SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Filed by: Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc.
Attorneys for Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc.:
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP Douglas Carmichael (SBN 187432), Responsible Partner Francesca Morano (SBN 204871), Billing Partner Yuki Nakamura (SBN 298561), Lead Associate Carlos Espinoza (SBN 312084), Associate 600 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3200 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 555-9800 Facsimile: (213) 555-9801
Of Counsel: WORTHAM & ADAIR LLP Diana Prescott (SBN 221743), Partner 611 West Sixth Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-4100 Facsimile: (213) 555-4101
Attorneys for Plaintiff Vantor Holdings Corp. (Counsel of Record):
KESSLER, BRANDT & WHITFIELD LLP Martin Kessler (SBN 142987), Senior Partner Natalie Whitfield (SBN 219856), Partner Jason Okafor (SBN 285431), Senior Associate 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 555-7200 Facsimile: (310) 555-7201
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT CASCADE RETAIL HOLDINGS INC.
I. NOTICE OF MOTION
TO PLAINTIFF VANTOR HOLDINGS CORP. AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, KESSLER, BRANDT & WHITFIELD LLP:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc. ("Cascade" or "CRH") hereby gives notice that it will move, and does hereby move, this Court for an order granting partial summary judgment, or in the alternative partial summary adjudication, on the following causes of action set forth in Plaintiff Vantor Holdings Corp.'s ("Vantor") Complaint filed September 7, 2021:
1. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action: Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and
2. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action: Unfair Business Practices in Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.
This motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c on the grounds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to either the Second Cause of Action or the Third Cause of Action and that Cascade is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both causes of action.
This motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion; the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; the Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed concurrently herewith; the Declaration of Douglas Carmichael in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and all exhibits attached thereto; the Declaration of Yuki Nakamura in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and all exhibits attached thereto; the Declaration of Dr. Vivian Ostrowski in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and all exhibits attached thereto; all papers and records on file in this action; and such oral argument as the Court may entertain at the hearing on this motion.
The Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Partial Summary Judgment and the Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts are each filed concurrently herewith on February 28, 2023.
II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A. Nature of the Case
On September 7, 2021, Plaintiff Vantor Holdings Corp. ("Vantor") filed this action against Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc. ("Cascade") alleging three causes of action arising out of Cascade's entry into supply agreements with three consumer-goods suppliers: Hemsworth Consumer Products LLC ("Hemsworth"), Tridale Manufacturing Inc. ("Tridale"), and Orion Lifestyle Brands Corp. ("Orion"). Vantor's Complaint alleges that Cascade's strategic initiative known internally as "Project Atlas" — a supplier diversification program launched in February 2021 — constituted a systematic scheme to poach Vantor's key suppliers and thereby cripple Vantor's competitive position in the retail market.
The three causes of action alleged in the Complaint are: (1) Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations (First Cause of Action); (2) Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Second Cause of Action); and (3) Unfair Business Practices in Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (Third Cause of Action). Vantor claims total damages of $87.4 million across all three causes of action.
Cascade filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses on October 18, 2021, denying all material allegations and asserting, among other defenses, that its conduct constituted lawful competitive activity, that Vantor failed to mitigate its damages, and that Vantor's claims are barred by the terms of Vantor's own supply agreements with Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion.
This case has now been in active litigation for approximately seventeen months. The parties have conducted extensive discovery, and the record is fully developed with respect to the Second and Third Causes of Action. The time has come for this Court to adjudicate the legal insufficiency of those claims before the parties and the Court invest additional time and resources in preparing them for trial.
B. Scope of This Motion
This motion is narrowly tailored. Cascade does not seek summary judgment or summary adjudication on the First Cause of Action for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations. Cascade reserves all defenses on that claim — including, without limitation, its affirmative defenses relating to the termination-for-convenience provisions in Vantor's supply agreements, Vantor's failure to mitigate, and the measure of damages — for resolution at trial.
Rather, this motion targets only the Second Cause of Action (Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage) and the Third Cause of Action (Unfair Business Practices under California Business and Professions Code § 17200). Both claims fail as a matter of law based on the undisputed record developed through extensive discovery, which includes 78,412 documents produced by Cascade, 41,308 documents produced by Vantor, 23,567 documents produced by the third-party suppliers Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion through subpoenas duces tecum, and fourteen (14) depositions taken in this matter. The record is not only extensive but dispositive — it conclusively demonstrates that Vantor cannot satisfy the essential elements of either claim.
C. Summary of Arguments
Second Cause of Action — Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. Under well-established California law, a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant engaged in conduct that is "independently wrongful" — that is, wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself. This requirement has been the governing standard since the California Supreme Court's seminal decision in della Penna v. Crowne Albany Industries (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376 and was further clarified in Glenrock Corporation (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134. Vantor cannot satisfy this essential element. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Cascade engaged in ordinary, lawful competitive activity: it offered better commercial terms to suppliers who were free to — and did — exercise termination-for-convenience clauses in their existing agreements with Vantor. There is no evidence of fraud, coercion, misrepresentation, bribery, or any other conduct that could be characterized as independently wrongful. Without independently wrongful conduct, the Second Cause of Action fails as a matter of law, and this Court should grant summary judgment in Cascade's favor.
Third Cause of Action — Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Vantor's claim under the Unfair Competition Law is entirely derivative of and duplicative of the tortious interference claims alleged in the First and Second Causes of Action. Vantor's Complaint alleges no independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice beyond the same supplier-solicitation conduct that forms the factual predicate for the tortious interference claims. California courts routinely dismiss § 17200 claims that merely repackage the same factual predicate as the underlying tort claims without identifying an independently actionable practice. None of the three prongs of the UCL — unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent — is satisfied on the undisputed facts. Moreover, Vantor seeks only damages and restitution through its § 17200 claim, not injunctive relief, further confirming the duplicative and impermissible nature of the claim. The Third Cause of Action should be dismissed as a matter of law.
III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The following is a summary of the material facts relevant to this motion. Each fact stated herein is supported by citations to the undisputed evidence as set forth in the concurrently filed Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SSUMF"), and is further supported by the Declarations of Douglas Carmichael, Yuki Nakamura, and Dr. Vivian Ostrowski filed herewith.
A. The Parties
Cascade Retail Holdings Inc. Cascade is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, publicly traded on the Nasdaq Stock Market under the ticker symbol "CRHI." (SSUMF ¶ 1.) Cascade's principal place of business and corporate headquarters are located at 2200 Elliott Avenue West, Suite 1400, Seattle, Washington 98119. (SSUMF ¶ 1.) Cascade is a multi-channel retailer that operates more than 340 retail locations across 22 states and maintains a substantial e-commerce platform serving customers nationwide. (SSUMF ¶ 2.) For its fiscal year ending December 31, 2021, Cascade reported annual revenue of approximately $6.8 billion. (SSUMF ¶ 3; Carmichael Decl., Ex. A [Cascade 2021 10-K Filing].)
Vantor Holdings Corp. Vantor is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California and is privately held. (SSUMF ¶ 4.) Vantor's corporate headquarters are located at 18500 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 600, Irvine, California 92612. (SSUMF ¶ 4.) Vantor operates approximately 85 retail locations concentrated in four states: California, Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon. (SSUMF ¶ 5.) For its fiscal year ending December 31, 2021, Vantor reported annual revenue of approximately $1.1 billion. (SSUMF ¶ 6; Carmichael Decl., Ex. B [excerpted Vantor financial statements produced in discovery].)
The Three Suppliers. The three suppliers at the center of this litigation are: (1) Hemsworth Consumer Products LLC ("Hemsworth"), an Oregon limited liability company headquartered in Portland, Oregon, which manufactures and distributes home goods products; (2) Tridale Manufacturing Inc. ("Tridale"), a Nevada corporation headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada, which manufactures and distributes consumer electronics accessories; and (3) Orion Lifestyle Brands Corp. ("Orion"), a California corporation headquartered in Los Angeles, California, which manufactures and distributes personal care products. (SSUMF ¶¶ 7–9.)
B. The Vantor Exclusive Supply Agreements
Prior to the events giving rise to this litigation, Vantor maintained exclusive supply agreements with each of the three suppliers. The relevant terms of those agreements are undisputed and are as follows:
Orion–Vantor Agreement. Vantor and Orion entered into an Exclusive Supply and Distribution Agreement effective July 1, 2018 (the "Orion–Vantor Agreement"). (SSUMF ¶ 10; Carmichael Decl., Ex. C.) The Orion–Vantor Agreement had a four-year term, set to expire on June 30, 2022. (SSUMF ¶ 10.) The agreement required a minimum annual purchase commitment by Vantor of $14.6 million. (SSUMF ¶ 11.) Critically, Section 12.3 of the Orion–Vantor Agreement contained a termination-for-convenience clause permitting either party to terminate the agreement upon 120 calendar days' prior written notice, with or without cause. (SSUMF ¶ 12; Carmichael Decl., Ex. C at § 12.3.)
Hemsworth–Vantor Agreement. Vantor and Hemsworth entered into an Exclusive Supply and Distribution Agreement effective March 15, 2019 (the "Hemsworth–Vantor Agreement"). (SSUMF ¶ 13; Carmichael Decl., Ex. D.) The Hemsworth–Vantor Agreement had a three-year term, set to expire on March 14, 2022. (SSUMF ¶ 13.) The agreement required a minimum annual purchase commitment by Vantor of $12.5 million. (SSUMF ¶ 14.) Section 14.2 of the Hemsworth–Vantor Agreement contained a termination-for-convenience clause permitting either party to terminate the agreement upon 90 calendar days' prior written notice, with or without cause. (SSUMF ¶ 15; Carmichael Decl., Ex. D at § 14.2.)
Tridale–Vantor Agreement. Vantor and Tridale entered into an Exclusive Supply and Distribution Agreement effective January 10, 2020 (the "Tridale–Vantor Agreement"). (SSUMF ¶ 16; Carmichael Decl., Ex. E.) The Tridale–Vantor Agreement had a two-year term, set to expire on January 9, 2022. (SSUMF ¶ 16.) The agreement required a minimum annual purchase commitment by Vantor of $8.3 million. (SSUMF ¶ 17.) Section 11.4 of the Tridale–Vantor Agreement contained a termination-for-convenience clause permitting either party to terminate the agreement upon 60 calendar days' prior written notice, with or without cause. (SSUMF ¶ 18; Carmichael Decl., Ex. E at § 11.4.)
Each of the three supply agreements thus contained an express, unambiguous provision permitting either party — including the supplier — to terminate the agreement at will upon the specified notice period. (SSUMF ¶ 19.) There is no dispute as to the existence or enforceability of these termination-for-convenience clauses. The clauses are a central, undisputed feature of the contractual landscape in which the events at issue in this action unfolded.
C. The Cascade Supply Agreements
In the spring and summer of 2021, Cascade entered into supply agreements with each of the three suppliers on the following terms:
Cascade–Orion Agreement. Cascade and Orion entered into a Supply and Distribution Agreement effective May 10, 2021 (the "Cascade–Orion Agreement"). (SSUMF ¶ 20; Carmichael Decl., Ex. F.) The Cascade–Orion Agreement has a four-year term and includes an annual purchase commitment by Cascade of $31.0 million — more than double the annual purchase commitment under the Orion–Vantor Agreement. (SSUMF ¶ 21.)
Cascade–Hemsworth Agreement. Cascade and Hemsworth entered into a Supply and Distribution Agreement effective June 1, 2021 (the "Cascade–Hemsworth Agreement"). (SSUMF ¶ 22; Carmichael Decl., Ex. G.) The Cascade–Hemsworth Agreement has a five-year term and includes an annual purchase commitment by Cascade of $28.0 million — more than double the annual purchase commitment under the Hemsworth–Vantor Agreement. (SSUMF ¶ 23.)
Cascade–Tridale Agreement. Cascade and Tridale entered into a Supply and Distribution Agreement effective August 15, 2021 (the "Cascade–Tridale Agreement"). (SSUMF ¶ 24; Carmichael Decl., Ex. H.) The Cascade–Tridale Agreement has a three-year term and includes an annual purchase commitment by Cascade of $19.5 million — more than double the annual purchase commitment under the Tridale–Vantor Agreement. (SSUMF ¶ 25.)
It is undisputed that each of the three suppliers independently exercised its termination-for-convenience right under its respective Vantor agreement prior to or concurrent with entering into its respective agreement with Cascade. (SSUMF ¶ 26; Carmichael Decl., Exs. I, J, K [supplier termination notices to Vantor].) The termination notices were issued by the suppliers themselves, not by Cascade, and each notice complied with the applicable contractual notice period. (SSUMF ¶ 27.)
D. Project Atlas
In February 2021, Cascade launched "Project Atlas," a strategic initiative designed to identify and onboard approximately 25 new suppliers across three product categories: home goods, consumer electronics accessories, and personal care products. (SSUMF ¶ 28; Nakamura Decl., Ex. 1 [Project Atlas charter document, CRH-000014271].) The initiative was led by Annika Bergström, Cascade's Vice President of Strategic Sourcing, who reported directly to Lena Torvik, Cascade's Senior Vice President of Supply Chain & Procurement. (SSUMF ¶ 29.) Cascade allocated a budget of $4.2 million for supplier transition costs associated with Project Atlas, including due diligence, onboarding, logistics integration, and initial purchase commitments. (SSUMF ¶ 30; Nakamura Decl., Ex. 2 [Project Atlas budget memorandum, CRH-000027833].)
Project Atlas was a broadly scoped commercial initiative. The program identified and evaluated dozens of potential new suppliers across the three target categories, of which Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion were only three. (SSUMF ¶ 31.) The evidence shows that Cascade's interest in these three suppliers was driven by the quality and market positioning of their respective product lines, not by any desire to target Vantor or deprive Vantor of its supplier base. (SSUMF ¶ 32; Bergström Dep. Tr. at 87:14–89:3, Oct. 12, 2022.)
Discovery in this action revealed a total of 2,847 internal emails among the Project Atlas team referencing potential new suppliers. (SSUMF ¶ 33; Nakamura Decl. ¶ 8.) Of these 2,847 emails, only 14 emails — representing less than 0.5% of the total — specifically mentioned Vantor's existing supplier relationships with Hemsworth, Tridale, or Orion. (SSUMF ¶ 34; Nakamura Decl. ¶ 9 and Ex. 3 [compilation of the 14 emails, CRH-000041902 through CRH-000041915].) Significantly, none of these 14 emails demonstrates actual knowledge by any Cascade employee of the specific exclusivity provisions contained in the Vantor supplier agreements. (SSUMF ¶ 35.) None of the 14 emails suggests, recommends, or describes any plan to interfere with, disrupt, or undermine Vantor's relationships with the three suppliers. (SSUMF ¶ 36.) To the contrary, the emails reflect routine market intelligence gathering — discussions about which suppliers were available in the marketplace and what product categories they served. (SSUMF ¶ 37; Bergström Dep. Tr. at 112:5–115:19.)
E. Discovery Record
This matter has been subject to extensive discovery over the course of more than a year. The scope and volume of the discovery record is significant and bears mention because Vantor has had every opportunity to uncover evidence of independently wrongful conduct by Cascade — and has failed to do so.
From Cascade's custodial files alone, a total of 452,316 documents were collected and subjected to review. (SSUMF ¶ 38; Nakamura Decl. ¶ 12.) Of these, 198,740 documents were reviewed for relevance and privilege. (SSUMF ¶ 38.) Cascade produced 78,412 documents in response to Vantor's document requests and third-party subpoenas. (SSUMF ¶ 39.) Vantor produced 41,308 documents from its own files. (SSUMF ¶ 40.) The three third-party suppliers — Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion — collectively produced 23,567 documents in response to subpoenas duces tecum. (SSUMF ¶ 41.) Cascade maintained a privilege log containing 3,214 entries. (SSUMF ¶ 42.)
The parties and third parties collectively participated in fourteen (14) depositions. (SSUMF ¶ 43.) Vantor noticed and took eight depositions; Cascade noticed and took six. Key depositions include the deposition of Annika Bergström, Cascade's VP of Strategic Sourcing and the leader of Project Atlas (October 12, 2022); the deposition of Thomas Brennecke, Vantor's VP of Supplier Relations (October 26, 2022); and the deposition of Lena Torvik, Cascade's SVP of Supply Chain & Procurement (November 18, 2022). (SSUMF ¶¶ 44–46.)
On June 15, 2022, Vantor filed a motion to compel expanded discovery, seeking production of documents relating to Cascade's relationships with an additional 37 suppliers beyond the three at issue. (SSUMF ¶ 47.) On August 3, 2022, this Court granted Vantor's motion in part, permitting expanded discovery limited to 15 additional supplier relationships (for a total of 18, including the three at issue in this action). (SSUMF ¶ 48.) Even with the benefit of this expanded discovery, Vantor has failed to uncover any evidence of independently wrongful conduct by Cascade.
F. Expert Reports
The parties have exchanged expert reports on the issue of damages.
Vantor's Expert. On December 9, 2022, Vantor served the expert report of Dr. Harold Pryce of Meridian Forensic Economics LLC, who opines that Vantor suffered total damages of $87.4 million across all three causes of action. (SSUMF ¶ 49; Nakamura Decl., Ex. 4 [Pryce Report].) Dr. Pryce's damages model rests on projected future revenue streams that Vantor would have earned had its supplier relationships with Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion continued and expanded indefinitely, without regard to the termination-for-convenience clauses in Vantor's own supply agreements. (SSUMF ¶ 50.) Specifically, Dr. Pryce calculates damages of $34.2 million attributable to the Hemsworth relationship (based on a projected five-year revenue stream), $22.8 million attributable to the Tridale relationship (based on a projected four-year revenue stream), and $30.4 million attributable to the Orion relationship (based on a projected six-year revenue stream), each discounted to present value at a rate of 8.5%. (SSUMF ¶ 51.)
Cascade's Expert. On December 22, 2022, Cascade served the rebuttal expert report of Dr. Vivian Ostrowski of Archer & Colvin Consulting Group. (SSUMF ¶ 52; Ostrowski Decl., Ex. A [Ostrowski Rebuttal Report].) Dr. Ostrowski's report demonstrates that provable damages, if any, are limited to a range of $6.1 million to $11.3 million — a fraction of Vantor's claimed damages — based on the remaining terms of the exclusive supply agreements at the time the suppliers exercised their termination-for-convenience rights. (SSUMF ¶ 53.) Specifically, Dr. Ostrowski calculates that the maximum provable damages attributable to the Hemsworth relationship are $2.8 million to $4.9 million (reflecting approximately nine months remaining on the Hemsworth–Vantor Agreement at the time of termination); the maximum provable damages attributable to the Tridale relationship are $1.4 million to $2.7 million (reflecting approximately five months remaining on the Tridale–Vantor Agreement); and the maximum provable damages attributable to the Orion relationship are $1.9 million to $3.7 million (reflecting approximately 13 months remaining on the Orion–Vantor Agreement). (SSUMF ¶ 54.) Dr. Ostrowski further opines that these figures should be reduced by 40% to 55% to account for Vantor's failure to mitigate its damages by seeking alternative suppliers. (SSUMF ¶ 55.)
The depositions of Dr. Pryce (January 20, 2023) and Dr. Ostrowski (February 3, 2023) have been completed. (SSUMF ¶¶ 56–57.)
IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c, a party may move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of a cause of action if "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c). Summary adjudication of a cause of action is appropriate where the court determines that there is "no triable issue of material fact" as to that cause of action. Id. § 437c(f)(1).
A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the initial burden of showing that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Tarrant Holdings (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. A defendant satisfies its burden by presenting evidence that negates an element of the plaintiff's claim or by presenting evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, evidence needed to establish one or more elements of the claim. Id. at 853–855.
Once the moving defendant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by admissible evidence, that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 849. The plaintiff cannot rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings but must set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. Id. at 849–850.
In evaluating the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider "all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 843. However, the nonmoving party's evidence must be sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find in its favor; speculation and conjecture are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.
As set forth below, Cascade has met its burden of demonstrating that Vantor cannot establish the essential elements of its Second and Third Causes of Action, and Vantor cannot carry its resulting burden to show the existence of any triable issue of material fact.
V. ARGUMENT
A. The Second Cause of Action for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Fails as a Matter of Law
1. Elements of the Claim Under California Law. To prevail on a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: (1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant's intentional acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant's wrongful acts. Glenrock Corporation (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153; della Penna v. Crowne Albany Industries (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 389–392.
Critically, as the California Supreme Court established in della Penna and reaffirmed in Korea Supply, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was "independently wrongful" — that is, "wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself." della Penna, 11 Cal.4th at 393. The Court of Appeal has explained that independently wrongful conduct means "conduct that is actionable as a violation of law, whether statutory or common law." Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1152. The independently wrongful conduct requirement is not merely a pleading formality; it is a substantive element of the tort that the plaintiff must prove by competent evidence. Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at 1158–1159.
This "independently wrongful" requirement is the critical distinction between tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and tortious interference with existing contractual relations. The latter tort does not require a showing of independently wrongful conduct because it protects an existing, legally binding contractual relationship. See Camberwell Corporation (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55–56. In contrast, the prospective advantage tort protects only an expectancy of future economic benefit — a weaker interest that warrants protection only when the defendant has engaged in conduct that is independently wrongful. della Penna, 11 Cal.4th at 392–393.
The rationale for this distinction is sound. As the della Penna court explained, allowing claims for interference with prospective economic advantage without the independently wrongful requirement would "impose tort liability for otherwise lawful and socially productive business competition" and would chill the very competitive activity that California's free-market system encourages. Id. at 391–392. The independently wrongful requirement ensures that the tort protects against only those interferences achieved through wrongful means, not against the ordinary rough-and-tumble of commercial competition.
2. Vantor Cannot Establish Independently Wrongful Conduct. The undisputed evidence in this case conclusively demonstrates that Cascade's conduct was not independently wrongful by any legal measure. Cascade's conduct consisted entirely of offering superior commercial terms to suppliers in a competitive marketplace — precisely the type of ordinary business activity that the independently wrongful requirement was designed to protect.
The nature of Cascade's conduct was quintessentially competitive. The undisputed facts establish that Cascade offered each of the three suppliers annual purchase commitments that were more than double what the suppliers were receiving under their existing agreements with Vantor. Cascade offered Hemsworth $28.0 million annually compared to Vantor's $12.5 million — a 124% increase. Cascade offered Tridale $19.5 million annually compared to Vantor's $8.3 million — a 135% increase. Cascade offered Orion $31.0 million annually compared to Vantor's $14.6 million — a 112% increase. (SSUMF ¶¶ 14, 17, 11, 21, 23, 25.) These were arms-length commercial offers made in a competitive marketplace, and the suppliers found them attractive for the obvious reason that they represented substantially greater economic value.
There is nothing remotely wrongful about offering a supplier better terms than it is receiving from an existing customer. This is how competitive markets function. Suppliers are entitled to evaluate their options and contract with the parties that offer the best combination of economic terms, reliability, and growth potential. Cascade's offers were exactly the type of competition that California law not only permits but actively encourages.
The undisputed deposition testimony confirms the lawful nature of Cascade's conduct. Annika Bergström, the Cascade executive who led Project Atlas, testified unequivocally that Cascade's outreach to potential new suppliers, including Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion, followed Cascade's standard procurement procedures. (Bergström Dep. Tr. at 87:14–89:3, 112:5–115:19, Oct. 12, 2022.) Ms. Bergström testified that the Project Atlas team identified potential suppliers based on publicly available market information, industry trade publications, trade show contacts, and recommendations from existing business partners — the same channels Cascade uses in the ordinary course of its procurement activities. (Bergström Dep. Tr. at 91:7–94:12.) Ms. Bergström further testified that at no point did any member of the Project Atlas team attempt to induce any supplier to breach an existing contract, make any misrepresentation to any supplier about Vantor or Vantor's business, or engage in any coercive or threatening conduct toward any supplier. (Bergström Dep. Tr. at 126:3–128:18.)
Lena Torvik, Cascade's SVP of Supply Chain & Procurement and Ms. Bergström's direct supervisor, corroborated this testimony in her November 18, 2022 deposition. Ms. Torvik testified that Project Atlas was designed as a broad-based supplier diversification initiative aimed at strengthening Cascade's supply chain across multiple product categories, and that the initiative was not directed at Vantor or any other specific competitor. (Torvik Dep. Tr. at 43:9–46:14, Nov. 18, 2022.) Ms. Torvik further testified that she was not aware of the specific terms of Vantor's supply agreements with any of the three suppliers, including the exclusivity provisions, at the time the Project Atlas outreach was conducted. (Torvik Dep. Tr. at 58:2–60:11.)
The documentary record contains no evidence of independently wrongful conduct. As noted above, Cascade produced 78,412 documents in this litigation, drawn from a collection of 452,316 documents. Vantor's counsel had the opportunity to review all produced documents, depose Cascade's key witnesses, and pursue expanded discovery pursuant to this Court's August 3, 2022 order. Despite this exhaustive opportunity, Vantor has not identified — and cannot identify — a single document reflecting fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, threats, bribery, or any other independently wrongful act directed at Hemsworth, Tridale, or Orion.
Of the 2,847 internal Project Atlas emails referencing potential new suppliers, only 14 mention Vantor's supplier relationships. (SSUMF ¶¶ 33–34.) These 14 emails represent less than 0.5% of the Project Atlas communications. And none of the 14 emails — not one — contains any suggestion of improper means, threats, fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion directed at the suppliers. (SSUMF ¶¶ 35–37.) None reflects knowledge of the exclusivity provisions in the Vantor agreements. None suggests a plan to interfere with, undermine, or disrupt Vantor's business. The emails reflect nothing more than routine market intelligence — discussions about which suppliers serve which product categories and whether those suppliers might be interested in doing business with Cascade.
The suppliers independently chose to terminate their Vantor agreements. The undisputed evidence establishes that each of the three suppliers made its own independent business decision to exercise the termination-for-convenience clause in its existing Vantor agreement and to enter into a new supply agreement with Cascade. The termination decisions were made by the suppliers' own management teams based on their assessment of the relative economic value of the Cascade and Vantor relationships.
The supplier witnesses confirmed this at their depositions. Janet Kohler, Hemsworth's CEO, testified that Hemsworth's decision to terminate its Vantor agreement was driven by the "transformative" magnitude of Cascade's purchase commitment, which would allow Hemsworth to "scale production, invest in new product lines, and access a national retail footprint" that Vantor's regional operations could not provide. (Kohler Dep. Tr. at 67:18–70:4.) Ms. Kohler further testified that Cascade did not pressure Hemsworth to terminate its Vantor agreement and that the termination decision was made by Hemsworth's board of directors after careful deliberation. (Kohler Dep. Tr. at 72:9–74:16.)
Gregory Fontaine, Tridale's President, testified that Tridale terminated its Vantor agreement because Cascade's offer "represented more than twice the annual revenue we were generating from the Vantor account" and because Cascade offered access to a nationwide distribution network. (Fontaine Dep. Tr. at 54:3–56:8.) Mr. Fontaine confirmed that no one from Cascade asked, encouraged, or pressured Tridale to terminate its agreement with Vantor. (Fontaine Dep. Tr. at 58:11–59:22.)
Simone Alvarez, Orion's CEO, testified that Orion's decision was motivated by "pure economics" and the opportunity to "more than double our revenue from a single retail channel." (Alvarez Dep. Tr. at 81:6–83:14.) Ms. Alvarez testified that Cascade's representatives never disparaged Vantor, never made any representations about Vantor's financial condition or business prospects, and never suggested that Orion should breach or terminate its Vantor agreement. (Alvarez Dep. Tr. at 85:1–87:19.)
This testimony is uncontradicted. Vantor has not identified any evidence — deposition testimony, documents, or otherwise — that contradicts the suppliers' consistent, unequivocal testimony that they made their termination decisions independently and without pressure from Cascade.
3. Vantor's Allegations Amount to Nothing More Than Lawful Competition. Vantor's core theory of liability on the Second Cause of Action is that Cascade "systematically targeted" Vantor's suppliers and offered them better terms for the purpose of depriving Vantor of its supply relationships. But even accepting this characterization of Cascade's intent — which the evidence does not support — it does not satisfy the independently wrongful requirement.
Vantor conflates competitive harm with actionable wrongful conduct. The mere fact that Cascade sought to do business with suppliers who also happened to supply Vantor does not rise to the level of independently wrongful conduct. See della Penna, 11 Cal.4th at 392–393 (rejecting the proposition that interference alone is sufficient); Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal.4th at 1152 (independently wrongful means must be shown). Even aggressive competition — including specifically targeting a competitor's business partners with superior offers — is not independently wrongful absent fraud, threats, violation of statute, or other independently tortious or criminal conduct. See Morriven & Linley LLP (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1139, 1154 (emphasizing that "competition is not wrongful, even when engaged in for the purpose of securing business that might otherwise go to a competitor").
California courts have consistently applied this principle to dismiss claims for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage where, as here, the defendant's conduct consisted of lawful competitive activity. In PM Group, Inc. v. Stewart (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 55, the Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment against a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim where the defendant's conduct consisted of soliciting the plaintiff's employees by offering them better compensation packages. The court held that such conduct was "ordinary competitive behavior" and was not independently wrongful. Id. at 65–67. The same reasoning applies with equal force here: Cascade offered better terms to suppliers who were free to contract with any customer they chose.
Vantor's Complaint and discovery responses fail to identify any specific independently wrongful act by Cascade. Vantor does not allege fraud. Vantor does not allege bribery. Vantor does not allege violation of trade secret law. Vantor does not allege misrepresentation to the suppliers. Vantor does not allege threats or coercion. Vantor does not allege violation of any statute or regulation. What Vantor alleges is that Cascade competed for Vantor's suppliers and won. That is not a tort — it is the free market at work.
4. The Termination-for-Convenience Clauses Further Undermine the Prospective Advantage Claim. The termination-for-convenience clauses in each of the three Vantor supply agreements further undermine Vantor's claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage in two independent respects.
First, the clauses negate the element of a prospective economic advantage with a reasonable probability of future benefit. The tort of interference with prospective economic advantage requires, as its threshold element, the existence of an "economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third person containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff." Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at 1153 (emphasis added). Where the third party has an unfettered contractual right to terminate the relationship at any time upon short notice, the plaintiff's expectation of continued benefit is necessarily uncertain and speculative. All three Vantor supply agreements contained termination-for-convenience clauses — 90 days for Hemsworth, 60 days for Tridale, and 120 days for Orion. (SSUMF ¶¶ 12, 15, 18.) These clauses meant that the suppliers could walk away from their Vantor relationships at any time, for any reason, and for no reason at all, upon the specified notice. The existence of these clauses significantly undermines the claim that Vantor had a protectable expectation of continued economic benefit from the supplier relationships, particularly as to the period beyond the remaining terms of the agreements.
Second, the suppliers' exercise of their contractual termination rights cannot be attributed to Cascade as independently wrongful conduct. Each supplier exercised its termination-for-convenience right independently, in compliance with the contractual notice requirements, and based on its own assessment of its business interests. (SSUMF ¶¶ 26–27.) The exercise of a lawful contractual right by a third party is not an independently wrongful act, and it cannot be transformed into one simply because the third party was motivated by a more attractive offer from a competitor. See Quelimane, 19 Cal.4th at 55–56.
Vantor's claimed expectation of renewed and expanded supplier relationships beyond the existing contract terms is speculative and unsupported by the contractual framework that Vantor itself negotiated. Vantor agreed to termination-for-convenience clauses that gave each supplier the unilateral right to end the relationship. Vantor cannot now claim that a competing offer that prompted the exercise of that right constitutes tortious interference with a prospective advantage that the termination clauses rendered inherently uncertain.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Second Cause of Action fails as a matter of law, and this Court should grant summary judgment in Cascade's favor.
B. The Third Cause of Action Under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 Fails as a Matter of Law
1. Elements of a § 17200 Claim. California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), codified at Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., prohibits any "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The UCL establishes three distinct prongs under which a business practice may be found to constitute unfair competition: (a) the "unlawful" prong, which prohibits conduct that violates another law, whether statutory or regulatory; (b) the "unfair" prong, which prohibits conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law or otherwise violates established public policy; and (c) the "fraudulent" prong, which prohibits conduct that is likely to deceive members of the public. Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180; Calderon Partners LLC (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949–950.
Each prong provides an independent basis for liability; a plaintiff need only establish that the challenged conduct falls within one prong. Id. However, the UCL is not a catch-all statute, and its application must be tethered to specific, identifiable business practices that fall within the scope of at least one of the three prongs. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 187. As demonstrated below, Vantor's § 17200 claim fails under all three prongs.
2. Vantor's § 17200 Claim Is Entirely Duplicative of Its Tortious Interference Claims. As a threshold matter, Vantor's § 17200 claim is fatally flawed because it is entirely duplicative of the tortious interference claims alleged in the First and Second Causes of Action. A review of the Complaint makes this abundantly clear: the Third Cause of Action incorporates by reference all of the factual allegations underlying the First and Second Causes of Action and then simply alleges that the same conduct — Cascade's solicitation of Vantor's suppliers — constitutes an "unlawful," "unfair," or "fraudulent" business practice within the meaning of § 17200. (Compl. ¶¶ 78–85.)
Vantor's Complaint alleges no independent unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent act or practice beyond the supplier-solicitation conduct that forms the factual predicate for the tortious interference claims. Vantor identifies no separate statutory violation, no separate regulatory breach, and no conduct directed at the consuming public that would independently sustain a § 17200 claim. The § 17200 claim is nothing more than a relabeling of the same cause of action under a different statutory heading.
California courts have consistently held that a § 17200 claim that merely repackages the same factual predicate as an underlying tort claim, without identifying a separately actionable practice, is duplicative and subject to dismissal. See Severin & Co. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 164, 178 ("The UCL does not provide a separate cause of action when the claim is based entirely on the same acts as the other causes of action."); see also Sundial & Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1185 (affirming dismissal of duplicative UCL claim). The Third Cause of Action falls squarely within this line of authority and should be dismissed on this basis alone.
3. The "Unlawful" Prong Is Not Satisfied. The "unlawful" prong of the UCL borrows violations of other laws — including statutes, regulations, and common law rules — and treats them as independently actionable as unfair competition. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 180. To state a claim under the unlawful prong, a plaintiff must identify a predicate violation of some law other than § 17200 itself. Aldermere Group (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554.
Vantor has failed to identify any such predicate violation. Vantor does not allege any violation of a specific statute or regulation other than § 17200 itself. The only arguably unlawful conduct that Vantor identifies is the alleged tortious interference — but that is the very claim already pled in the First and Second Causes of Action. An alleged common-law tort cannot serve as a "predicate violation" for a § 17200 unlawful-prong claim when the § 17200 claim is based on the identical facts and identical theory. To allow otherwise would render the UCL a limitless amplifier of any tort claim, a result that California courts have consistently rejected. See Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at 1143–1144.
There is no allegation of an antitrust violation. There is no allegation of trade secret misappropriation under California Civil Code §§ 3426 et seq. — and Vantor made a deliberate decision not to pursue such a claim. There is no allegation of a violation of any consumer protection statute, employment law, environmental regulation, or any other independent legal obligation. The unlawful prong is simply not satisfied.
4. The "Unfair" Prong Is Not Satisfied. The "unfair" prong of the UCL is subject to what courts have termed the "tethering" requirement. In the context of claims brought by business competitors (as opposed to consumers), the California Supreme Court has held that the "unfair" prong must be tethered to a legislatively declared policy or must threaten an "incipient" violation of an antitrust law. Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 186–187. The Supreme Court adopted this standard specifically to prevent the "unfair" prong from becoming a basis for courts to impose their own notions of commercial morality on business dealings. Id. at 184–185.
Cascade's competitive solicitation of suppliers does not threaten any antitrust violation, incipient or otherwise. The markets for home goods, consumer electronics accessories, and personal care products are robustly competitive, with numerous manufacturers and retailers competing for supply relationships. (SSUMF ¶¶ 58–60; Ostrowski Decl. ¶¶ 14–18.) There is no allegation or evidence that Cascade possesses market power in any relevant market, that Cascade's conduct tends to reduce competition, or that Cascade's supplier agreements foreclose competitors from obtaining alternative supply sources. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that Vantor was free to — and did — identify and negotiate with alternative suppliers following the termination of the Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion agreements, albeit with what Vantor characterizes as insufficient mitigation success. (Brennecke Dep. Tr. at 143:12–147:9, Oct. 26, 2022.)
There is no evidence of predatory pricing — Cascade's supplier commitments were at market rates, and indeed represented premium pricing that reflected the value Cascade placed on the suppliers' products. There is no evidence of exclusive dealing arrangements that foreclose competition — the Cascade supplier agreements do not prevent the suppliers from also selling to other retailers (other than Vantor under the exclusive provisions that Vantor itself chose to include in its own agreements). There is no evidence of any other conduct that could be characterized as an incipient antitrust concern.
Nor can Vantor identify any legislatively declared policy that Cascade's conduct violates. Competing for business relationships, offering better commercial terms, and contracting with suppliers who choose to exercise their lawful termination rights does not offend any legislative policy. To the contrary, such conduct is precisely the competitive dynamic that California's commercial law framework is designed to facilitate.
5. The "Fraudulent" Prong Is Not Satisfied. The "fraudulent" prong of the UCL prohibits business acts or practices that are "likely to deceive" members of the public. In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 312. The fraudulent prong is directed at conduct that involves misrepresentation, deception, or the dissemination of misleading information to consumers or the public.
Vantor has not alleged — and cannot establish — that Cascade engaged in any misrepresentation, deception, or conduct likely to mislead the public. The conduct at issue in this case involved private commercial negotiations between Cascade and three individual suppliers. The negotiations were conducted at arms-length by sophisticated business entities represented by counsel. The public was not involved in these transactions, no consumer-facing conduct is at issue, and no consumer harm is alleged.
There is no allegation that Cascade made any false or misleading statements to Hemsworth, Tridale, or Orion in connection with the negotiation of the Cascade supply agreements. There is no allegation that Cascade made any false or misleading public statements about Vantor. There is no allegation that Cascade's conduct had any impact on consumers or the public at large. The fraudulent prong is simply inapplicable to the private commercial conduct at issue here.
6. Vantor's Remedy Under § 17200 Is Unavailable. Even if Vantor could establish a viable § 17200 claim — which it cannot — the remedies Vantor seeks are not available under the UCL. Section 17200 authorizes only two forms of relief: injunctive relief and restitution. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203; Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at 1144. Section 17200 does not authorize the recovery of compensatory damages, consequential damages, lost profits, or any other form of damages. Id.; Cel-Tech, 20 Cal.4th at 179.
Vantor's Complaint seeks money damages and restitution through the § 17200 claim but does not seek injunctive relief. The absence of any request for injunctive relief is telling — it confirms that Vantor is not genuinely seeking to restrain any ongoing unfair business practice but is instead attempting to use § 17200 as an alternative damages vehicle for the same conduct underlying its tort claims. This is precisely the type of UCL claim that California courts have rejected as duplicative and improper.
Moreover, to the extent Vantor seeks restitution, it cannot establish entitlement to that remedy. Restitution under § 17200 requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant received money or property that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff. Korea Supply, 29 Cal.4th at 1148–1149. Vantor cannot make this showing. The revenue that Cascade earned from its supplier agreements with Hemsworth, Tridale, and Orion was not money or property belonging to Vantor. The suppliers voluntarily contracted with Cascade on arms-length terms and delivered products to Cascade in exchange for contractual payments. Vantor has no proprietary interest in that revenue stream, and the mere fact that Vantor previously purchased products from the same suppliers does not give Vantor a restitutionary claim to the revenue Cascade earned from its own, independent supplier relationships.
The unavailability of Vantor's claimed remedy provides yet another independent basis for granting summary judgment on the Third Cause of Action.
C. Policy Considerations Support Granting This Motion
Beyond the specific legal deficiencies of Vantor's Second and Third Causes of Action, strong policy considerations counsel in favor of granting this motion.
Protecting lawful competition. Allowing overbroad tortious interference claims and derivative § 17200 claims to proceed to trial would chill ordinary competitive activity throughout California. If a retailer could face tort liability simply for offering a supplier better commercial terms — without any showing of fraud, coercion, or other independently wrongful conduct — the consequences for California's commercial marketplace would be severe. Businesses would be deterred from competing for supplier relationships, supply chains would ossify, and suppliers would lose the benefit of competitive bidding for their products and services. The right to compete for business relationships is a fundamental principle of California's free-market economy, and the independently wrongful requirement in the prospective economic advantage tort exists precisely to protect that right.
Judicial efficiency. Granting this motion will narrow this case to the remaining First Cause of Action (Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations) and will streamline the issues for trial. The parties will be spared the burden and expense of preparing for trial on two causes of action that fail as a matter of law. The Court's time will be preserved for adjudication of the issues that genuinely present triable questions of fact. And the jury, if this matter proceeds to a jury trial, will not be burdened with the confusion of evaluating claims that lack legal foundation.
This Court has both the authority and the responsibility to dispose of legally deficient claims on summary judgment and to focus the remaining litigation on the issues that warrant trial. This motion presents a clear and appropriate case for the exercise of that authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc. respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion for partial summary judgment and enter judgment in Cascade's favor on:
1. Vantor's Second Cause of Action for Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; and
2. Vantor's Third Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices in Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.
In the alternative, Cascade respectfully requests that the Court grant summary adjudication on each cause of action separately pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(f)(1).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: February 28, 2023
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP
By: ________
Douglas Carmichael, Partner
Francesca Morano, Partner Yuki Nakamura, Senior Associate Carlos Espinoza, Associate
600 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3200 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 555-9800 Facsimile: (213) 555-9801
Attorneys for Defendant Cascade Retail Holdings Inc.
Of Counsel: Diana Prescott, Partner WORTHAM & ADAIR LLP 611 West Sixth Street, Suite 2400 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-4100 Facsimile: (213) 555-4101
PROOF OF SERVICE
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I, Carlos Espinoza, declare as follows:
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is 600 South Grand Avenue, Suite 3200, Los Angeles, California 90071.
On February 28, 2023, I served the foregoing document described as NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT CASCADE RETAIL HOLDINGS INC., together with the concurrently filed MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT and SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS, and all supporting declarations and exhibits, on the following parties by the methods indicated below:
Martin Kessler, Senior Partner Natalie Whitfield, Partner Jason Okafor, Senior Associate KESSLER, BRANDT & WHITFIELD LLP 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 555-7200 Facsimile: (310) 555-7201
Email: mkessler@kbwlaw.com; nwhitfield@kbwlaw.com; jokafor@kbwlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Vantor Holdings Corp.
BY ELECTRONIC FILING: I caused the above-referenced documents to be electronically filed with the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, through the Court's electronic filing system on February 28, 2023. Service on all parties was effectuated through the Court's electronic filing system, which transmitted a Notice of Electronic Filing to all registered counsel of record.
BY EMAIL: I caused a true and correct copy of the above-referenced documents to be transmitted via email on February 28, 2023 to each of the persons listed above at the email addresses set forth above. The transmission was reported as complete and without error.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 28, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.
________________________________________
Carlos Espinoza
| VANTOR HOLDINGS CORP., a California corporation, | Case No. 21STCV-34872 |
| Plaintiff, | NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT CASCADE RETAIL HOLDINGS INC. |
v.
Motion to Be Heard:
CASCADE RETAIL HOLDINGS INC., a Delaware corporation,
Time: [To be specified by Court Clerk]
Defendant.
Filed: February 28, 2023
Action Filed: September 7, 2021