1017-00004 · Entities. Aurelius Global Media Group · Class Certification

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT

MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, and YESENIA PADILLA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP Renata Vasquez (SBN 224578) Devon Archer (SBN 301462) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-7200 Facsimile: (213) 555-7201

Attorneys for Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc.

DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DR. HOWARD RENNICK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. ("AMA"), by and through its counsel of record, Calderwood & Harkness LLP, hereby submits these evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Dr. Howard Rennick ("Rennick Declaration"), filed by Plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla (collectively, "Plaintiffs") in support of their Motion for Class Certification. The Rennick Declaration was filed on April 14, 2023, and the accompanying expert report of Dr. Rennick is dated April 28, 2023.

Dr. Rennick is identified as a partner at Pinnacle Economic Consulting Group LLC, located at 3000 El Camino Real, Suite 500, Palo Alto, California 94306. He has been retained by Plaintiffs to provide expert opinion on the calculation of aggregate class-wide damages for alleged meal period, rest period, off-the-clock overtime, and wage statement violations, as well as penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq.

AMA objects to specific paragraphs, tables, and opinions contained in the Rennick Declaration on the grounds that they fail to satisfy the requirements for admissible expert testimony under California Evidence Code sections 801 and 802, and that they must be excluded under the California Supreme Court's gatekeeping framework as articulated in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747. Under Sargon, the trial court serves as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is based on (1) assumptions of fact without evidentiary support, (2) speculative or conjectural factors, or (3) factors that are so remote or attenuated as to provide no reasonable basis for the expert's opinion. (Id. at pp. 770–772.) Dr. Rennick's declaration is replete with assumptions and methodological choices that run afoul of each of these principles.

These evidentiary objections are filed concurrently with AMA's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, the Declaration of Dr. Rajesh Makhija (Workforce Dynamics Consulting LLC), the Declaration of Dr. Catherine Lindstrom (Hargrove Analytics Inc.), and the Declarations of Lorraine Okafor, Celine Arroyo, and Karen Fong. AMA respectfully requests that the Court consider these objections in connection with the hearing on Plaintiffs' certification motion scheduled for July 28, 2023.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

California Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), provides that expert opinion testimony is admissible only when it is "[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion." (Cal. Evid. Code § 801, subd. (b).)

California Evidence Code section 802 further provides that a witness testifying as an expert "may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion." (Cal. Evid. Code § 802.) The statute requires that the matter upon which the expert bases his or her opinion be "of a type that reasonably may be relied upon" by an expert in the relevant field. (Ibid.)

The California Supreme Court's decision in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 establishes a robust gatekeeping role for the trial court in evaluating the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. As the Court explained:

"Under Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative."

(Id. at p. 771.)

The Sargon Court further held that the trial court must determine whether the expert's opinion is "based, in part, on a factor that has no connection with the pertinent facts" and whether the opinion is "so unreasonable that it is of no assistance to the trier of fact." (Id. at p. 772.) The court does not weigh competing expert opinions or choose sides in a battle of the experts; rather, it serves as a gatekeeper to ensure that each opinion rests on a defensible factual and methodological foundation. (Ibid.) As the Court stated, "the expert's opinion may not be based 'on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors.'" (Id. at p. 770.)

Critically, under Sargon, assumptions that are "contrary to the evidence" or "without evidentiary support" in the record render the resulting expert opinion inadmissible. (Id. at p. 771.) This principle applies with particular force in the class certification context, where expert testimony often supplies the methodological framework for determining whether damages are susceptible to common proof. An expert's damages model, no matter how mathematically sophisticated, is only as reliable as the factual assumptions upon which it rests. Where those assumptions lack evidentiary support or contradict the record, the model does not constitute probative evidence of anything.

With these principles in mind, AMA sets forth the following specific objections to the Rennick Declaration.

III. OBJECTIONS

Objection No. 1

Paragraphs 14–19 and Table 3 of the Rennick Declaration

Meal Period Damages Calculation — Assumption That Every Auto-Deducted Meal Period Constitutes a "Missed" Meal Period

The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 14 through 19 and the accompanying Table 3, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate first meal period premium damages of approximately $16.3 million for the putative class. The core methodology underlying this calculation proceeds as follows: Dr. Rennick identifies approximately 612,000 shifts during the class period (November 1, 2018 through present) for which AMA's NovaPay Solutions TimeTrack Pro timekeeping system applied an automatic 30-minute meal period deduction. He then subtracts approximately 18,400 shifts for which a Missed Meal Attestation was recorded in the TimeTrack Pro system (and for which a meal period premium was already paid by AMA), yielding approximately 593,600 "net missed" meal periods. Dr. Rennick multiplies the 593,600 figure by the average hourly rate of approximately $27.50 to derive the $16.3 million aggregate meal period damages figure.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. Dr. Rennick's meal period damages calculation rests entirely on a foundational assumption that is unsupported by, and directly contrary to, the evidence in this case: namely, the assumption that every shift in which the automatic 30-minute meal period deduction was applied — but no Missed Meal Attestation was recorded — constitutes a shift in which the employee was denied a compliant meal period and is therefore entitled to one hour of premium pay under Labor Code section 226.7.

This assumption is factually unjustified and fundamentally mischaracterizes the purpose and operation of the automatic meal period deduction. The purpose of the auto-deduction feature in AMA's TimeTrack Pro system is to record the 30 minutes deducted for a compliant meal period that was actually taken by the employee. Consider the following scenario, which is the ordinary course of business at AMA's facilities: an employee clocks in at 8:00 a.m., takes a 30-minute, duty-free meal period at approximately noon, and clocks out at 5:00 p.m. The TimeTrack Pro system records 9.0 hours of total clock time, the auto-deduction subtracts 0.5 hours for the meal period, and the employee is compensated for 8.5 hours of work (or 8.0 hours of straight time plus 0.5 hours of overtime, as applicable). In this scenario, the auto-deduction accurately reflects the time taken for a compliant meal period, and no meal period premium is owed.

Dr. Rennick's methodology effectively treats the auto-deduction itself as proof of a meal period violation, when in fact the auto-deduction is a neutral timekeeping mechanism that operates identically regardless of whether the employee actually took a compliant break. The auto-deduction records the same 30-minute deduction whether the employee took a full, uninterrupted, duty-free meal period or whether the employee worked through the meal period entirely. It is the factual circumstances surrounding each shift — not the mere existence of the auto-deduction — that determine whether a violation occurred.

To establish that a meal period premium is owed under Labor Code section 226.7, one must demonstrate that the employee did not actually receive a compliant, duty-free, 30-minute meal period — a factual determination that requires individualized evidence regarding what actually happened during each shift, not a blanket assumption applied uniformly across more than half a million shifts.

Moreover, the empirical data in the record directly undermines Dr. Rennick's assumption. The Missed Meal Attestation feature in TimeTrack Pro — which was activated at four of AMA's seven California facilities (specifically, the West Hollywood headquarters (Facility 1), the Sherman Oaks facility (Facility 3), the Hollywood facility (Facility 5), and the Santa Monica facility (Facility 6)) — provided employees at those facilities with a mechanism to electronically report instances in which they were unable to take a compliant meal period. At those four facilities, the attestation usage rates ranged from 1.8% to 4.1% of eligible shifts, as follows:

These attestation rates — reflecting the percentage of eligible shifts for which employees affirmatively reported a missed meal period — are far more consistent with the inference that the vast majority of employees at those facilities actually took compliant meal periods than with the inference that all 593,600 "unattested" shifts involved missed meals. If the true violation rate were anything approaching Dr. Rennick's assumed near-100% rate, one would expect attestation usage rates dramatically higher than 1.8% to 4.1%.

At the three facilities where the Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the relevant period — Studio City (Facility 2), Burbank (Facility 4), and El Segundo (Facility 7) — the absence of attestation data simply means there is no electronic record either confirming or denying whether meals were taken. The absence of attestation data at these facilities does not establish that meals were missed; it merely establishes that the particular electronic reporting mechanism was not available.

Dr. Rennick's foundational assumption thus has no connection to the factual record and produces a result that is facially implausible. The assumption that every auto-deducted shift without a corresponding attestation constitutes a missed meal period implies a near-100% meal period violation rate across approximately 1,850 employees over a multi-year class period — a rate that would be extraordinary for any employer, let alone one that has implemented timekeeping systems, attestation features, and meal period policies specifically designed to ensure compliance.

Under Sargon, an expert opinion based on an assumption that is "contrary to the evidence" or "without evidentiary support" must be excluded. (55 Cal.4th at p. 771.) Dr. Rennick's assumption that every auto-deducted shift constitutes a violation is precisely the type of unsupported foundational assumption that Sargon requires the Court to exclude.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 14 through 19 and Table 3 of the Rennick Declaration and the associated $16.3 million meal period damages calculation. In the alternative, AMA requests that the Court exclude the opinion to the extent it relies on the assumption that every auto-deducted shift without a corresponding Missed Meal Attestation constitutes a missed meal period.

Objection No. 2

Paragraphs 20–24 and Table 4 of the Rennick Declaration

Rest Period Damages Calculation — Unsupported 50% Violation Rate Assumption

The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 20 through 24 and the accompanying Table 4, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate rest period premium damages of approximately $8.4 million for the putative class. His methodology proceeds as follows: Dr. Rennick identifies approximately 612,000 rest-period-eligible shifts during the class period and applies an assumed violation rate of 50%, yielding approximately 306,000 shifts in which employees allegedly were denied compliant rest periods. He multiplies the 306,000 figure by the average hourly rate of approximately $27.50 per hour to arrive at the $8.4 million aggregate rest period damages figure.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. The 50% rest period violation rate that forms the foundation of Dr. Rennick's rest period damages calculation is entirely unsupported by any empirical, statistical, or documentary evidence in the record. Dr. Rennick derives the 50% figure solely from the declarations of the three named plaintiffs — Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla — each of whom describes her or his own individual experience with rest period denials during their respective tenures at AMA.

Extrapolating a class-wide violation rate from the subjective, anecdotal testimony of three self-selected individuals — each of whom worked in a different division, at a different facility, and under different supervisors — is inherently speculative and unreliable. Specifically:

• Marisol Fuentes was employed as a Production Coordinator in the Unscripted Programming Division at AMA's Studio City facility (Facility 2).

• Derek Halloran was employed as a Post-Production Assistant in the Digital Content Division at AMA's Hollywood facility (Facility 5).

• Yesenia Padilla was employed as a Segment Coordinator in the Live Events Division at AMA's Burbank facility (Facility 4).

The putative class comprises approximately 1,850 individuals who worked across 7 distinct facilities and 14 distinct show units during the class period. The three named plaintiffs represent a minuscule, non-random, non-representative fraction of this population. Their individual experiences cannot reasonably be generalized to the class as a whole without some statistical methodology to validate the representativeness of their accounts.

Compounding this problem, AMA's TimeTrack Pro system does not record rest periods — consistent with standard industry practice, as rest periods are paid time that employers are generally not required to track. The absence of rest period tracking data means there is no systemic electronic data source from which a class-wide rest period violation rate can be derived. Dr. Rennick acknowledged this data limitation in his report, stating at page 18 that "rest period timing data is not available in the TimeTrack Pro system." Yet having acknowledged the absence of data, Dr. Rennick proceeded to construct a damages model based on an arbitrary assumption — 50% — that has no factual anchor in the record.

Under Sargon, expert opinion based on "speculative or conjectural factors" must be excluded. (55 Cal.4th at p. 770.) An assumed 50% violation rate derived from three anecdotal declarations, with no statistical basis, no empirical validation, and no reliable methodology for extrapolation, is the definition of speculation. Dr. Rennick has not conducted a survey of class members. He has not performed any sampling analysis. He has not applied regression analysis or any other accepted statistical technique to test whether the named plaintiffs' experiences are representative of the class. He has simply selected a round number — 50% — and applied it uniformly to 612,000 shifts.

Moreover, the named plaintiffs' own deposition testimony undermines even the anecdotal basis for the 50% assumption. Derek Halloran testified at his May 9, 2023 deposition as follows:

"Q. How often were you able to take your rest breaks during a typical workday?

A. Usually I could take them. During crunch periods, like when we had a delivery deadline, sometimes I couldn't take my second rest break. But most days I could take my breaks.

Q. When you say 'crunch periods,' how often did those occur?

A. It depended on the show. Maybe a few weeks out of every production cycle."

(Halloran Dep. 78:11–22.)

Extrapolating a 50% violation rate from testimony indicating that rest period violations occurred only during limited "crunch periods" — which Mr. Halloran described as occurring "a few weeks out of every production cycle" — is methodologically indefensible. The named plaintiff's own testimony, taken at face value, suggests a violation rate far lower than 50%.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 20 through 24 and Table 4 of the Rennick Declaration in their entirety. The rest period damages opinion lacks any evidentiary foundation and constitutes pure speculation that must be excluded under Sargon.

Objection No. 3

Paragraphs 25–29 and Table 5 of the Rennick Declaration

Off-the-Clock Overtime Damages Calculation — Unsupported 37.5-Minute Per-Shift Assumption

The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 25 through 29 and the accompanying Table 5, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate off-the-clock overtime damages of approximately $12.2 million (after adjustments for shifts not exceeding 8 hours). His methodology proceeds as follows: Dr. Rennick assumes that each class member performed 37.5 minutes of uncompensated off-the-clock work per shift — a figure he derives by taking the mathematical midpoint of the 30-to-45-minute range of alleged pre-shift setup and post-shift wrap time asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint and declarations. He then applies the overtime rate of 1.5 times the average regular rate of pay (approximately $41.25 per hour, based on an average regular rate of approximately $27.50 per hour), on the assumption that all off-the-clock time falls in overtime hours. He applies this calculation across approximately 612,000 eligible shifts, with certain adjustments for shifts that did not exceed 8 hours of recorded time, to arrive at the $12.2 million aggregate figure.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. The 37.5-minute per-shift off-the-clock assumption is the linchpin of Dr. Rennick's overtime damages calculation, and it has no empirical basis whatsoever. Dr. Rennick derives the 37.5-minute figure by taking the arithmetic midpoint of a range — 30 to 45 minutes — that is itself asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint and supporting declarations without empirical support. Dr. Rennick does not conduct any independent analysis of actual pre-shift or post-shift time. He does not examine login or badge-swipe data. He does not survey employees. He does not analyze any subset of time records to validate or test the assumption. He simply takes a range alleged by the plaintiffs, computes the midpoint, and applies it uniformly to every shift worked by every class member during the class period.

This approach fails to satisfy Sargon for multiple independent reasons.

First, different employees in different roles performed fundamentally different pre-shift and post-shift tasks — or none at all. The putative class includes Production Coordinators, Post-Production Assistants, Segment Coordinators, and numerous other job titles, each with distinct job functions and workflows. Production Coordinators in the Unscripted Programming Division may have different pre-shift responsibilities than Post-Production Assistants in the Digital Content Division, who work in an entirely different production environment. Employees working office or preparation days — as opposed to shooting days in the field or on set — would have little or no pre-shift setup or post-shift wrap time. Employees in post-production operations at Facilities 1, 5, and 7 work in office environments with regular schedules and standard start and end procedures that do not involve the type of physical setup and breakdown alleged by Plaintiffs. The 37.5-minute figure cannot be applied uniformly across all class members, all facilities, all show units, and all types of work days without producing grossly inaccurate results.

Second, the assumption that all off-the-clock time falls in overtime hours — warranting the 1.5× multiplier — is independently unsupported. Not all shifts exceed 8 hours. For shifts that do not exceed 8 hours, any off-the-clock time would be compensable at the regular rate of pay, not the overtime rate. Dr. Rennick acknowledges in paragraph 27 of his declaration that he makes "adjustments for shifts not exceeding 8 hours," but his description of those adjustments is cursory and inadequately explained. He does not identify what percentage of shifts he excluded or adjusted, what methodology he used to make the adjustments, or how the adjustments affected the overall damages figure. This lack of transparency renders it impossible for AMA — or the Court — to evaluate the reliability of the adjustment.

Third, the record contains affirmative evidence contradicting Dr. Rennick's assumption that all pre-shift arrival time constitutes compensable, employer-mandated work. Celine Arroyo, AMA's Director of Production Operations, testified at her May 11, 2023 deposition as follows:

"Q. Are you aware of employees arriving at the production site before call time?

A. Yes, some crew members arrive early. Some people like to get coffee, review their notes, get settled in. Some like to get ahead on their tasks for the day.

Q. Is that early arrival directed by AMA?

A. No. Our production protocols are very clear: employees are to clock in at call time. Call time is the start of the workday. If someone chooses to arrive early for their own personal convenience, that is their choice.

Q. Has AMA ever instructed employees to arrive before call time and perform work without clocking in?

A. Absolutely not. That would be a violation of our policy."

(Arroyo Dep. 142:5–23.)

Dr. Rennick's assumption ignores this testimony entirely and treats voluntary, undirected early arrival as employer-mandated off-the-clock work across every single shift in the class period. An expert opinion that assumes facts contrary to sworn testimony in the record — without addressing or explaining why that testimony should be disregarded — is the type of opinion that Sargon requires the Court to exclude.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 25 through 29 and Table 5 of the Rennick Declaration. The off-the-clock overtime damages calculation is speculative, assumes facts not in evidence, contradicts sworn testimony in the record, and applies a uniform assumption where individualized analysis is required.

Objection No. 4

Paragraphs 30–34 of the Rennick Declaration

Failure to Account for Facility-by-Facility Variation in Attestation Feature Availability

The Challenged Testimony. Throughout paragraphs 30 through 34 of his declaration, Dr. Rennick treats all seven of AMA's California production facilities as a homogeneous group. His damages model applies the same methodology — auto-deduction equals violation — uniformly across all facilities without distinguishing between:

(a) Facilities 1, 3, 5, and 6 (West Hollywood HQ, Sherman Oaks, Hollywood, and Santa Monica, respectively), where the Missed Meal Attestation feature was activated in the TimeTrack Pro system and where employees had an electronic mechanism to report missed meals; and

(b) Facilities 2, 4, and 7 (Studio City, Burbank, and El Segundo, respectively), where the Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the period from January 2019 through December 2022, when the feature was subsequently activated at all facilities.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. The availability of the Missed Meal Attestation feature is a material factual distinction that Dr. Rennick ignores entirely in constructing his damages model. This distinction matters because it affects both the data available for analysis and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that data.

At the four facilities where the attestation feature was active, the low attestation usage rates provide a data point — however imperfect — regarding the actual incidence of missed meal periods. Those usage rates are as follows:

At the three facilities where the feature was not active during the January 2019 through December 2022 period, no comparable attestation data exists. The evidentiary environment is fundamentally different at these two groups of facilities, and any reliable damages model must account for that difference.

At a minimum, a methodologically sound expert analysis would perform separate calculations for the two groups of facilities, using different assumptions and different data inputs appropriate to the data available for each group. Dr. Rennick does not do this. Instead, he applies a single, undifferentiated methodology across all seven facilities, as if the availability or non-availability of the attestation feature were irrelevant.

This is precisely the type of oversimplification that Sargon prohibits. An expert cannot ignore material differences in the underlying facts and produce a single, undifferentiated opinion that treats fundamentally different evidentiary environments as identical. The factual foundation of the opinion must be connected to the facts of the case, and where the facts vary materially across subgroups, the opinion must account for that variation or explain why it can be disregarded.

Dr. Rennick's approach also fails to account for the significant variation in working conditions, shift lengths, and production types across AMA's 14 distinct show units. As documented in the expert report of Dr. Rajesh Makhija of Workforce Dynamics Consulting LLC (dated May 19, 2023), there are statistically significant differences in work schedules, overtime frequency, and meal period timing across the 14 show units. Dr. Makhija's analysis demonstrates that self-reported missed meal period rates — based on analysis of attestation data where available and supplemented by manager interview data — range from 2.1% for the studio-based show "Kitchen Clash" at Facility 1 to 18.7% for the field-based show "Summit Challenge" coordinated from Facility 4. This nearly ninefold variation in actual missed meal rates across show units underscores the fundamental unreliability of Dr. Rennick's one-size-fits-all approach.

A damages model that assumes a uniform, near-100% violation rate across all facilities and all show units — when objective and empirical data demonstrates actual violation rates varying from 2.1% to 18.7% — is not within the range of reasonable expert opinion. It is the type of speculative, unsupported opinion that the Sargon gatekeeping framework requires the Court to exclude.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 30 through 34 of the Rennick Declaration to the extent they present or rely upon a uniform, facility-undifferentiated damages model. In the alternative, AMA requests that the Court exclude the model's application to Facilities 1, 3, 5, and 6, where the attestation data directly contradicts Dr. Rennick's assumed near-100% violation rate.

Objection No. 5

Paragraphs 35–40 and Table 7 of the Rennick Declaration

PAGA Penalty Calculation — Assumes Maximum Statutory Penalties Without Accounting for Judicial Discretion

The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 35 through 40 and the accompanying Table 7, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq., in the amount of $12.2 million. Dr. Rennick arrives at this figure by applying the maximum statutory penalties of $100 per employee per pay period for the initial violation and $200 per employee per pay period for each subsequent violation, as specified in Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, subdivision (f). The $12.2 million figure assumes maximum penalties across every alleged violation type — meal period, rest period, off-the-clock overtime, and wage statement — for every pay period during the PAGA period, for all approximately 1,850 aggrieved employees.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. Dr. Rennick's PAGA penalty calculation is unreliable because it assumes the imposition of maximum statutory penalties without any accounting for the Court's broad statutory discretion to reduce those penalties.

California Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (e)(2), expressly grants the Court discretion to reduce PAGA penalties below the statutory maximum:

"The court may, in its discretion, award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory."

(Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (e)(2).)

California courts routinely exercise this discretion to reduce PAGA penalties substantially below the statutory maximum. In practice, courts consider range factors in determining the appropriate penalty amount, including whether the employer's violations were willful or inadvertent, whether the employer has taken corrective action, the severity of the violations, the number of employees affected, and whether the aggregate penalty amount would be disproportionate to the actual harm suffered by employees. (See, e.g., Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77 [affirming trial court's exercise of discretion to reduce PAGA penalties]; Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1213–1216 [discussing factors relevant to penalty reduction].)

Dr. Rennick's calculation ignores this statutory mechanism entirely. His model assumes maximum penalties across the board with zero reduction — an assumption that is inconsistent with prevailing judicial practice and with the statutory framework itself, which expressly contemplates the possibility and, in many cases, the appropriateness of reduction. An expert damages model that ignores a statutory reduction mechanism and assumes a maximum outcome is not a reliable projection of actual PAGA exposure; it is a ceiling calculation masquerading as an expected-value estimate.

Furthermore, the $12.2 million PAGA calculation is entirely derivative of Dr. Rennick's underlying violation assumptions — specifically, the near-100% meal period violation rate (challenged in Objection No. 1), the 50% rest period violation rate (challenged in Objection No. 2), and the 37.5-minute off-the-clock assumption (challenged in Objection No. 3). Because those underlying assumptions are unsupported by the evidence and methodologically deficient, as set forth in detail in Objections Nos. 1 through 3 above, the PAGA penalty calculation built upon them is equally unreliable. Speculation compounded by additional speculation does not yield reliable expert opinion.

Finally, Dr. Rennick does not present any alternative scenarios, sensitivity analyses, or range estimates modeling the effect of penalty reductions. A responsible expert opinion on PAGA exposure would, at a minimum, present a range of outcomes reflecting different penalty levels and different assumptions about the Court's exercise of discretion. Dr. Rennick's failure to present any such alternatives further undermines the reliability and usefulness of his PAGA opinion.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 35 through 40 and Table 7 of the Rennick Declaration in their entirety. In the alternative, AMA requests that the Court exclude the PAGA penalty opinion to the extent it assumes maximum statutory penalties without accounting for the Court's reduction discretion under Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (e)(2).

Objection No. 6

Paragraphs 41–43 of the Rennick Declaration

Improper Extrapolation from Named Plaintiffs to Class-Wide Violation Rates Without Statistical Methodology

The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 41 through 43 of the Rennick Declaration, Dr. Rennick states that his assumed violation rates for rest periods and off-the-clock work are "informed by" and "consistent with" the declarations of the three named plaintiffs — Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla — and are "representative of the experiences of similarly situated employees" within the putative class.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. Dr. Rennick does not employ any accepted statistical methodology to derive his assumed violation rates from the named plaintiffs' declarations. He does not conduct random sampling. He does not perform regression analysis. He does not apply survey methodology. He does not use any technique recognized in the field of applied statistics or econometrics to test whether the experiences of three self-selected individuals are representative of a class of approximately 1,850 individuals. Instead, he relies on the subjective, non-random, non-representative experiences of three individuals who were selected by Plaintiffs' counsel precisely because their experiences are believed to be favorable to Plaintiffs' claims.

The three named plaintiffs work in three different divisions — Unscripted Programming, Post-Production/Digital Content, and Live Events — at three different facilities — Studio City (Facility 2), Hollywood (Facility 5), and Burbank (Facility 4). They occupy three different job titles — Production Coordinator, Post-Production Assistant, and Segment Coordinator. They worked under different supervisors, on different show units, with different production schedules and workflows. They are not a statistically representative sample of the putative class by any accepted measure of representativeness.

The declaration of an expert that an assumed violation rate is "informed by" three anecdotal data points, without any statistical foundation, without any sampling methodology, and without any analysis to validate the representativeness of those data points, is the type of speculation that Sargon bars. (55 Cal.4th at pp. 770–772.) An expert cannot transform anecdotal evidence into a class-wide assumption through the alchemy of characterizing anecdotes as "representative" without conducting any analysis whatsoever to validate that characterization. The word "representative" is a conclusion, not a methodology.

This objection applies to the rest period violation rate assumption of 50% (Objection No. 2) and the off-the-clock assumption of 37.5 minutes per shift (Objection No. 3) specifically, but it also applies generally to any aspect of Dr. Rennick's damages model that relies on the named plaintiffs' declarations as a proxy for class-wide experience. To the extent Dr. Rennick's model depends on the proposition that three individuals' experiences can be generalized to 1,850 class members across 7 facilities and 14 show units without any statistical methodology, the model is speculative and unreliable.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 41 through 43 of the Rennick Declaration and any opinion that relies on the named plaintiffs' declarations as a statistical basis for class-wide violation rate assumptions.

Objection No. 7

Paragraphs 44–46 of the Rennick Declaration

Aggregate Damages Summary — $38.6 Million Figure

The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 44 through 46 of the Rennick Declaration, Dr. Rennick presents his aggregate damages opinion of $38.6 million for the putative class. This figure is the sum of the individual damages components set forth in his declaration: approximately $16.3 million in meal period premium damages (Table 3), approximately $8.4 million in rest period premium damages (Table 4), approximately $12.2 million in off-the-clock overtime damages (Table 5), and approximately $12.2 million in PAGA penalties (Table 7), offset by certain credits and adjustments that Dr. Rennick identifies at paragraphs 44 and 45.

Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.

Argument. Because the aggregate damages figure of $38.6 million is the sum of the individual component calculations challenged in Objections Nos. 1 through 6 above — each of which is based on unsupported assumptions, speculative violation rates, and methodologically deficient extrapolations from anecdotal evidence — the aggregate figure is equally unreliable and inadmissible. The aggregate opinion inherits and compounds all of the deficiencies of its component parts. A sum of speculative numbers is itself speculative.

This is particularly significant at the class certification stage, where Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that damages are susceptible to measurement across the entire class using common proof. As the United States Supreme Court held in Granite Harbor Partners LLC v. Behrend (2013) 569 U.S. 27, 35, a damages model that is "at odds with" the theory of liability, or that fails to measure damages attributable to the specific theory of harm alleged, does not satisfy the predominance requirement for class certification. While Northgate Enterprises arose in the antitrust context and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, California courts applying the analogous requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 have recognized that a damages model must bear a rational connection to the facts and theory of the case in order to support certification. (See Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 28–30 [discussing the importance of reliable methodology in class action damages models].)

A damages model that is built on speculation rather than evidence — that assumes near-100% violation rates where empirical data shows rates of 1.8% to 4.1%, that applies an arbitrary 50% violation rate without any statistical foundation, and that imposes a uniform 37.5-minute off-the-clock assumption contradicted by sworn testimony — does not constitute the type of common proof that supports class certification. It is an exercise in assumption-stacking that, if credited, would allow Plaintiffs to certify a class based on nothing more than their expert's willingness to adopt favorable assumptions.

AMA's expert, Dr. Catherine Lindstrom of Hargrove Analytics Inc., has provided an alternative damages calculation in her rebuttal expert report dated June 9, 2023. Dr. Lindstrom calculates aggregate damages of approximately $5.8 million — approximately 15% of Dr. Rennick's figure. Dr. Lindstrom's calculation is derived from actual missed-meal attestation data at the four facilities where the feature was active, supplemented by conservative extrapolation to the three facilities where the feature was not active, using verified violation rates rather than assumed rates. While AMA does not ask the Court to resolve the dispute between Dr. Rennick and Dr. Lindstrom at this stage, the magnitude of the gap between $38.6 million and $5.8 million underscores the extent to which Dr. Rennick's opinion depends on speculative assumptions rather than empirical evidence.

Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 44 through 46 of the Rennick Declaration and the aggregate $38.6 million damages opinion in their entirety. In the alternative, if the Court declines to exclude the aggregate opinion, AMA respectfully requests that the Court note for purposes of its certification analysis that the opinion is controverted, rests on disputed and unsupported assumptions, and should be evaluated with appropriate skepticism.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. respectfully requests that the Court sustain each of the foregoing seven evidentiary objections and exclude the identified portions of the Declaration of Dr. Howard Rennick from consideration in connection with Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.

In the alternative, to the extent the Court declines to exclude any or all of the challenged testimony, AMA respectfully requests that the Court consider the methodological deficiencies identified herein in evaluating whether Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that common questions predominate over individual questions and that damages are susceptible to proof on a class-wide basis through common evidence.

AMA does not ask this Court to resolve the battle of the experts at the class certification stage. AMA recognizes that the certification inquiry is not a merits determination, and that the Court need not choose between competing expert methodologies in order to determine whether certification is appropriate. AMA does, however, ask the Court to fulfill its gatekeeping function under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, by ensuring that Dr. Rennick's opinions rest on a defensible factual and methodological foundation before they are considered as evidence bearing on the certification analysis. For the reasons stated in detail above, Dr. Rennick's opinions do not rest on such a foundation, and they should be excluded.

Dated: June 16, 2023

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

By: /s/ Renata Vasquez

________________________________________

Renata Vasquez (SBN 224578) Devon Archer (SBN 301462) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-7200 Facsimile: (213) 555-7201

Attorneys for Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017.

On June 16, 2023, I served the foregoing document described as DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DR. HOWARD RENNICK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION on the interested parties in this action as follows:

BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By transmitting a true and correct copy of the foregoing document via the Court's electronic filing system and by electronic mail to the parties listed below at the electronic service addresses indicated:

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on June 16, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.

________________________________________

Devon Archer

Lead Case No.:	22STCV38214 (Consolidated with 22STCV39501)
Assigned for All Purposes to:	Hon. Raymond Escobedo, Dept. 34

DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DR. HOWARD RENNICK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Hearing Date:	July 28, 2023
Time:	8:30 a.m.
Dept.:	34
Facility	Location	Attestation Rate
Facility 1	West Hollywood HQ	2.3%
Facility 3	Sherman Oaks	4.1%
Facility 5	Hollywood	1.8%
Facility 6	Santa Monica	3.7%
Facility	Location	Attestation Rate
Facility 1	West Hollywood HQ	2.3%
Facility 3	Sherman Oaks	4.1%
Facility 5	Hollywood	1.8%
Facility 6	Santa Monica	3.7%
Party	Counsel	Address	Email
Plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla	Marco Castellano, Esq. / Diane Salas, Esq., Castellano Byrne & Salas LLP	11755 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900, Los Angeles, CA 90025	mcastellano@inlawlaw.com / dsalas@inlawlaw.com
Plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla	Sandra Higuera, Esq., Veltrano Employment Law Group PC	350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2800, Los Angeles, CA 90071	shiguera@ridgemontlaw.com

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT
MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, and YESENIA PADILLA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
Defendants.
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP Renata Vasquez (SBN 224578) Devon Archer (SBN 301462) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-7200 Facsimile: (213) 555-7201
Attorneys for Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc.
DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DR. HOWARD RENNICK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. ("AMA"), by and through its counsel of record, Calderwood & Harkness LLP, hereby submits these evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Dr. Howard Rennick ("Rennick Declaration"), filed by Plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla (collectively, "Plaintiffs") in support of their Motion for Class Certification. The Rennick Declaration was filed on April 14, 2023, and the accompanying expert report of Dr. Rennick is dated April 28, 2023.
Dr. Rennick is identified as a partner at Pinnacle Economic Consulting Group LLC, located at 3000 El Camino Real, Suite 500, Palo Alto, California 94306. He has been retained by Plaintiffs to provide expert opinion on the calculation of aggregate class-wide damages for alleged meal period, rest period, off-the-clock overtime, and wage statement violations, as well as penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq.
AMA objects to specific paragraphs, tables, and opinions contained in the Rennick Declaration on the grounds that they fail to satisfy the requirements for admissible expert testimony under California Evidence Code sections 801 and 802, and that they must be excluded under the California Supreme Court's gatekeeping framework as articulated in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747. Under Sargon, the trial court serves as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is based on (1) assumptions of fact without evidentiary support, (2) speculative or conjectural factors, or (3) factors that are so remote or attenuated as to provide no reasonable basis for the expert's opinion. (Id. at pp. 770–772.) Dr. Rennick's declaration is replete with assumptions and methodological choices that run afoul of each of these principles.
These evidentiary objections are filed concurrently with AMA's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, the Declaration of Dr. Rajesh Makhija (Workforce Dynamics Consulting LLC), the Declaration of Dr. Catherine Lindstrom (Hargrove Analytics Inc.), and the Declarations of Lorraine Okafor, Celine Arroyo, and Karen Fong. AMA respectfully requests that the Court consider these objections in connection with the hearing on Plaintiffs' certification motion scheduled for July 28, 2023.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
California Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), provides that expert opinion testimony is admissible only when it is "[b]ased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion." (Cal. Evid. Code § 801, subd. (b).)
California Evidence Code section 802 further provides that a witness testifying as an expert "may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter (including, in the case of an expert, his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion." (Cal. Evid. Code § 802.) The statute requires that the matter upon which the expert bases his or her opinion be "of a type that reasonably may be relied upon" by an expert in the relevant field. (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court's decision in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 establishes a robust gatekeeping role for the trial court in evaluating the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. As the Court explained:
"Under Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative."
(Id. at p. 771.)
The Sargon Court further held that the trial court must determine whether the expert's opinion is "based, in part, on a factor that has no connection with the pertinent facts" and whether the opinion is "so unreasonable that it is of no assistance to the trier of fact." (Id. at p. 772.) The court does not weigh competing expert opinions or choose sides in a battle of the experts; rather, it serves as a gatekeeper to ensure that each opinion rests on a defensible factual and methodological foundation. (Ibid.) As the Court stated, "the expert's opinion may not be based 'on assumptions of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural factors.'" (Id. at p. 770.)
Critically, under Sargon, assumptions that are "contrary to the evidence" or "without evidentiary support" in the record render the resulting expert opinion inadmissible. (Id. at p. 771.) This principle applies with particular force in the class certification context, where expert testimony often supplies the methodological framework for determining whether damages are susceptible to common proof. An expert's damages model, no matter how mathematically sophisticated, is only as reliable as the factual assumptions upon which it rests. Where those assumptions lack evidentiary support or contradict the record, the model does not constitute probative evidence of anything.
With these principles in mind, AMA sets forth the following specific objections to the Rennick Declaration.
III. OBJECTIONS
Objection No. 1
Paragraphs 14–19 and Table 3 of the Rennick Declaration
Meal Period Damages Calculation — Assumption That Every Auto-Deducted Meal Period Constitutes a "Missed" Meal Period
The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 14 through 19 and the accompanying Table 3, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate first meal period premium damages of approximately $16.3 million for the putative class. The core methodology underlying this calculation proceeds as follows: Dr. Rennick identifies approximately 612,000 shifts during the class period (November 1, 2018 through present) for which AMA's NovaPay Solutions TimeTrack Pro timekeeping system applied an automatic 30-minute meal period deduction. He then subtracts approximately 18,400 shifts for which a Missed Meal Attestation was recorded in the TimeTrack Pro system (and for which a meal period premium was already paid by AMA), yielding approximately 593,600 "net missed" meal periods. Dr. Rennick multiplies the 593,600 figure by the average hourly rate of approximately $27.50 to derive the $16.3 million aggregate meal period damages figure.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. Dr. Rennick's meal period damages calculation rests entirely on a foundational assumption that is unsupported by, and directly contrary to, the evidence in this case: namely, the assumption that every shift in which the automatic 30-minute meal period deduction was applied — but no Missed Meal Attestation was recorded — constitutes a shift in which the employee was denied a compliant meal period and is therefore entitled to one hour of premium pay under Labor Code section 226.7.
This assumption is factually unjustified and fundamentally mischaracterizes the purpose and operation of the automatic meal period deduction. The purpose of the auto-deduction feature in AMA's TimeTrack Pro system is to record the 30 minutes deducted for a compliant meal period that was actually taken by the employee. Consider the following scenario, which is the ordinary course of business at AMA's facilities: an employee clocks in at 8:00 a.m., takes a 30-minute, duty-free meal period at approximately noon, and clocks out at 5:00 p.m. The TimeTrack Pro system records 9.0 hours of total clock time, the auto-deduction subtracts 0.5 hours for the meal period, and the employee is compensated for 8.5 hours of work (or 8.0 hours of straight time plus 0.5 hours of overtime, as applicable). In this scenario, the auto-deduction accurately reflects the time taken for a compliant meal period, and no meal period premium is owed.
Dr. Rennick's methodology effectively treats the auto-deduction itself as proof of a meal period violation, when in fact the auto-deduction is a neutral timekeeping mechanism that operates identically regardless of whether the employee actually took a compliant break. The auto-deduction records the same 30-minute deduction whether the employee took a full, uninterrupted, duty-free meal period or whether the employee worked through the meal period entirely. It is the factual circumstances surrounding each shift — not the mere existence of the auto-deduction — that determine whether a violation occurred.
To establish that a meal period premium is owed under Labor Code section 226.7, one must demonstrate that the employee did not actually receive a compliant, duty-free, 30-minute meal period — a factual determination that requires individualized evidence regarding what actually happened during each shift, not a blanket assumption applied uniformly across more than half a million shifts.
Moreover, the empirical data in the record directly undermines Dr. Rennick's assumption. The Missed Meal Attestation feature in TimeTrack Pro — which was activated at four of AMA's seven California facilities (specifically, the West Hollywood headquarters (Facility 1), the Sherman Oaks facility (Facility 3), the Hollywood facility (Facility 5), and the Santa Monica facility (Facility 6)) — provided employees at those facilities with a mechanism to electronically report instances in which they were unable to take a compliant meal period. At those four facilities, the attestation usage rates ranged from 1.8% to 4.1% of eligible shifts, as follows:
These attestation rates — reflecting the percentage of eligible shifts for which employees affirmatively reported a missed meal period — are far more consistent with the inference that the vast majority of employees at those facilities actually took compliant meal periods than with the inference that all 593,600 "unattested" shifts involved missed meals. If the true violation rate were anything approaching Dr. Rennick's assumed near-100% rate, one would expect attestation usage rates dramatically higher than 1.8% to 4.1%.
At the three facilities where the Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the relevant period — Studio City (Facility 2), Burbank (Facility 4), and El Segundo (Facility 7) — the absence of attestation data simply means there is no electronic record either confirming or denying whether meals were taken. The absence of attestation data at these facilities does not establish that meals were missed; it merely establishes that the particular electronic reporting mechanism was not available.
Dr. Rennick's foundational assumption thus has no connection to the factual record and produces a result that is facially implausible. The assumption that every auto-deducted shift without a corresponding attestation constitutes a missed meal period implies a near-100% meal period violation rate across approximately 1,850 employees over a multi-year class period — a rate that would be extraordinary for any employer, let alone one that has implemented timekeeping systems, attestation features, and meal period policies specifically designed to ensure compliance.
Under Sargon, an expert opinion based on an assumption that is "contrary to the evidence" or "without evidentiary support" must be excluded. (55 Cal.4th at p. 771.) Dr. Rennick's assumption that every auto-deducted shift constitutes a violation is precisely the type of unsupported foundational assumption that Sargon requires the Court to exclude.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 14 through 19 and Table 3 of the Rennick Declaration and the associated $16.3 million meal period damages calculation. In the alternative, AMA requests that the Court exclude the opinion to the extent it relies on the assumption that every auto-deducted shift without a corresponding Missed Meal Attestation constitutes a missed meal period.
Objection No. 2
Paragraphs 20–24 and Table 4 of the Rennick Declaration
Rest Period Damages Calculation — Unsupported 50% Violation Rate Assumption
The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 20 through 24 and the accompanying Table 4, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate rest period premium damages of approximately $8.4 million for the putative class. His methodology proceeds as follows: Dr. Rennick identifies approximately 612,000 rest-period-eligible shifts during the class period and applies an assumed violation rate of 50%, yielding approximately 306,000 shifts in which employees allegedly were denied compliant rest periods. He multiplies the 306,000 figure by the average hourly rate of approximately $27.50 per hour to arrive at the $8.4 million aggregate rest period damages figure.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. The 50% rest period violation rate that forms the foundation of Dr. Rennick's rest period damages calculation is entirely unsupported by any empirical, statistical, or documentary evidence in the record. Dr. Rennick derives the 50% figure solely from the declarations of the three named plaintiffs — Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla — each of whom describes her or his own individual experience with rest period denials during their respective tenures at AMA.
Extrapolating a class-wide violation rate from the subjective, anecdotal testimony of three self-selected individuals — each of whom worked in a different division, at a different facility, and under different supervisors — is inherently speculative and unreliable. Specifically:
• Marisol Fuentes was employed as a Production Coordinator in the Unscripted Programming Division at AMA's Studio City facility (Facility 2).
• Derek Halloran was employed as a Post-Production Assistant in the Digital Content Division at AMA's Hollywood facility (Facility 5).
• Yesenia Padilla was employed as a Segment Coordinator in the Live Events Division at AMA's Burbank facility (Facility 4).
The putative class comprises approximately 1,850 individuals who worked across 7 distinct facilities and 14 distinct show units during the class period. The three named plaintiffs represent a minuscule, non-random, non-representative fraction of this population. Their individual experiences cannot reasonably be generalized to the class as a whole without some statistical methodology to validate the representativeness of their accounts.
Compounding this problem, AMA's TimeTrack Pro system does not record rest periods — consistent with standard industry practice, as rest periods are paid time that employers are generally not required to track. The absence of rest period tracking data means there is no systemic electronic data source from which a class-wide rest period violation rate can be derived. Dr. Rennick acknowledged this data limitation in his report, stating at page 18 that "rest period timing data is not available in the TimeTrack Pro system." Yet having acknowledged the absence of data, Dr. Rennick proceeded to construct a damages model based on an arbitrary assumption — 50% — that has no factual anchor in the record.
Under Sargon, expert opinion based on "speculative or conjectural factors" must be excluded. (55 Cal.4th at p. 770.) An assumed 50% violation rate derived from three anecdotal declarations, with no statistical basis, no empirical validation, and no reliable methodology for extrapolation, is the definition of speculation. Dr. Rennick has not conducted a survey of class members. He has not performed any sampling analysis. He has not applied regression analysis or any other accepted statistical technique to test whether the named plaintiffs' experiences are representative of the class. He has simply selected a round number — 50% — and applied it uniformly to 612,000 shifts.
Moreover, the named plaintiffs' own deposition testimony undermines even the anecdotal basis for the 50% assumption. Derek Halloran testified at his May 9, 2023 deposition as follows:
"Q. How often were you able to take your rest breaks during a typical workday?
A. Usually I could take them. During crunch periods, like when we had a delivery deadline, sometimes I couldn't take my second rest break. But most days I could take my breaks.
Q. When you say 'crunch periods,' how often did those occur?
A. It depended on the show. Maybe a few weeks out of every production cycle."
(Halloran Dep. 78:11–22.)
Extrapolating a 50% violation rate from testimony indicating that rest period violations occurred only during limited "crunch periods" — which Mr. Halloran described as occurring "a few weeks out of every production cycle" — is methodologically indefensible. The named plaintiff's own testimony, taken at face value, suggests a violation rate far lower than 50%.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 20 through 24 and Table 4 of the Rennick Declaration in their entirety. The rest period damages opinion lacks any evidentiary foundation and constitutes pure speculation that must be excluded under Sargon.
Objection No. 3
Paragraphs 25–29 and Table 5 of the Rennick Declaration
Off-the-Clock Overtime Damages Calculation — Unsupported 37.5-Minute Per-Shift Assumption
The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 25 through 29 and the accompanying Table 5, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate off-the-clock overtime damages of approximately $12.2 million (after adjustments for shifts not exceeding 8 hours). His methodology proceeds as follows: Dr. Rennick assumes that each class member performed 37.5 minutes of uncompensated off-the-clock work per shift — a figure he derives by taking the mathematical midpoint of the 30-to-45-minute range of alleged pre-shift setup and post-shift wrap time asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint and declarations. He then applies the overtime rate of 1.5 times the average regular rate of pay (approximately $41.25 per hour, based on an average regular rate of approximately $27.50 per hour), on the assumption that all off-the-clock time falls in overtime hours. He applies this calculation across approximately 612,000 eligible shifts, with certain adjustments for shifts that did not exceed 8 hours of recorded time, to arrive at the $12.2 million aggregate figure.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. The 37.5-minute per-shift off-the-clock assumption is the linchpin of Dr. Rennick's overtime damages calculation, and it has no empirical basis whatsoever. Dr. Rennick derives the 37.5-minute figure by taking the arithmetic midpoint of a range — 30 to 45 minutes — that is itself asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint and supporting declarations without empirical support. Dr. Rennick does not conduct any independent analysis of actual pre-shift or post-shift time. He does not examine login or badge-swipe data. He does not survey employees. He does not analyze any subset of time records to validate or test the assumption. He simply takes a range alleged by the plaintiffs, computes the midpoint, and applies it uniformly to every shift worked by every class member during the class period.
This approach fails to satisfy Sargon for multiple independent reasons.
First, different employees in different roles performed fundamentally different pre-shift and post-shift tasks — or none at all. The putative class includes Production Coordinators, Post-Production Assistants, Segment Coordinators, and numerous other job titles, each with distinct job functions and workflows. Production Coordinators in the Unscripted Programming Division may have different pre-shift responsibilities than Post-Production Assistants in the Digital Content Division, who work in an entirely different production environment. Employees working office or preparation days — as opposed to shooting days in the field or on set — would have little or no pre-shift setup or post-shift wrap time. Employees in post-production operations at Facilities 1, 5, and 7 work in office environments with regular schedules and standard start and end procedures that do not involve the type of physical setup and breakdown alleged by Plaintiffs. The 37.5-minute figure cannot be applied uniformly across all class members, all facilities, all show units, and all types of work days without producing grossly inaccurate results.
Second, the assumption that all off-the-clock time falls in overtime hours — warranting the 1.5× multiplier — is independently unsupported. Not all shifts exceed 8 hours. For shifts that do not exceed 8 hours, any off-the-clock time would be compensable at the regular rate of pay, not the overtime rate. Dr. Rennick acknowledges in paragraph 27 of his declaration that he makes "adjustments for shifts not exceeding 8 hours," but his description of those adjustments is cursory and inadequately explained. He does not identify what percentage of shifts he excluded or adjusted, what methodology he used to make the adjustments, or how the adjustments affected the overall damages figure. This lack of transparency renders it impossible for AMA — or the Court — to evaluate the reliability of the adjustment.
Third, the record contains affirmative evidence contradicting Dr. Rennick's assumption that all pre-shift arrival time constitutes compensable, employer-mandated work. Celine Arroyo, AMA's Director of Production Operations, testified at her May 11, 2023 deposition as follows:
"Q. Are you aware of employees arriving at the production site before call time?
A. Yes, some crew members arrive early. Some people like to get coffee, review their notes, get settled in. Some like to get ahead on their tasks for the day.
Q. Is that early arrival directed by AMA?
A. No. Our production protocols are very clear: employees are to clock in at call time. Call time is the start of the workday. If someone chooses to arrive early for their own personal convenience, that is their choice.
Q. Has AMA ever instructed employees to arrive before call time and perform work without clocking in?
A. Absolutely not. That would be a violation of our policy."
(Arroyo Dep. 142:5–23.)
Dr. Rennick's assumption ignores this testimony entirely and treats voluntary, undirected early arrival as employer-mandated off-the-clock work across every single shift in the class period. An expert opinion that assumes facts contrary to sworn testimony in the record — without addressing or explaining why that testimony should be disregarded — is the type of opinion that Sargon requires the Court to exclude.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 25 through 29 and Table 5 of the Rennick Declaration. The off-the-clock overtime damages calculation is speculative, assumes facts not in evidence, contradicts sworn testimony in the record, and applies a uniform assumption where individualized analysis is required.
Objection No. 4
Paragraphs 30–34 of the Rennick Declaration
Failure to Account for Facility-by-Facility Variation in Attestation Feature Availability
The Challenged Testimony. Throughout paragraphs 30 through 34 of his declaration, Dr. Rennick treats all seven of AMA's California production facilities as a homogeneous group. His damages model applies the same methodology — auto-deduction equals violation — uniformly across all facilities without distinguishing between:
(a) Facilities 1, 3, 5, and 6 (West Hollywood HQ, Sherman Oaks, Hollywood, and Santa Monica, respectively), where the Missed Meal Attestation feature was activated in the TimeTrack Pro system and where employees had an electronic mechanism to report missed meals; and
(b) Facilities 2, 4, and 7 (Studio City, Burbank, and El Segundo, respectively), where the Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the period from January 2019 through December 2022, when the feature was subsequently activated at all facilities.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. The availability of the Missed Meal Attestation feature is a material factual distinction that Dr. Rennick ignores entirely in constructing his damages model. This distinction matters because it affects both the data available for analysis and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that data.
At the four facilities where the attestation feature was active, the low attestation usage rates provide a data point — however imperfect — regarding the actual incidence of missed meal periods. Those usage rates are as follows:
At the three facilities where the feature was not active during the January 2019 through December 2022 period, no comparable attestation data exists. The evidentiary environment is fundamentally different at these two groups of facilities, and any reliable damages model must account for that difference.
At a minimum, a methodologically sound expert analysis would perform separate calculations for the two groups of facilities, using different assumptions and different data inputs appropriate to the data available for each group. Dr. Rennick does not do this. Instead, he applies a single, undifferentiated methodology across all seven facilities, as if the availability or non-availability of the attestation feature were irrelevant.
This is precisely the type of oversimplification that Sargon prohibits. An expert cannot ignore material differences in the underlying facts and produce a single, undifferentiated opinion that treats fundamentally different evidentiary environments as identical. The factual foundation of the opinion must be connected to the facts of the case, and where the facts vary materially across subgroups, the opinion must account for that variation or explain why it can be disregarded.
Dr. Rennick's approach also fails to account for the significant variation in working conditions, shift lengths, and production types across AMA's 14 distinct show units. As documented in the expert report of Dr. Rajesh Makhija of Workforce Dynamics Consulting LLC (dated May 19, 2023), there are statistically significant differences in work schedules, overtime frequency, and meal period timing across the 14 show units. Dr. Makhija's analysis demonstrates that self-reported missed meal period rates — based on analysis of attestation data where available and supplemented by manager interview data — range from 2.1% for the studio-based show "Kitchen Clash" at Facility 1 to 18.7% for the field-based show "Summit Challenge" coordinated from Facility 4. This nearly ninefold variation in actual missed meal rates across show units underscores the fundamental unreliability of Dr. Rennick's one-size-fits-all approach.
A damages model that assumes a uniform, near-100% violation rate across all facilities and all show units — when objective and empirical data demonstrates actual violation rates varying from 2.1% to 18.7% — is not within the range of reasonable expert opinion. It is the type of speculative, unsupported opinion that the Sargon gatekeeping framework requires the Court to exclude.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 30 through 34 of the Rennick Declaration to the extent they present or rely upon a uniform, facility-undifferentiated damages model. In the alternative, AMA requests that the Court exclude the model's application to Facilities 1, 3, 5, and 6, where the attestation data directly contradicts Dr. Rennick's assumed near-100% violation rate.
Objection No. 5
Paragraphs 35–40 and Table 7 of the Rennick Declaration
PAGA Penalty Calculation — Assumes Maximum Statutory Penalties Without Accounting for Judicial Discretion
The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 35 through 40 and the accompanying Table 7, Dr. Rennick calculates aggregate penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq., in the amount of $12.2 million. Dr. Rennick arrives at this figure by applying the maximum statutory penalties of $100 per employee per pay period for the initial violation and $200 per employee per pay period for each subsequent violation, as specified in Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, subdivision (f). The $12.2 million figure assumes maximum penalties across every alleged violation type — meal period, rest period, off-the-clock overtime, and wage statement — for every pay period during the PAGA period, for all approximately 1,850 aggrieved employees.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. Dr. Rennick's PAGA penalty calculation is unreliable because it assumes the imposition of maximum statutory penalties without any accounting for the Court's broad statutory discretion to reduce those penalties.
California Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (e)(2), expressly grants the Court discretion to reduce PAGA penalties below the statutory maximum:
"The court may, in its discretion, award a lesser amount than the maximum civil penalty amount specified by this part if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory."
(Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, subd. (e)(2).)
California courts routinely exercise this discretion to reduce PAGA penalties substantially below the statutory maximum. In practice, courts consider range factors in determining the appropriate penalty amount, including whether the employer's violations were willful or inadvertent, whether the employer has taken corrective action, the severity of the violations, the number of employees affected, and whether the aggregate penalty amount would be disproportionate to the actual harm suffered by employees. (See, e.g., Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 77 [affirming trial court's exercise of discretion to reduce PAGA penalties]; Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1213–1216 [discussing factors relevant to penalty reduction].)
Dr. Rennick's calculation ignores this statutory mechanism entirely. His model assumes maximum penalties across the board with zero reduction — an assumption that is inconsistent with prevailing judicial practice and with the statutory framework itself, which expressly contemplates the possibility and, in many cases, the appropriateness of reduction. An expert damages model that ignores a statutory reduction mechanism and assumes a maximum outcome is not a reliable projection of actual PAGA exposure; it is a ceiling calculation masquerading as an expected-value estimate.
Furthermore, the $12.2 million PAGA calculation is entirely derivative of Dr. Rennick's underlying violation assumptions — specifically, the near-100% meal period violation rate (challenged in Objection No. 1), the 50% rest period violation rate (challenged in Objection No. 2), and the 37.5-minute off-the-clock assumption (challenged in Objection No. 3). Because those underlying assumptions are unsupported by the evidence and methodologically deficient, as set forth in detail in Objections Nos. 1 through 3 above, the PAGA penalty calculation built upon them is equally unreliable. Speculation compounded by additional speculation does not yield reliable expert opinion.
Finally, Dr. Rennick does not present any alternative scenarios, sensitivity analyses, or range estimates modeling the effect of penalty reductions. A responsible expert opinion on PAGA exposure would, at a minimum, present a range of outcomes reflecting different penalty levels and different assumptions about the Court's exercise of discretion. Dr. Rennick's failure to present any such alternatives further undermines the reliability and usefulness of his PAGA opinion.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 35 through 40 and Table 7 of the Rennick Declaration in their entirety. In the alternative, AMA requests that the Court exclude the PAGA penalty opinion to the extent it assumes maximum statutory penalties without accounting for the Court's reduction discretion under Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (e)(2).
Objection No. 6
Paragraphs 41–43 of the Rennick Declaration
Improper Extrapolation from Named Plaintiffs to Class-Wide Violation Rates Without Statistical Methodology
The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 41 through 43 of the Rennick Declaration, Dr. Rennick states that his assumed violation rates for rest periods and off-the-clock work are "informed by" and "consistent with" the declarations of the three named plaintiffs — Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla — and are "representative of the experiences of similarly situated employees" within the putative class.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. Dr. Rennick does not employ any accepted statistical methodology to derive his assumed violation rates from the named plaintiffs' declarations. He does not conduct random sampling. He does not perform regression analysis. He does not apply survey methodology. He does not use any technique recognized in the field of applied statistics or econometrics to test whether the experiences of three self-selected individuals are representative of a class of approximately 1,850 individuals. Instead, he relies on the subjective, non-random, non-representative experiences of three individuals who were selected by Plaintiffs' counsel precisely because their experiences are believed to be favorable to Plaintiffs' claims.
The three named plaintiffs work in three different divisions — Unscripted Programming, Post-Production/Digital Content, and Live Events — at three different facilities — Studio City (Facility 2), Hollywood (Facility 5), and Burbank (Facility 4). They occupy three different job titles — Production Coordinator, Post-Production Assistant, and Segment Coordinator. They worked under different supervisors, on different show units, with different production schedules and workflows. They are not a statistically representative sample of the putative class by any accepted measure of representativeness.
The declaration of an expert that an assumed violation rate is "informed by" three anecdotal data points, without any statistical foundation, without any sampling methodology, and without any analysis to validate the representativeness of those data points, is the type of speculation that Sargon bars. (55 Cal.4th at pp. 770–772.) An expert cannot transform anecdotal evidence into a class-wide assumption through the alchemy of characterizing anecdotes as "representative" without conducting any analysis whatsoever to validate that characterization. The word "representative" is a conclusion, not a methodology.
This objection applies to the rest period violation rate assumption of 50% (Objection No. 2) and the off-the-clock assumption of 37.5 minutes per shift (Objection No. 3) specifically, but it also applies generally to any aspect of Dr. Rennick's damages model that relies on the named plaintiffs' declarations as a proxy for class-wide experience. To the extent Dr. Rennick's model depends on the proposition that three individuals' experiences can be generalized to 1,850 class members across 7 facilities and 14 show units without any statistical methodology, the model is speculative and unreliable.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 41 through 43 of the Rennick Declaration and any opinion that relies on the named plaintiffs' declarations as a statistical basis for class-wide violation rate assumptions.
Objection No. 7
Paragraphs 44–46 of the Rennick Declaration
Aggregate Damages Summary — $38.6 Million Figure
The Challenged Testimony. In paragraphs 44 through 46 of the Rennick Declaration, Dr. Rennick presents his aggregate damages opinion of $38.6 million for the putative class. This figure is the sum of the individual damages components set forth in his declaration: approximately $16.3 million in meal period premium damages (Table 3), approximately $8.4 million in rest period premium damages (Table 4), approximately $12.2 million in off-the-clock overtime damages (Table 5), and approximately $12.2 million in PAGA penalties (Table 7), offset by certain credits and adjustments that Dr. Rennick identifies at paragraphs 44 and 45.
Grounds for Objection. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 801, subd. (b), 802; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770–772.
Argument. Because the aggregate damages figure of $38.6 million is the sum of the individual component calculations challenged in Objections Nos. 1 through 6 above — each of which is based on unsupported assumptions, speculative violation rates, and methodologically deficient extrapolations from anecdotal evidence — the aggregate figure is equally unreliable and inadmissible. The aggregate opinion inherits and compounds all of the deficiencies of its component parts. A sum of speculative numbers is itself speculative.
This is particularly significant at the class certification stage, where Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that damages are susceptible to measurement across the entire class using common proof. As the United States Supreme Court held in Granite Harbor Partners LLC v. Behrend (2013) 569 U.S. 27, 35, a damages model that is "at odds with" the theory of liability, or that fails to measure damages attributable to the specific theory of harm alleged, does not satisfy the predominance requirement for class certification. While Northgate Enterprises arose in the antitrust context and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, California courts applying the analogous requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 have recognized that a damages model must bear a rational connection to the facts and theory of the case in order to support certification. (See Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 28–30 [discussing the importance of reliable methodology in class action damages models].)
A damages model that is built on speculation rather than evidence — that assumes near-100% violation rates where empirical data shows rates of 1.8% to 4.1%, that applies an arbitrary 50% violation rate without any statistical foundation, and that imposes a uniform 37.5-minute off-the-clock assumption contradicted by sworn testimony — does not constitute the type of common proof that supports class certification. It is an exercise in assumption-stacking that, if credited, would allow Plaintiffs to certify a class based on nothing more than their expert's willingness to adopt favorable assumptions.
AMA's expert, Dr. Catherine Lindstrom of Hargrove Analytics Inc., has provided an alternative damages calculation in her rebuttal expert report dated June 9, 2023. Dr. Lindstrom calculates aggregate damages of approximately $5.8 million — approximately 15% of Dr. Rennick's figure. Dr. Lindstrom's calculation is derived from actual missed-meal attestation data at the four facilities where the feature was active, supplemented by conservative extrapolation to the three facilities where the feature was not active, using verified violation rates rather than assumed rates. While AMA does not ask the Court to resolve the dispute between Dr. Rennick and Dr. Lindstrom at this stage, the magnitude of the gap between $38.6 million and $5.8 million underscores the extent to which Dr. Rennick's opinion depends on speculative assumptions rather than empirical evidence.
Relief Requested. AMA respectfully requests that the Court exclude paragraphs 44 through 46 of the Rennick Declaration and the aggregate $38.6 million damages opinion in their entirety. In the alternative, if the Court declines to exclude the aggregate opinion, AMA respectfully requests that the Court note for purposes of its certification analysis that the opinion is controverted, rests on disputed and unsupported assumptions, and should be evaluated with appropriate skepticism.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. respectfully requests that the Court sustain each of the foregoing seven evidentiary objections and exclude the identified portions of the Declaration of Dr. Howard Rennick from consideration in connection with Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification.
In the alternative, to the extent the Court declines to exclude any or all of the challenged testimony, AMA respectfully requests that the Court consider the methodological deficiencies identified herein in evaluating whether Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that common questions predominate over individual questions and that damages are susceptible to proof on a class-wide basis through common evidence.
AMA does not ask this Court to resolve the battle of the experts at the class certification stage. AMA recognizes that the certification inquiry is not a merits determination, and that the Court need not choose between competing expert methodologies in order to determine whether certification is appropriate. AMA does, however, ask the Court to fulfill its gatekeeping function under Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, by ensuring that Dr. Rennick's opinions rest on a defensible factual and methodological foundation before they are considered as evidence bearing on the certification analysis. For the reasons stated in detail above, Dr. Rennick's opinions do not rest on such a foundation, and they should be excluded.
Dated: June 16, 2023
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP
By: /s/ Renata Vasquez
________________________________________
Renata Vasquez (SBN 224578) Devon Archer (SBN 301462) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-7200 Facsimile: (213) 555-7201
Attorneys for Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc.
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017.
On June 16, 2023, I served the foregoing document described as DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DR. HOWARD RENNICK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION on the interested parties in this action as follows:
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: By transmitting a true and correct copy of the foregoing document via the Court's electronic filing system and by electronic mail to the parties listed below at the electronic service addresses indicated:
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 16, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.
________________________________________
Devon Archer
Lead Case No.: | 22STCV38214 (Consolidated with 22STCV39501)
Assigned for All Purposes to: | Hon. Raymond Escobedo, Dept. 34
DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF DR. HOWARD RENNICK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Hearing Date: | July 28, 2023
Time: | 8:30 a.m.
Dept.: | 34
Facility | Location | Attestation Rate
Facility 1 | West Hollywood HQ | 2.3%
Facility 3 | Sherman Oaks | 4.1%
Facility 5 | Hollywood | 1.8%
Facility 6 | Santa Monica | 3.7%
Facility | Location | Attestation Rate
Facility 1 | West Hollywood HQ | 2.3%
Facility 3 | Sherman Oaks | 4.1%
Facility 5 | Hollywood | 1.8%
Facility 6 | Santa Monica | 3.7%
Party | Counsel | Address | Email
Plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla | Marco Castellano, Esq. / Diane Salas, Esq., Castellano Byrne & Salas LLP | 11755 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900, Los Angeles, CA 90025 | mcastellano@inlawlaw.com / dsalas@inlawlaw.com
Plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla | Sandra Higuera, Esq., Veltrano Employment Law Group PC | 350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2800, Los Angeles, CA 90071 | shiguera@ridgemontlaw.com

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I. INTRODUCTION

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

III. OBJECTIONS

IV. CONCLUSION

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Record

Parties

Dates

Amounts