PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
FINAL INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
Grievance Investigation: Dr. Marcus Ellender
Director of Biomedical Engineering Laboratories
Prepared for: Thornwick Medical Research Institute
Prepared by: Calderwood & Harkness LLP
Date: November 22, 2024
C&H Matter No.: 1029-00002
Prepared by:
Renata Vasquez, Partner, Labor & Employment Nadia Petrov, Associate, Labor & Employment James Underwood, Associate, Labor & Employment
Calderwood & Harkness LLP One Federal Place, Suite 3200 Boston, MA 02110
Delivered to:
Elena Graff, General Counsel Thornwick Medical Research Institute 480 Kendall Avenue Cambridge, MA 02142
Grace Okenwa, Vice President, Human Resources Thornwick Medical Research Institute 480 Kendall Avenue Cambridge, MA 02142
This report is a privileged and confidential attorney-client communication and attorney work product prepared at the direction and for the benefit of Thornwick Medical Research Institute. It is not intended for distribution to, or use by, any third party without the express written consent of Thornwick Medical Research Institute's General Counsel. The attorney-client privilege and work-product protections belong exclusively to Thornwick Medical Research Institute as the institutional client.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Calderwood & Harkness LLP ("C&H") was retained by Thornwick Medical Research Institute ("TMRI") on September 10, 2024, to conduct an independent workplace investigation into formal grievances filed by five TMRI employees against Dr. Marcus Ellender, Director of Biomedical Engineering Laboratories. The investigation was initiated at the request and under the direction of TMRI's General Counsel, Elena Graff, for the purpose of providing legal advice to TMRI regarding the grievances and the appropriate institutional response.
The grievances were filed between August 12, 2024, and September 4, 2024, pursuant to the formal complaint procedure set forth in TMRI Employee Handbook § 7.3. The five complainants — Dr. Yuna Sakata, Trevor Hollins, Dr. Priya Chandrasekaran, Miguel Ferreira, and Sandra Nix — alleged four categories of misconduct by Dr. Ellender:
(1) Retaliation against employees who reported safety concerns to TMRI's Environmental Health & Safety ("EHS") office or other internal authorities;
(2) Creation of a hostile work environment through verbal intimidation, discriminatory scheduling, and punitive work assignments;
(3) Violations of OSHA-mandated safety protocols and biohazard-containment requirements, including directed circumvention of personal protective equipment ("PPE") requirements during aerosol-generating laboratory procedures; and
(4) Falsification or alteration of safety-incident reports and laboratory-notebook entries, including records related to a September 14, 2023 biohazard-containment breach involving Biosafety Level 2 ("BSL-2") materials.
Over the course of approximately eleven weeks, from September 10, 2024, through November 22, 2024, C&H conducted a comprehensive investigation that included the following activities:
• Witness Interviews. C&H interviewed fourteen (14) unique witnesses across nineteen (19) interview sessions. This included five complainant interviews, eight corroborating-witness interviews, one respondent interview of Dr. Ellender conducted over two days with his personal counsel present, and three follow-up interview sessions.
• Document Review. C&H reviewed 1,247 documents collected pursuant to a litigation-hold memorandum issued by General Counsel Graff on September 13, 2024. The document collection included email correspondence, safety-incident reports, laboratory-notebook pages, performance-evaluation forms, EHS audit reports, scheduling records, meeting minutes, grant-progress reports, and human resources files.
• Independent EHS Audit Findings. C&H considered the preliminary findings of an independent environmental health and safety audit of TMRI Biomedical Engineering Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4, conducted by Haverford Safety Consulting Group, LLC, under the direction of Liam Garrett, CIH, CSP.
Based on its investigation, and applying a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard consistent with best practices for internal workplace investigations, C&H has reached the following findings:
Retaliation (Allegation Category 1): SUBSTANTIATED. The evidence established that Dr. Ellender reassigned Dr. Yuna Sakata from her position on an active NIH-funded research project (NIH Grant No. 5R01-EB029174) within eleven (11) business days of her oral report of a chemical spill in Lab B-2 to EHS Director Alan Murdoch. The reassignment was to a significantly lower-profile internal assignment — a sterilization-protocol review — without any documented performance-based or programmatic justification. An email dated August 9, 2024, from Dr. Ellender to Lab B-2 Supervisor Joanna Pratt, stating "Sakata is becoming a problem — move her off the grant and onto the sterilization-protocol review," directly links the reassignment to Dr. Sakata's protected activity. The evidence further established that Dr. Ellender threatened Lab Technician Miguel Ferreira with termination for raising PPE-related safety concerns with the EHS office. These actions constitute violations of TMRI Anti-Retaliation Policy HR-2021-009 and implicate the Massachusetts Whistleblower Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 149, § 185.
Hostile Work Environment (Allegation Category 2): SUBSTANTIATED IN PART. Multiple witnesses corroborated a pattern of verbal intimidation, demeaning language directed at technicians and junior researchers, and unfavorable scheduling practices targeting specific employees. This conduct constitutes a clear violation of the TMRI Respectful Workplace Policy HR-2021-005. However, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Dr. Ellender's conduct was motivated by or directed at employees on the basis of protected characteristics — specifically national origin or gender — within the meaning of M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4, or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While Dr. Priya Chandrasekaran reported a belief that her differential treatment may have been connected to her national origin or gender, she acknowledged difficulty identifying direct evidence tying the conduct to those characteristics, and no corroborating witness provided testimony establishing such a nexus.
Safety-Protocol Violations (Allegation Category 3): SUBSTANTIATED. The evidence established that Dr. Ellender directed laboratory technicians to bypass OSHA-mandated PPE requirements — specifically respiratory protection during aerosol-generating procedures — on at least three occasions between March and July 2024. This testimony was independently corroborated by three witnesses and is consistent with the preliminary findings of the Haverford Safety Consulting Group independent EHS audit, which identified nine (9) PPE-compliance deficiencies and three (3) biohazard-containment protocol violations in Labs B-1 and B-4. These actions constitute violations of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 et seq., the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules, and TMRI's internal EHS policies.
Falsification or Alteration of Records (Allegation Category 4): SUBSTANTIATED. Forensic comparison of laboratory-notebook entries from Lab B-2 confirmed that records documenting the scope and nature of a September 14, 2023 biohazard-containment breach involving BSL-2 materials were altered subsequent to their original creation. The alterations were made in handwriting identified as consistent with Dr. Ellender's, based on comparison with known exemplars, and served to minimize the severity of the incident. Additionally, two safety-incident reports (IR-2024-031 and IR-2024-038), authored or approved by Dr. Ellender, contained narrative descriptions attributing equipment malfunctions to operator error by a lab technician, which were directly contradicted by contemporaneous email correspondence acknowledging known equipment deficiencies. These actions constitute falsification of records in violation of TMRI policies and potentially implicate federal grant-integrity requirements and OSHA recordkeeping obligations.
In light of these findings, C&H recommends six corrective actions, which are detailed in Section VI of this report. In summary, those recommendations are:
1. Termination of Dr. Ellender's employment for cause pursuant to TMRI Employee Handbook § 9.2.
2. Referral to TMRI's Institutional Biosafety Committee and OSHA for review of the substantiated safety-protocol violations and evaluation of mandatory reporting obligations.
3. Notification to NIH Grants Management regarding the change in principal investigator status on two active NIH R01 grants (combined remaining funding of approximately $3.1 million).
4. Mandatory anti-retaliation and supervisory-conduct training for all lab directors and supervisors.
5. Revision of TMRI's safety-incident reporting procedures to include anonymous reporting options, independent EHS review, and enhanced chain-of-custody requirements for laboratory records.
6. Individual remediation for each of the five complainants, including restoration of research assignments, correction of personnel records, and protections from further retaliation.
The remainder of this report sets forth in detail the scope and methodology of the investigation, the factual background, the evidence gathered, the analysis applied, and the basis for each finding and recommendation.
II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
A. Engagement and Authority
On September 6, 2024, TMRI General Counsel Elena Graff contacted Renata Vasquez, Partner in the Labor & Employment Practice Group at Calderwood & Harkness LLP, to discuss the potential retention of outside counsel to conduct an independent investigation into formal grievances that had been filed by multiple employees of TMRI against Dr. Marcus Ellender, Director of Biomedical Engineering Laboratories. General Counsel Graff indicated that the volume and severity of the allegations, together with Dr. Ellender's senior position within the organization, warranted the engagement of an independent outside law firm to ensure an objective and thorough investigation.
Prior to this external engagement, TMRI's internal Human Resources department had undertaken certain preliminary steps. Specifically, TMRI HR Investigator David Chu, under the direction of Vice President of Human Resources Grace Okenwa, conducted preliminary intake interviews with each of the five complainants following receipt of their formal grievances. These intake interviews were conducted to assess the initial scope and nature of the allegations, gather threshold factual information, and determine whether the matter should be escalated beyond the standard internal grievance process.
Following the completion of the preliminary intake interviews, VP-HR Okenwa prepared and transmitted a memorandum to General Counsel Graff, dated September 3, 2024, in which she recommended the retention of outside counsel. VP-HR Okenwa's memorandum identified several factors supporting this recommendation, including: (i) the number of formal grievances filed (five) within a concentrated period; (ii) the seniority of the respondent and his role as a named principal investigator on active federal grants; (iii) the nature of the allegations, which included potential violations of federal safety regulations and possible falsification of records; and (iv) the potential for significant institutional exposure, including regulatory reporting obligations and grant-compliance implications. General Counsel Graff concurred with this recommendation and initiated contact with C&H.
The engagement letter between TMRI and C&H was executed on September 10, 2024. The letter was signed by Elena Graff on behalf of TMRI, in her capacity as General Counsel, and by Renata Vasquez on behalf of Calderwood & Harkness LLP. The engagement letter memorialized the terms and scope of the retention, including the hourly billing rates, the estimated budget range, and the understanding that the investigation was being conducted at the direction of and for the purpose of providing legal advice to TMRI's General Counsel. The investigation was assigned C&H Matter No. 1029-00002.
The investigation was conducted under the direction and at the request of TMRI's General Counsel for the express purpose of providing legal advice regarding the grievances, the factual record, and the appropriate institutional response. Consistent with well-established principles, the attorney-client privilege and work-product protections applicable to this investigation belong to TMRI as the institutional client, not to any individual employee, officer, or director. The decision whether to waive or assert these protections in any context rests solely with TMRI.
The C&H engagement team for this matter consisted of the following attorneys:
• Renata Vasquez, Partner — Responsible Partner and lead investigator, responsible for overall direction and supervision of the investigation, conduct of key witness interviews, analysis and findings, and final report preparation.
• Bernard Crawford, Partner — Billing Partner, responsible for administrative oversight of the engagement.
• Nadia Petrov, Associate — Lead Associate, responsible for assisting with witness interviews, preparation of detailed interview memoranda, document review and analysis, and report drafting.
• James Underwood, Associate — Working Associate, responsible for document collection coordination, preparation and maintenance of the document-review log, scheduling and logistics, and report drafting.
B. Scope of Investigation
The investigation was designed to address four categories of alleged misconduct as set forth in the five formal grievances filed against Dr. Ellender. Each category of allegation implicates specific TMRI policies, Massachusetts state law, and/or federal law and regulations. The four categories are as follows:
1. Retaliation. Employees alleged that Dr. Ellender engaged in retaliatory conduct against employees who reported safety concerns to TMRI's EHS office or other internal authorities. Retaliatory conduct alleged included adverse reassignment of a research scientist from an NIH-funded project and threats of termination directed at a lab technician. These allegations implicate the Massachusetts Whistleblower Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 149, § 185, which prohibits retaliation against employees who report violations or suspected violations of law or regulation to a public body or a person with supervisory authority, as well as TMRI Anti-Retaliation Policy HR-2021-009, which broadly prohibits retaliation against any employee who in good faith reports a workplace concern, including safety violations, through any reporting channel.
2. Hostile Work Environment. Employees alleged that Dr. Ellender created a hostile work environment through a pattern of verbal intimidation, demeaning language, discriminatory scheduling of work shifts, denial of professional-development opportunities, and issuance of retaliatory negative performance evaluations. These allegations implicate the Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Law, M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the extent the alleged conduct was based on protected characteristics such as national origin or gender. The allegations also implicate the TMRI Respectful Workplace Policy HR-2021-005, which sets institutional standards of workplace conduct irrespective of whether the conduct targets a protected characteristic.
3. Safety-Protocol Violations. Employees alleged that Dr. Ellender directed laboratory technicians to circumvent OSHA-mandated personal protective equipment requirements, specifically respiratory protection during aerosol-generating procedures, and that Dr. Ellender supervised laboratories in which biohazard-containment protocols were not consistently followed. These allegations implicate the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") PPE Standards set forth at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 et seq., the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (which impose containment and safety requirements for research involving BSL-2 biological materials), and TMRI's internal EHS policies implementing these federal requirements.
4. Falsification or Alteration of Records. Employees alleged that Dr. Ellender directed or personally undertook the alteration of laboratory-notebook entries to minimize the documented scope of a biohazard-containment breach, and that Dr. Ellender authored or approved safety-incident reports containing materially inaccurate narrative descriptions. These allegations implicate TMRI's institutional policies regarding record integrity, as well as federal grant-integrity requirements applicable to NIH-funded research and OSHA recordkeeping requirements.
The investigation covered conduct occurring in TMRI Biomedical Engineering Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4, all of which are located at TMRI's Cambridge, Massachusetts headquarters at 480 Kendall Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02142. The temporal scope of the investigation encompassed conduct occurring from January 2022 through September 2024, with particular focus on calendar years 2023 and 2024, the period during which the most significant alleged events occurred. This temporal scope was established at the outset of the investigation in consultation with General Counsel Graff and VP-HR Okenwa, based on the date range implicated by the grievances and the need to assess whether the alleged conduct constituted isolated incidents or reflected a broader pattern.
C. Investigative Methodology
C&H employed a multi-faceted investigative methodology designed to gather and assess both testimonial and documentary evidence. The principal components of the investigation are described below.
Witness Interviews. C&H conducted interviews of fourteen (14) unique witnesses across a total of nineteen (19) interview sessions during the period from September 23, 2024, through November 13, 2024. The interviews were structured in four phases:
Phase 1 — Complainant Interviews. The five complainants were interviewed first, during the period from September 23 through October 11, 2024. Each complainant was interviewed individually in a single session. The complainant interviews were conducted by Renata Vasquez and Nadia Petrov at C&H's Boston office. The purpose of these interviews was to obtain detailed, first-person accounts of the alleged misconduct, identify potential witnesses and documentary evidence, and assess the complainants' credibility.
Phase 2 — Corroborating-Witness Interviews. Following the complainant interviews, C&H interviewed eight corroborating witnesses during the week of October 14–18, 2024. These witnesses were identified through the complainant interviews, review of organizational charts and staffing records, and consultation with General Counsel Graff. The corroborating witnesses included Karen Ashby (Lab Technician IV, Lab B-4), Derek Loomis (Research Associate, Lab B-4), Alan Murdoch (Director of Environmental Health & Safety), Joanna Pratt (Lab B-2 Supervisor), and four additional witnesses consisting of laboratory personnel, EHS staff, and administrative staff whose identities are maintained in the confidential interview log. These interviews were conducted by Renata Vasquez, Nadia Petrov, and James Underwood at TMRI's Cambridge offices and at C&H's Boston office, as scheduling and logistical considerations required.
Phase 3 — Respondent Interview. The respondent interview of Dr. Marcus Ellender was conducted over two days, on October 23 and October 24, 2024, at C&H's Boston office (One Federal Place, Suite 3200). Dr. Ellender was accompanied by his personal counsel, Rachel Whitmore of Hadley, Brennan & Morrow LLP (75 Ashbury Asset Advisors, Suite 1400, Boston, MA 02109). Dr. Ellender retained Ms. Whitmore on approximately October 7, 2024, and Ms. Whitmore was designated as Dr. Ellender's counsel of record for purposes of this investigation. The respondent interview was conducted by Renata Vasquez, with Nadia Petrov present to take notes. The interview was conducted over two sessions totaling approximately seven hours, during which Dr. Ellender was afforded a full and fair opportunity to respond to each category of allegation, address specific pieces of evidence, present his account of relevant events, and identify any witnesses or documents he wished the investigation to consider.
Phase 4 — Follow-Up Interviews. Three follow-up interview sessions were conducted during the period from November 11 through November 13, 2024. These follow-up sessions were necessitated by issues that arose during the document review and the respondent interview, and were conducted to clarify certain factual matters, address new evidence, and resolve inconsistencies.
All interviewees received an Upjohn warning (sometimes referred to as a "corporate Miranda" warning) at the outset of each interview session. The Upjohn warning advised each interviewee of the following: (i) that C&H represents TMRI as the institutional client, not any individual employee; (ii) that the attorney-client privilege arising from the interview belongs to TMRI, not to the individual interviewee; (iii) that the interview is confidential and the interviewee should not discuss the substance of the interview with colleagues or other witnesses; and (iv) that TMRI, as the holder of the privilege, may choose to waive the privilege at its discretion, which could result in disclosure of the contents of the interview. Each interviewee acknowledged their understanding of these advisements before the interview proceeded.
Detailed interview summaries were prepared by Nadia Petrov and James Underwood following each interview session. These summaries are maintained as confidential attorney work product in the C&H matter file and are available to TMRI upon request.
Document Collection and Review. General Counsel Elena Graff issued a litigation-hold memorandum on September 13, 2024, directing the preservation of all documents and electronically stored information potentially relevant to the investigation. The litigation-hold memorandum was distributed to all relevant custodians, including Dr. Ellender (through his TMRI email), the five complainants, all laboratory supervisors for Labs B-1 through B-4, EHS Director Alan Murdoch, the TMRI IT department, and the TMRI HR department. The TMRI IT department was directed to preserve email accounts, network drives, and system backup data for the identified custodians.
In total, 1,247 documents were collected and reviewed as part of the investigation. The document collection included the following categories:
• 312 email threads from Dr. Ellender's TMRI institutional email account, covering the date range from January 1, 2023, through September 18, 2024 (the date on which Dr. Ellender was placed on paid administrative leave and his email access was suspended).
• 47 safety-incident reports filed for TMRI Biomedical Engineering Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4, covering calendar years 2022, 2023, and 2024.
• 15 laboratory-notebook pages from Lab B-2, dated September through October 2023, which had been flagged for potential alteration during the preliminary intake process and during complainant interviews.
• 28 performance-evaluation forms authored by Dr. Ellender for employees under his supervision, covering the period from 2022 through 2024.
• 6 TMRI EHS audit reports for the Biomedical Engineering Laboratories, covering the period from 2022 through 2024.
• Remaining documents, consisting of scheduling records for laboratory shifts, meeting minutes from laboratory staff meetings, grant-progress reports for the two active NIH R01 grants, and human resources files for Dr. Ellender and the five complainants.
The document-production review was completed on October 21, 2024. A detailed document-review log was prepared and maintained by James Underwood throughout the course of the review. The log tracks each document by Bates number (where applicable), document type, date, author/recipient, relevance determination, and any notes regarding the document's significance to the investigation. The document-review log is maintained in the C&H matter file and is available to TMRI upon request.
External EHS Audit. In October 2024, TMRI separately engaged Haverford Safety Consulting Group, LLC ("Haverford"), an independent environmental health and safety consulting firm located at 22 Trapelo Road, Suite 310, Waltham, MA 02452, to conduct a parallel safety-compliance audit of TMRI Biomedical Engineering Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4. The Haverford engagement was initiated by TMRI independently of, but in coordination with, the C&H investigation. The principal consultant for the Haverford engagement was Liam Garrett, CIH, CSP, a certified industrial hygienist and certified safety professional with extensive experience in laboratory safety compliance.
The purpose of the Haverford audit was to provide an independent, expert assessment of current safety-compliance conditions in the laboratories, separate from the legal investigation being conducted by C&H. Haverford's preliminary findings were transmitted to C&H on October 28, 2024, and were considered as part of C&H's investigation into the safety-protocol violation allegations. The Haverford engagement was conducted on a flat-fee basis in the amount of $34,500. Haverford's final audit report is expected to be delivered to TMRI separately.
D. Applicable Policies, Laws, and Regulations
The investigation was conducted with reference to the following TMRI policies, Massachusetts statutes, federal statutes, and federal regulations:
TMRI Internal Policies:
• TMRI Employee Handbook § 7.3 (Grievance and Complaint Procedure). This section establishes the formal process by which TMRI employees may file grievances regarding workplace conduct, including the procedures for intake, investigation, and resolution. All five formal grievances in this matter were filed pursuant to this section.
• TMRI Employee Handbook § 9.2 (Termination for Cause). This section identifies the categories of conduct that constitute grounds for termination of employment for cause, including but not limited to violations of law, falsification of records, serious safety violations, and retaliation against employees who engage in protected activity.
• TMRI Respectful Workplace Policy HR-2021-005. This policy establishes institutional standards of workplace conduct, prohibiting intimidating, demeaning, disrespectful, or abusive behavior in the workplace, regardless of whether such behavior targets a legally protected characteristic. The policy applies to all TMRI employees, including supervisors and directors.
• TMRI Anti-Retaliation Policy HR-2021-009. This policy prohibits retaliation against any TMRI employee who in good faith reports a workplace concern — including but not limited to safety violations, policy violations, or suspected illegal activity — through any internal or external reporting channel.
Massachusetts State Law:
• M.G.L. c. 149, § 185 (Massachusetts Whistleblower Protection Act). This statute prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report or threaten to report violations or suspected violations of any law, rule, or regulation to a public body or to a person with supervisory authority over the employee.
• M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4 (Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Law). This statute prohibits, among other things, discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of protected characteristics, including race, color, national origin, sex, gender identity, and other enumerated categories.
Federal Law and Regulations:
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination and harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, including the creation of a hostile work environment based on such characteristics.
• 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 et seq. (OSHA PPE Standards). These regulations require employers to assess workplace hazards, provide appropriate personal protective equipment, ensure its proper use, and train employees in its use. Specific provisions address respiratory protection, eye and face protection, and other categories of PPE relevant to laboratory work environments.
• NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules. These guidelines establish biosafety practices, containment levels, and oversight requirements for institutions conducting research with recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules, including research involving BSL-2 biological materials. Compliance with these guidelines is a condition of NIH funding.
The governing law for the engagement between TMRI and C&H is the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
E. Limitations and Caveats
C&H identifies the following limitations and caveats applicable to this investigation and to the findings set forth in this report:
Standard of Proof. C&H's findings are based on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard — that is, whether the evidence makes it more likely than not that the alleged conduct occurred as described. This standard is consistent with widely accepted best practices for internal workplace investigations and is the standard recommended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for employer-conducted investigations. It is not the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applicable in criminal proceedings.
Nature of This Report. This report is not a legal brief, a court filing, or a legal opinion. It does not constitute a legal determination of liability under any statute or common-law theory. Rather, it is a factual investigative report that sets forth C&H's findings based on the evidence gathered and analyzed during the investigation, together with an assessment of whether the evidence supports findings of policy violations and potential legal exposure.
Absence of Subpoena Authority. C&H did not have subpoena authority in conducting this investigation. All witness participation was voluntary, though subject to the cooperative-participation obligations of TMRI employees under TMRI Employee Handbook § 7.3, which requires employees to participate in workplace investigations conducted by or on behalf of the institution. All fourteen witnesses cooperated with the investigation. No witness refused to participate or was unavailable for interview.
Respondent's Participation. Dr. Marcus Ellender, through his personal counsel Rachel Whitmore of Hadley, Brennan & Morrow LLP, participated in the respondent interview conducted on October 23–24, 2024. Dr. Ellender was afforded a full and fair opportunity to respond to all allegations, address specific pieces of evidence presented to him during the interview, provide his account of relevant events, and identify any witnesses or documentary evidence he wished the investigation to consider. Dr. Ellender did not identify any additional witnesses or documents beyond those already within the scope of the investigation.
Scope of Liability Determinations. This report does not address the potential personal liability of Dr. Ellender or any other individual under state or federal law. It is limited to findings of fact and determinations of whether the evidence substantiates violations of TMRI policies and implicates potential violations of applicable laws and regulations. Any determination of personal liability would require separate legal analysis and, potentially, adjudication by a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction.
Reliance on Available Evidence. C&H's findings are based on the evidence that was available to the investigation team as of the date of this report. To the extent that additional evidence becomes available after the date of this report — including, for example, the final report of Haverford Safety Consulting Group (as distinguished from the preliminary findings considered herein) — TMRI may wish to consider whether such evidence warrants supplementation or revision of any finding.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Thornwick Medical Research Institute
Thornwick Medical Research Institute ("TMRI") is a Massachusetts nonprofit corporation organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, Employer Identification Number 04-3781256. TMRI was founded in 2003 and is headquartered at 480 Kendall Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, in the heart of the Kendall Square biomedical research corridor.
TMRI's mission is to advance biomedical science through translational research, bridging the gap between laboratory discovery and clinical application. The institute operates four biomedical research laboratories — designated Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4 — and two clinical-trial coordination centers. TMRI employs approximately 340 full-time employees, including 87 research scientists and laboratory technicians. The institute's workforce also includes postdoctoral fellows, visiting researchers, administrative staff, and support personnel.
TMRI operates on an annual budget of approximately $62 million, funded through a diversified portfolio of revenue sources. Federal grants constitute a significant share of operating revenue, with active awards from the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA"). Additional funding is provided by private foundation awards and licensing revenues derived from three FDA-cleared Class II medical devices developed in TMRI laboratories.
TMRI's governance structure includes a Board of Directors chaired by Dr. Constance Liu-Hartwell, a distinguished biomedical researcher and academic leader. The institute's executive leadership team is headed by Chief Executive Officer Dr. Philip Astbury, who reports to the Board. The Office of the General Counsel is led by Elena Graff, who serves as the institute's chief legal officer and is responsible for overseeing legal affairs, regulatory compliance, and risk management. The Human Resources function is led by Vice President of Human Resources Grace Okenwa.
B. The Biomedical Engineering Laboratories
TMRI Biomedical Engineering Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4 are located at TMRI's Cambridge headquarters. These four laboratory units constitute the core of TMRI's biomedical engineering research program, which focuses on the development and testing of medical devices, biosensors, and biomaterials. The research conducted in these laboratories involves a range of biological materials, including work with Biosafety Level 2 ("BSL-2") biological agents and materials. BSL-2 designation applies to laboratories working with agents that pose moderate hazards to personnel and the environment, requiring specific biosafety practices, containment equipment, and facility design features.
The four laboratory units are supervised by Dr. Marcus Ellender in his capacity as Director of Biomedical Engineering Laboratories. Each individual laboratory unit has a designated lab-specific supervisor who reports directly to Dr. Ellender. Among these supervisors, Joanna Pratt serves as the supervisor of Lab B-2, a role that is relevant to several of the allegations at issue in this investigation.
TMRI's Environmental Health & Safety ("EHS") office, directed by Alan Murdoch, is the institutional unit responsible for oversight of laboratory safety compliance across all TMRI research facilities. The EHS office is responsible for conducting periodic safety audits, reviewing and maintaining safety-incident reports, providing safety training, and ensuring compliance with applicable OSHA regulations, NIH biosafety guidelines, and TMRI's internal safety policies. The EHS office operates independently of the individual laboratory directors and reports to TMRI's administrative leadership.
In addition to the EHS office, the Biomedical Engineering Laboratories are subject to oversight by TMRI's Institutional Biosafety Committee ("IBC"), which is the institutional body responsible for reviewing and approving research protocols involving biohazardous materials, including BSL-2 agents. The IBC's oversight is a condition of TMRI's NIH funding and is required under the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules.
C. Dr. Marcus Ellender — Background and Role
Dr. Marcus Ellender is fifty-one (51) years old and holds a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Biomedical Engineering from Carston University. Prior to joining TMRI, Dr. Ellender held a tenured faculty appointment in the Department of Biomedical Engineering at Keller-Whitfield College of Sciences, where he taught and conducted research in medical-device development and biosensor technology. His academic career included a substantial publication record and experience supervising graduate students and postdoctoral researchers.
Dr. Ellender joined TMRI in January 2018 as the Director of Biomedical Engineering Laboratories. In this role, he is responsible for the overall direction and management of Laboratory Units B-1 through B-4, including the supervision of all personnel assigned to those units. At the time of the events at issue, Dr. Ellender supervised a total of forty-three (43) individuals: twenty-three (23) research scientists, fourteen (14) laboratory technicians, and six (6) postdoctoral fellows. He reports to TMRI's Chief Scientific Officer and, through that office, to the CEO.
Dr. Ellender's annual compensation at the time of his administrative leave consisted of a base salary of $247,000 plus a research-leadership stipend of $38,000, for a total annual compensation of $285,000.
Significantly, Dr. Ellender is the named principal investigator ("PI") on two active NIH R01 research grants:
• NIH Grant No. 5R01-EB029174, a five-year award of $2.9 million for the project period 2022–2027, funding research in advanced biosensor development.
• NIH Grant No. 1R01-EB034851, a five-year award of $1.9 million for the project period 2023–2028, funding research in biomaterial-device interfaces.
The combined total value of these two grants is $4.8 million, with approximately $3.1 million in combined remaining funds as of the date of this report. As the named PI, Dr. Ellender bears primary responsibility for the scientific and technical direction of the funded research, compliance with grant terms and conditions, and reporting to NIH. Any change in PI status — including a change resulting from separation from the grantee institution — requires notification to NIH Grants Management and the proposal of a successor PI.
Dr. Ellender was placed on paid administrative leave effective September 18, 2024, following the opening of the formal investigation. The decision to place Dr. Ellender on administrative leave was made by General Counsel Graff and VP-HR Okenwa, in consultation with CEO Astbury, as a precautionary measure to protect the integrity of the investigation and ensure the safety and well-being of laboratory personnel pending the investigation's completion. Dr. Ellender was notified of the administrative leave and the investigation by letter dated September 16, 2024.
On or about October 7, 2024, Dr. Ellender retained the law firm of Hadley, Brennan & Morrow LLP to serve as his personal legal counsel in connection with the investigation. Attorney Rachel Whitmore of that firm was designated as Dr. Ellender's counsel of record. C&H communicated with Ms. Whitmore to coordinate the scheduling and logistics of the respondent interview and to address procedural matters related to Dr. Ellender's participation.
D. The Complainants
Five TMRI employees filed formal grievances against Dr. Ellender during the period from August 12, 2024, through September 4, 2024. Each grievance was filed pursuant to the procedures set forth in TMRI Employee Handbook § 7.3. The complainants and their respective allegations are summarized below.
1. Dr. Yuna Sakata — Senior Research Scientist, Lab B-2.
Dr. Sakata has been employed by TMRI since March 2019 and holds the position of Senior Research Scientist assigned to Laboratory Unit B-2. She holds a doctoral degree and has a strong research background in biosensor design and characterization. Dr. Sakata filed the first formal grievance on August 12, 2024. Her grievance alleged retaliation by Dr. Ellender following her August 2, 2024 oral report of a chemical spill in Lab B-2 to EHS Director Alan Murdoch. Specifically, Dr. Sakata alleged that within eleven (11) business days of her safety report, she was reassigned from her position on NIH Grant No. 5R01-EB029174 — a high-profile, federally funded research project — to a lower-profile internal assignment, specifically a sterilization-protocol review. Dr. Sakata contended that the reassignment was punitive in nature, was undertaken without any stated performance-based or programmatic justification, and significantly diminished her professional-development and publication opportunities.
2. Trevor Hollins — Lab Technician III, Lab B-3.
Trevor Hollins has been employed by TMRI since June 2020 and holds the position of Lab Technician III assigned to Laboratory Unit B-3. He filed the second formal grievance on August 19, 2024. His grievance alleged two categories of misconduct. First, Hollins alleged that Dr. Ellender created a hostile work environment through a pattern of verbal intimidation during weekly Lab B-3 staff meetings, including statements demeaning his competence in front of colleagues. Second, Hollins alleged that Dr. Ellender authored or approved two safety-incident reports — designated IR-2024-031 and IR-2024-038 — that contained false narrative descriptions attributing equipment malfunctions to Hollins's operator error. Hollins contended that the equipment at issue was known to be defective, that the false narratives were inconsistent with contemporaneous evidence acknowledged by lab staff, and that the falsified reports were being used to build a pretextual basis for his eventual termination.
3. Dr. Priya Chandrasekaran — Postdoctoral Fellow, Lab B-1.
Dr. Chandrasekaran has been employed by TMRI since September 2022 as a Postdoctoral Fellow assigned to Laboratory Unit B-1. She filed the third formal grievance on August 26, 2024. Her grievance alleged hostile work environment and discrimination, including: (i) discriminatory scheduling that required her to work disproportionate weekend and evening shifts compared to similarly situated postdoctoral fellows; (ii) denial of conference-attendance opportunities that were made available to her peers; and (iii) a retaliatory negative performance review authored by Dr. Ellender that was inconsistent with the positive contemporaneous feedback she received from her day-to-day lab supervisor and collaborating scientists. Dr. Chandrasekaran expressed a belief that the differential treatment may have been motivated by her national origin or gender.
4. Miguel Ferreira — Lab Technician II, Lab B-4.
Miguel Ferreira has been employed by TMRI since January 2021 and holds the position of Lab Technician II assigned to Laboratory Unit B-4. He filed the fourth formal grievance on August 30, 2024. His grievance alleged two categories of misconduct. First, Ferreira alleged that Dr. Ellender directed Lab B-4 technicians, including Ferreira himself, to bypass OSHA-mandated personal protective equipment protocols — specifically respiratory protection — during time-sensitive aerosol-generating experiments on at least three occasions between March and July 2024. Second, Ferreira alleged that after he raised safety concerns with TMRI's EHS office, Dr. Ellender threatened him with termination, constituting retaliation for his protected safety reporting.
5. Sandra Nix — Research Associate, Lab B-2.
Sandra Nix has been employed by TMRI since November 2020 and holds the position of Research Associate assigned to Laboratory Unit B-2. She filed the fifth and final formal grievance on September 4, 2024. Her grievance alleged that she witnessed Dr. Ellender instruct staff members to alter laboratory-notebook entries related to a September 14, 2023 biohazard-containment breach in Lab B-2 involving BSL-2 materials. Nix stated that she had personally made original lab-notebook entries documenting the scope and nature of the breach, and that she subsequently observed that those entries had been altered in a manner that minimized the severity of the incident. Nix also alleged a generally hostile atmosphere in Lab B-2, including demeaning remarks by Dr. Ellender directed at junior staff members.
IV. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
This section summarizes the principal evidence gathered during the investigation, organized by type. The evidence is discussed in the context of the allegations and is cross-referenced to the analysis and findings set forth in Section V.
A. Testimonial Evidence
1. Complainant Interviews
C&H conducted individual interviews with each of the five complainants during the period from September 23 through October 11, 2024. Each interview was conducted at C&H's Boston office by Renata Vasquez and Nadia Petrov. All complainants received the Upjohn warning described in Section II.C at the outset of their respective interviews. The substance of each complainant's testimony is summarized below.
Dr. Yuna Sakata (interviewed September 23, 2024).
Dr. Sakata provided a detailed and consistent account of the events leading to her formal grievance. She described making an oral report to EHS Director Alan Murdoch on August 2, 2024, regarding a chemical spill in Lab B-2 that she believed had not been properly documented or addressed through TMRI's incident-reporting system. Dr. Sakata stated that she became aware of the spill during the course of her normal work activities and that, upon determining that no incident report had been filed, she brought the matter directly to Mr. Murdoch's attention. She characterized her report as a good-faith effort to ensure that a potential safety hazard was properly documented and remediated, consistent with TMRI's safety protocols and her responsibilities as a research scientist.
Dr. Sakata testified that within eleven (11) business days of her August 2, 2024 safety report, she was notified by Lab B-2 Supervisor Joanna Pratt that she was being reassigned from her research position on NIH Grant No. 5R01-EB029174 to an internal assignment — specifically, a sterilization-protocol review project. Dr. Sakata stated that she was given no performance-based or programmatic justification for the reassignment at the time it was communicated to her, nor at any point thereafter. She described the sterilization-protocol review as a low-profile, administrative project that was not commensurate with her qualifications, experience, or prior research responsibilities. The reassignment, she stated, effectively removed her from the principal research project to which she had been contributing for over two years, significantly diminishing her professional-development trajectory, her access to publication opportunities, and her standing within the research team.
Dr. Sakata further stated that her performance history at TMRI had been consistently positive. She reported receiving favorable annual performance reviews throughout her tenure, with no documented performance deficiencies or concerns raised by Dr. Ellender or any other supervisor. She had not been subject to any disciplinary action or corrective-action plan at any point during her employment.
Dr. Sakata described the reassignment as punitive and stated her belief that it was a direct consequence of her safety report to the EHS office. She testified that the temporal proximity between her report and the reassignment, combined with the absence of any legitimate justification, made the retaliatory nature of the action unmistakable.
Trevor Hollins (interviewed September 25, 2024).
Trevor Hollins provided testimony regarding both the hostile-work-environment and record-falsification allegations. Regarding the hostile-work-environment claim, Hollins described a persistent pattern of verbal intimidation by Dr. Ellender during weekly Lab B-3 staff meetings. He stated that Dr. Ellender frequently singled him out for criticism in front of his colleagues, using language that was demeaning and belittling. In particular, Hollins recalled Dr. Ellender telling him, in the presence of other staff members, that he was "replaceable" and that his work product was substandard. Hollins described these incidents as not isolated occurrences but rather a recurring feature of Dr. Ellender's management approach, which created an atmosphere of fear and intimidation within the laboratory.
Regarding the record-falsification allegation, Hollins identified two specific safety-incident reports — IR-2024-031 and IR-2024-038 — that he contended contained false narrative descriptions. Both reports attributed equipment malfunctions to Hollins's operator error. Hollins testified that the equipment at issue in both incidents was known to be defective and that multiple members of the Lab B-3 staff were aware of the deficiencies. He stated that contemporaneous email communications among lab staff acknowledged the equipment problems, and that these emails directly contradicted the narratives set forth in the incident reports authored or approved by Dr. Ellender.
Hollins expressed a belief that the falsified reports were being used to build a paper trail of performance deficiencies that would serve as a pretextual basis for his eventual termination. He stated that the pattern of demeaning treatment, combined with the creation of false documentation, left him feeling that his continued employment was precarious and that Dr. Ellender was actively working to manufacture grounds for his removal.
Dr. Priya Chandrasekaran (interviewed September 30, 2024).
Dr. Chandrasekaran provided testimony regarding differential treatment that she alleged constituted a hostile work environment. She described being assigned a disproportionate number of weekend and evening laboratory shifts compared to similarly situated postdoctoral fellows in Labs B-1 through B-4. Dr. Chandrasekaran stated that the scheduling disparity was noticeable, persistent, and without any articulated operational justification. She also testified that she was denied opportunities to attend professional conferences that were offered to her peers, limiting her professional development and networking opportunities at a critical stage of her postdoctoral career.
Additionally, Dr. Chandrasekaran described receiving a negative performance review from Dr. Ellender that she contended was retaliatory and inconsistent with the feedback she had received from other sources. She stated that her day-to-day lab supervisor and collaborating scientists had provided her with positive assessments of her work, and that Dr. Ellender's negative evaluation was at odds with these contemporaneous assessments. She viewed the negative review as an attempt to undermine her record and justify the differential treatment she was experiencing.
Dr. Chandrasekaran expressed a belief that the treatment she received may have been motivated by her national origin or gender. However, she acknowledged during the interview that she had difficulty identifying specific statements made by Dr. Ellender or specific conduct that directly tied the differential treatment to these characteristics. She stated that the overall pattern of treatment — the unfavorable scheduling, the denial of conference opportunities, and the negative review — created an inference of discriminatory intent, but she was unable to point to direct evidence, such as discriminatory remarks, that would establish a causal connection.
Miguel Ferreira (interviewed October 2, 2024).
Miguel Ferreira provided detailed testimony regarding the PPE-bypass allegations and the retaliatory-threat allegation. Regarding the PPE-bypass claim, Ferreira testified that on at least three occasions between March and July 2024, Dr. Ellender directed Lab B-4 technicians, including Ferreira, to proceed with aerosol-generating experimental procedures without donning the required respiratory protection. Ferreira stated that the procedures in question involved the generation of aerosolized particulates in quantities and concentrations that required the use of respiratory protection under OSHA standards and TMRI's internal EHS protocols.
Ferreira testified that Dr. Ellender characterized the PPE requirements as "overkill" and stated that they were "slowing things down unnecessarily." Ferreira recalled that these statements were made during time-sensitive experimental runs when Dr. Ellender was focused on meeting project deadlines. Ferreira provided approximate dates and descriptive details for each of the three occasions on which he was directed to bypass respiratory protection, and his account was internally consistent across these three incidents.
Ferreira further testified that, after he raised safety concerns with TMRI's EHS office — specifically, after he spoke with EHS Director Alan Murdoch about the PPE issues in Lab B-4 — Dr. Ellender confronted him and threatened him with termination. Ferreira recalled Dr. Ellender saying words to the effect of: "If you go to Murdoch's office one more time, you won't have a position to come back to." Ferreira described this statement as a direct and unmistakable threat of retaliation for his exercise of his right to report safety concerns. He stated that the threat had a chilling effect on his willingness to raise further concerns and that he feared for his continued employment.
Sandra Nix (interviewed October 8, 2024).
Sandra Nix provided testimony regarding the lab-notebook alteration allegation and the general work environment in Lab B-2. Regarding the notebook alteration, Nix described the events surrounding the September 14, 2023 biohazard-containment breach in Lab B-2 involving BSL-2 materials. She stated that on the date of the breach, she personally made entries in the Lab B-2 laboratory notebook documenting the scope, nature, and severity of the containment failure. These original entries were made in her own handwriting and reflected her contemporaneous observations and understanding of the incident.
Nix testified that at some point subsequent to the date of the breach, she observed that the lab-notebook entries had been altered. Specifically, she stated that modifications had been made to the entries — in handwriting that she identified as Dr. Ellender's — that minimized the scope of the breach and downplayed the severity of the containment failure. Nix stated that she was present when Dr. Ellender instructed staff members to alter the entries and that Dr. Ellender's stated purpose was to avoid drawing undue attention to the incident and to prevent regulatory scrutiny. Nix described this instruction as a clear directive to falsify institutional records.
In addition to the notebook-alteration testimony, Nix described a generally hostile atmosphere in Lab B-2 under Dr. Ellender's supervision. She corroborated the accounts of other witnesses regarding Dr. Ellender's use of demeaning language toward junior staff members and his dismissive attitude toward safety concerns. Nix stated that the work environment in Lab B-2 discouraged open communication about safety issues and created a culture in which employees feared raising concerns.
2. Corroborating Witness Interviews
C&H conducted interviews with eight corroborating witnesses during the week of October 14–18, 2024. These witnesses were identified through the complainant interviews, review of organizational charts and staffing records, and consultation with General Counsel Graff. The key corroborating-witness testimony is summarized below.
Karen Ashby, Lab Technician IV, Lab B-4 (interviewed October 14, 2024).
Karen Ashby provided testimony that independently corroborated Miguel Ferreira's account of being directed to bypass PPE requirements. Ashby stated that she personally witnessed Dr. Ellender instruct technicians in Lab B-4 to skip respiratory protection during aerosol-generating procedures on at least two specific occasions. Her account was consistent with Ferreira's in both its description of the events and the language used by Dr. Ellender. Ashby confirmed that Dr. Ellender used the word "overkill" to characterize the PPE requirements during at least one of the incidents she witnessed. She described a general atmosphere in Lab B-4 in which safety compliance was deprioritized when it conflicted with experimental timelines.
Derek Loomis, Research Associate, Lab B-4 (interviewed October 15, 2024).
Derek Loomis provided testimony that further corroborated the accounts of Ferreira and Ashby. Loomis stated that he was present during at least one specific incident, which he placed in approximately June 2024, in which Dr. Ellender overruled a technician's request to pause an experimental procedure to retrieve the required PPE. Loomis stated that the technician indicated a desire to stop work to obtain a respirator, and that Dr. Ellender directed the technician to continue without it, citing the time-sensitive nature of the experiment. Loomis described a broader pattern in Lab B-4 in which Dr. Ellender exerted pressure on staff to prioritize speed and experimental throughput over safety compliance, creating an environment where adherence to PPE protocols was viewed as an impediment rather than a requirement.
Alan Murdoch, Director of Environmental Health & Safety (interviewed October 16, 2024).
Alan Murdoch, in his capacity as TMRI's Director of Environmental Health & Safety, provided testimony that corroborated key elements of the complaints filed by Dr. Sakata and Miguel Ferreira. Murdoch confirmed that Dr. Yuna Sakata came to his office on August 2, 2024, and made an oral report regarding a chemical spill in Lab B-2. Murdoch stated that Dr. Sakata expressed concern that the spill had not been properly reported through TMRI's incident-reporting system and that she wanted to ensure that the matter was addressed. Murdoch stated that he initiated a review of the matter following Dr. Sakata's report. He further stated that he was not informed of Dr. Sakata's subsequent reassignment until he learned of it in connection with the filing of her formal grievance, and that no one from Lab B-2 or Dr. Ellender's office communicated the reassignment to the EHS office.
Murdoch also confirmed that Miguel Ferreira had separately raised PPE-related safety concerns with the EHS office regarding practices in Lab B-4. Murdoch stated that Ferreira's concerns focused on the use of respiratory protection during aerosol-generating procedures and that Ferreira described feeling pressured to forgo required PPE. Murdoch indicated that he had intended to follow up on Ferreira's concerns but that the formal grievance process had overtaken his internal review.
Joanna Pratt, Lab B-2 Supervisor (interviewed October 17, 2024).
Joanna Pratt's testimony was particularly significant with respect to the retaliation allegation. Pratt confirmed that she received the August 9, 2024 email from Dr. Ellender in which he instructed her to reassign Dr. Sakata from NIH Grant No. 5R01-EB029174 to the sterilization-protocol review project. Pratt stated that the email was the first and only communication she received regarding the reassignment, and that Dr. Ellender did not provide any performance-based or programmatic justification for the instruction either in the email or in any subsequent conversation.
Pratt further stated that she was uncomfortable with the instruction and that she personally felt the reassignment was motivated by Dr.