PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP One Liberty Plaza, 50th Floor New York, NY 10006
June 7, 2024
CROSS-EXAMINATION OUTLINE — SANDRA CHOW DEPOSITION
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I. OBJECTIVES OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
Sandra Chow is Northwind Maritime Corporation's ("Northwind") Chief Financial Officer and the individual most directly responsible for quantifying and substantiating Northwind's claimed damages totaling $18,300,000 across multiple categories. She oversaw the internal compilation of the damages figures, coordinated with Northwind's damages expert, and signed or verified Northwind's interrogatory responses concerning its alleged losses. As such, she is the single most important fact witness on the damages side of this case and the witness best positioned to expose weaknesses in Northwind's damages presentation.
The primary objectives of the cross-examination are as follows:
1.  Undermine the reliability and methodology of Northwind's damages calculations across all categories. Northwind's damages claim spans nine distinct categories, several of which rest on internally generated calculations that have not been independently verified. The examination should probe the factual foundation, documentary support, and computational methodology for each category with the aim of demonstrating that the overall figure is unreliable and unsubstantiated.
2.  Establish that Northwind inflated its claimed losses, particularly substitute charter costs, cargo damage, and lost sub-charter profit. There are strong indications that Northwind failed to obtain competitive substitute charter rates, overstated the quantum of iron ore oxidation damage, and presented its lost sub-charter profit margin in a manner that ignores intervening costs that would reduce or eliminate the claimed spread.
3.  Elicit admissions regarding Northwind's failure to mitigate damages. Across multiple categories — particularly substitute charter costs and lost sub-charter profit — Northwind appears to have taken inadequate steps to minimize its losses, or to have delayed in arranging substitute tonnage when commercially reasonable alternatives were available.
4.  Probe the factual basis for the withheld hire of $1,620,000 (October 1 through December 31, 2022, being $14,750 per day multiplied by 110 days) and whether Northwind's withholding was proper under Clause 11 (off-hire) or constituted a unilateral setoff. There is a critical discrepancy between the 68 off-hire days Northwind claims and the 110 days of hire it actually withheld, representing an unexplained gap of 42 days ($617,000). This discrepancy goes directly to the bona fides of Northwind's conduct and supports TSL's position that the withholding was unauthorized.
5.  Establish the foundation for TSL's counterclaim for $1,620,000 in unpaid hire. Chow's testimony is essential to proving that hire was due and owing for the period in question and that Northwind's unilateral decision to withhold payment was not authorized by the charter-party.
6.  Obtain admissions useful for TSL's partial summary judgment motion on the liquidated damages cap interpretation (Clause 28 — single cap of $4,500,000 for the entire charter period versus Northwind's argument that the cap applies on a per-period basis). If the cap is a single, aggregate cap, it is potentially dispositive of the largest single element of Northwind's claim and eliminates Northwind's attempt to "stack" the cap across multiple breach periods.
7.  Test Chow's personal knowledge versus reliance on others, particularly Northwind's damages expert, Dr. Rajesh Anand of Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP. To the extent that Chow is merely parroting conclusions fed to her by Dr. Anand or by counsel, her testimony carries less weight as lay fact testimony and her role as the purported fact witness for damages is undercut.
II. PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND AND FOUNDATION QUESTIONS
A. Role and Responsibilities
The examination should begin by establishing Chow's professional background and her role within Northwind in order to fix the scope of her personal knowledge and responsibility for the matters at issue.
•  Confirm that Chow holds the title of Chief Financial Officer of Northwind Maritime Corporation.
•  Confirm that Northwind Maritime Corporation is incorporated in the Republic of the marshall Islands, with its principal office located at 1700 Harbor Gateway, Suite 500, Stamford, Connecticut 06902.
•  Establish the duration of Chow's tenure as CFO. Determine when she was appointed to the role, whether she held any prior positions within Northwind or its affiliates, and whether there were any gaps in her service.
•  Confirm that Chow reports directly to Viktor Lindgren, President and Managing Director of Northwind Maritime Corporation. Establish the nature and frequency of that reporting relationship — weekly meetings, monthly financial reviews, ad hoc reporting on material matters, and so forth.
•  Establish the full scope of Chow's responsibilities, including but not limited to: financial reporting; internal and external auditing coordination; budgeting and forecasting; treasury and cash management; supervision of the accounting staff; damages quantification in connection with this and any other pending litigation; and any role in operational or commercial decision-making related to charter-party performance.
•  Determine Chow's specific involvement with the charter-party for the M/V Aegean Fortuna (Charter-Party Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203). When did she first become involved with this particular charter? Was she involved in the negotiation of the charter-party terms, or did she become involved only after the charter was executed on December 3, 2020? What was her role during the charter period — was she involved in the financial administration of hire payments, off-hire determinations, or commercial operations, or did she become involved only after disputes arose?
B. Involvement in This Litigation
This line of questioning is designed to determine the extent to which Chow's damages calculations were her own independent work versus the product of direction from counsel or collaboration with the damages expert.
•  When was Chow first asked to quantify Northwind's damages in connection with the charter-party disputes? Was this before or after Northwind filed the complaint on October 2, 2023?
•  Who directed her to compile the damages figures? Was it Richard Hartnett, Northwind's General Counsel? Viktor Lindgren, as President and Managing Director? Outside counsel Margaret Delacroix or others at Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP? Some combination of these individuals?
•  What documents and data did Chow rely upon in compiling the damages figures? Did she work from Northwind's own accounting records, or did she also rely on third-party documentation, market data, or information provided by other Northwind employees or agents?
•  Has Chow reviewed any expert reports prepared in connection with this litigation? Specifically, has she reviewed Dr. Rajesh Anand's expert report, prepared on behalf of Northwind by Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP? When did she first review that report? Has she reviewed any draft versions of the report?
•  Did Chow provide data, source documents, or instructions to Dr. Anand or his team at Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP? If so, what data or instructions did she provide, and when? Were there any communications between Chow and Dr. Anand or his staff in which Chow expressed views about the appropriate methodology or quantum of damages?
•  Confirm that Chow signed or verified Northwind's interrogatory responses regarding damages. These responses were served during the January through August 2024 discovery period. Did Chow personally review and verify the accuracy of every figure set forth in those responses before signing the verification?
C. Familiarity with the Charter-Party Terms
It is essential to establish at the outset the degree to which Chow is familiar with the specific charter-party provisions that bear on the damages calculations. If she is not familiar with these provisions, her testimony regarding damages is necessarily limited.
•  Has Chow read the NYPE 2015 form charter-party as executed between Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) and Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA (as Disponent Owner) on December 3, 2020?
•  Is she familiar with the daily hire rate specified in the charter-party — $14,750 per day?
•  Is she familiar with the charter period — 36 months, commencing January 15, 2021 and expiring January 14, 2024?
•  Can she confirm that the total value of the charter over its 36-month term is approximately $16,166,000 (calculated as $14,750 per day multiplied by approximately 1,095 days)?
•  Is she familiar with the following specific provisions of the charter-party:
•  Clause 28 — Liquidated Damages: the formula for calculating liquidated damages, the cap, and the meaning of "single continuous period of breach";
•  Clause 11 — Off-Hire: the circumstances under which the vessel goes off-hire, the obligations of the parties during an off-hire period, and the notice requirements;
•  Clause 5 — Trade Limits: the geographic and cargo trading limits applicable to the vessel during the charter period;
•  Clause 6 — Maintenance and Seaworthiness: TSL's obligation (as disponent owner) to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition and in compliance with class requirements.
•  If Chow claims familiarity with any of these provisions, probe the depth of her understanding. If she does not claim familiarity, establish that her damages calculations rest on provisions she has not personally studied.
III. OFF-HIRE DEDUCTIONS ($1,003,000)
A. Calculation Methodology
This damages category is foundational because it underlies several other categories. The examination should establish the precise mechanics of Northwind's off-hire calculation and probe its reliability.
•  Confirm that Northwind claims a total of 68 off-hire days across three separate incidents during the charter period.
•  Confirm the basic calculation: 68 days multiplied by the daily hire rate of $14,750 per day equals $1,003,000 (with the understanding that the precise figure may vary slightly depending on rounding).
•  Walk through each incident period in detail:
Incident 1: March 12 – April 2, 2022 (22 days) — Turbocharger Failure, Indian Ocean
•  What was the nature of the turbocharger failure? When and how was it discovered?
•  Where was the vessel at the time of the failure? What was the intended voyage?
•  The vessel proceeded to Colombo, Sri Lanka for repairs. Who made the decision to proceed to Colombo? Was it the Master, TSL, or Northwind?
•  How long did the repairs take? Were the repairs performed promptly and efficiently?
•  How did Northwind determine that the off-hire period commenced on March 12 and ended on April 2? What event triggered the commencement of off-hire — the initial failure, the loss of speed, the deviation to Colombo? What event marked the end of off-hire — completion of repairs, departure from Colombo, resumption of the original voyage?
Incident 2: July 8 – July 29, 2022 (21 days) — BWTS Malfunction and Auxiliary Boiler Failure, Richards Bay, South Africa
•  Confirm that this incident involved two separate mechanical issues: a ballast water treatment system ("BWTS") malfunction and an auxiliary boiler failure.
•  Were these related or independent failures?
•  The vessel was at Richards Bay, South Africa. Was it at anchor, alongside, or in transit?
•  How did Northwind determine that off-hire commenced on July 8 and ended on July 29?
•  Were the BWTS malfunction and the boiler failure repaired simultaneously, or sequentially? If sequentially, how was the off-hire period calculated — from the first failure to the last repair completion?
Incident 3: November 15 – December 10, 2022 (25 days) — Cylinder Liner Failure, Drydocking at Keppel Verolme Shipyard, Rotterdam
•  What was the nature of the cylinder liner failure? When and how was it discovered?
•  The vessel underwent drydocking at Keppel Verolme Shipyard in Rotterdam. Was the drydocking required solely for the cylinder liner repair, or were other repairs or maintenance performed during the drydocking?
•  How did Northwind determine that off-hire commenced on November 15 and ended on December 10?
•  If other maintenance work was performed during the drydocking, is any portion of the 25-day period attributable to maintenance that would have been performed regardless of the cylinder liner failure? If so, should those days be excluded from the off-hire calculation?
•  Determination of Off-Hire Dates: Probe how the precise start and end dates of each off-hire period were determined. Who at Northwind made the determination that the vessel was off-hire? Was it Chow, Lindgren, the operations department, or legal counsel? What documents support the off-hire periods — log abstracts, vessel reports, repair records, correspondence between Northwind and TSL?
•  Formal Off-Hire Notices: Did Northwind serve formal off-hire notices on TSL under Clause 11 for each of the three incidents? If so, obtain the specific dates of each notice, the identity of the person at Northwind who sent the notice, and the identity of the person at TSL to whom the notice was directed. If Northwind did not serve formal off-hire notices, probe whether the failure to give notice affects Northwind's right to claim off-hire under the charter-party terms.
•  Partial Days: Were there any partial days of off-hire that Northwind counted as full days? For example, if the turbocharger failure occurred at 1800 hours on March 12, did Northwind count March 12 as a full off-hire day? If so, what is the justification?
B. Overlap and Double-Counting
This is one of the most important lines of questioning in the entire examination, as it goes to the integrity of Northwind's overall damages framework.
•  Establish whether the off-hire deductions of $1,003,000 overlap with any of the other damages categories claimed by Northwind. Specifically:
•  Do the substitute charter costs ($471,600) relate to the same off-hire days? If so, Northwind is potentially claiming both a deduction from hire for off-hire days and the additional cost of substitute tonnage for the same period — meaning it is being compensated twice for the same lost use of the vessel.
•  Do the liquidated damages under Clause 28 ($4,500,000) compensate for the consequences of the same off-hire events? If so, Northwind is claiming both off-hire deductions and liquidated damages for the same underlying breaches.
•  Does the lost sub-charter profit ($166,600) relate to the same 68 off-hire days? If so, Northwind is claiming the lost profit margin on the Eastbourne sub-charter for the same days it already claims off-hire deductions and liquidated damages.
•  Critical Discrepancy — $1,003,000 vs. $1,620,000: Probe whether the $1,003,000 in off-hire deductions was actually withheld from Northwind's hire payments to TSL. If so, is this the same $1,620,000 in withheld hire that forms the basis of TSL's counterclaim, or is it a separate amount? The $1,003,000 represents 68 days of hire at $14,750 per day. The $1,620,000 withheld by Northwind represents 110 days of hire at $14,750 per day (October 1 through December 31, 2022). There is a discrepancy of 42 days and $617,000 between these two figures.
•  Require Chow to explain what accounts for the additional 42 days ($617,000) of withheld hire beyond the 68 claimed off-hire days. Was the additional $617,000 withheld as a setoff against other categories of damages? If so, which categories? Under what contractual or legal authority?
IV. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER CLAUSE 28 ($4,500,000)
A. Clause 28 Interpretation
This section addresses the single largest component of Northwind's damages claim and the issue most directly relevant to TSL's planned partial summary judgment motion.
•  Confirm Chow's understanding of the Clause 28 liquidated damages formula. The formula provides for liquidated damages equal to 150% of the aggregate off-hire days multiplied by the daily hire rate, subject to a cap of $4,500,000 for any "single continuous period of breach."
•  Walk through the per-incident mathematical calculation under the formula:
68 off-hire days × $14,750/day × 1.5 = $1,504,500
•  Note that this is the result of applying the formula to the aggregate off-hire days, regardless of whether one treats the three incidents as a single period of breach or as three separate periods.
•  Explore Northwind's stated position that each of the three incidents constitutes a separate "single continuous period of breach," thereby allowing the $4,500,000 cap to be applied independently to each incident. Probe whether Chow personally holds this view based on her reading of the charter-party or whether she was instructed to adopt this interpretation by counsel (Richard Hartnett or Margaret Delacroix).
•  Key Line of Questioning: Did Northwind initially calculate its liquidated damages at $1,504,500 — the result of the formula — and subsequently adjust the claimed figure upward to $4,500,000? If so, when did the figure change? At whose direction? Was the change driven by legal analysis regarding the interpretation of the cap, or by a desire to maximize the claimed damages?
•  Probe whether Chow is aware that the formula result ($1,504,500) is well below the $4,500,000 cap even under Northwind's per-period theory. Under Northwind's theory, each incident would have its own $4,500,000 cap, but the formula calculation for each incident individually is:
•  Incident 1: 22 days × $14,750 × 1.5 = $486,750
•  Incident 2: 21 days × $14,750 × 1.5 = $464,625
•  Incident 3: 25 days × $14,750 × 1.5 = $553,125
•  Total: $1,504,500
•  None of these individual calculations approaches the $4,500,000 cap, and the aggregate of all three is $1,504,500. What, then, is the basis for claiming $4,500,000 rather than $1,504,500?
•  Northwind claims three separate breach periods and asserts that this creates three separate $4,500,000 caps (i.e., a potential aggregate of $13,500,000), but Northwind nevertheless agrees that the effective aggregate liquidated damages figure is $4,500,000. Explore the internal inconsistency in this position. If Northwind's per-period theory is correct, why is the claimed amount limited to $4,500,000 rather than a higher figure?
B. Double-Recovery Concern
•  Probe whether the liquidated damages under Clause 28 are intended as an exclusive remedy for breach of the maintenance and seaworthiness obligations under Clause 6, or whether they are cumulative with other damages categories. This is a critical issue because Northwind appears to be claiming liquidated damages on top of multiple categories of actual damages — off-hire deductions, substitute charter costs, and lost sub-charter profit — all arising from the same three incidents.
•  If Clause 28 liquidated damages are intended to compensate for the consequences of off-hire caused by breaches of Clause 6, does Northwind also claim separate off-hire deductions of $1,003,000 for those same periods? If so, there is a clear potential for double recovery: Northwind would be receiving both the liquidated damages (which incorporate and multiply the off-hire days) and separate off-hire deductions (which refund the hire paid for those same days).
•  Ask Chow to explain, in her own words, how Northwind avoids double-counting between the $4,500,000 in liquidated damages and:
(a) the $1,003,000 in off-hire deductions;
(b) the $471,600 in substitute charter costs; and
(c) the $166,600 in lost sub-charter profit.
•  If Chow cannot articulate a coherent explanation, this admission is extremely valuable for TSL's summary judgment motion.
V. SUBSTITUTE CHARTER COSTS ($471,600)
A. Calculation.  
•  Confirm the claimed calculation for substitute charter costs:
($21,300/day − $14,750/day) × 72 days = $6,550/day × 72 days = $471,600
•  Establish the identity of the substitute vessel or vessels that Northwind chartered during the off-hire periods. What was the name of each vessel? Who was the owner? What were the terms of the charter — was it a time charter, voyage charter, or trip charter? What was the duration?
•  Critical Question: The calculation uses 72 days, but Northwind claims a total of 68 off-hire days across the three incidents. What accounts for the additional 4 days? Were there mobilization or demobilization days? Did the substitute charter extend beyond the off-hire period? If so, why should TSL bear the cost of additional days beyond the off-hire periods that TSL allegedly caused?
•  Probe the $21,300 per day substitute charter rate in detail:
•  When was the substitute charter entered into? Was it negotiated and fixed before, during, or after the off-hire event(s) it was intended to cover?
•  Was it a spot fixture or a term fixture? Spot rates are typically higher than term rates, and the choice of a spot fixture (if that is what occurred) raises mitigation questions.
•  Were competing quotes obtained from other owners or brokers before Northwind fixed the substitute charter? If so, how many quotes were obtained? From whom? What were the quoted rates? Why was the $21,300 rate selected?
•  Was the $21,300 rate at, above, or below prevailing market rates at the time of fixation? What is the basis for any assertion that the rate was at or below market?
•  Does Chow have personal knowledge of the negotiations or the market conditions, or is she relying on others?
B. Mitigation.  This line of questioning is designed to establish a failure-to-mitigate defense with respect to the substitute charter costs.
•  What specific steps did Northwind take to minimize the cost of substitute tonnage?
•  Were alternative vessels available at lower daily rates? If Northwind obtained multiple quotes, were any of those quotes at rates lower than $21,300 per day? If so, why did Northwind not accept a lower-priced alternative?
•  Did Northwind consider partial cargoes, voyage charters, cargo consolidation, or other arrangements that might have reduced the cost of covering its cargo obligations during the off-hire periods?
•  Did Northwind have other vessels in its own fleet — or in the fleet of any affiliate — that could have been redeployed to cover the cargo commitments without chartering substitute tonnage from third parties? If so, at what effective cost?
•  Timeline: How quickly did Northwind arrange substitute tonnage after each incident was reported? For each of the three incidents, determine: (a) when Northwind first learned that the M/V Aegean Fortuna would be off-hire for an extended period; (b) when Northwind first began seeking substitute tonnage; and (c) when the substitute charter was actually fixed. If there was a delay between the onset of the off-hire event and the fixation of the substitute charter, probe whether that delay resulted in higher rates (e.g., because the vessel was needed on shorter notice).
C. Documentation.  
•  Request that Chow identify all supporting documents for the substitute charter costs, including but not limited to: the substitute charter-party agreement(s); fixture notes; broker correspondence; competing quotes; invoices; and records of payment.
•  Cross-reference with Northwind's discovery production. Note that Calderwood & Harkness sent a discovery dispute letter dated April 5, 2024 (addressed to Jason Trumbull at Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP) regarding Northwind's deficient production of sub-charter documents relating to its arrangement with Eastbourne Bulk Carriers Ltd. Probe whether the substitute charter documents have been fully produced, or whether the same production deficiencies identified in the April 5 letter extend to the substitute charter documents as well.
•  If any documents have not been produced, probe why not and whether Chow can nonetheless testify to the figures she has cited.
VI. CARGO DAMAGE CLAIMS — IRON ORE OXIDATION ($3,420,000)
A. Factual Basis
•  Confirm that this damages category relates specifically to Incident 2 (July 8 through July 29, 2022) — the BWTS malfunction and auxiliary boiler failure at Richards Bay, South Africa.
•  Confirm the nature of the cargo: iron ore. Confirm the nature of the alleged damage: oxidation of the iron ore during the period of delay at Richards Bay.
•  Who owned the iron ore cargo at the relevant time? Was Northwind the cargo interest (i.e., did Northwind own the cargo), or was Northwind acting solely as a charterer arranging transport for third-party cargo interests? This distinction is critical because if Northwind did not own the cargo, it may not have standing to claim cargo damage unless it has been assigned the rights of the cargo owner or has been held liable to the cargo owner.
•  Identify the specific cargo lots affected, including: the bill or bills of lading numbers; the quantity of iron ore loaded; the shipper and consignee; and the ports of loading and intended discharge.
•  How was the $3,420,000 figure calculated? Was it based on independent appraisals of the damaged cargo? Market value diminution (i.e., the difference between the market value of undamaged iron ore and the market value of the oxidized iron ore at the time and place of discharge)? The actual sale price differential (i.e., the difference between the price the cargo was expected to sell for and the price actually received for the damaged cargo)?
•  Who conducted the appraisal or valuation? Was it an independent surveyor, or was the valuation performed internally by Northwind?
B. Causation.  
•  TSL's defense with respect to the BWTS malfunction is that the malfunction was caused by Northwind's agents loading contaminated ballast water at a prior port. This is a critical causation issue because if the BWTS malfunction was the result of Northwind's own conduct (or the conduct of its agents), the resulting cargo damage is not attributable to TSL.
•  Probe Chow's knowledge of the ballast loading at the prior port:
•  Which port was the vessel at before arriving at Richards Bay?
•  Which agents arranged or supervised the ballast loading at that prior port? Were they Northwind's agents, TSL's agents, or independent agents?
•  What instructions were given regarding ballast loading? Were there any specific requirements regarding ballast water quality?
•  Is Chow aware of any evidence suggesting that the ballast water loaded at the prior port was contaminated or otherwise non-compliant?
•  Did Northwind investigate the cause of the BWTS malfunction? If so, who conducted the investigation? What were the findings? Was a written report prepared? Has that report been produced in discovery?
•  Separate the causation question into two distinct issues: Was the iron ore oxidation caused by the BWTS malfunction itself (e.g., because the BWTS malfunction resulted in conditions that accelerated oxidation), or was it caused by the 21-day delay at Richards Bay during which the iron ore sat in the holds exposed to ambient conditions? This distinction matters because even if TSL is responsible for the delay, the extent of the damage may depend on conditions at Richards Bay (temperature, humidity, ventilation of holds) rather than solely on the passage of time.
C. Insurance and Subrogation
•  Did Northwind or the cargo owners file claims with cargo insurers in connection with the iron ore oxidation?
•  Were any of the $3,420,000 in claimed cargo losses reimbursed, in whole or in part, by insurance? If so, what amount was recovered from insurers?
•  If Northwind has already been reimbursed by insurers for all or part of the cargo damage, is Northwind claiming in this litigation amounts that it has already recovered? If so, this constitutes potential double recovery and must be explored.
•  Inter-Club Agreement: Probe Chow's awareness of the Inter-Club Agreement (ICA) and its provisions regarding the allocation of cargo claim liability between owner and charterer. The ICA establishes standard apportionment rules for cargo claims in the context of time charters. Is Chow familiar with the ICA? Has anyone at Northwind or at Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern analyzed the application of the ICA to the iron ore cargo claim? If so, what was the conclusion?
VII. DEMURRAGE AND DEAD FREIGHT — QINGDAO LAYCAN MISS ($1,230,000)
A. The Maputo Deviation
•  Confirm the factual basis for this damages category: In September 2022, the M/V Aegean Fortuna deviated from its planned Durban-to-Qingdao voyage to load cargo at Maputo, Mozambique. The deviation added approximately 4 days to the voyage. As a result, Northwind alleges that the vessel missed a cargo laycan window at the port of Qingdao (People's Republic of China) scheduled for October 1–5, 2022.
•  Probe Chow's personal knowledge of the routing decision. Was she involved in any discussions or communications about the Maputo call, or is she relying entirely on the accounts of operational staff (such as chartering managers or operations personnel)?
•  Did Northwind receive advance notice of the Maputo call? If so, when? From whom — TSL, the Master, a broker? Did Northwind object to the deviation? If so, in what form (oral, written, email)? If not, does the failure to object constitute acquiescence?
•  TSL's position is that the Maputo call was necessitated by weather conditions and routing considerations in the Mozambique Channel and was within the Master's discretion under the charter-party and general maritime law. Probe Chow's knowledge of the weather and sea conditions in the Mozambique Channel in September 2022. Does she have any basis to dispute TSL's account, or is she simply relying on the conclusion that the deviation caused the laycan miss?
B. Damages Calculation
•  How was the $1,230,000 figure derived? Break the figure down into its component parts:
•  Demurrage Component: What is the claimed demurrage rate? How many days of demurrage are claimed? On which vessel? Was this demurrage incurred at Qingdao, at Maputo, or at some other port?
•  Dead Freight Component: What quantity of cargo was not loaded due to the missed laycan? What was the contracted freight rate? What was the alternative rate, if any? How is the dead freight differential calculated?
•  Identify the supporting documentation for the $1,230,000 figure, including: contracts with receivers or shippers at Qingdao; demurrage invoices or claims; dead freight claims; fixture recaps or fixture confirmations; and any correspondence with the Qingdao counterparties regarding the missed laycan.
•  Were the Qingdao receivers or shippers compensated by Northwind for the missed laycan, demurrage, or dead freight? If so, has Northwind produced proof of payment (bank transfer records, cancelled checks, wire confirmations)? If Northwind has not yet paid these claims, is it seeking to recover contingent or unliquidated liabilities that may never materialize?
•  Could Northwind have rescheduled the laycan? Was the October 1–5 window the only available window at Qingdao, or were there subsequent windows that could have been used? Did Northwind attempt to renegotiate the laycan dates with its Qingdao counterparties? If not, why not?
VIII. ADDITIONAL PORT COSTS AND BUNKER SURCHARGES ($875,400)
This damages category is a catch-all and is particularly susceptible to challenge on grounds of specificity, documentation, and overlap with other categories.
•  Require Chow to provide a detailed breakdown of the $875,400 figure:
•  Which ports are included? For each port, what specific costs were incurred (e.g., port charges, pilotage, towage, agency fees, terminal handling charges, bunker surcharges)?
•  Which voyages do these costs relate to?
•  How much of the $875,400 relates to each of the three off-hire incidents (Colombo, Richards Bay, Rotterdam) versus the Maputo deviation?
•  Were any of these costs ordinary operating expenses that Northwind would have incurred regardless of the alleged breaches? For example, if the vessel was going to call at Colombo or Rotterdam on its scheduled itinerary, Northwind would have incurred port costs at those locations in any event. Only the incremental costs attributable to the off-hire events or deviation should be recoverable.
•  Identify the supporting invoices, receipts, and payment records for each component of this category. Have all such documents been produced in discovery?
•  Probe whether any port costs included in the $875,400 figure are already accounted for in the off-hire deductions ($1,003,000) or the substitute charter cost calculations ($471,600). If Northwind is deducting hire for off-hire days on the theory that it should not pay for a vessel it cannot use, it should not also be claiming additional port costs incurred during those same off-hire periods as a separate damages item — that would constitute double-counting.
IX. LOST SUB-CHARTER PROFIT WITH EASTBOURNE BULK CARRIERS ($166,600)
A. The Eastbourne Sub-Charter
•  Confirm that Northwind sub-chartered the M/V Aegean Fortuna to Eastbourne Bulk Carriers Ltd., a company organized under the laws of England and Wales, at a daily rate of $17,200 per day.
•  When was the Eastbourne sub-charter entered into? What was its duration? Was it coterminous with the head charter (i.e., did it run for the full 36-month charter period from January 15, 2021 through January 14, 2024), or did it cover only a portion of the head charter period?
•  Confirm the claimed lost profit calculation:
($17,200/day − $14,750/day) × 68 off-hire days = $2,450/day × 68 days = $166,600
•  Was the $2,450 per day spread between the sub-charter rate and the head charter rate the actual profit margin earned by Northwind on the sub-charter? Or were there additional costs — such as brokerage commissions, address commissions, operational expenses borne by Northwind, or administrative overhead — that would reduce the net profit below $2,450 per day?
•  If there were additional costs, what were they? What was the actual net daily profit margin after deducting all costs?
B. Document Production Issues
•  Reference Calderwood & Harkness's letter dated April 5, 2024, addressed to Jason Trumbull at Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP, regarding Northwind's deficient production of sub-charter documents with Eastbourne Bulk Carriers Ltd. Despite our repeated requests, Northwind has not produced the full sub-charter agreement, nor has it produced all addenda, riders, recaps, and related communications.
•  Has the full Eastbourne sub-charter agreement now been produced? If not, why not? Is Northwind claiming privilege over any portion of the sub-charter documentation? On what basis?
•  Have all addenda, riders, side letters, and communications between Northwind and Eastbourne Bulk Carriers relating to the sub-charter been produced?
•  Were there other sub-charters of the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the 36-month head charter period besides the Eastbourne sub-charter? If so, to whom, at what daily rates, and for what periods? This information is relevant to determining the market rate at which the vessel could be sub-chartered and, by extension, the reasonableness of the Eastbourne sub-charter rate.
•  Did the Eastbourne sub-charter contain its own off-hire provisions? If so, did Eastbourne claim off-hire against Northwind during the three incidents? If Eastbourne placed the vessel off-hire under the sub-charter, what was the effect on Northwind's financial position?
•  Did Northwind pay Eastbourne Bulk Carriers any compensation — whether as off-hire deductions, damages, or goodwill payments — for the periods during which the M/V Aegean Fortuna was off-hire under the head charter? If so, how much was paid, and is that amount included anywhere in Northwind's claimed damages?
C. Overlap with Other Damages Categories
•  This is the critical overlap question for this category. If Northwind is claiming off-hire deductions of $1,003,000 for the same 68 off-hire days, liquidated damages of $4,500,000 that incorporate and multiply those same 68 off-hire days, and substitute charter costs of $471,600 for covering its cargo obligations during those periods, can it also claim an additional $166,600 in lost sub-charter profit for the same 68-day period?
•  Stated more directly: Is Northwind seeking triple (or even quadruple) recovery for the same underlying harm — the inability to use the M/V Aegean Fortuna for 68 days?
•  Ask Chow to reconcile these overlapping claims. If she cannot, this admission supports TSL's argument that Northwind's damages framework is internally inconsistent and inflated.
X. THIRD-PARTY SHIPPER CLAIMS ($5,634,400)
A. Identification of Claims
•  Northwind claims $5,634,400 in pass-through liability arising from three separate cargo claims brought by third-party shippers. Require Chow to identify each claim in detail:
•  The identity of each claimant (company name, jurisdiction of incorporation, relationship to Northwind);
•  The type of cargo involved in each claim;
•  The voyage during which the alleged cargo damage occurred;
•  The amount of each individual claim;
•  The legal theory asserted by each claimant (breach of contract of carriage, negligence, bailment, etc.).
•  What is the current status of each of the three shipper claims? For each, determine whether the claim is: still pending (and if so, in what forum — arbitration, litigation, or pre-dispute negotiation); settled (and if so, on what terms and for what amount); or reduced to a judgment or arbitral award.
•  Has Northwind actually paid any of these claims? If so, produce proof of payment. If Northwind has not yet paid, are the claims still contingent? Can Northwind recover damages for contingent liabilities that have not yet crystallized?
•  Were these claims brought against Northwind in its capacity as charterer, or against TSL and/or Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. in their capacity as disponent owner and/or registered owner? If the claims were brought against TSL or Aegean Fortuna, on what basis is Northwind claiming these amounts as its own damages?
B. Legal Basis for Pass-Through
•  TSL's defense is that third-party shipper claims are not recoverable as charter-party damages in this proceeding, either because they are too remote, because they fall within the Inter-Club Agreement allocation framework, or because they are the subject of Justice Chen's ruling narrowing Count III.
•  Justice Chen's order of March 8, 2024 on TSL's motion to dismiss narrowed Count III of Northwind's complaint, which is the count addressing pass-through liability for third-party shipper claims. Probe Chow's understanding of which shipper claims survived the motion to dismiss in their entirety, which were narrowed or partially dismissed, and which were eliminated. If Chow lacks understanding of the legal rulings, note this for the record — it undermines her credibility as the person who "verified" the damages calculations.
•  Inter-Club Agreement: Probe Chow's awareness of the Inter-Club Agreement (ICA) and its standard apportionment provisions for cargo claims between owner and charterer under time charters. If the ICA applies, it may allocate a significant portion of the third-party shipper claims to Northwind rather than to TSL, reducing or eliminating this damages category.
C. Quantification.  
•  How did Chow arrive at the aggregate figure of $5,634,400 for the three claims? Is this simply the sum of the three individual claim amounts, or was there any adjustment or analysis?
•  Identify the individual claim amounts and confirm that they sum to $5,634,400.
•  Were independent valuations, cargo surveys, or appraisals conducted in connection with any of the three claims? If so, by whom? Have those reports been produced in discovery?
•  Have the shippers received any insurance recoveries for their cargo losses? If so, those recoveries should offset the amounts that Northwind claims. Probe whether Chow has investigated or accounted for shipper insurance recoveries.
XI. NORTHWIND'S LEGAL FEES CLAIMED AS DAMAGES ($999,000)
•  Northwind claims $999,000 in legal fees and expert costs as an element of its damages in this action. This is an unusual claim, as legal fees are typically recoverable only as costs (if at all) and not as substantive damages. Probe the legal and contractual basis for this claim.
•  Request a breakdown of the $999,000 figure:
•  Fees of Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP (outside litigation counsel) — what amount?
•  Expert costs of Captain James Blackmore of Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd. (Northwind's liability/causation expert) — what amount?
•  Expert costs of Dr. Rajesh Anand of Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP (Northwind's damages expert) — what amount?
•  Other costs (copying, travel, court fees, service of process, etc.) — what amount?
•  Is there a contractual basis in the charter-party for fee-shifting? Does any provision of the NYPE 2015 form, or any rider or addendum, provide that the prevailing party is entitled to recover its legal fees and costs from the non-prevailing party? If not, on what theory does Northwind claim legal fees as an element of substantive damages (as opposed to costs upon a potential motion for costs after judgment)?
•  Does Chow have personal knowledge of the fee calculations, or is she relying entirely on information provided by legal counsel? If the latter, her testimony on this category has limited evidentiary value.
•  Has Northwind's total litigation spend actually reached $999,000 as of the date of the complaint (October 2, 2023)? The complaint was filed less than one year after the first off-hire incident and only months after the charter period expired. Probe whether the $999,000 figure is an actual figure or a projected figure. If projected, on what basis?
XII. WITHHELD HIRE / TSL COUNTERCLAIM ($1,620,000)
A. The Withholding
This section is the foundation of TSL's counterclaim and should be explored in detail. The examination on this topic should be conducted first, while the witness is fresh, per the timing strategy below.
•  Confirm that Northwind withheld hire payments for the period October 1 through December 31, 2022 — a total of 110 days during the final quarter of the calendar year.
•  Confirm the total amount withheld: $14,750 per day multiplied by 110 days equals approximately $1,620,000 (the pleading alleges $1,622,500, which reflects the precise arithmetic, with the $1,620,000 figure used as a rounded approximation; clarify the exact figure with the witness).
•  Who at Northwind authorized the decision to withhold hire payments? Did Chow personally make or approve the decision? Did Viktor Lindgren direct the withholding? Did Richard Hartnett (General Counsel) advise on it? Was outside counsel Margaret Delacroix involved in the decision?
•  Under what charter-party provision did Northwind claim the right to withhold hire? Did Northwind assert that the withholding was authorized under Clause 11 (off-hire), or did Northwind assert a right of equitable setoff against other claimed damages?
•  The 42-Day Discrepancy: The 110 days of withheld hire substantially exceeds the 68 off-hire days that Northwind claims across the three incidents. What is the basis for withholding hire for 42 additional days beyond the claimed off-hire periods? If the withholding for 68 days was based on off-hire, what was the basis for withholding hire for the remaining 42 days? Was the additional withholding a unilateral setoff against anticipated damages in other categories? If so, which categories? Was Northwind authorized to do so under the charter-party?
B. Setoff Justification
•  Did Northwind provide TSL with written notice of its intent to withhold hire? If so, when was the notice sent? What did the notice state? Did it specify the charter-party provision relied upon? Did it quantify the amount being withheld and the basis for the calculation?
•  Did TSL object to the withholding? If so, when? In what form? What was Northwind's response to TSL's objection?
•  Explore whether Northwind's setoff was proper under New York law. Under New York law, a party may exercise a right of setoff only where it has a liquidated, admitted, or adjudicated claim against the other party. At the time Northwind withheld hire in October, November, and December 2022:
•  Had Northwind's off-hire claims been admitted by TSL? (No.)
•  Had Northwind's off-hire claims been reduced to judgment or arbitral award? (No.)
•  Were Northwind's off-hire claims liquidated — i.e., were they for a sum certain that was not subject to genuine dispute? (Arguably not, given TSL's defenses regarding causation and the proper calculation of off-hire periods.)
•  If the answer to all three questions is "no," then Northwind did not have a liquidated, admitted, or adjudicated claim at the time of the withholding, and the withholding constituted an unauthorized unilateral setoff.
•  Establish that the hire was due and owing under the charter-party for the period in question, that Northwind's obligation to pay hire was unconditional (subject only to the specific off-hire provisions of Clause 11), and that Northwind's unilateral decision to withhold $1,620,000 in hire was not authorized by any provision of the charter-party.
XIII. OVERALL DAMAGES METHODOLOGY AND CONSISTENCY
A. Internal vs. Expert Calculations
•  Did Chow prepare the initial damages figures independently, working from Northwind's own financial records and data, or did she work with Dr. Rajesh Anand and his team at Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP from the outset?
•  If Chow prepared initial calculations independently, were those initial figures consistent with the figures that ultimately appeared in Dr. Anand's expert report (served August 19, 2024)? If there were discrepancies, what were they and how were they resolved?
•  Were there any revisions to the damages figures over time? If so, when were the revisions made? What prompted the revisions? At whose direction were the revisions made — Chow's own judgment, Lindgren's instruction, Hartnett's direction, or counsel's advice?
•  To the extent that Chow's figures changed to align more closely with Dr. Anand's figures (or vice versa), explore the sequence and direction of influence. Did Dr. Anand's analysis drive changes to Chow's internal calculations, or did Chow's instructions drive Dr. Anand's methodology?
B. Total Claimed vs. Supportable
•  Walk through the full $18,300,000 claim category by category and challenge each:
•  Identify the categories where there is overlap or double-counting. In particular, the following categories all relate to the same 68 off-hire days and potentially compensate for the same harm (lost use of the vessel):
(a) Off-hire deductions: $1,003,000
(b) Liquidated damages: $4,500,000 (which are calculated based on the same off-hire days)
(c) Substitute charter costs: $471,600 (incurred to replace the vessel during the off-hire periods)
(d) Lost sub-charter profit: $166,600 (lost because the vessel was unavailable during the off-hire periods)
Subtotal of potentially overlapping categories: $6,141,200
•  Probe overall reasonableness. Northwind's total claim of $18,300,000 exceeds the total value of the entire 36-month charter ($14,750 per day × approximately 1,095 days ≈ $16,166,000). Ask Chow to explain how Northwind can justify a damages claim that exceeds the value of the entire charter. Does this not suggest that the claim is inflated?
C. Failure to Mitigate
•  General question: What specific steps did Northwind take to mitigate its damages after each of the three incidents and after the Maputo deviation?
•  Were there opportunities to reduce Northwind's exposure that Northwind did not pursue? For example:
•  Could Northwind have sourced substitute tonnage at lower rates?
•  Could Northwind have renegotiated laycan windows or cargo commitments to avoid demurrage and dead freight?
•  Could Northwind have coordinated with Eastbourne Bulk Carriers to minimize the impact on the sub-charter?
•  Could Northwind have sought interim relief (e.g., arbitration or injunctive relief) rather than unilaterally withholding hire?
•  Timing of substitute charter arrangements — were they prompt or delayed? For each incident, determine the elapsed time between the onset of the off-hire event and the fixation of substitute tonnage. If there was a material delay, probe whether a more prompt response would have reduced Northwind's damages.
•  Did Northwind consider renegotiating the Eastbourne sub-charter during the disruption periods, for example by substituting another vessel from its fleet or by agreeing to a temporary reduction in the sub-charter rate?
XIV. FINANCIAL RECORDS AND DOCUMENTATION
•  Identify all financial records, spreadsheets, accounting entries, general ledger entries, invoices, and payment records that Northwind relies upon in support of its damages claim of $18,300,000.
•  Have all such documents been produced in discovery? If not, identify which documents have not been produced and the reason for the non-production.
•  Identify any documents that Chow reviewed in preparation for this deposition (June 14, 2024). This may include: the charter-party, internal financial records, prior deposition transcripts, the complaint and answer, discovery responses, correspondence, and any expert reports or draft reports. To the extent that documents reviewed in preparation were provided by counsel, note any potential privilege issues but press for identification of non-privileged documents.
•  Identify any documents that Chow personally created or directed others to create in connection with the damages calculation, including: spreadsheets, models, memoranda, summaries, presentations, or communications to counsel or to Dr. Anand. These documents may be discoverable as non-privileged business records even if they were later shared with counsel.
XV. KEY DOCUMENTS TO USE DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION
The following documents should be assembled, tabbed, and available for use during the examination. Each document should be pre-marked as a deposition exhibit or ready for marking on the day of the deposition.
1.  Charter-Party (NYPE 2015 form, dated December 3, 2020, Charter-Party Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203) — with specific attention to:
•  Clause 1 (Duration and Delivery)
•  Clause 5 (Trade Limits)
•  Clause 6 (Maintenance and Seaworthiness)
•  Clause 11 (Off-Hire)
•  Clause 28 (Liquidated Damages)
2.  Northwind's Interrogatory Responses regarding damages calculations (served during the January–August 2024 discovery period), including the verification signed by Chow.
3.  Eastbourne Sub-Charter Agreement (to the extent produced in discovery), including all addenda, riders, side letters, and related correspondence.
4.  Substitute Charter Agreement(s) — identifying the substitute vessel, owner, rate, and duration.
5.  Cargo Damage Appraisals and Claims Correspondence — particularly relating to the iron ore oxidation at Richards Bay.
6.  Northwind's Internal Accounting Records for Withheld Hire — covering the period October 1 through December 31, 2022, showing the amounts withheld, the dates of withholding, and any internal approvals or authorizations.
7.  Off-Hire Notices Issued by Northwind — for each of the three incidents, to the extent such notices exist.
8.  Deposition Transcript of Viktor Lindgren (taken May 30, 2024) — for purposes of cross-referencing any inconsistencies between Lindgren's testimony and Chow's testimony, particularly with respect to the authorization of the hire withholding, the decision-making regarding substitute charter arrangements, and the Maputo deviation.
9.  Communications Between Chow and Dr. Rajesh Anand (Northwind's damages expert, Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP) — to the extent produced in discovery or obtainable through deposition questioning.
10.  Calderwood & Harkness's April 5, 2024 discovery Dispute Letter to Jason Trumbull at Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP regarding Northwind's deficient production of sub-charter documents relating to Eastbourne Bulk Carriers Ltd.
XVI. EXAMINATION SEQUENCE AND TIMING STRATEGY
Anticipated Duration: 4 to 5 hours, inclusive of breaks. Under CPLR 3113 and the Commercial Division rules, the deposition is subject to the seven-hour presumptive limit, so there is sufficient margin. However, the examination should be conducted efficiently to maintain momentum and prevent the witness from becoming comfortable.
Proposed Sequence:
Strategic Notes on Sequencing:
•  Begin with background and foundation questions (Segment 1) to establish the witness's credentials, scope of knowledge, and role in the damages calculation. These questions are non-threatening and allow the witness to settle into the deposition, which makes subsequent pivots to more aggressive questioning more effective.
•  Move to the withheld hire / counterclaim area (Segment 2) first, while the witness is fresh and before opposing counsel has an opportunity to observe our examination strategy and prepare the witness during breaks. The withheld hire area is the strongest line of questioning for TSL's counterclaim and involves the critical 42-day discrepancy that is difficult for the witness to explain coherently.
•  Proceed through damages categories in order of strategic importance, not in order of presentation in the complaint. The liquidated damages / double-counting issue (Segment 3) is the second most important topic because it directly supports TSL's partial summary judgment motion.
•  Conclude with the overall methodology and document identification questions (Segment 11), which serve as a cleanup and allow for follow-up on any threads left open from earlier segments.
•  Reserve flexibility for follow-up on unexpected testimony. If the witness makes surprising admissions or provides inconsistent testimony on any topic, be prepared to deviate from the planned sequence to pursue those openings.
XVII. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
The following objections are anticipated from opposing counsel (Margaret Delacroix, lead partner, or Jason Trumbull, senior associate, of Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP) during the examination:
1. Form Objections / Calls for Legal Conclusion
Anticipated Context: Questions regarding Chow's interpretation of Clause 28, including the meaning of "single continuous period of breach" and the application of the $4,500,000 cap.
Response Strategy: Frame questions in terms of Chow's factual understanding and business calculations rather than asking her to render legal interpretations. For example, instead of asking "Does Clause 28 provide for a single aggregate cap or per-period caps?", ask "When you calculated the liquidated damages figure of $4,500,000, did you apply the cap once to the entire charter period or separately to each incident? What instructions did you receive about how to apply the cap?" The form objection may be noted for the record, but the witness should be directed to answer.
2. Privilege Objections
Anticipated Context: Questions regarding communications between Chow and Northwind's counsel (Hartnett, Delacroix, or others) about damages strategy, the decision to withhold hire, or the interpretation of charter-party provisions. Also anticipated on questions about documents shared with or created at the direction of counsel.
Response Strategy: Push back firmly on overbroad privilege assertions regarding purely financial data and business calculations. The fact that Chow may have shared a damages spreadsheet with counsel does not render the underlying business data privileged. Distinguish between (a) requests for the substance of legal advice received (which may be privileged) and (b) requests for the factual inputs, data sources, and business judgments that underlie the damages calculations (which are not privileged). If opposing counsel instructs the witness not to answer on privilege grounds, note the instruction for the record and indicate that TSL may seek a ruling from Justice Chen compelling an answer.
3. Instruction Not to Answer (Settlement / Mediation)
Anticipated Context: Questions that touch on Northwind's settlement posture or its willingness to negotiate particular damages categories. The parties have not yet reached the mediation stage, and settlement discussions may be off-limits under FRE 408 / CPLR principles.
Response Strategy: Avoid questions that directly solicit settlement offers or mediation positions. However, questions about whether Northwind has internally revised its damages figures — and the reasons for such revisions — are fair game and should be pursued. If opposing counsel objects that such questions implicate settlement discussions, note that the question concerns the factual basis and evolution of the damages claim, not settlement posture.
4. General Obstructionist Conduct
Anticipated Context: Margaret Delacroix is known to be a vigorous advocate and may engage in speaking objections, coaching the witness through the form of objections, or taking excessive breaks.
Response Strategy: Maintain a professional tone but insist on the record that objections be stated in the form required by the Commercial Division rules (i.e., stating the ground for the objection without argument or instruction). If coaching is suspected, note it on the record and request that the question be re-read and answered without interference. If breaks become excessive or appear designed to disrupt momentum, note the pattern on the record.
XVIII. NOTES AND COORDINATION
Examination Team:
•  Carlos Espinoza (Lead Associate) will conduct the examination. Carlos has primary responsibility for the damages defense in this matter and has the deepest familiarity with the financial details of Northwind's claim.
•  Hannah Brinkley (Associate) will attend the deposition for real-time document identification and note-taking. Hannah should have the full exhibit set tabbed and ready, organized in the sequence outlined in Section XVI above, with backup copies available for the witness and opposing counsel. Hannah should flag in real time any testimony that is inconsistent with Lindgren's May 30 deposition transcript or with Northwind's interrogatory responses.
Post-Examination Coordination:
•  Following the deposition, Carlos and Hannah should prepare a summary memorandum of key admissions and notable testimony for distribution to Douglas Carmichael (Partner in charge of overall matter strategy).
•  Coordinate with Douglas Carmichael on any strategic pivots warranted by unexpected testimony. If Chow makes significant admissions regarding the liquidated damages cap, the 42-day withholding discrepancy, or the double-counting issues, those admissions may accelerate the timeline for TSL's partial summary judgment motion.
Summary Judgment Preparation:
•  The deposition transcript of Sandra Chow will be a principal exhibit in TSL's partial summary judgment motion on (a) the liquidated damages cap interpretation (Clause 28 — single aggregate cap vs. per-period caps) and (b) the Maputo deviation claim. The motion is scheduled to be filed September 20, 2024.
•  Key admissions to target for summary judgment:
(1) Chow's acknowledgment that the mathematical application of the Clause 28 formula to the claimed off-hire days yields $1,504,500, not $4,500,000, and that the figure was subsequently increased at counsel's direction;
(2) Any admission that off-hire deductions and liquidated damages compensate for the same harm — i.e., the lost use of the vessel during the off-hire periods — creating a double-recovery problem;
(3) Failure to mitigate substitute charter costs — evidence that Northwind did not obtain competing quotes, delayed in arranging substitute tonnage, or selected a substitute vessel at above-market rates;
(4) Lack of documentary support for any damages category — admissions that sp