang and, on the Kestrel side, to Luisa Erdmann (Kestrel's Account Manager for the WAL relationship). Dr. Vollmer should confirm that WAL provided Kestrel with detailed non-conformance reports for each rejected lot, including the specific porosity data that formed the basis for the rejection. WAL's position is that Kestrel was fully informed of the grounds for each rejection and was given every reasonable opportunity to cure.
E. Consistency of WAL's Inspection Standards
Dr. Vollmer should testify that WAL applied the same ≤0.25% porosity standard to all suppliers of titanium alloy turbine housings throughout the period relevant to this arbitration, including during the earlier contract years (CY1–CY3, approximately June 2018 through June 2021) when Kestrel's deliveries were generally compliant with WAL's specifications. The ≤0.25% threshold was not introduced, modified, or selectively applied in CY4. It was a constant, published requirement from the inception of the MSA.
Dr. Vollmer should further explain that the quality failures giving rise to this dispute began in CY4 (commencing approximately June 2021, with the first rejected lot arriving in March 2022). During CY1–CY3, Kestrel's lots were subjected to the same incoming inspection procedures under WAL-QCP-100 and assessed against the same ≤0.25% porosity limit, and Kestrel's deliveries during that period generally met the specification. The fact that the quality failures are concentrated in CY4 strongly suggests that the change occurred on Kestrel's side — in Kestrel's manufacturing process, raw material sourcing, or quality management — rather than on WAL's side in the form of a changed or artificially tightened acceptance criterion.
This testimony is specifically designed to address Kestrel's core allegation that WAL applied an unpublished porosity tolerance of ≤0.15% in CY4 to engineer pretextual rejections. If WAL had changed its acceptance criteria — as Kestrel alleges — one would expect to see rejections not only of Kestrel's lots but also of lots from WAL's other titanium alloy turbine housing suppliers during the same period. Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to testify that WAL's other suppliers continued to meet the ≤0.25% specification in CY4, and that the non-conformance pattern was unique to Kestrel's deliveries.
F. The Decision to Onboard Valkyr Precision Components Inc.
Dr. Vollmer should confirm that the evaluation of Valkyr Precision Components Inc. ("Valkyr"), based in Tucson, Arizona, as a potential alternative supplier of titanium alloy turbine housings commenced only after Kestrel's quality failures became persistent and it became apparent that WAL faced a risk of supply-chain disruption for a safety-critical component. The engineering qualification process for Valkyr's turbine housings — including first-article inspection, metallurgical analysis, and design review — was initiated as a prudent supply-chain continuity measure, consistent with WAL's obligation to ensure an uninterrupted supply of flight-critical components for its own customers.
Dr. Vollmer should make clear that the Valkyr qualification process was not a pretext to replace Kestrel. Kestrel's position in this arbitration is that WAL sought to terminate the MSA in order to switch to a lower-cost domestic supplier, and that the quality rejections were manufactured to create a basis for termination. This theory is contradicted by the economics of the Valkyr arrangement. Valkyr's unit price for equivalent turbine housings is €8,432.92 per unit, compared to Kestrel's CY4 contract price of €5,222.92 per unit — a difference of €3,210.00 per unit, representing a price premium of approximately 61.5%. WAL thus paid a substantial premium to secure an alternative source of supply, a fact that is entirely inconsistent with the theory that cost savings motivated the switch.
Dr. Vollmer should note that while she was involved in the engineering qualification of Valkyr's products — because that process falls within her engineering and quality oversight responsibilities — the commercial decision to onboard Valkyr, including the negotiation of pricing and contractual terms, was managed by Gerald Huang and the Global Supply Chain Operations team. Questions regarding WAL's supply-chain strategy, vendor selection criteria, and procurement decision-making should accordingly be deferred to Mr. Huang's testimony.
IV. ANTICIPATED CROSS-EXAMINATION — HRS STRATEGY AND SUGGESTED RESPONSES
Based on Kestrel's Statement of Claim, its subsequent written submissions, and the expert reports submitted on Kestrel's behalf, we anticipate that HRS will pursue the following lines of cross-examination with Dr. Vollmer. For each anticipated line of attack, this section sets forth the likely approach, the underlying objective, and the preparation points that Dr. Vollmer should internalize in advance of the hearing.
A. Anticipated Line 1: WAL Applied an Unpublished ≤0.15% Porosity Standard
This is the centerpiece of Kestrel's case, and it will almost certainly be the primary focus of Dr. Vollmer's cross-examination. HRS will likely argue that WAL's actual testing practice — as distinct from its contractual specification — applied a stricter, unpublished standard of ≤0.15% porosity, and that the contractual ≤0.25% threshold was not the operative criterion used to make acceptance/rejection decisions. Kestrel's theory is that WAL internally tightened its porosity requirements in CY4, without notifying Kestrel, in order to create a basis for rejections that would not have occurred under the contractual standard.
Preparation points:
• Dr. Vollmer should firmly and unequivocally state that the applicable standard was and always has been ≤0.25% as stated in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. She should not hedge, qualify, or express uncertainty on this point. The contractual specification is clear, and the rejection decisions were made on the basis of that specification.
• HRS may attempt to introduce internal WAL documents — such as internal engineering memoranda, email exchanges among WAL quality engineers, or internal quality dashboards — that reference a ≤0.15% "target," "preferred specification," or "internal quality goal." If shown such documents, Dr. Vollmer should distinguish clearly between an internal aspirational quality target and the contractual acceptance/rejection criterion. It is standard practice in aerospace engineering for organizations to maintain internal quality targets that are more stringent than contractual minimums. An internal target of ≤0.15% reflects WAL's aspiration to produce and procure components of the highest possible quality; it does not establish a contractual obligation on the part of suppliers, nor was it ever communicated to Kestrel as the applicable acceptance criterion.
• Dr. Vollmer should emphasize that all rejection decisions were made solely on the basis of the contractual ≤0.25% threshold, not on any internal preference or aspiration. If HRS presses on this point, Dr. Vollmer should reiterate that the rejection notices and non-conformance reports issued for each lot identify the contractual specification — ≤0.25% — as the basis for rejection, and that no rejection was issued for a lot that met the ≤0.25% standard.
• As a factual matter, the porosity data from the rejected lots supports WAL's position. Readings across the rejected lots ranged from 0.19% to 0.38%, with many readings clearly above even a ≤0.25% standard. If WAL were applying a ≤0.15% standard, one would expect rejections of lots with porosity readings in the 0.16%–0.24% range where no units exceeded 0.25%. That is not the pattern reflected in the data.
B. Anticipated Line 2: WAL's Inspection Methodology Was Flawed or Biased
HRS may challenge the sampling methodology employed under WAL-QCP-100, arguing that it was statistically inadequate, improperly implemented, or selectively applied to Kestrel's lots in a manner designed to produce rejections. This line of attack may be supported by the expert testimony of Dr. Martina Kessler (Director, Albrecht Prüftechnik GmbH), Kestrel's designated expert on metallurgical testing methodology.
Preparation points:
• Dr. Vollmer should explain that WAL-QCP-100 conforms to industry-standard aerospace incoming inspection protocols, including the sampling plans set forth in AQL (Acceptable Quality Level) standards derived from AS9138 and analogous aerospace quality standards. The sampling methodology is not a novel or bespoke creation of WAL; it reflects established practices widely used throughout the aerospace supply chain.
• The procedure was applied consistently to all lots from all suppliers of titanium alloy turbine housings, not selectively to Kestrel. Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to confirm that the same sample sizes, selection criteria, and testing protocols were used for Kestrel's lots as for lots received from WAL's other qualified suppliers.
• Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to discuss, at a general level, the sample sizes used for each lot (consistent with WAL-QCP-100's sampling tables), the random selection methodology for identifying units within the lot to be sampled, and the calibration and maintenance records for the testing equipment used in the Manassas laboratory. She should not, however, attempt to provide expert-level statistical analysis; if pressed on statistical methodology questions, she should note that Dr. Raymond Chow's expert report addresses the statistical validity of WAL's sampling approach and that she concurs with his conclusions as a matter of engineering judgment.
• Dr. Vollmer should cross-reference Dr. Chow's independent analysis, which utilized separate samples drawn from the same lots and was conducted using independent laboratory equipment and procedures. Dr. Chow's results corroborated WAL's internal findings, confirming that the porosity exceedances identified by WAL were not artifacts of testing error or methodological bias.
C. Anticipated Line 3: Earlier Contract Years Show WAL Accepted Similar Quality Levels
HRS may attempt to demonstrate that WAL accepted lots during CY1–CY3 with porosity levels comparable to those of the rejected CY4 lots, thereby suggesting that WAL changed its standards — not Kestrel's quality. This line of attack would involve presenting historical lot inspection data from the earlier contract years and comparing it to the CY4 rejection data.
Preparation points:
• Dr. Vollmer should testify that the historical acceptance records for CY1–CY3 show that Kestrel's lots during those periods generally met the ≤0.25% porosity specification. The lots accepted during CY1–CY3 were accepted because they were compliant — not because WAL was applying a more lenient standard.
• If confronted with specific historical lot data purporting to show CY1–CY3 lots with porosity levels similar to those of the rejected CY4 lots, Dr. Vollmer should carefully review each data point presented to her before responding. She should distinguish between lots that met the ≤0.25% specification (which would have been properly accepted) and any marginal cases. If HRS identifies specific lots from CY1–CY3 with porosity readings in the 0.20%–0.25% range, Dr. Vollmer should confirm that those lots met the specification and were properly accepted, and that there is no inconsistency between accepting a lot at 0.24% porosity and rejecting a lot with individual units at 0.27% or 0.32% porosity.
• Dr. Vollmer should not concede, under any circumstances, that WAL "relaxed" its standards during the earlier contract years. The standard was ≤0.25% from the inception of the MSA, and it was applied consistently. If CY1–CY3 lots met that standard and CY4 lots did not, the explanation lies in a change in Kestrel's manufacturing quality — not in a change in WAL's acceptance criteria.
• If HRS presses on the existence of any CY1–CY3 lots that were accepted despite marginal porosity readings, Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to note that the lot-level conformance determination considers the entire distribution of readings within the sample, and that a lot with all units at or below 0.25% — even if some are close to the threshold — is properly accepted under WAL-QCP-100.
D. Anticipated Line 4: Dr. Vollmer's Role in the Valkyr Decision Reveals Pretext
HRS may probe Dr. Vollmer's involvement in the evaluation and qualification of Valkyr Precision Components Inc. to suggest that the termination of the Kestrel MSA was pretextual — motivated not by genuine quality concerns but by WAL's desire to replace Kestrel with a domestic supplier. This line of cross-examination is likely to focus on the timeline of Valkyr's qualification and on Dr. Vollmer's personal involvement in the process.
Preparation points:
• Dr. Vollmer should clarify the timeline of Valkyr's engagement with precision. Valkyr was not approached or evaluated as a potential supplier until after Kestrel's quality failures had become persistent — specifically, not until multiple lots had been rejected and the uncured rejections had begun to accumulate beyond the Persistent Quality Failure threshold. The engineering qualification process for Valkyr was initiated as a supply-chain continuity measure, undertaken to ensure that WAL could continue to receive flight-critical turbine housings in the event that the Kestrel relationship was terminated or further disrupted.
• Dr. Vollmer should note — and this point cannot be overemphasized — that Valkyr's unit price of €8,432.92 is substantially higher than Kestrel's CY4 contract price of €5,222.92. This price differential of approximately €3,210.00 per unit, or roughly 61.5%, directly contradicts any theory that cost savings motivated WAL's decision to transition away from Kestrel. WAL's decision to onboard Valkyr at a significant cost premium is consistent with a company facing a genuine supply-chain emergency, not with a company seeking to reduce procurement costs.
• If questioned about the commercial or strategic rationale for the Valkyr onboarding — as distinct from the engineering qualification of Valkyr's products — Dr. Vollmer should appropriately defer to Gerald Huang, who has primary responsibility for procurement, vendor management, and supply-chain strategy within WAL's organizational structure. Dr. Vollmer's role was limited to the engineering evaluation of Valkyr's turbine housings to determine whether they met WAL's engineering specifications. The commercial decision to engage Valkyr was Mr. Huang's.
E. Anticipated Line 5: Technical Challenges to Porosity Testing Results
HRS may, with the support of Dr. Martina Kessler's expert testimony, challenge the reliability of specific porosity measurements obtained by WAL's internal laboratory and/or by Dr. Chow's independent analysis. Dr. Kessler, who serves as Director of Albrecht Prüftechnik GmbH, a German materials testing laboratory, may critique the testing methodology, sample preparation techniques, image analysis parameters, or equipment calibration underlying the porosity measurements.
Preparation points:
• Dr. Vollmer should be mindful of the distinction between her role as a fact witness and Dr. Chow's role as an expert witness. When confronted with challenges to specific metallurgical methodology points — such as the selection of magnification levels for image analysis, the polishing protocols used in sample preparation, or the statistical treatment of measurement uncertainty — Dr. Vollmer should defer to Dr. Chow's expert opinion. She is not being presented as a metallurgical testing expert, and she should not attempt to provide expert-level rebuttals to Dr. Kessler's methodology critiques.
• That said, Dr. Vollmer can and should confirm that WAL's internal testing results were consistent with and corroborated by Dr. Chow's independent findings. This is a powerful point: two independent testing processes — WAL's internal laboratory and Arclight Materials Science's external laboratory — both identified porosity exceedances in the same lots. The consistency of these results substantially undermines any suggestion that WAL's internal testing was flawed or biased.
• Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to explain, at a general level, the difference between WAL's internal testing process (conducted by WAL's Manassas laboratory as part of the incoming inspection under WAL-QCP-100) and Dr. Chow's independent re-testing (conducted at Arclight's facilities using separate samples drawn from the same lots). Both processes identified porosity exceedances, and both concluded that the lots failed to meet the ≤0.25% contractual specification.
• Dr. Vollmer should not overreach into areas of pure expert metallurgical opinion. If asked a question that calls for specialized expertise beyond her knowledge as an engineering executive, she should state that the question is better addressed by Dr. Chow's expert report and testimony, and that she is not in a position to offer an expert opinion on that particular methodology point.
F. Anticipated Line 6: Amendment No. 2 and COVID Disruptions
HRS may argue that Amendment No. 2 to the MSA, dated September 3, 2021, which extended the cure period from thirty (30) to forty-five (45) calendar days and added a force majeure carve-out for pandemic-related delays, implicitly acknowledged that quality issues during the CY4 period were attributable to pandemic disruptions rather than to deficiencies in Kestrel's manufacturing process. Under this theory, the quality failures were a foreseeable consequence of COVID-related supply-chain disruptions that both parties recognized and addressed through Amendment No. 2, and WAL's subsequent reliance on those quality failures as grounds for termination was inconsistent with the intent of the amendment.
Preparation points:
• Dr. Vollmer should explain clearly and firmly that Amendment No. 2 addressed logistics and delivery timing — not quality standards. The extension of the cure period from thirty to forty-five days was intended to accommodate delays in international shipping and rework logistics caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. It recognized that the physical process of shipping replacement units from Stuttgart to Manassas, or of reworking units and re-shipping them, might take longer than thirty days during a period of global logistics disruption. It did not modify, relax, or otherwise alter any of WAL's engineering specifications, including the ≤0.25% porosity limit in WAL-SPEC-TH-401.
• Dr. Vollmer should draw a clear distinction between COVID-related disruptions to shipping, logistics, and delivery timing — which Amendment No. 2 addressed — and the quality of Kestrel's manufacturing process at its Stuttgart facility. The porosity of a turbine housing is determined by the manufacturing process (casting, forging, heat treatment, etc.) at Kestrel's Stuttgart facility, not by the logistics of delivering the finished product to Manassas. There is no plausible mechanism by which COVID-related shipping delays would cause an increase in the porosity of components manufactured at Kestrel's Stuttgart plant.
• The force majeure carve-out added by Amendment No. 2 applied to delivery delays — i.e., delays in Kestrel's ability to deliver lots to WAL's Manassas facility by the scheduled delivery dates set forth in the MSA's delivery schedule. It did not apply to non-conformance with technical specifications. A component that arrives late due to pandemic-related shipping disruptions is subject to the force majeure carve-out; a component that arrives on time but fails to meet the porosity specification is not.
• Dr. Vollmer should be prepared to note that the negotiation of Amendment No. 2 was led by Gerald Huang on WAL's behalf and by Luisa Erdmann on Kestrel's behalf. Dr. Vollmer was consulted on the engineering implications of the amendment — specifically, to confirm that the extended cure period would not create safety or scheduling risks for WAL's production program — but she was not the primary negotiator. If detailed questions arise about the negotiation history or commercial intent of Amendment No. 2, they should be deferred to Mr. Huang.
V. KEY DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS FOR DR. VOLLMER'S TESTIMONY
The following documents are anticipated to be used in connection with Dr. Vollmer's direct examination and/or cross-examination. Dr. Vollmer should review each of these documents thoroughly in advance of the preparation sessions and should be comfortable locating and discussing relevant provisions, data points, and entries within each document.
Dr. Vollmer should be particularly familiar with Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4, as these are the documents most likely to be the subject of detailed questioning during both direct and cross-examination. She should be able to locate specific entries, explain the structure and format of each document, and confirm the accuracy of the information contained therein based on her personal knowledge and involvement.
In addition to the documents listed above, HRS may introduce internal WAL documents not listed here during cross-examination — including internal emails, engineering memoranda, or quality dashboard reports that reference the ≤0.15% internal quality target. Dr. Vollmer should be prepared for this possibility and should respond to such documents in accordance with the preparation points set forth in Section IV.A above.
VI. COORDINATION WITH OTHER WITNESSES
A. Coordination with Gerald Huang
Gerald Huang, Vice President of Global Supply Chain Operations at WAL, will testify on matters relating to supply-chain management, commercial communications with Kestrel regarding the rejection and cure process, and the decision to evaluate and onboard Valkyr Precision Components Inc. as an alternative supplier. Mr. Huang's testimony covers the commercial, procurement, and logistics dimensions of the disputed events, while Dr. Vollmer's testimony covers the technical, engineering, and quality-control dimensions.
Dr. Vollmer's testimony should be carefully delineated to focus on technical and engineering aspects. When questions arise during her testimony — particularly during cross-examination — that touch on commercial strategy, procurement decision-making, pricing negotiations, or supply-chain management, Dr. Vollmer should appropriately defer to Mr. Huang. This delineation serves two purposes: it ensures that each witness testifies within his or her area of direct knowledge and responsibility, and it avoids potential inconsistencies that could arise if both witnesses offer independent recollections of events outside their primary functional areas.
It is essential to ensure consistency between Dr. Vollmer's and Mr. Huang's accounts of the rejection and cure timeline and the internal WAL communications surrounding those events. During the preparation sessions, we will cross-reference Dr. Vollmer's recollection of key dates, communications, and decisions against Mr. Huang's anticipated testimony to identify and resolve any discrepancies. Particular attention should be paid to the following points of overlap:
• The dates on which rejection notices were issued and received by Kestrel
• The content and timing of cure-related communications with Dr. Voss and Ms. Erdmann
• The internal WAL decision-making process leading to the Notice of Termination
• The timeline of Valkyr's evaluation and qualification
B. Coordination with Expert Witnesses
Dr. Raymond Chow, Arclight Materials Science Inc. — Dr. Chow will testify as WAL's designated metallurgical expert. His expert report presents the results of his independent metallurgical analysis of samples drawn from the rejected lots, including porosity measurements, microstructural characterization, and an assessment of the statistical validity of WAL's sampling methodology. Dr. Vollmer's testimony on WAL's internal testing results should be consistent with and supported by Dr. Chow's independent findings. During the preparation sessions, we will review the key data points and conclusions in Dr. Chow's report alongside WAL's internal non-conformance reports to confirm alignment. Where Dr. Vollmer is asked questions on cross-examination that call for expert-level metallurgical opinion, she should defer to Dr. Chow.
Dr. Nadia Ostrovsky, Ridgeline Economic Consulting LLC — Dr. Ostrovsky will testify as WAL's designated damages expert. Her report addresses the quantification of damages (or, more precisely, the rebuttal of Kestrel's claimed damages) and the economic reasonableness of WAL's termination decision. There is no need for direct coordination between Dr. Vollmer and Dr. Ostrovsky, as their testimony addresses distinct subject matters. However, it should be noted that Dr. Vollmer's testimony on the nature, severity, and persistence of Kestrel's quality failures — and on the engineering justification for WAL's rejection decisions — provides the factual foundation that supports the reasonableness of WAL's termination, which in turn underpins Dr. Ostrovsky's damages rebuttal. Dr. Vollmer's credibility on the technical issues is thus critical to the overall effectiveness of WAL's damages defense.
VII. PREPARATION SCHEDULE AND LOGISTICS
The following preparation schedule is proposed for Dr. Vollmer's witness preparation. All sessions will be held at the offices of Sternfeld & Calloway LLP, unless otherwise indicated.
Initial Preparation Session:
Participants: Dr. Ingrid Vollmer; Jeffrey Park (Associate); Simone Laroche (Senior Associate)
Timing: To be scheduled for the week of December 26–29, 2023
Agenda: Review of key testimony topics for direct examination (Section III); initial walkthrough of anticipated cross-examination lines (Section IV); review of key documentary exhibits (Section V); identification of any factual gaps or areas requiring further investigation.
Follow-Up Session with Theodore Langston:
Participants: Dr. Ingrid Vollmer; Theodore Langston (Partner); Jeffrey Park (Associate)
Timing: To be scheduled for the first week of January 2024 (January 2–5), prior to the commencement of the evidentiary hearing
Agenda: Refinement of direct examination testimony; review of anticipated cross-examination with Partner-level input on strategy; finalization of exhibit order and demonstrative materials; discussion of Tribunal dynamics and procedural considerations.
Mock Cross-Examination Session:
Participants: Dr. Ingrid Vollmer; Simone Laroche (conducting mock cross-examination); Jeffrey Park (observing and providing feedback)
Timing: To be scheduled in conjunction with or immediately following the follow-up session with Theodore Langston (January 2–5, 2024)
Agenda: Simone Laroche will simulate HRS's anticipated cross-examination approach, testing Dr. Vollmer's responses to the lines of questioning identified in Section IV. The session will focus on maintaining composure under adversarial questioning, avoiding overstatement and speculation, and appropriately deferring questions outside Dr. Vollmer's areas of direct knowledge.
Pre-Hearing Document Review:
Dr. Vollmer should independently review all key exhibits listed in Section V in advance of the preparation sessions. She should flag any documents with which she is unfamiliar, any entries or data points that she cannot confirm from personal knowledge, and any potential issues or questions that should be addressed during the preparation sessions.
Hearing Logistics:
The evidentiary hearing is scheduled to take place at the ICC Hearing Centre, New York, New York, from January 8 through January 12, 2024. Dr. Vollmer's testimony is tentatively scheduled in accordance with Respondent's Pre-Hearing Organizational Submission filed in December 2023. The precise date and time of her testimony will be confirmed based on the Tribunal's procedural timetable, which may be adjusted during the hearing.
The language of arbitration is English. Dr. Vollmer is fully comfortable testifying in English, and no interpreter will be required. Travel and accommodation arrangements for Dr. Vollmer will be coordinated separately.
VIII. GENERAL WITNESS GUIDELINES
The following guidelines should be reviewed with Dr. Vollmer during each preparation session and reinforced prior to her testimony at the hearing:
1. Testify truthfully and precisely. Dr. Vollmer must testify truthfully at all times. She should answer each question as precisely as possible, providing the information requested without volunteering additional information beyond the scope of the question. Volunteering information on cross-examination can open new lines of inquiry and create unnecessary risk.
2. Acknowledge uncertainty rather than speculate. If Dr. Vollmer is uncertain about a specific data point, date, document, or technical detail, she should say so clearly. Responses such as "I do not recall the specific figure, but it is documented in the non-conformance report" or "I would need to review the document to confirm" are preferable to guesses or approximations that could later be shown to be inaccurate.
3. Defer expert metallurgical opinions to Dr. Chow. Dr. Vollmer is testifying as a fact witness — as the engineering executive who designed and administered WAL's inspection protocols and who authorized the rejection decisions at issue. She is not being presented as a metallurgical testing expert. When cross-examination questions call for expert-level opinions on metallurgical testing methodology, statistical analysis of porosity measurements, or other specialized technical matters, she should defer to Dr. Chow's expert report and testimony. She may, however, offer her engineering judgment on matters within her role and experience, such as the engineering rationale for the ≤0.25% porosity specification.
4. Remain composed during cross-examination. Dr. Maximilian Haber and Katrin Schäfer are experienced international arbitration advocates who may adopt a confrontational or adversarial tone during cross-examination. This is a deliberate tactic designed to unsettle the witness and elicit imprecise or emotional responses. Dr. Vollmer should remain calm, measured, and professional throughout. She should take her time before responding, listen to each question carefully and in its entirety before answering, and request clarification if a question is ambiguous or compound.
5. Avoid characterizing Kestrel's conduct as intentional or fraudulent. WAL's legal position in this arbitration is that Kestrel failed to meet its contractual specifications and failed to cure the resulting non-conformances within the contractual cure period. WAL does not allege fraud, intentional misconduct, or bad faith on Kestrel's part. Dr. Vollmer should not characterize Kestrel's quality failures as deliberate, intentional, or fraudulent. The appropriate framing is that the delivered lots did not conform to the contractual specification, and that Kestrel failed to cure the non-conformances — regardless of Kestrel's intent or the reasons for the quality degradation.
6. Use proper contractual references. When referring to the Master Supply Agreement, Dr. Vollmer should use the full reference on first mention: "the Master Supply Agreement dated June 15, 2018, between Whitmore Aerospace LLC and Kestrel Dynamics GmbH." Thereafter, she may refer to it as "the MSA." Similarly, she should use the full designation for engineering specifications (e.g., "WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3") and quality control procedures (e.g., "WAL-QCP-100") to ensure clarity in the hearing record.
7. Listen to objections. If either party's counsel raises an objection during Dr. Vollmer's testimony, she should stop speaking immediately and wait for the Tribunal to rule on the objection before continuing. She should not attempt to finish her answer while an objection is pending.
8. Do not discuss testimony with other witnesses. During the course of the hearing, Dr. Vollmer should not discuss the substance of her testimony — or the testimony of any other witness — with Gerald Huang, Dr. Chow, Dr. Ostrovsky, or any other witness in the proceeding. This restriction applies both before and after Dr. Vollmer's testimony, until the evidentiary hearing has concluded.
This memorandum will be supplemented as necessary following the initial preparation session and in light of any additional submissions or procedural developments prior to the evidentiary hearing. Please direct any questions to Jeffrey Park at x4817.
— END OF MEMORANDUM —
No. | Document Description | Relevance
1 | WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3 (Microstructural Acceptance Criteria — Porosity Specification: ≤0.25%) | Establishes the contractual porosity limit; central to WAL's defense
2 | WAL-QCP-100, Revision F (Incoming Inspection Procedure, effective March 1, 2021) | Establishes the inspection methodology; demonstrates consistent application
3 | Rejection Notices for all 14 lots (Lot KDG-2022-0307 through Lot KDG-2022-0919) | Documents each rejection and the stated basis
4 | Non-Conformance Reports with porosity data for each rejected lot | Provides the specific porosity measurements supporting each rejection
5 | Cure correspondence between WAL (Dr. Vollmer / Gerald Huang) and Kestrel (Dr. Stefan Voss / Luisa Erdmann) | Documents the cure process and Kestrel's failure to cure 7 lots
6 | WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause dated October 3, 2022 | Documents WAL's invocation of § 14.2(b) for Persistent Quality Failure
7 | Amendment No. 1 (February 10, 2020) — Addition of WAL-SPEC-TH-410; volume increase to 4,000 maximum units | Demonstrates evolution of contractual scope without change to porosity spec
8 | Amendment No. 2 (September 3, 2021) — Cure period extension to 45 days; force majeure carve-out | Addresses COVID-related modifications; confirms no change to quality specs
9 | Dr. Raymond Chow's Expert Report (Arclight Materials Science Inc.) — Metallurgical analysis confirming porosity levels of 0.19%–0.38% | Corroborates WAL's internal testing results through independent analysis
10 | Historical lot acceptance records for CY1–CY3 (June 2018 – June 2021) | Demonstrates consistent application of ≤0.25% standard in prior years

MEMORANDUM

ENGAGEMENT NO.: 1019-00001

I. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW

II. WITNESS BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

V. KEY DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS FOR DR. VOLLMER'S TESTIMONY

VI. COORDINATION WITH OTHER WITNESSES

VII. PREPARATION SCHEDULE AND LOGISTICS

VIII. GENERAL WITNESS GUIDELINES

Record

Parties

Dates

Amounts