MEMORANDUM
PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
TO: Douglas Carmichael, Francesca Morano
FROM: Carlos Espinoza, Hannah Brinkley
DATE: June 21, 2024
RE: Deposition Preparation — Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos; Northwind Maritime Corporation v. Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd., Index No. 655421/2023, Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, Commercial Division (Part 49, Hon. Lorraine K. Chen, J.S.C.)
C&H MATTER NO.: 1044-00006
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I. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW
The purpose of this memorandum is to prepare Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos for his deposition, which is currently scheduled for June 28, 2024. The deposition has been noticed by Hargrove, Delacroix & Stern LLP ("HD&S"), counsel for Plaintiff Northwind Maritime Corporation ("Northwind" or "Charterer"). The lead partner at HD&S responsible for this matter is Margaret Delacroix. Based on the staffing pattern observed at prior depositions in this case, the examining attorneys are expected to be Jason Trumbull, a senior associate at HD&S who has conducted the majority of fact-witness depositions thus far, and/or Priya Mehta, a mid-level associate who assisted at the depositions of Viktor Lindgren and Sandra Chow. It is possible that Ms. Delacroix herself will attend and participate in portions of the examination, particularly if she intends to use the Vlahos deposition at trial or in connection with summary judgment briefing.
Petros Vlahos is employed by Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL") and its wholly owned vessel-owning subsidiary, Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL" or "Aegean Fortuna Shipholding"). Vlahos has served as Chief Engineer aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna (IMO No. 9847231) during the charter period relevant to this litigation. As Chief Engineer, Vlahos is the most senior engineering officer aboard the vessel, with direct supervisory authority over all engine room operations, planned and unplanned maintenance, and the monitoring and maintenance of all propulsion and auxiliary machinery. His testimony is therefore critical to virtually every engineering and mechanical issue in dispute.
The Vlahos deposition follows four prior depositions in this matter:
• Alexandros Stavridis (TSL Operations Director), deposed April 22, 2024;
• Capt. Nikolaos Giannopoulos (Master, M/V Aegean Fortuna), deposed May 10, 2024;
• Viktor Lindgren (Northwind Senior Chartering Manager), deposed May 30, 2024; and
• Sandra Chow (Northwind Financial Controller), deposed June 14, 2024.
Vlahos is a critical fact witness on all three mechanical incidents at the center of this dispute and on the overall maintenance regime of the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period. His testimony will directly affect the viability of TSL's defenses on each of the three incidents:
(1) Incident 1 — Main Engine Turbocharger Failure (March–April 2022): TSL's defense rests on the theory that the turbocharger failure was attributable to a latent defect not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. Vlahos's testimony regarding the pre-failure maintenance history, the absence of detectable warning signs, and the nature of the failure is essential to this defense.
(2) Incident 2 — BWTS Malfunction and Auxiliary Boiler Failure (July 2022): TSL's defense attributes the ballast water treatment system ("BWTS") malfunction to contaminated ballast water loaded at a prior port at the direction or under the control of Northwind's agents. Vlahos is the primary witness who can testify to the condition of the BWTS before and after the contaminated ballast intake, as well as to the chain of causation.
(3) Incident 3 — Main Engine Cylinder Liner Failure (November–December 2022): TSL has conceded that this failure was attributable to a maintenance deficiency. Vlahos's testimony on this incident must be handled carefully — he must be forthright about the facts while limiting the damage to TSL's position on the other two incidents and supporting TSL's quantum dispute on the scope of Northwind's damages.
In addition to the three incidents, Vlahos may be questioned about the Maputo deviation in September 2022, general vessel maintenance practices, GMCB classification records and surveys, bunker consumption and fuel quality, and his interactions with Northwind's agents and port authorities throughout the charter period.
This memorandum should be read in conjunction with the prior deposition preparation memos for Alexandros Stavridis (dated April 15, 2024) and Capt. Nikolaos Giannopoulos (dated May 3, 2024), both of which address overlapping factual areas. Consistency of the factual narrative across all three TSL witnesses is essential.
II. WITNESS BACKGROUND AND BIOGRAPHY
A. Professional Background
Petros Vlahos is the Chief Engineer of the M/V Aegean Fortuna. His full legal name, as reflected in his seaman's documents and employment records, is Petros Ioannis Vlahos. He is a Greek national.
Vlahos is employed by Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL"), which serves as the operational employer and technical manager of the vessel. The M/V Aegean Fortuna is registered to Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL"), a wholly owned subsidiary of TSL incorporated in the Republic of Liberia under Registration No. LR-C-20167845. AFSL is a single-purpose vehicle established solely to hold title to the M/V Aegean Fortuna; all crewing, technical management, and commercial operations are handled by TSL through its Athens headquarters and its operational offices in Piraeus.
Vlahos's total years of maritime engineering experience should be confirmed with him at the preparation session. Based on TSL's internal records and the information provided to us by TSL General Counsel Markos Theodorakis, Vlahos has approximately fifteen to eighteen years of seagoing experience, all or substantially all of which has been in engineering roles aboard commercial vessels. He holds the following certifications and qualifications, which should be verified during the preparation session:
• STCW (Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping) certificates, including the mandatory certificates for Chief Engineer officers on vessels of 3,000 kW propulsion power or more;
• Chief Engineer Certificate of Competency ("CoC"), issued by the Hellenic Republic (Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy);
• Such additional certificates as may be required by the flag state (Republic of Liberia) or the classification society (GMCB).
Prior to his assignment to the M/V Aegean Fortuna, Vlahos served on other vessels within the TSL fleet. TSL operates a fleet of approximately thirty-four vessels, including dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels. The specific vessels on which Vlahos previously served should be confirmed at the preparation session. The length of his service aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna is of particular importance, and we need to confirm whether he was aboard the vessel at the commencement of the charter-party on January 15, 2021, or whether he joined the vessel at some later date. If he was not aboard at commencement, the identity of the Chief Engineer who preceded him and the date of the handover will be relevant, as Northwind's counsel will likely seek to establish whether there were any engineering handover notes or concerns communicated at that time.
B. Vessel Specifications — M/V *Aegean Fortuna*
The M/V Aegean Fortuna is a Supramax dry bulk carrier with the following principal specifications:
The charter-party at issue in this litigation is on an amended NYPE 2015 form, executed on December 3, 2020, with a commencement date of January 15, 2021, and a term of thirty-six months, expiring January 14, 2024 (Charter-Party Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203). The daily hire rate under the charter-party is $14,750 per day. The charterer under the charter-party is Northwind Maritime Corporation, a marshall Islands corporation (Entity No. MI-94827), with its principal office at 1700 Harbor Gateway, Suite 500, Stamford, Connecticut 06902.
The charter-party was negotiated and executed on behalf of TSL by Alexandros Stavridis (Operations Director) and on behalf of Northwind by Viktor Lindgren (Senior Chartering Manager), with the involvement of brokers on both sides. The terms of the charter-party, and in particular Clause 6 (maintenance and seaworthiness), Clause 11 (off-hire), and the various rider clauses addressing BWTS compliance, classification maintenance, and liquidated damages, are central to the disputes in this case.
C. Role Aboard the Vessel
As Chief Engineer, Vlahos bears primary responsibility for the maintenance and operation of all engine room equipment, machinery, and auxiliary systems aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna. This includes, without limitation:
• The main engine (a two-stroke, slow-speed diesel engine, manufacturer and model to be confirmed);
• All turbochargers associated with the main engine;
• Auxiliary engines and generators;
• The auxiliary boiler and associated steam systems;
• The ballast water treatment system (BWTS);
• Fuel oil and lubricating oil purification, transfer, and storage systems;
• The planned maintenance system (PMS) as applied to all engine room machinery;
• Engine room safety systems, including fire detection and suppression;
• Spare parts inventory management and procurement requests.
Vlahos has supervisory responsibility over all engine room crew members, including the Second Engineer, Third Engineer, Fourth Engineer, engine room ratings, and any electricians or oilers assigned to the vessel. In the ordinary course, the Chief Engineer reports to the Master (Capt. Nikolaos Giannopoulos) on operational matters aboard the vessel and reports to TSL's shore-side technical management department on maintenance planning, equipment condition, spare parts procurement, and class survey preparation.
Vlahos's responsibilities are directly relevant to Clause 6 of the charter-party, which imposes upon the Owner the obligation to maintain the vessel in a "thoroughly efficient state of hull, machinery, and equipment" and to maintain compliance with GMCB classification requirements throughout the charter period. Clause 6 is a core provision in Northwind's case: Northwind contends that TSL breached this obligation with respect to all three incidents, entitling Northwind to off-hire, damages, and related relief.
In practice, the Chief Engineer's Clause 6 responsibilities encompass the maintenance of detailed engine room logbooks, the timely submission of repair requisitions to TSL's shore-side technical department, the management of spare parts inventory levels, the coordination and facilitation of GMCB survey attendance, the reporting of any machinery defects or deficiencies, and the implementation of manufacturer-recommended maintenance schedules for all critical equipment.
III. ANTICIPATED AREAS OF QUESTIONING
This section sets forth the areas in which Vlahos is most likely to face questioning from Northwind's counsel, organized by topic. For each area, we identify the relevant factual narrative, TSL's defensive position, the anticipated lines of attack by Northwind, and key points that Vlahos should emphasize in his testimony.
A. General Vessel Maintenance During Charter Period
Northwind's counsel will almost certainly begin the deposition with, or devote a substantial block of time to, questions about the overall maintenance regime aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna from the commencement of the charter-party on January 15, 2021 through the end of the relevant period in December 2022. This line of questioning serves a dual purpose for Northwind: it establishes the baseline for arguing that TSL's maintenance was systematically deficient, and it provides a predicate for Northwind's position that the three incidents were not isolated events but rather a pattern of neglect.
The key categories of documents that are likely to be the subject of questioning include:
• Planned Maintenance System (PMS) Records: The PMS is a computerized database (typically maintained in software such as AMOS or ShipManager) that tracks all scheduled maintenance tasks for every piece of machinery aboard the vessel, records completed maintenance, and flags overdue items. Northwind will seek to identify any maintenance tasks that were overdue, deferred, or not completed during the charter period.
• Engine Room Logbooks: These are contemporaneous handwritten or electronic records maintained by the engineering officers on a daily basis, recording machinery operating parameters (temperatures, pressures, speeds, fuel consumption), maintenance activities, and any abnormalities or alarms.
• GMCB Class Survey Reports: Reports issued by Global Maritime Classification Bureau following annual, intermediate, and special surveys, including any deficiency findings, conditions of class, or recommendations.
• Deficiency Lists: Internal or external lists of items requiring attention, whether generated by the crew, by TSL's technical department, or by GMCB surveyors.
• Dry-Docking Records: Records of the vessel's most recent dry-docking prior to the charter period, the scope of work performed, and any planned dry-docking during the charter period.
Vlahos should be prepared to describe, in general terms, the frequency of routine inspections he conducted, the vessel's compliance with GMCB continuous survey requirements, any outstanding class conditions or recommendations during the 2021–2022 period, the availability and adequacy of spare parts aboard the vessel, and the quality and responsiveness of TSL's shore-side technical department in addressing maintenance needs.
TSL's position on general maintenance is that the Owner maintained the vessel in compliance with Clause 6 of the charter-party and with all applicable GMCB classification requirements throughout the charter period. The three incidents, while undeniably disruptive, had distinct and separate causes — a latent defect, charterer-caused contamination, and a discrete maintenance failure — and do not, individually or collectively, establish a pattern of systematic maintenance neglect.
Vlahos should be comfortable articulating this position in factual terms, without characterizing it as a legal conclusion. For example, he can testify that the PMS was followed, that routine inspections were conducted, that GMCB surveys were attended and requirements met, and that spare parts were ordered and replaced in the ordinary course. He should not testify that "TSL complied with Clause 6" as a legal conclusion, but he can and should testify to the factual underpinnings of that conclusion.
B. Incident 1 — Main Engine Turbocharger Failure (March 12 – April 2, 2022)
1. Factual Narrative
On or about March 12, 2022, the main engine turbocharger aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna suffered a failure while the vessel was transiting the Indian Ocean en route from Paradip, India to Mombasa, Kenya. The precise nature of the turbocharger failure — which is expected to involve a bearing failure, blade damage, or a combination of both — should be confirmed with Vlahos at the preparation session. The failure rendered the main engine incapable of operating at normal service speed and, depending on the severity, may have required the engine to be shut down or operated at significantly reduced power.
Upon the onset of the turbocharger failure, Vlahos would have been the first or among the first officers to identify and assess the problem. The steps he took upon discovering the failure are of particular importance and should be elicited in detail during the preparation session. These steps likely included:
• Immediate assessment of the nature and severity of the failure;
• Implementation of emergency procedures to protect the main engine from further damage;
• Communication with the Master (Capt. Giannopoulos) regarding the vessel's operational capability;
• Communication with TSL's shore-side technical management (likely via email, sat-phone, or the vessel's communication system) to report the failure and request instructions;
• Evaluation of whether a temporary or partial repair could be effected aboard the vessel or whether the vessel would need to divert for shore-side repair.
The vessel was diverted to Colombo, Sri Lanka, where the turbocharger was repaired or replaced. The vessel was off-hire for a total of twenty-two days, from March 12, 2022 through April 2, 2022. This off-hire period, and the costs associated with it, form a component of Northwind's damages claim.
2. TSL Defense — Latent Defect
TSL's position on Incident 1 is that the turbocharger failure was attributable to a latent defect — that is, a defect in the turbocharger that was not apparent upon reasonable inspection and was not attributable to negligent or inadequate maintenance by TSL or its crew. Under the charter-party (and under general maritime law principles), an owner is not liable for off-hire resulting from a latent defect in machinery, provided that the owner exercised due diligence in maintaining the equipment.
To support this defense, Vlahos should be prepared to testify to the following factual elements:
(a) Pre-Voyage Inspections and Maintenance History: Vlahos should describe the maintenance that was performed on the turbocharger prior to the failure, including any inspections, overhauls, part replacements, or manufacturer-recommended service performed during the charter period or shortly before the charter commenced. He should be able to reference specific PMS entries and engine room log entries reflecting this maintenance.
(b) Compliance with Manufacturer's Recommended Maintenance Schedule: The turbocharger manufacturer (to be confirmed, but likely Ashgrove Group, Tidewater Group, or Northpoint Industries) will have published a recommended maintenance schedule specifying inspection intervals, overhaul intervals, and parts replacement schedules. Vlahos should be prepared to testify that these intervals were followed.
(c) GMCB Survey Records: GMCB class surveys of the main engine should have been conducted in accordance with the continuous survey cycle. Vlahos should be prepared to testify that no GMCB surveyor identified a deficiency in the turbocharger condition prior to the failure.
(d) Internal/Hidden Nature of the Defect: The defect that caused the turbocharger failure was internal to the component — for example, a metallurgical defect in a bearing or blade — and was not detectable through the routine external inspections and performance monitoring that constitute standard maintenance practice. This is consistent with the preliminary conclusions of Dr. Henrik Sørensen of Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS (Copenhagen), whom TSL has retained as its engineering expert.
(e) Absence of Prior Warning Signs: Vlahos should testify about whether any prior warning signs existed, including vibration anomalies, temperature excursions, abnormal oil analysis results, or other indicators that might have suggested an impending turbocharger problem. If no such indicators were present, this strongly supports the latent defect defense. If any such indicators were present, Vlahos should be prepared to explain them in context — for example, that any observed variations were within normal operating parameters and did not suggest an imminent failure.
The due diligence element of the defense requires TSL to show that it took all reasonable steps to maintain the turbocharger in proper working order. The combination of Vlahos's testimony regarding maintenance compliance and Dr. Sørensen's expert opinion regarding the undetectable nature of the defect should establish this element.
Key documents that Vlahos must review in connection with Incident 1 include:
• Turbocharger maintenance log entries (PMS records) for the period from the vessel's delivery or the commencement of the charter through March 2022;
• Manufacturer service bulletins applicable to the turbocharger model;
• GMCB survey reports for the main engine during the 2020–2022 period;
• Repair records from Colombo, including the repair yard's diagnostic reports, work orders, and any metallurgical or failure analysis performed on the failed turbocharger components;
• Spare parts purchase orders for turbocharger components;
• Engine room logbook entries for the weeks preceding the failure, with particular attention to main engine operating parameters;
• Any correspondence between Vlahos and TSL shore-side regarding the turbocharger condition prior to the failure.
3. Anticipated Northwind Lines of Attack
Northwind's counsel, guided by the opinions of their expert Capt. Julian Blackmore (Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., London), will likely pursue several lines of attack on Incident 1:
(a) Insufficient Maintenance Intervals: Northwind may argue that the intervals between turbocharger inspections or overhauls were longer than the manufacturer's recommendations or industry best practice. Vlahos should be prepared to defend the actual maintenance intervals by reference to the PMS records and the manufacturer's service bulletins.
(b) Ignored Warning Signs: This is perhaps the most dangerous line of attack. If there were any anomalies in turbocharger operating parameters — vibration levels, exhaust gas temperatures, turbocharger speed, bearing temperatures, or lubricating oil analysis results — Northwind will argue that these constituted warning signs that should have prompted immediate inspection or replacement. Vlahos must be thoroughly familiar with the operating data for the turbocharger in the weeks and months before the failure and must be prepared to explain, with specificity, why any observed variations did not indicate an impending failure.
(c) Vibration Monitoring Equipment: Northwind may ask whether the vessel was equipped with vibration monitoring equipment for the turbocharger, whether that equipment was operational, and whether the data was regularly reviewed. If the vessel lacked such equipment, Northwind may argue that this represents a failure to exercise due diligence.
(d) Oil Sample Analysis Trends: If lubricating oil samples from the turbocharger bearings were collected and analyzed during the charter period (as is common industry practice), the analysis results should show the trends in metal particles, viscosity, and contamination levels. Any deteriorating trend could be used by Northwind to argue that the failure was foreseeable.
(e) Communications with Shore-Side: Northwind will seek to identify any communications — emails, Meridian Services Inc. messages, internal reports, or verbal communications — in which Vlahos or any other engineering officer expressed concern about the turbocharger's condition prior to the failure. Any such communication, even if ultimately concluded with a decision that no immediate action was required, will be used aggressively by Northwind.
Impeachment Risk: The greatest impeachment risk on Incident 1 lies in any contemporaneous written communication — email, Meridian Services Inc. message, internal memorandum, or engine room logbook entry — in which Vlahos or a subordinate engineer expressed concern about the turbocharger before the failure. During the preparation session, we must ask Vlahos directly whether any such communication exists and review all relevant documents carefully.
4. Key Points for Testimony
Vlahos's testimony on Incident 1 should emphasize the following points:
• The turbocharger was maintained in accordance with the planned maintenance system and the manufacturer's recommended service schedule;
• GMCB surveys during the relevant period did not identify any deficiency in the turbocharger;
• There were no warning signs — or, if there were ambiguous indicators, they were within normal operating parameters and did not suggest imminent failure;
• Post-failure analysis (whether metallurgical examination, manufacturer's assessment, or repair yard diagnostic) confirmed the presence of a latent defect;
• Vlahos took appropriate and prompt action upon discovering the failure, including immediate communication with the Master and shore-side management;
• The vessel was diverted to the nearest suitable port (Colombo) for repair, and the repair was completed as expeditiously as possible.
Vlahos should not speculate about the precise metallurgical or engineering cause of the turbocharger failure beyond his actual knowledge and observations. The detailed causation analysis is the province of TSL's expert, Dr. Sørensen, whose report is expected to be served on August 5, 2024 — after the Vlahos deposition. Nevertheless, Vlahos's factual testimony must independently support the latent defect defense, and his account of the facts must be consistent with the conclusions that Dr. Sørensen is expected to reach.
C. Incident 2 — Ballast Water Treatment System (BWTS) Malfunction and Auxiliary Boiler Failure (July 8 – July 29, 2022)
1. Factual Narrative
On or about July 8, 2022, the M/V Aegean Fortuna experienced a dual mechanical failure while loading cargo at the port of Richards Bay, South Africa. The first failure involved a malfunction of the vessel's ballast water treatment system (BWTS), which rendered the system unable to treat ballast water to the standards required by the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention) and applicable port state regulations. The second failure involved the vessel's auxiliary boiler, which suffered a failure that impaired the vessel's ability to generate steam for cargo operations and heating requirements.
The nature of the BWTS malfunction should be confirmed with Vlahos in detail during the preparation session. Based on the information available to the team, the malfunction involved contamination and fouling of the BWTS components — potentially including the UV treatment lamps, filtration elements, or both — that rendered the system inoperable or unable to achieve the required discharge standard. The BWTS model and manufacturer should be confirmed.
The nature of the auxiliary boiler failure should similarly be confirmed. The key question is whether the boiler failure was causally related to the BWTS malfunction (e.g., if contaminated water from the ballast system entered the boiler feedwater circuit) or whether it was an independent failure that coincidentally occurred at approximately the same time. TSL's position on this causal question is significant and should be clarified during the preparation session.
The vessel was off-hire for a total of twenty-one days, from July 8, 2022 through July 29, 2022. During this period, the vessel was at or near Richards Bay while repairs to the BWTS and auxiliary boiler were arranged and completed.
At the time of the failure, the vessel was loading or preparing to load a cargo of iron ore at Richards Bay. This is significant because Northwind has asserted a separate cargo damage claim in the amount of $3,420,000, alleging that the iron ore cargo sustained oxidation damage during the off-hire period or as a consequence of the mechanical failures.
2. TSL Defense — Charterer Causation / Contaminated Ballast
TSL's defense on Incident 2 is that the BWTS malfunction was caused by the intake of contaminated ballast water at a prior port call, and that the contamination was attributable to Northwind or Northwind's agents, who directed the vessel's trading pattern and were responsible for port selection and cargo operations.
To support this defense, Vlahos should be prepared to testify to the following:
(a) Identification of the Prior Port: Vlahos should identify the specific port at which the contaminated ballast water was loaded, the approximate date of the ballast water intake, and the circumstances under which the ballast was taken on. This is a critical factual element — the contamination defense depends on establishing a specific source of the contaminated water and linking that source to the BWTS malfunction.
(b) Evidence of Contamination: Vlahos should describe the evidence that the ballast water was contaminated — for example, unusually high sediment levels, unusual chemical composition, visible discoloration or turbidity, or port water quality data indicating that the port in question had known water quality issues. If ballast water samples were collected and tested, the results should be referenced.
(c) Observations at the Time of Ballast Intake: Vlahos should describe whether he personally observed or recorded any unusual conditions in the ballast water after it was taken on at the prior port — for example, high sediment content in the ballast tanks, unusual filter blockage rates, or BWTS alarm activations during treatment of the ballast water from that port.
(d) Communication with Northwind's Agents or Port Authorities: Vlahos should testify about any communications he had with Northwind's agents, local port authorities, or other parties regarding the quality of the ballast water at the prior port. If Vlahos raised concerns about water quality at the time, this is powerful evidence. If he did not, Northwind will use this fact against him.
(e) BWTS Performance Before vs. After Contamination: This is a crucial comparison. Vlahos should be able to testify that the BWTS was operating normally and without incident before the intake of the contaminated ballast, and that the system's problems began after the contaminated water was introduced. BWTS operating logs, alarm histories, and maintenance records should document this comparison.
(f) Whether Vlahos Raised Concerns About Ballast Water Intake: If Vlahos expressed concern about the quality of the ballast water at the prior port — whether to the Master, to TSL shore-side management, or to Northwind's agents — this is important supporting evidence. If he did not, he should be prepared to explain why not (e.g., the contamination was not visually apparent at the time of intake).
Regarding the auxiliary boiler failure, TSL's position on whether it was causally linked to the BWTS issue or an independent failure must be clarified and consistently presented. If the boiler failure was causally linked to the contaminated ballast (e.g., contaminated water entered the boiler feedwater system through a cross-connection or shared piping), then the boiler failure is also attributable to Northwind's agents. If it was an independent failure, TSL must be prepared to defend it on its own merits — potentially as a separate latent defect or as a lesser maintenance issue distinct from the systematic neglect alleged by Northwind.
Key documents for Incident 2 include:
• BWTS operating logs and alarm logs for the period from the prior port call through July 2022;
• Ballast water exchange and treatment records, including records of ballast water intake at the prior port;
• Any ballast water samples or test results;
• Engine room logbook entries for June–July 2022;
• Correspondence with the BWTS manufacturer regarding the malfunction;
• Repair invoices and work orders from Richards Bay;
• Auxiliary boiler maintenance and operating records;
• Any communications between Vlahos, the Master, TSL shore-side, and Northwind's agents regarding the BWTS malfunction and boiler failure.
3. Connection to Cargo Damage Claim
Northwind has asserted a cargo damage claim in the amount of $3,420,000, alleging that the iron ore cargo loaded at Richards Bay sustained oxidation damage during the off-hire period associated with Incident 2. This claim is separate from the off-hire claim and raises its own set of factual and legal issues.
Vlahos's testimony on the cargo damage claim should address the following factual areas:
• The timeline of the BWTS malfunction and auxiliary boiler failure in relation to the cargo loading operations;
• What measures were taken, if any, to protect the cargo during the off-hire period — including ventilation procedures, hold inspections, and any cargo care steps taken by the crew;
• Whether the cargo damage (iron ore oxidation) was caused by the off-hire delay, by inadequate ventilation, by exposure to moisture from the boiler failure, or by other factors unrelated to the mechanical incidents;
• The condition of the cargo at the time of loading and at the time the off-hire period commenced.
TSL's defense on the cargo damage claim includes the argument that cargo damage claims as between Owner and Charterer under a time charter are governed by the Inter-Club Agreement (ICA), which allocates liability based on specific categories and limits the Owner's exposure in certain circumstances. Vlahos should not opine on legal arguments or the applicability of the ICA, but he should provide the factual foundation for TSL's causation defense — i.e., that the cargo damage was not caused by TSL's negligence but rather by the contaminated ballast (attributable to Northwind's agents) or by the inherent characteristics of the cargo.
4. Anticipated Northwind Lines of Attack
Northwind's counsel will pursue several lines of attack on Incident 2:
(a) Challenging the Contaminated Ballast Theory: Northwind will argue that the BWTS malfunction was caused by inadequate maintenance of the system rather than by contaminated ballast. They will ask whether Vlahos tested the ballast water at the time of intake at the prior port, whether he reported any contamination to anyone at the time, and whether the BWTS had a history of maintenance problems or prior malfunctions. If the BWTS had any prior maintenance issues — even minor ones — Northwind will use them to undermine the contamination defense.
(b) Questioning the Auxiliary Boiler: Northwind will probe whether the auxiliary boiler was independently due for maintenance, whether there were prior GMCB deficiency findings or conditions of class relating to the boiler, and whether the boiler failure was a predictable consequence of deferred maintenance rather than an unforeseeable event. If the boiler failure was independent of the BWTS issue, Northwind will argue it as an additional example of TSL's maintenance failures.
(c) Expert-Driven Questioning: Northwind's maritime expert (Capt. Julian Blackmore) and damages expert (Dr. Rajesh Anand of Pinnacle Valuation Partners LLP, New York) may have provided opinions that inform the questioning on BWTS maintenance history, the adequacy of the contamination defense, and the causation of cargo damage. While we do not yet have access to Northwind's expert reports (which are due after the close of fact discovery), the deposition questions may reflect the experts' preliminary opinions.
(d) BWTS Alarm Logs: If the BWTS had an electronic alarm and event logging system, the alarm logs may show whether the system was experiencing problems before the contaminated ballast was taken on. Northwind will seek to use any pre-contamination alarms as evidence that the system was already malfunctioning.
Impeachment Risk: The primary impeachment risk on Incident 2 lies in (i) any BWTS maintenance records or alarm logs showing pre-existing problems with the system before the contaminated ballast intake, (ii) any engine room logbook entries failing to note the contamination at the time of intake, and (iii) any GMCB findings relating to the BWTS or auxiliary boiler. During the preparation session, all of these documents must be reviewed with Vlahos in detail.
5. Key Points for Testimony
Vlahos's testimony on Incident 2 should emphasize:
• The BWTS was functioning normally before the intake of contaminated ballast water at the prior port;
• The contamination was the proximate cause of the BWTS malfunction;
• The contaminated ballast was loaded at a port selected by Northwind or Northwind's agents as part of the vessel's trading pattern under the charter-party;
• Any contemporaneous documentary evidence supporting the contamination theory — ballast water records, engine room logbook entries, communications with shore-side or with the BWTS manufacturer;
• On the auxiliary boiler failure, Vlahos should be straightforward about the nature of the failure and any independent maintenance issues, but should clearly distinguish the boiler failure from the BWTS problem if they are unrelated;
• Vlahos's account of Incident 2 must be consistent with the testimony given by Capt. Giannopoulos at his May 10, 2024 deposition.
D. Incident 3 — Main Engine Cylinder Liner Failure (November 15 – December 10, 2022)
1. Factual Narrative
On or about November 15, 2022, the M/V Aegean Fortuna experienced a failure of a main engine cylinder liner, the nature of which — whether cracking, wear beyond permissible limits, or catastrophic failure — should be confirmed with Vlahos at the preparation session. The failure was sufficiently serious to require drydocking for repair.
The vessel was diverted to Keppel Verolme Shipyard in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, where the cylinder liner was replaced and associated repairs were performed. The vessel was off-hire for a total of twenty-five days, from November 15 through December 10, 2022. The drydocking at Keppel Verolme also provided an opportunity for other maintenance and class survey work to be performed, the scope of which should be confirmed with Vlahos.
The consequences of the cylinder liner failure may have extended beyond the liner itself — depending on the mode of failure, there may have been damage to the piston, piston rings, cylinder head, or other associated components. Vlahos should be prepared to describe the full extent of the damage observed and the full scope of the drydock repairs.
2. TSL Position — Concession on Maintenance Failure, Dispute on Quantum
Unlike Incidents 1 and 2, TSL has conceded that the cylinder liner failure in Incident 3 was attributable to a maintenance deficiency. This concession was made after careful review of the facts and consultation with Dr. Sørensen and other technical advisors. Vlahos must fully understand this concession and its implications for his testimony. He should not attempt to defend the maintenance history of the cylinder liner or minimize the failure — doing so would undermine TSL's credibility on the issues where it is contesting liability (Incidents 1 and 2) and could appear evasive or dishonest.
However, TSL disputes the quantum of damages that Northwind claims in connection with Incident 3. Northwind's damages calculations, as outlined in Sandra Chow's June 14, 2024 deposition testimony, include not only the twenty-five days of off-hire but also consequential damages, delay damages, and potentially other costs that TSL contends are excessive, duplicative, or not properly attributable to Incident 3. The quantum dispute is primarily a matter for the parties' damages experts, but Vlahos can provide factual testimony relevant to several quantum issues.
Vlahos should be prepared to testify to the following:
(a) Maintenance Performed on the Cylinder Liner: What maintenance had been performed on the cylinder liner prior to the failure? When were the last measurements of liner wear taken? What were the results? Were the liners within manufacturers' tolerance at the time of the last measurement?
(b) Planned Maintenance Schedule for Cylinder Liners: What was the PMS schedule for cylinder liner inspection and replacement? Was the schedule followed? If not, why not? Were any inspections deferred, and if so, at whose direction?
(c) GMCB Findings: Had GMCB noted any cylinder liner condition in its recent surveys? Were there any outstanding conditions of class or recommendations relating to the main engine cylinder liners?
(d) Cause of Failure: Why did the liner fail despite maintenance? Were there contributing factors such as the age of the liner, operational stresses (e.g., heavy weather, high-power operation), or the quality of replacement parts?
(e) Drydock Repair Scope and Duration: What was done at Keppel Verolme? How long did each component of the repair take? How quickly did TSL mobilize for the drydocking — i.e., how long between the failure and the arrival at Keppel Verolme, and was the drydock schedule arranged promptly?
3. Anticipated Northwind Lines of Attack
Northwind's counsel will pursue several lines of questioning on Incident 3, with a particular focus on using the conceded maintenance failure to undermine TSL's defenses on Incidents 1 and 2:
(a) "If you concede this was a maintenance failure, why not the others?": This is the most predictable and potentially most damaging line of questioning. Northwind will attempt to use Incident 3 as evidence of a systemic pattern of maintenance neglect, arguing that if TSL failed to properly maintain the cylinder liners, it likely also failed to properly maintain the turbocharger (Incident 1) and the BWTS (Incident 2). Vlahos should not characterize TSL's legal strategy or explain why TSL concedes one incident but not the others. Instead, he should confine himself to testifying about the factual differences between the three incidents — the cylinder liner failure had identifiable maintenance deficiencies in the record, while the turbocharger failure involved a hidden defect and the BWTS failure was caused by external contamination.
(b) Cylinder Liner Wear Tracking: Northwind will ask whether cylinder liner wear was regularly measured, what the measurements showed over time, and whether the measurements indicated that the liner was approaching or had exceeded its wear limit. If the measurements showed a deteriorating trend that was not acted upon, this will support Northwind's narrative.
(c) Duration of Off-Hire: Northwind may argue that the twenty-five-day off-hire period was unreasonably long and that TSL could have arranged repairs more quickly. Questions may focus on the time elapsed between the failure and the arrival at Keppel Verolme, the availability of drydock facilities at closer ports, and whether TSL's response was prompt and efficient.
(d) Pattern Argument: As noted, Northwind's overarching strategy on Incident 3 is to use it as the centerpiece of a "pattern of mechanical failures" argument that undermines TSL's defenses on the other incidents.
4. Key Points for Testimony
Vlahos's testimony on Incident 3 should be guided by the following principles:
• Be honest and forthright. TSL has conceded the maintenance failure, and Vlahos should not try to minimize it, explain it away, or characterize it as anything other than what it was. Evasiveness or defensiveness on this point will damage Vlahos's credibility on the points that matter most — his testimony about Incidents 1 and 2.
• Focus on the factual circumstances. Vlahos should describe what happened, what maintenance was or was not performed, and what the condition of the cylinder liner was. He should answer questions directly and without equivocation.
• Distinguish from the other incidents. When appropriate (but without appearing coached), Vlahos should describe the factual differences between the three incidents. The cylinder liner failure had a different cause and a different maintenance history than the turbocharger failure or the BWTS malfunction. These are factual, not legal, distinctions.
• Testify to the promptness of TSL's response. Even on a conceded maintenance failure, TSL should receive credit for mobilizing promptly to arrange drydocking, completing the repairs efficiently, and returning the vessel to service as quickly as reasonably possible.
• Do not estimate damages. The quantum dispute is a matter for the damages experts. Vlahos should testify about the facts of the repair — scope of work, duration, what was done — but should not opine on the dollar amount of damages or the reasonableness of Northwind's claims.
E. GMCB Classification Records and Surveys
Northwind's counsel will almost certainly devote a block of questioning to the GMCB classification records and surveys. The classification society's records are among the most probative evidence of whether TSL maintained the vessel in the "thoroughly efficient state" required by Clause 6, and any GMCB deficiency findings or conditions of class will be used by Northwind as evidence of maintenance failures.
Vlahos should be prepared to discuss the following topics in detail:
• GMCB Continuous Survey Cycle: The M/V Aegean Fortuna is subject to GMCB's continuous survey program, which includes annual surveys, intermediate surveys (at approximately 2.5 years), and special or renewal surveys (at approximately 5 years). Vlahos should be able to describe the survey cycle for the vessel and identify which surveys were conducted during the 2021–2022 period.
• Outstanding Class Conditions or Recommendations: Vlahos should be prepared to identify and explain any outstanding class conditions (i.e., items that GMCB required to be rectified by a certain date as a condition of maintaining class) or recommendations (i.e., items that GMCB suggested be addressed but did not require as a condition of class) during the 2021–2022 period. If any conditions or recommendations related to the turbocharger, BWTS, auxiliary boiler, or cylinder liners, Vlahos should be prepared to explain what they were, when they were issued, and what was done to address them.
• Class Suspensions, Withdrawals, or Threats: Did GMCB at any point suspend or withdraw the vessel's class, or threaten to do so? If so, the circumstances and resolution are critical.
• Communications Between Vlahos and GMCB Surveyors: Vlahos interacts directly with GMCB surveyors when they attend the vessel for surveys or inspections. He should be prepared to describe these interactions and any discussions about the condition of the vessel's machinery.
• Pre-Failure GMCB Findings on the Three Incident Areas: Did GMCB identify any deficiencies in the turbocharger, BWTS, auxiliary boiler, or cylinder liners before the respective failures? The answer to this question is critical for each incident. If GMCB found no deficiencies, this supports TSL's position (particularly on Incident 1). If GMCB identified deficiencies that were not addressed, this will be damaging.
• Vlahos's Role in Survey Preparation: Vlahos is responsible for preparing the vessel's engine room machinery for GMCB surveys. This includes ensuring that machinery is accessible for inspection, that required measurements are taken, and that any open conditions or recommendations have been addressed. Northwind may suggest that Vlahos or TSL managed the survey process so as to conceal deficiencies, which Vlahos should firmly deny if that is the case.
Key documents for this topic include GMCB survey reports, class status certificates, condition of class notifications, and any correspondence between Vlahos and GMCB surveyors.
F. The Maputo Deviation (September 2022)
Although the Maputo deviation is primarily within the domain of the Master (Capt. Giannopoulos), Northwind's counsel may question Vlahos about engineering-related aspects of the deviation. Northwind alleges that TSL directed the M/V Aegean Fortuna to deviate from its charted course between Durban, South Africa and Qingdao, China by calling at the port of Maputo, Mozambique in September 2022. According to Northwind, this deviation added approximately four days to the voyage and caused Northwind to miss a cargo laycan window at Qingdao (October 1–5, 2022), resulting in demurrage and dead freight claims totaling $1,230,000. TSL's position is that the Maputo call was necessitated by weather and routing conditions and was within the Master's navigational discretion; it was not a deviation for the purpose of loading TSL's own cargo.
Vlahos may be asked about:
• Whether the engine room was in a state of readiness for the Maputo call — i.e., whether there were any engineering or machinery-related issues that required or justified the Maputo stop;
• Whether Vlahos was aware of any operational reason related to engine room condition (e.g., need for bunkers, need for spare parts, need for shore-side repair) that contributed to the decision to call at Maputo;
• Whether the Maputo call affected any engineering or maintenance plans — for example, whether maintenance or inspections were performed during the port call;
• Vlahos's understanding of why the vessel called at Maputo — whether it was for weather routing purposes, cargo loading, bunkering, or other reasons;
• Whether Vlahos was aware that any cargo was loaded at Maputo for TSL's own account.