1017-00004 · Entities. Aurelius Global Media Group · Class Certification

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT

Lead Case No. 22STCV38214 (Consolidated with Case No. 22STCV39501)

Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. Raymond Escobedo, Dept. 34

Filed: June 16, 2023

Filed concurrently with: Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; Declarations of Lorraine Okafor, Celine Arroyo, Karen Fong, Dr. Rajesh Makhija, Dr. Catherine Lindstrom, and Devon Archer; Compendium of Exhibits, Volumes I–III; and Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Dr. Howard Rennick.

DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, AND YESENIA PADILLA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. ("AMA" or "Defendant") hereby submits the following evidentiary objections to the declarations of named plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes ("Fuentes"), Derek Halloran ("Halloran"), and Yesenia Padilla ("Padilla") (collectively, the "Named Plaintiffs"), each filed on April 14, 2023, in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (the "Motion").

These objections are made pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 350, 352, 403, 702, 800, 801, 802, and 1200, and all other applicable evidentiary provisions. AMA objects to specific statements in each declaration that: (a) constitute lay opinion testimony beyond each declarant's personal knowledge; (b) are conclusory and lack the requisite foundation; (c) purport to describe the experiences of absent putative class members based on speculation or hearsay; and (d) constitute improper opinion testimony on matters requiring expert qualification that the Named Plaintiffs do not possess.

The declarations of the Named Plaintiffs are central to Plaintiffs' argument that common questions predominate and that class-wide adjudication is appropriate. Plaintiffs' counsel relies upon these declarations to assert that AMA maintained a single, uniform policy or practice of denying meal and rest breaks to all non-exempt employees at all seven of AMA's California production facilities across all fourteen show units. As demonstrated in AMA's concurrently filed Opposition, this assertion is factually incorrect. It is also unsupported by admissible evidence, because the Named Plaintiffs' declarations are replete with inadmissible speculation, hearsay, conclusory assertions, and lay opinions masquerading as expert analysis.

AMA respectfully requests that the Court sustain each of the following evidentiary objections and disregard the identified statements when ruling on the Motion for Class Certification.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

The following legal standards govern the admissibility of the challenged testimony in the Named Plaintiffs' declarations.

A. Personal Knowledge (Evid. Code § 702)

California Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a), provides that "[t]he testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter." A declaration submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (d); Bozzi v. Tarrant Corporation, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761.) A declarant's belief or conjecture about facts not personally observed does not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement. (Gatton v. A.P. Green Services, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 688, 695.) Declarations that are based on information obtained from others, or that reflect speculation about the experiences of individuals other than the declarant, fail to satisfy this threshold requirement.

B. Lay Opinion (Evid. Code § 800)

Under Evidence Code section 800, lay witness opinion testimony is admissible only if it is "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony." A lay witness may not offer opinions that extend beyond the witness's personal observation or that purport to address topics requiring specialized knowledge, training, or experience. (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098.) Lay witnesses are strictly limited to describing what they personally observed and experienced; they may not generalize from their individual experience to draw conclusions about the experiences of others, the motives of corporate actors, or the aggregate impact of workplace practices across multiple facilities and divisions.

C. Expert Opinion (Evid. Code §§ 801, 802)

Evidence Code section 801 provides that expert opinion testimony is admissible only when offered by a witness who is qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Section 802 further requires that the reasons for an expert's opinion be disclosed to the trier of fact. A lay witness may not testify as to statistical patterns, company-wide practices at locations where she did not work, aggregate violation rates across a class of employees, or the design and functionality of complex timekeeping systems. Such matters require the specialized analysis of a qualified expert. (People v. Mendibles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1293; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771–772.)

D. Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200)

Evidence Code section 1200 defines hearsay as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." Hearsay is inadmissible unless a recognized exception applies. (Evid. Code § 1200, subd. (b).) Declarations that recount out-of-court statements by unnamed co-workers about their own break experiences, offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that those co-workers did not receive compliant meal or rest breaks—constitute classic hearsay. The fact that the hearsay declarants are not identified by name makes the hearsay all the more unreliable, as AMA cannot verify, rebut, or test the underlying statements through cross-examination or other means.

E. Foundation (Evid. Code § 403)

Evidence Code section 403 places on the proponent of evidence the burden of establishing a sufficient foundation for the proffered testimony. The proponent must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts necessary for the testimony's admissibility have been established. Where a declarant lacks the foundation to offer testimony on a particular subject—because, for example, she did not personally observe the events described, or lacks the specialized knowledge necessary to support an opinion—the testimony is inadmissible for lack of foundation.

III. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF MARISOL FUENTES

For context, the Court should be aware of the following undisputed facts relevant to the scope and weight of Fuentes's declaration:

• Fuentes was employed by AMA as a Production Coordinator in the Unscripted Programming Division at AMA's Studio City facility, located at 4024 Penmark Strategy Partners Avenue, Studio City, California 91604, designated in the record as "Facility 2."

• Fuentes's employment with AMA commenced on March 14, 2019, and terminated on August 5, 2022. Her hourly rate at separation was $28.50 per hour.

• Facility 2 (Studio City) was one of three AMA facilities at which the TimeTrack Pro Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the relevant class period. The other two facilities where the feature was not activated were Facility 1 (West Hollywood HQ) and Facility 3 (Sherman Oaks). The attestation feature was activated at Facilities 4 through 7 (Burbank, Hollywood, Santa Monica, and El Segundo), as established in the declaration of Karen Fong, AMA's Payroll Manager.

• Fuentes worked in one of AMA's fourteen show units—the Unscripted Programming Division—at one of AMA's seven California production facilities.

These facts establish the inherent limitations of Fuentes's personal knowledge and the scope of testimony she is competent to offer.

Objection No. 1

Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶ 14 (and similar statements in ¶¶ 18, 23, and 31). Fuentes states, in substance, that "most production coordinators at AMA were unable to take compliant meal periods" and that "almost no one" at AMA "received proper breaks during production days."

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation; beyond personal knowledge (Evid. Code § 702).

Fuentes worked at a single AMA facility—Studio City (Facility 2)—among AMA's seven California production facilities. She was assigned exclusively to the Unscripted Programming Division, which is one of fourteen show units operating across AMA's California operations. Fuentes has no personal knowledge of the meal and rest break experiences of employees at the six other AMA facilities (West Hollywood HQ, Sherman Oaks, Burbank, Hollywood, Santa Monica, and El Segundo), or of employees in the thirteen other show units in which she did not work. Her declaration does not establish—nor could it establish—that she personally observed or had personal knowledge of the break practices at any facility other than Studio City, or in any division other than Unscripted Programming.

Fuentes's conclusory characterization of what "most" production coordinators or "almost no one" at AMA experienced improperly bootstraps her individual experience at a single facility into purported evidence of a class-wide violation. The question of whether AMA's meal period practices constituted a uniform class-wide violation—as opposed to individualized experiences varying by facility, show unit, supervisor, and production schedule—is the central contested question in the certification motion. It cannot be established through the lay speculation of a single employee at a single facility.

Prejudice: If the Court considers this testimony, it will have before it purported evidence of a "company-wide" practice based on nothing more than one employee's unsupported assumption that her experience at one facility was shared by approximately 1,850 employees across seven facilities and fourteen show units. This is precisely the type of inadmissible generalization that must be excluded to ensure the Court's certification analysis rests on admissible evidence.

Objection No. 2

Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 15–17, 22. Fuentes states, in substance, that AMA maintained a "company-wide culture" or "uniform practice" of requiring employees to work through meal periods, and that AMA's management "across all facilities" Discouraged employees from taking their legally required breaks.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation; beyond personal knowledge (Evid. Code § 702).

Fuentes has no foundation to testify about practices at facilities where she never worked. She was employed at one facility and interacted with supervisors in one division. Testimony about AMA's "company-wide culture" or management practices "across all facilities" is beyond the scope of her personal knowledge. AMA operates seven distinct production facilities in California, each with its own facility management, production schedules, and operational characteristics. The evidence in the record—including the declaration of Celine Arroyo, AMA's Director of Production Operations, and the expert analysis of Dr. Rajesh Makhija—establishes significant and statistically meaningful variation in scheduling practices, shift lengths, overtime frequency, and meal period compliance across AMA's fourteen show units and seven facilities. Fuentes's bald assertion of "uniformity" is contradicted by the record and is, in any event, beyond the competence of a lay witness to establish.

Additional Ground — Expert Opinion (Evid. Code § 801): To the extent Fuentes purports to characterize AMA's practices as "uniform" or to identify a "company-wide culture," she is offering an opinion that requires the specialized analysis of an industrial/organizational expert, such as Dr. Makhija, who analyzed scheduling data, organizational structures, and operational workflows across all fourteen show units. A lay production coordinator who worked in a single division at a single facility is not qualified to render such an opinion.

Objection No. 3

Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 19–21. Fuentes recounts conversations with unnamed co-workers who allegedly told her they "never" received compliant meal breaks, or that their supervisors "always" made them work through their breaks.

Grounds: Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200). The out-of-court statements of unnamed co-workers, offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that those co-workers did not receive compliant meal breaks and that their supervisors required them to work through breaks—are inadmissible hearsay. No exception to the hearsay rule applies. The statements are not party admissions (Evid. Code § 1220) because the unnamed co-workers are not parties to this action. The statements do not fall within any other recognized hearsay exception.

These unnamed individuals could have submitted their own declarations if Plaintiffs wished to present their testimony. Plaintiffs' failure to do so—and their reliance instead on Fuentes's second-hand recounting of unattributed conversations—should not be rewarded by admitting hearsay testimony that AMA has no ability to test through cross-examination.

Additional Ground — Lack of Foundation: Fuentes does not identify the co-workers by name, position, facility, show unit, or time period. She does not identify when the conversations took place, the context in which they occurred, or the specific words used. This lack of specificity makes it impossible for AMA to verify, rebut, or contextualize the statements, and it deprives the Court of any basis to assess their reliability or relevance.

Objection No. 4

Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 25–27. Fuentes opines that the TimeTrack Pro auto-deduction system was "designed to cheat employees," was "inherently unfair," and "could not accurately capture" actual meal period practices across AMA's facilities.

Grounds: Improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improperly invades the province of expert testimony (Evid. Code § 801).

Fuentes is not qualified to opine on the design, functionality, architecture, or configuration of AMA's TimeTrack Pro timekeeping system. The TimeTrack Pro system is a complex enterprise timekeeping platform developed and maintained by NovaPay Solutions, a third-party payroll and time-and-attendance vendor. The system's configuration—including the auto-deduction feature, the Missed Meal Attestation feature, and the integration of meal period data with AMA's payroll processing—involves technical decisions made by AMA's HR and payroll departments in consultation with NovaPay's Client Data Services team. This is a matter requiring technical expertise of the type provided by Dr. Catherine Lindstrom of Hargrove Analytics Inc. (whose declaration is filed concurrently herewith), the testimony of Karen Fong (AMA Payroll Manager), and the testimony of Marcus Yee (NovaPay Solutions, Director of Client Data Services).

Fuentes may testify about her personal experience using the time clock at Facility 2—e.g., that she punched in and out at a kiosk, that she was or was not aware of the auto-deduction feature, and what she personally observed when she clocked in and out. However, she may not offer opinions about the system's design intent, its accuracy across all facilities and employees, or its capacity to "cheat" the workforce. Such characterizations constitute improper lay opinion on technical matters that are beyond her competence.

Objection No. 5

Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶ 33. Fuentes states that "thousands of employees" were underpaid as a result of AMA's meal period practices and that the "total harm" to the class was in the "tens of millions of dollars."

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); expert opinion on damages (Evid. Code § 801).

Damages quantification for a putative class of approximately 1,850 non-exempt employees over a multi-year class period (November 1, 2018 through the present) requires rigorous economic analysis of TimeTrack Pro timekeeping data, payroll records, applicable hourly pay rates, premium pay obligations under Labor Code section 226.7, and other variables. This is the province of a qualified damages expert, such as Dr. Howard Rennick of Pinnacle Economic Consulting Group LLC—Plaintiffs' own retained expert—who performed precisely this type of analysis in his expert report. A lay witness is not competent to estimate aggregate class damages, and Fuentes has no foundation to offer testimony on the total financial impact of AMA's practices on a class of employees whose identities, work schedules, pay rates, and break experiences she does not know.

IV. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF DEREK HALLORAN

For context, the Court should be aware of the following undisputed facts relevant to the scope and weight of Halloran's declaration:

• Halloran was employed by AMA as a Post-Production Assistant in the Digital Content Division at AMA's Hollywood facility, located at 1438 N. Gower Street, Hollywood, California 90028, designated in the record as "Facility 5."

• Halloran's employment with AMA commenced on June 1, 2020, and terminated on November 30, 2022. His hourly rate at separation was $24.75 per hour.

• Facility 5 (Hollywood) was one of four AMA facilities at which the TimeTrack Pro Missed Meal Attestation feature was activated during the relevant class period. The attestation feature was also activated at Facilities 4 (Burbank), 6 (Santa Monica), and 7 (El Segundo), as established in the declaration of Karen Fong.

• At his deposition on May 9, 2023, Halloran testified that he was aware of the Missed Meal Attestation feature but "never used it because nobody else did and I didn't want to cause problems." (Halloran Dep. 87:14–18.) He also testified that he was "usually" able to take a meal break "except during crunch periods." (Halloran Dep. 62:7–12.)

• Post-production operations at the Hollywood facility are office-based, with relatively regular eight-to-ten-hour schedules, a work environment that is fundamentally different from live production, field production, or studio production.

Objection No. 6

Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 11, 16, 24. Halloran states, in substance, that employees "at all AMA facilities" or "across AMA's California operations" experienced the same meal period violations that he experienced at the Hollywood facility.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); speculation (Evid. Code § 702); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800).

Halloran worked exclusively at the Hollywood facility (Facility 5) in the post-production department. Post-production is a fundamentally different work environment than live production, field production, or studio production. Post-production operations are office-based, involve regular schedules, and center on editing, color correction, sound mixing, and quality control activities that are performed at workstations in an office setting. By contrast, live events operations (Padilla's division) involve twelve-to-sixteen-hour shoots driven by the timing of live broadcasts; field-based production involves on-location shoots with variable and often unpredictable scheduling; and studio-based production involves stage work with its own set of operational constraints.

Halloran has no personal knowledge of the break practices at the other six AMA facilities (West Hollywood HQ, Studio City, Sherman Oaks, Burbank, Santa Monica, and El Segundo), or in the other thirteen show units in which he did not work. His extrapolation from his post-production experience at a single facility to the experiences of the entire putative class is without foundation and constitutes inadmissible speculation.

Objection No. 7

Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 18–20. Halloran opines that the Missed Meal Attestation feature available at his facility was "useless," "a sham," or "designed to create the illusion of compliance" rather than to actually address missed meal periods.

Grounds: Improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); invades the province of expert testimony (Evid. Code § 801).

Halloran may testify about his personal experience with the Missed Meal Attestation feature—including that he was aware of the feature, that he personally chose not to use it, and his subjective reasons for not doing so (as he did at his May 9, 2023 deposition). However, he is not qualified to opine on the feature's design, corporate purpose, or effectiveness across the entire workforce. His characterization of the feature as "useless" or a "sham" is a legal or quasi-expert conclusion, not a statement of observed fact. The question of whether the attestation feature was an adequate mechanism for ensuring compliance with California's meal period requirements is a contested legal and factual issue that cannot be resolved through a lay witness's pejorative characterization.

Note regarding contradictory deposition testimony: Halloran's declaration characterization of the attestation feature as "useless" is contradicted by his own deposition testimony. At deposition, Halloran acknowledged that the attestation feature was available at his facility (Hollywood, Facility 5), that he was aware of it, and that his decision not to use it was based on a subjective desire not to "cause problems"—not on any deficiency in the feature's functionality. (Halloran Dep. 87:14–18; 89:3–11.) A feature that a witness acknowledges was available and functional, but chose not to use for personal reasons, is not "useless" as a matter of fact. Halloran's declaration testimony on this point should be excluded as both lacking foundation and inconsistent with his sworn deposition testimony.

Objection No. 8

Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 21–22. Halloran recounts statements by unnamed colleagues in the post-production department who allegedly told him they were "afraid" to report missed meal periods or that their supervisors "retaliated" against employees who used the Missed Meal Attestation feature.

Grounds: Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200). The out-of-court statements of unnamed post-production colleagues, offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that those colleagues were afraid to report missed meal periods and that supervisors retaliated against employees who used the attestation feature—are inadmissible hearsay. No hearsay exception applies. The unnamed colleagues are not identified by name, position, or time period, making verification of the statements impossible.

Additional Ground — Improper Lay Opinion: To the extent Halloran offers these unattributed statements as evidence of a "culture of fear" or a "policy of retaliation" at AMA, he is offering an improper lay opinion on a matter that requires foundation and evidence beyond second-hand conversations with unidentified co-workers. The existence (or non-existence) of a "culture of fear" or a "policy of retaliation" is a factual conclusion that would need to be established through direct evidence—such as the testimony of employees who actually experienced retaliation, documentation of complaints and disciplinary actions, or expert analysis of AMA's workplace culture—not through a lay witness's recitation of anonymous hearsay.

Objection No. 9

Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 13–14, 28. Halloran states that AMA "systematically" required off-the-clock work before and after shifts, or that performing off-the-clock work was "company policy."

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); conclusory; beyond personal knowledge (Evid. Code § 702).

Halloran may testify about his own pre-shift and post-shift activities at the Hollywood facility. At his deposition, Halloran estimated that he spent approximately fifteen to thirty minutes per shift logging in to editing systems and setting up his workstation before his shift officially began. (Halloran Dep. 44:8–22.) He may describe these personal experiences. However, he may not characterize pre-shift and post-shift activities as "systematic" or as "company policy" based solely on his experience in one department at one facility.

The characterization of such practices as "systematic" or as "company policy" implies that AMA made a deliberate, centralized decision to require off-the-clock work across all facilities and divisions. This is a factual assertion for which Halloran has no foundation. The evidence in the record—including the declaration of Celine Arroyo, AMA's Director of Production Operations—establishes that pre-shift and post-shift practices varied significantly across AMA's fourteen show units, depending on the nature of the production, the equipment involved, the physical setup of each facility, and the individual practices of supervisors and employees.

Moreover, this Court has already addressed the individualized nature of off-the-clock claims. The Court's prior order denying certification of the off-the-clock and overtime claims recognized that such claims are inherently individualized and not amenable to class treatment. Halloran's attempt to characterize individualized pre-shift activities as "company policy" is inconsistent with the Court's prior findings and is, in any event, unsupported by admissible evidence.

Objection No. 10

Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶ 30. Halloran states that AMA's meal period policy or auto-deduction practice was "unlawful," "illegal," or "violated California law."

Grounds: Improper legal conclusion; improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800).

Whether AMA's meal period policies and practices violated the California Labor Code, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 12-2001, or other applicable provisions of California law is a question for the Court, not for a lay witness. Halloran is not an attorney and has no legal training or expertise. He is not qualified to offer legal conclusions regarding the lawfulness of AMA's policies. His declaration should be limited to his personal factual observations—what he saw, heard, and experienced at the Hollywood facility—and should not extend to legal characterizations that are within the exclusive province of the Court.

V. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF YESENIA PADILLA

For context, the Court should be aware of the following undisputed facts relevant to the scope and weight of Padilla's declaration:

• Padilla was employed by AMA as a Segment Coordinator in the Live Events Division at AMA's Burbank facility, located at 3800 W. Alameda Avenue, Burbank, California 91505, designated in the record as "Facility 4."

• Padilla's employment with AMA commenced on January 10, 2018, and terminated on May 17, 2022. Her hourly rate at separation was $31.00 per hour.

• Facility 4 (Burbank) was one of three AMA facilities at which the TimeTrack Pro Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the relevant class period.

• Padilla separated from AMA more than six months before the complaint in this action was filed. (Padilla separated on May 17, 2022; the complaint was filed on November 1, 2022.)

• At her deposition on May 16, 2023, Padilla provided testimony regarding a workplace culture in the Live Events Division where, in her words, "everyone knew you didn't get breaks during a show, and nobody complained because that's just how it worked." (Padilla Dep. 113:4–8.) This testimony, while vivid, was specific to Padilla's experience in the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility.

• The Live Events Division involves unique scheduling constraints driven by the timing of live television productions, including concerts, award shows, and other live broadcasts. These constraints are materially different from the scheduling practices in AMA's other divisions.

Objection No. 11

Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 10, 15, 26, 34. Padilla states, in substance, that "employees at every AMA facility" experienced the same break violations she experienced, or that "all non-exempt AMA workers in California" were denied compliant meal periods.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); speculation (Evid. Code § 702); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800).

Padilla worked exclusively in the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility (Facility 4). Live events operations have unique scheduling constraints that are driven by the timing of live television productions—including concert broadcasts, award shows, and live competition programs—that cannot be paused, rescheduled, or restructured to accommodate meal breaks in the same manner as pre-recorded studio productions. These constraints are materially different from those governing other AMA operations:

• Studio-based shows such as "Kitchen Clash," which taped at the West Hollywood HQ (Facility 1), operated on consistent nine-hour production days with reliable meal breaks scheduled during natural breaks in taping, as established in the declaration of Celine Arroyo.

• Post-production operations at the Hollywood facility (Facility 5) were office-based, with regular eight-to-ten-hour schedules and standardized lunch periods.

• Digital content production operated on hybrid schedules, with some employees working from home and others in-office, and with scheduling flexibility that is not available in live events operations.

• Field-based production (on-location shoots) involved variable scheduling driven by location availability, weather, talent schedules, and other factors unique to each production.

Padilla has no personal knowledge of break practices at any facility other than Burbank and cannot competently testify about the experiences of employees in the other thirteen show units across AMA's six other facilities. Her assertion that "all non-exempt AMA workers in California" experienced the same violations she experienced is pure speculation, unsupported by any foundation in the record.

Objection No. 12

Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶ 17. Padilla states that the denial of meal and rest breaks is "standard practice in the entertainment industry" or "how things work across all production companies," implying that AMA's practices were part of an industry-wide norm.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); irrelevant (Evid. Code § 350).

Padilla is not qualified to testify about industry-wide practices. She worked for one employer—AMA—in one division—Live Events—at one facility—Burbank. She has not been disclosed or qualified as an expert in entertainment industry labor practices, nor has she demonstrated the breadth of experience across multiple production companies that would be necessary to support a generalization about "industry-wide" norms. Even if such testimony were relevant to the issues before the Court—which it is not—it would require the expertise of an industrial/organizational expert with knowledge of employment practices across the entertainment industry.

Moreover, this testimony is irrelevant under Evidence Code section 350. This case concerns AMA's policies and practices, not the entertainment industry's practices generally. Industry custom or practice is not a defense to statutory violations and is equally not proof of them. Whether other production companies also fail to provide compliant meal periods has no bearing on whether AMA's specific policies and practices complied with the requirements of the California Labor Code and IWC Wage Order No. 12-2001. The testimony is therefore irrelevant and should be excluded on that independent ground.

Objection No. 13

Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 19–21. Padilla recounts conversations with employees at AMA facilities other than Burbank—employees she allegedly encountered at company-wide events, training sessions, or other gatherings—who purportedly described their own break experiences at their respective facilities.

Grounds: Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200). The statements of employees at other AMA facilities, recounted by Padilla, are out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that employees at other facilities also experienced meal period violations similar to those described by Padilla. These statements are inadmissible hearsay. No exception to the hearsay rule applies. The statements are not party admissions, not statements against interest, not spontaneous declarations, and do not fall within any other recognized exception.

The declarants are not identified by name, facility, job title, show unit, or time period. This lack of identifying information makes it impossible for AMA to verify the existence of the conversations, identify the individuals involved, assess whether their experiences are representative or anomalous, or subject the underlying testimony to cross-examination. If Plaintiffs wished to present testimony from employees at other AMA facilities regarding their break experiences, those employees could and should have submitted their own declarations. Plaintiffs' failure to do so cannot be remedied by laundering hearsay through a named plaintiff's declaration.

Objection No. 14

Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 28–29. Padilla opines that AMA implemented the TimeTrack Pro auto-deduction feature "to avoid paying meal period premiums" or "as a cost-saving measure designed to shortchange employees."

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation (Evid. Code § 702).

Padilla, a segment coordinator in the Live Events Division, has no personal knowledge of AMA's business reasons for configuring its TimeTrack Pro timekeeping system. The decision to implement the TimeTrack Pro auto-deduction feature was made by AMA's Human Resources and Payroll departments in connection with AMA's transition to the NovaPay Solutions payroll platform, effective January 1, 2019. This decision involved personnel with whom Padilla has not demonstrated she had any involvement, communication, or interaction, including:

• Lorraine Okafor, Senior Vice President of Human Resources, who oversaw the transition to NovaPay Solutions and approved the TimeTrack Pro configuration;

• Karen Fong, Payroll Manager, who worked with NovaPay to implement the auto-deduction feature and the Missed Meal Attestation functionality at selected facilities; and

• Marcus Yee, Director of Client Data Services at NovaPay Solutions, who configured the TimeTrack Pro system according to AMA's specifications.

Padilla's characterization of AMA's corporate intent—that the auto-deduction was implemented "to avoid paying premiums" or "to shortchange employees"—is pure speculation. She has offered no foundation for this assertion. She has not testified that any AMA manager or executive communicated such a purpose to her, nor has she pointed to any document or communication suggesting such a motive. Her opinion about AMA's corporate intent is inadmissible.

Objection No. 15

Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 12, 32. Padilla states that "at least 80%" of shifts involved missed meal periods, or that "virtually every" shift during live events productions resulted in a meal period violation.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); invades the province of expert testimony (Evid. Code §§ 801, 802).

Quantitative estimates of violation rates across a putative class of approximately 1,850 non-exempt employees over a class period spanning November 1, 2018 through October 31, 2023 require rigorous statistical analysis of TimeTrack Pro timekeeping data, payroll records, Missed Meal Attestation records, production schedules, and other data. This analysis must account for variations across facilities, show units, production types, supervisors, shift lengths, and individual employee practices. It is precisely the type of analysis that Plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Howard Rennick of Pinnacle Economic Consulting Group LLC, was retained to perform, and that Defense expert Dr. Catherine Lindstrom of Hargrove Analytics Inc. has critiqued in her declaration.

A lay fact witness is not competent to estimate violation rates for a class of 1,850 employees. Padilla's personal impressions about the frequency of missed breaks during her own shifts in the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility cannot substitute for data-driven statistical analysis and cannot be extrapolated to the entire class. Her quantitative estimates are without foundation and should be excluded.

Objection No. 16

Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 22–23. Padilla states that AMA "never" provided rest periods during live events productions, or that "no employee" at AMA received compliant rest breaks during production days.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation (Evid. Code § 702).

Padilla may testify about her own rest period experiences within the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility. She may not, however, extrapolate those experiences to the entire putative class. Rest periods present unique evidentiary challenges because they are not recorded in the TimeTrack Pro system. This is consistent with standard industry practice, as rest periods are paid time and are not subject to the same recordkeeping requirements as meal periods. The absence of timekeeping data for rest periods means that evidence of rest period practices must come from testimony of individual employees and supervisors—testimony that, by its nature, will vary by facility, show unit, supervisor, and production type.

This Court's certification order (issued August 11, 2023) recognized this very problem when it denied certification of the rest period claims, finding "no common proof of a systematic failure to provide rest periods" and that "Plaintiffs have presented only anecdotal evidence from three declarants, each with different experiences at different facilities." Padilla's conclusory assertion that "no employee" at AMA received compliant rest breaks is precisely the type of anecdotal generalization that the Court has already found insufficient to support class treatment of the rest period claims, and it should be excluded as lacking foundation and constituting improper lay opinion.

Note: Even Padilla's own testimony regarding rest periods is specific to the unique context of live events productions. The evidence in the record establishes that live events operations are materially different from studio-based, field-based, post-production, and digital content operations. The scheduling constraints of live television—where productions cannot be paused for breaks—do not apply to studio tapings, office-based post-production, or other AMA operations. Padilla's experience in live events is not generalizable to the class, even with respect to rest periods.

VI. GENERAL OBJECTIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL THREE DECLARATIONS

In addition to the specific objections set forth above, AMA asserts the following objections that apply to all three declarations.

Objection No. 17

Objected-to Statements: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 34–35; Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 29, 31; Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 33, 35–36. Each declarant states, in substance, that her experience is "typical" of all class members, that her claims are "common to the class," or that "every employee" at AMA had the same experience she had.

Grounds: Improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); legal conclusion; lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403).

Whether the named plaintiffs' claims are "typical" of the claims of the putative class, or whether "common" questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions, are legal conclusions for the Court to make in applying the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and the standards established by the California Supreme Court in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 and Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319. These are not factual matters within the competence of lay witnesses. A named plaintiff may describe her own experience; she may not declare, as a legal conclusion, that her experience satisfies the prerequisites for class certification. Such declarations usurp the Court's role as gatekeeper on the certification question.

Additional Ground: The record evidence directly contradicts these assertions of typicality and commonality. Dr. Makhija's expert analysis, set forth in his declaration filed concurrently herewith, demonstrates statistically significant variation across AMA's fourteen show units and seven facilities in the following key variables:

• Scheduling practices (fixed versus variable schedules; use of call times versus set start times);

• Average shift length (ranging from 8.2 hours in studio-based productions at West Hollywood HQ to 13.7 hours in the Live Events Division);

• Overtime frequency (ranging from 12% of shifts in post-production to 68% of shifts in live events);

• Meal period timing and duration (ranging from 95% compliance in the "Kitchen Clash" unit to 41% compliance in the Live Events Division); and

• Supervisor-level variation in break scheduling practices (with 14 different show units overseen by 23 different production managers with materially different management styles and operational approaches).

Each named plaintiff worked in a different division (Unscripted Programming, Post-Production/Digital Content, and Live Events), at a different facility (Studio City, Hollywood, and Burbank, respectively), under different supervisors, with different scheduling patterns and different work environments. Their experiences are not typical of each other, let alone of 1,850 putative class members. Their conclusory assertions to the contrary are inadmissible.

Objection No. 18

Objected-to Statements: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 16, 24; Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 15, 25–26; Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 14, 27, 30. Each declarant states, in substance, that AMA's management "knew" about the meal and rest break violations and "intentionally" chose not to remedy them, or that AMA "deliberately" implemented the auto-deduction feature to deny employees their legally required meal period premiums.

Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); speculation (Evid. Code § 702); improper lay opinion on state of mind (Evid. Code § 800).

None of the three named plaintiffs was a member of AMA's management team. Each was an hourly, non-exempt production-support employee: Fuentes was a Production Coordinator, Halloran was a Post-Production Assistant, and Padilla was a Segment Coordinator. None of the three declarants held a supervisory, managerial, or executive position at AMA. They have no personal knowledge of what AMA's senior management—including Jonathan Mercer (President of AMA), Lorraine Okafor (Senior Vice President of Human Resources), or Gregory Tanaka (Vice President of Legal & Compliance)—knew, intended, or decided regarding timekeeping system configuration, meal period policy design, or the implementation of compliance measures.

The declarants' statements about AMA's corporate knowledge and intent are speculative and inadmissible. A lay employee may testify about what she personally observed in the workplace; she may not testify about the subjective knowledge or intent of corporate officers and executives with whom she had no direct communication on the relevant topics. The question of whether AMA acted knowingly or intentionally is a factual question that must be established through competent evidence—such as the testimony of AMA's decision-makers, corporate documents reflecting the decision-making process, or other direct evidence of corporate knowledge—not through the speculation of hourly employees who were not involved in and had no knowledge of AMA's management decisions.

VII. REQUEST

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. respectfully requests that the Court:

1. Sustain each of the foregoing eighteen evidentiary objections (Objection Nos. 1 through 18);

2. Exclude and disregard the identified statements in the declarations of Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla in ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; and

3. Consider these objections in connection with AMA's Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition, and supporting declarations and exhibits, all filed concurrently herewith.

Dated: June 16, 2023

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

By: ________

Devon Archer (SBN 301462)

Renata Vasquez (SBN 224578) Devon Archer (SBN 301462) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-7200 Facsimile: (213) 555-7201

Attorneys for Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, declare as follows:

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is Calderwood & Harkness LLP, 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017.

On June 16, 2023, I caused to be served the foregoing document described as:

DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, AND YESENIA PADILLA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

on all parties in this action by serving a true copy thereof via electronic service through the Court's electronic filing and service system, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 2.251, and the parties' agreement to accept electronic service, on the following counsel of record:

Marco Castellano Diane Salas Trevor Kim CASTELLANO BYRNE & SALAS LLP 11755 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900 Los Angeles, California 90025 Telephone: (310) 555-4400

Email: mcastellano@inlawlaw.com; dsalas@inlawlaw.com; tkim@inlawlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Sandra Higuera VELTRANO EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP PC 350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 555-8100

Email: shiguera@ridgemontlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on June 16, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.

________________________________________

Alyssa Chen

MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, and YESENIA PADILLA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Defendants.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES — CENTRAL DISTRICT
Lead Case No. 22STCV38214 (Consolidated with Case No. 22STCV39501)
Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon. Raymond Escobedo, Dept. 34
Filed: June 16, 2023
Filed concurrently with: Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; Declarations of Lorraine Okafor, Celine Arroyo, Karen Fong, Dr. Rajesh Makhija, Dr. Catherine Lindstrom, and Devon Archer; Compendium of Exhibits, Volumes I–III; and Evidentiary Objections to Declaration of Dr. Howard Rennick.
DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, AND YESENIA PADILLA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. ("AMA" or "Defendant") hereby submits the following evidentiary objections to the declarations of named plaintiffs Marisol Fuentes ("Fuentes"), Derek Halloran ("Halloran"), and Yesenia Padilla ("Padilla") (collectively, the "Named Plaintiffs"), each filed on April 14, 2023, in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (the "Motion").
These objections are made pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 350, 352, 403, 702, 800, 801, 802, and 1200, and all other applicable evidentiary provisions. AMA objects to specific statements in each declaration that: (a) constitute lay opinion testimony beyond each declarant's personal knowledge; (b) are conclusory and lack the requisite foundation; (c) purport to describe the experiences of absent putative class members based on speculation or hearsay; and (d) constitute improper opinion testimony on matters requiring expert qualification that the Named Plaintiffs do not possess.
The declarations of the Named Plaintiffs are central to Plaintiffs' argument that common questions predominate and that class-wide adjudication is appropriate. Plaintiffs' counsel relies upon these declarations to assert that AMA maintained a single, uniform policy or practice of denying meal and rest breaks to all non-exempt employees at all seven of AMA's California production facilities across all fourteen show units. As demonstrated in AMA's concurrently filed Opposition, this assertion is factually incorrect. It is also unsupported by admissible evidence, because the Named Plaintiffs' declarations are replete with inadmissible speculation, hearsay, conclusory assertions, and lay opinions masquerading as expert analysis.
AMA respectfully requests that the Court sustain each of the following evidentiary objections and disregard the identified statements when ruling on the Motion for Class Certification.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
The following legal standards govern the admissibility of the challenged testimony in the Named Plaintiffs' declarations.
A. Personal Knowledge (Evid. Code § 702)
California Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a), provides that "[t]he testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter." A declaration submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (d); Bozzi v. Tarrant Corporation, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761.) A declarant's belief or conjecture about facts not personally observed does not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement. (Gatton v. A.P. Green Services, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 688, 695.) Declarations that are based on information obtained from others, or that reflect speculation about the experiences of individuals other than the declarant, fail to satisfy this threshold requirement.
B. Lay Opinion (Evid. Code § 800)
Under Evidence Code section 800, lay witness opinion testimony is admissible only if it is "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony." A lay witness may not offer opinions that extend beyond the witness's personal observation or that purport to address topics requiring specialized knowledge, training, or experience. (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1098.) Lay witnesses are strictly limited to describing what they personally observed and experienced; they may not generalize from their individual experience to draw conclusions about the experiences of others, the motives of corporate actors, or the aggregate impact of workplace practices across multiple facilities and divisions.
C. Expert Opinion (Evid. Code §§ 801, 802)
Evidence Code section 801 provides that expert opinion testimony is admissible only when offered by a witness who is qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Section 802 further requires that the reasons for an expert's opinion be disclosed to the trier of fact. A lay witness may not testify as to statistical patterns, company-wide practices at locations where she did not work, aggregate violation rates across a class of employees, or the design and functionality of complex timekeeping systems. Such matters require the specialized analysis of a qualified expert. (People v. Mendibles (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1293; Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771–772.)
D. Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200)
Evidence Code section 1200 defines hearsay as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated." Hearsay is inadmissible unless a recognized exception applies. (Evid. Code § 1200, subd. (b).) Declarations that recount out-of-court statements by unnamed co-workers about their own break experiences, offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that those co-workers did not receive compliant meal or rest breaks—constitute classic hearsay. The fact that the hearsay declarants are not identified by name makes the hearsay all the more unreliable, as AMA cannot verify, rebut, or test the underlying statements through cross-examination or other means.
E. Foundation (Evid. Code § 403)
Evidence Code section 403 places on the proponent of evidence the burden of establishing a sufficient foundation for the proffered testimony. The proponent must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts necessary for the testimony's admissibility have been established. Where a declarant lacks the foundation to offer testimony on a particular subject—because, for example, she did not personally observe the events described, or lacks the specialized knowledge necessary to support an opinion—the testimony is inadmissible for lack of foundation.
III. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF MARISOL FUENTES
For context, the Court should be aware of the following undisputed facts relevant to the scope and weight of Fuentes's declaration:
• Fuentes was employed by AMA as a Production Coordinator in the Unscripted Programming Division at AMA's Studio City facility, located at 4024 Penmark Strategy Partners Avenue, Studio City, California 91604, designated in the record as "Facility 2."
• Fuentes's employment with AMA commenced on March 14, 2019, and terminated on August 5, 2022. Her hourly rate at separation was $28.50 per hour.
• Facility 2 (Studio City) was one of three AMA facilities at which the TimeTrack Pro Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the relevant class period. The other two facilities where the feature was not activated were Facility 1 (West Hollywood HQ) and Facility 3 (Sherman Oaks). The attestation feature was activated at Facilities 4 through 7 (Burbank, Hollywood, Santa Monica, and El Segundo), as established in the declaration of Karen Fong, AMA's Payroll Manager.
• Fuentes worked in one of AMA's fourteen show units—the Unscripted Programming Division—at one of AMA's seven California production facilities.
These facts establish the inherent limitations of Fuentes's personal knowledge and the scope of testimony she is competent to offer.
Objection No. 1
Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶ 14 (and similar statements in ¶¶ 18, 23, and 31). Fuentes states, in substance, that "most production coordinators at AMA were unable to take compliant meal periods" and that "almost no one" at AMA "received proper breaks during production days."
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation; beyond personal knowledge (Evid. Code § 702).
Fuentes worked at a single AMA facility—Studio City (Facility 2)—among AMA's seven California production facilities. She was assigned exclusively to the Unscripted Programming Division, which is one of fourteen show units operating across AMA's California operations. Fuentes has no personal knowledge of the meal and rest break experiences of employees at the six other AMA facilities (West Hollywood HQ, Sherman Oaks, Burbank, Hollywood, Santa Monica, and El Segundo), or of employees in the thirteen other show units in which she did not work. Her declaration does not establish—nor could it establish—that she personally observed or had personal knowledge of the break practices at any facility other than Studio City, or in any division other than Unscripted Programming.
Fuentes's conclusory characterization of what "most" production coordinators or "almost no one" at AMA experienced improperly bootstraps her individual experience at a single facility into purported evidence of a class-wide violation. The question of whether AMA's meal period practices constituted a uniform class-wide violation—as opposed to individualized experiences varying by facility, show unit, supervisor, and production schedule—is the central contested question in the certification motion. It cannot be established through the lay speculation of a single employee at a single facility.
Prejudice: If the Court considers this testimony, it will have before it purported evidence of a "company-wide" practice based on nothing more than one employee's unsupported assumption that her experience at one facility was shared by approximately 1,850 employees across seven facilities and fourteen show units. This is precisely the type of inadmissible generalization that must be excluded to ensure the Court's certification analysis rests on admissible evidence.
Objection No. 2
Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 15–17, 22. Fuentes states, in substance, that AMA maintained a "company-wide culture" or "uniform practice" of requiring employees to work through meal periods, and that AMA's management "across all facilities" Discouraged employees from taking their legally required breaks.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation; beyond personal knowledge (Evid. Code § 702).
Fuentes has no foundation to testify about practices at facilities where she never worked. She was employed at one facility and interacted with supervisors in one division. Testimony about AMA's "company-wide culture" or management practices "across all facilities" is beyond the scope of her personal knowledge. AMA operates seven distinct production facilities in California, each with its own facility management, production schedules, and operational characteristics. The evidence in the record—including the declaration of Celine Arroyo, AMA's Director of Production Operations, and the expert analysis of Dr. Rajesh Makhija—establishes significant and statistically meaningful variation in scheduling practices, shift lengths, overtime frequency, and meal period compliance across AMA's fourteen show units and seven facilities. Fuentes's bald assertion of "uniformity" is contradicted by the record and is, in any event, beyond the competence of a lay witness to establish.
Additional Ground — Expert Opinion (Evid. Code § 801): To the extent Fuentes purports to characterize AMA's practices as "uniform" or to identify a "company-wide culture," she is offering an opinion that requires the specialized analysis of an industrial/organizational expert, such as Dr. Makhija, who analyzed scheduling data, organizational structures, and operational workflows across all fourteen show units. A lay production coordinator who worked in a single division at a single facility is not qualified to render such an opinion.
Objection No. 3
Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 19–21. Fuentes recounts conversations with unnamed co-workers who allegedly told her they "never" received compliant meal breaks, or that their supervisors "always" made them work through their breaks.
Grounds: Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200). The out-of-court statements of unnamed co-workers, offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that those co-workers did not receive compliant meal breaks and that their supervisors required them to work through breaks—are inadmissible hearsay. No exception to the hearsay rule applies. The statements are not party admissions (Evid. Code § 1220) because the unnamed co-workers are not parties to this action. The statements do not fall within any other recognized hearsay exception.
These unnamed individuals could have submitted their own declarations if Plaintiffs wished to present their testimony. Plaintiffs' failure to do so—and their reliance instead on Fuentes's second-hand recounting of unattributed conversations—should not be rewarded by admitting hearsay testimony that AMA has no ability to test through cross-examination.
Additional Ground — Lack of Foundation: Fuentes does not identify the co-workers by name, position, facility, show unit, or time period. She does not identify when the conversations took place, the context in which they occurred, or the specific words used. This lack of specificity makes it impossible for AMA to verify, rebut, or contextualize the statements, and it deprives the Court of any basis to assess their reliability or relevance.
Objection No. 4
Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 25–27. Fuentes opines that the TimeTrack Pro auto-deduction system was "designed to cheat employees," was "inherently unfair," and "could not accurately capture" actual meal period practices across AMA's facilities.
Grounds: Improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improperly invades the province of expert testimony (Evid. Code § 801).
Fuentes is not qualified to opine on the design, functionality, architecture, or configuration of AMA's TimeTrack Pro timekeeping system. The TimeTrack Pro system is a complex enterprise timekeeping platform developed and maintained by NovaPay Solutions, a third-party payroll and time-and-attendance vendor. The system's configuration—including the auto-deduction feature, the Missed Meal Attestation feature, and the integration of meal period data with AMA's payroll processing—involves technical decisions made by AMA's HR and payroll departments in consultation with NovaPay's Client Data Services team. This is a matter requiring technical expertise of the type provided by Dr. Catherine Lindstrom of Hargrove Analytics Inc. (whose declaration is filed concurrently herewith), the testimony of Karen Fong (AMA Payroll Manager), and the testimony of Marcus Yee (NovaPay Solutions, Director of Client Data Services).
Fuentes may testify about her personal experience using the time clock at Facility 2—e.g., that she punched in and out at a kiosk, that she was or was not aware of the auto-deduction feature, and what she personally observed when she clocked in and out. However, she may not offer opinions about the system's design intent, its accuracy across all facilities and employees, or its capacity to "cheat" the workforce. Such characterizations constitute improper lay opinion on technical matters that are beyond her competence.
Objection No. 5
Objected-to Statement: Fuentes Declaration, ¶ 33. Fuentes states that "thousands of employees" were underpaid as a result of AMA's meal period practices and that the "total harm" to the class was in the "tens of millions of dollars."
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); expert opinion on damages (Evid. Code § 801).
Damages quantification for a putative class of approximately 1,850 non-exempt employees over a multi-year class period (November 1, 2018 through the present) requires rigorous economic analysis of TimeTrack Pro timekeeping data, payroll records, applicable hourly pay rates, premium pay obligations under Labor Code section 226.7, and other variables. This is the province of a qualified damages expert, such as Dr. Howard Rennick of Pinnacle Economic Consulting Group LLC—Plaintiffs' own retained expert—who performed precisely this type of analysis in his expert report. A lay witness is not competent to estimate aggregate class damages, and Fuentes has no foundation to offer testimony on the total financial impact of AMA's practices on a class of employees whose identities, work schedules, pay rates, and break experiences she does not know.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF DEREK HALLORAN
For context, the Court should be aware of the following undisputed facts relevant to the scope and weight of Halloran's declaration:
• Halloran was employed by AMA as a Post-Production Assistant in the Digital Content Division at AMA's Hollywood facility, located at 1438 N. Gower Street, Hollywood, California 90028, designated in the record as "Facility 5."
• Halloran's employment with AMA commenced on June 1, 2020, and terminated on November 30, 2022. His hourly rate at separation was $24.75 per hour.
• Facility 5 (Hollywood) was one of four AMA facilities at which the TimeTrack Pro Missed Meal Attestation feature was activated during the relevant class period. The attestation feature was also activated at Facilities 4 (Burbank), 6 (Santa Monica), and 7 (El Segundo), as established in the declaration of Karen Fong.
• At his deposition on May 9, 2023, Halloran testified that he was aware of the Missed Meal Attestation feature but "never used it because nobody else did and I didn't want to cause problems." (Halloran Dep. 87:14–18.) He also testified that he was "usually" able to take a meal break "except during crunch periods." (Halloran Dep. 62:7–12.)
• Post-production operations at the Hollywood facility are office-based, with relatively regular eight-to-ten-hour schedules, a work environment that is fundamentally different from live production, field production, or studio production.
Objection No. 6
Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 11, 16, 24. Halloran states, in substance, that employees "at all AMA facilities" or "across AMA's California operations" experienced the same meal period violations that he experienced at the Hollywood facility.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); speculation (Evid. Code § 702); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800).
Halloran worked exclusively at the Hollywood facility (Facility 5) in the post-production department. Post-production is a fundamentally different work environment than live production, field production, or studio production. Post-production operations are office-based, involve regular schedules, and center on editing, color correction, sound mixing, and quality control activities that are performed at workstations in an office setting. By contrast, live events operations (Padilla's division) involve twelve-to-sixteen-hour shoots driven by the timing of live broadcasts; field-based production involves on-location shoots with variable and often unpredictable scheduling; and studio-based production involves stage work with its own set of operational constraints.
Halloran has no personal knowledge of the break practices at the other six AMA facilities (West Hollywood HQ, Studio City, Sherman Oaks, Burbank, Santa Monica, and El Segundo), or in the other thirteen show units in which he did not work. His extrapolation from his post-production experience at a single facility to the experiences of the entire putative class is without foundation and constitutes inadmissible speculation.
Objection No. 7
Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 18–20. Halloran opines that the Missed Meal Attestation feature available at his facility was "useless," "a sham," or "designed to create the illusion of compliance" rather than to actually address missed meal periods.
Grounds: Improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); invades the province of expert testimony (Evid. Code § 801).
Halloran may testify about his personal experience with the Missed Meal Attestation feature—including that he was aware of the feature, that he personally chose not to use it, and his subjective reasons for not doing so (as he did at his May 9, 2023 deposition). However, he is not qualified to opine on the feature's design, corporate purpose, or effectiveness across the entire workforce. His characterization of the feature as "useless" or a "sham" is a legal or quasi-expert conclusion, not a statement of observed fact. The question of whether the attestation feature was an adequate mechanism for ensuring compliance with California's meal period requirements is a contested legal and factual issue that cannot be resolved through a lay witness's pejorative characterization.
Note regarding contradictory deposition testimony: Halloran's declaration characterization of the attestation feature as "useless" is contradicted by his own deposition testimony. At deposition, Halloran acknowledged that the attestation feature was available at his facility (Hollywood, Facility 5), that he was aware of it, and that his decision not to use it was based on a subjective desire not to "cause problems"—not on any deficiency in the feature's functionality. (Halloran Dep. 87:14–18; 89:3–11.) A feature that a witness acknowledges was available and functional, but chose not to use for personal reasons, is not "useless" as a matter of fact. Halloran's declaration testimony on this point should be excluded as both lacking foundation and inconsistent with his sworn deposition testimony.
Objection No. 8
Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 21–22. Halloran recounts statements by unnamed colleagues in the post-production department who allegedly told him they were "afraid" to report missed meal periods or that their supervisors "retaliated" against employees who used the Missed Meal Attestation feature.
Grounds: Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200). The out-of-court statements of unnamed post-production colleagues, offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that those colleagues were afraid to report missed meal periods and that supervisors retaliated against employees who used the attestation feature—are inadmissible hearsay. No hearsay exception applies. The unnamed colleagues are not identified by name, position, or time period, making verification of the statements impossible.
Additional Ground — Improper Lay Opinion: To the extent Halloran offers these unattributed statements as evidence of a "culture of fear" or a "policy of retaliation" at AMA, he is offering an improper lay opinion on a matter that requires foundation and evidence beyond second-hand conversations with unidentified co-workers. The existence (or non-existence) of a "culture of fear" or a "policy of retaliation" is a factual conclusion that would need to be established through direct evidence—such as the testimony of employees who actually experienced retaliation, documentation of complaints and disciplinary actions, or expert analysis of AMA's workplace culture—not through a lay witness's recitation of anonymous hearsay.
Objection No. 9
Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 13–14, 28. Halloran states that AMA "systematically" required off-the-clock work before and after shifts, or that performing off-the-clock work was "company policy."
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); conclusory; beyond personal knowledge (Evid. Code § 702).
Halloran may testify about his own pre-shift and post-shift activities at the Hollywood facility. At his deposition, Halloran estimated that he spent approximately fifteen to thirty minutes per shift logging in to editing systems and setting up his workstation before his shift officially began. (Halloran Dep. 44:8–22.) He may describe these personal experiences. However, he may not characterize pre-shift and post-shift activities as "systematic" or as "company policy" based solely on his experience in one department at one facility.
The characterization of such practices as "systematic" or as "company policy" implies that AMA made a deliberate, centralized decision to require off-the-clock work across all facilities and divisions. This is a factual assertion for which Halloran has no foundation. The evidence in the record—including the declaration of Celine Arroyo, AMA's Director of Production Operations—establishes that pre-shift and post-shift practices varied significantly across AMA's fourteen show units, depending on the nature of the production, the equipment involved, the physical setup of each facility, and the individual practices of supervisors and employees.
Moreover, this Court has already addressed the individualized nature of off-the-clock claims. The Court's prior order denying certification of the off-the-clock and overtime claims recognized that such claims are inherently individualized and not amenable to class treatment. Halloran's attempt to characterize individualized pre-shift activities as "company policy" is inconsistent with the Court's prior findings and is, in any event, unsupported by admissible evidence.
Objection No. 10
Objected-to Statement: Halloran Declaration, ¶ 30. Halloran states that AMA's meal period policy or auto-deduction practice was "unlawful," "illegal," or "violated California law."
Grounds: Improper legal conclusion; improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800).
Whether AMA's meal period policies and practices violated the California Labor Code, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 12-2001, or other applicable provisions of California law is a question for the Court, not for a lay witness. Halloran is not an attorney and has no legal training or expertise. He is not qualified to offer legal conclusions regarding the lawfulness of AMA's policies. His declaration should be limited to his personal factual observations—what he saw, heard, and experienced at the Hollywood facility—and should not extend to legal characterizations that are within the exclusive province of the Court.
V. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF YESENIA PADILLA
For context, the Court should be aware of the following undisputed facts relevant to the scope and weight of Padilla's declaration:
• Padilla was employed by AMA as a Segment Coordinator in the Live Events Division at AMA's Burbank facility, located at 3800 W. Alameda Avenue, Burbank, California 91505, designated in the record as "Facility 4."
• Padilla's employment with AMA commenced on January 10, 2018, and terminated on May 17, 2022. Her hourly rate at separation was $31.00 per hour.
• Facility 4 (Burbank) was one of three AMA facilities at which the TimeTrack Pro Missed Meal Attestation feature was not activated during the relevant class period.
• Padilla separated from AMA more than six months before the complaint in this action was filed. (Padilla separated on May 17, 2022; the complaint was filed on November 1, 2022.)
• At her deposition on May 16, 2023, Padilla provided testimony regarding a workplace culture in the Live Events Division where, in her words, "everyone knew you didn't get breaks during a show, and nobody complained because that's just how it worked." (Padilla Dep. 113:4–8.) This testimony, while vivid, was specific to Padilla's experience in the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility.
• The Live Events Division involves unique scheduling constraints driven by the timing of live television productions, including concerts, award shows, and other live broadcasts. These constraints are materially different from the scheduling practices in AMA's other divisions.
Objection No. 11
Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 10, 15, 26, 34. Padilla states, in substance, that "employees at every AMA facility" experienced the same break violations she experienced, or that "all non-exempt AMA workers in California" were denied compliant meal periods.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); speculation (Evid. Code § 702); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800).
Padilla worked exclusively in the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility (Facility 4). Live events operations have unique scheduling constraints that are driven by the timing of live television productions—including concert broadcasts, award shows, and live competition programs—that cannot be paused, rescheduled, or restructured to accommodate meal breaks in the same manner as pre-recorded studio productions. These constraints are materially different from those governing other AMA operations:
• Studio-based shows such as "Kitchen Clash," which taped at the West Hollywood HQ (Facility 1), operated on consistent nine-hour production days with reliable meal breaks scheduled during natural breaks in taping, as established in the declaration of Celine Arroyo.
• Post-production operations at the Hollywood facility (Facility 5) were office-based, with regular eight-to-ten-hour schedules and standardized lunch periods.
• Digital content production operated on hybrid schedules, with some employees working from home and others in-office, and with scheduling flexibility that is not available in live events operations.
• Field-based production (on-location shoots) involved variable scheduling driven by location availability, weather, talent schedules, and other factors unique to each production.
Padilla has no personal knowledge of break practices at any facility other than Burbank and cannot competently testify about the experiences of employees in the other thirteen show units across AMA's six other facilities. Her assertion that "all non-exempt AMA workers in California" experienced the same violations she experienced is pure speculation, unsupported by any foundation in the record.
Objection No. 12
Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶ 17. Padilla states that the denial of meal and rest breaks is "standard practice in the entertainment industry" or "how things work across all production companies," implying that AMA's practices were part of an industry-wide norm.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); irrelevant (Evid. Code § 350).
Padilla is not qualified to testify about industry-wide practices. She worked for one employer—AMA—in one division—Live Events—at one facility—Burbank. She has not been disclosed or qualified as an expert in entertainment industry labor practices, nor has she demonstrated the breadth of experience across multiple production companies that would be necessary to support a generalization about "industry-wide" norms. Even if such testimony were relevant to the issues before the Court—which it is not—it would require the expertise of an industrial/organizational expert with knowledge of employment practices across the entertainment industry.
Moreover, this testimony is irrelevant under Evidence Code section 350. This case concerns AMA's policies and practices, not the entertainment industry's practices generally. Industry custom or practice is not a defense to statutory violations and is equally not proof of them. Whether other production companies also fail to provide compliant meal periods has no bearing on whether AMA's specific policies and practices complied with the requirements of the California Labor Code and IWC Wage Order No. 12-2001. The testimony is therefore irrelevant and should be excluded on that independent ground.
Objection No. 13
Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 19–21. Padilla recounts conversations with employees at AMA facilities other than Burbank—employees she allegedly encountered at company-wide events, training sessions, or other gatherings—who purportedly described their own break experiences at their respective facilities.
Grounds: Hearsay (Evid. Code § 1200). The statements of employees at other AMA facilities, recounted by Padilla, are out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that employees at other facilities also experienced meal period violations similar to those described by Padilla. These statements are inadmissible hearsay. No exception to the hearsay rule applies. The statements are not party admissions, not statements against interest, not spontaneous declarations, and do not fall within any other recognized exception.
The declarants are not identified by name, facility, job title, show unit, or time period. This lack of identifying information makes it impossible for AMA to verify the existence of the conversations, identify the individuals involved, assess whether their experiences are representative or anomalous, or subject the underlying testimony to cross-examination. If Plaintiffs wished to present testimony from employees at other AMA facilities regarding their break experiences, those employees could and should have submitted their own declarations. Plaintiffs' failure to do so cannot be remedied by laundering hearsay through a named plaintiff's declaration.
Objection No. 14
Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 28–29. Padilla opines that AMA implemented the TimeTrack Pro auto-deduction feature "to avoid paying meal period premiums" or "as a cost-saving measure designed to shortchange employees."
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation (Evid. Code § 702).
Padilla, a segment coordinator in the Live Events Division, has no personal knowledge of AMA's business reasons for configuring its TimeTrack Pro timekeeping system. The decision to implement the TimeTrack Pro auto-deduction feature was made by AMA's Human Resources and Payroll departments in connection with AMA's transition to the NovaPay Solutions payroll platform, effective January 1, 2019. This decision involved personnel with whom Padilla has not demonstrated she had any involvement, communication, or interaction, including:
• Lorraine Okafor, Senior Vice President of Human Resources, who oversaw the transition to NovaPay Solutions and approved the TimeTrack Pro configuration;
• Karen Fong, Payroll Manager, who worked with NovaPay to implement the auto-deduction feature and the Missed Meal Attestation functionality at selected facilities; and
• Marcus Yee, Director of Client Data Services at NovaPay Solutions, who configured the TimeTrack Pro system according to AMA's specifications.
Padilla's characterization of AMA's corporate intent—that the auto-deduction was implemented "to avoid paying premiums" or "to shortchange employees"—is pure speculation. She has offered no foundation for this assertion. She has not testified that any AMA manager or executive communicated such a purpose to her, nor has she pointed to any document or communication suggesting such a motive. Her opinion about AMA's corporate intent is inadmissible.
Objection No. 15
Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 12, 32. Padilla states that "at least 80%" of shifts involved missed meal periods, or that "virtually every" shift during live events productions resulted in a meal period violation.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); invades the province of expert testimony (Evid. Code §§ 801, 802).
Quantitative estimates of violation rates across a putative class of approximately 1,850 non-exempt employees over a class period spanning November 1, 2018 through October 31, 2023 require rigorous statistical analysis of TimeTrack Pro timekeeping data, payroll records, Missed Meal Attestation records, production schedules, and other data. This analysis must account for variations across facilities, show units, production types, supervisors, shift lengths, and individual employee practices. It is precisely the type of analysis that Plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Howard Rennick of Pinnacle Economic Consulting Group LLC, was retained to perform, and that Defense expert Dr. Catherine Lindstrom of Hargrove Analytics Inc. has critiqued in her declaration.
A lay fact witness is not competent to estimate violation rates for a class of 1,850 employees. Padilla's personal impressions about the frequency of missed breaks during her own shifts in the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility cannot substitute for data-driven statistical analysis and cannot be extrapolated to the entire class. Her quantitative estimates are without foundation and should be excluded.
Objection No. 16
Objected-to Statement: Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 22–23. Padilla states that AMA "never" provided rest periods during live events productions, or that "no employee" at AMA received compliant rest breaks during production days.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); speculation (Evid. Code § 702).
Padilla may testify about her own rest period experiences within the Live Events Division at the Burbank facility. She may not, however, extrapolate those experiences to the entire putative class. Rest periods present unique evidentiary challenges because they are not recorded in the TimeTrack Pro system. This is consistent with standard industry practice, as rest periods are paid time and are not subject to the same recordkeeping requirements as meal periods. The absence of timekeeping data for rest periods means that evidence of rest period practices must come from testimony of individual employees and supervisors—testimony that, by its nature, will vary by facility, show unit, supervisor, and production type.
This Court's certification order (issued August 11, 2023) recognized this very problem when it denied certification of the rest period claims, finding "no common proof of a systematic failure to provide rest periods" and that "Plaintiffs have presented only anecdotal evidence from three declarants, each with different experiences at different facilities." Padilla's conclusory assertion that "no employee" at AMA received compliant rest breaks is precisely the type of anecdotal generalization that the Court has already found insufficient to support class treatment of the rest period claims, and it should be excluded as lacking foundation and constituting improper lay opinion.
Note: Even Padilla's own testimony regarding rest periods is specific to the unique context of live events productions. The evidence in the record establishes that live events operations are materially different from studio-based, field-based, post-production, and digital content operations. The scheduling constraints of live television—where productions cannot be paused for breaks—do not apply to studio tapings, office-based post-production, or other AMA operations. Padilla's experience in live events is not generalizable to the class, even with respect to rest periods.
VI. GENERAL OBJECTIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL THREE DECLARATIONS
In addition to the specific objections set forth above, AMA asserts the following objections that apply to all three declarations.
Objection No. 17
Objected-to Statements: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 34–35; Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 29, 31; Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 33, 35–36. Each declarant states, in substance, that her experience is "typical" of all class members, that her claims are "common to the class," or that "every employee" at AMA had the same experience she had.
Grounds: Improper lay opinion (Evid. Code § 800); legal conclusion; lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403).
Whether the named plaintiffs' claims are "typical" of the claims of the putative class, or whether "common" questions of law or fact predominate over individual questions, are legal conclusions for the Court to make in applying the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 382 and the standards established by the California Supreme Court in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 and Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319. These are not factual matters within the competence of lay witnesses. A named plaintiff may describe her own experience; she may not declare, as a legal conclusion, that her experience satisfies the prerequisites for class certification. Such declarations usurp the Court's role as gatekeeper on the certification question.
Additional Ground: The record evidence directly contradicts these assertions of typicality and commonality. Dr. Makhija's expert analysis, set forth in his declaration filed concurrently herewith, demonstrates statistically significant variation across AMA's fourteen show units and seven facilities in the following key variables:
• Scheduling practices (fixed versus variable schedules; use of call times versus set start times);
• Average shift length (ranging from 8.2 hours in studio-based productions at West Hollywood HQ to 13.7 hours in the Live Events Division);
• Overtime frequency (ranging from 12% of shifts in post-production to 68% of shifts in live events);
• Meal period timing and duration (ranging from 95% compliance in the "Kitchen Clash" unit to 41% compliance in the Live Events Division); and
• Supervisor-level variation in break scheduling practices (with 14 different show units overseen by 23 different production managers with materially different management styles and operational approaches).
Each named plaintiff worked in a different division (Unscripted Programming, Post-Production/Digital Content, and Live Events), at a different facility (Studio City, Hollywood, and Burbank, respectively), under different supervisors, with different scheduling patterns and different work environments. Their experiences are not typical of each other, let alone of 1,850 putative class members. Their conclusory assertions to the contrary are inadmissible.
Objection No. 18
Objected-to Statements: Fuentes Declaration, ¶¶ 16, 24; Halloran Declaration, ¶¶ 15, 25–26; Padilla Declaration, ¶¶ 14, 27, 30. Each declarant states, in substance, that AMA's management "knew" about the meal and rest break violations and "intentionally" chose not to remedy them, or that AMA "deliberately" implemented the auto-deduction feature to deny employees their legally required meal period premiums.
Grounds: Lacks foundation (Evid. Code § 403); speculation (Evid. Code § 702); improper lay opinion on state of mind (Evid. Code § 800).
None of the three named plaintiffs was a member of AMA's management team. Each was an hourly, non-exempt production-support employee: Fuentes was a Production Coordinator, Halloran was a Post-Production Assistant, and Padilla was a Segment Coordinator. None of the three declarants held a supervisory, managerial, or executive position at AMA. They have no personal knowledge of what AMA's senior management—including Jonathan Mercer (President of AMA), Lorraine Okafor (Senior Vice President of Human Resources), or Gregory Tanaka (Vice President of Legal & Compliance)—knew, intended, or decided regarding timekeeping system configuration, meal period policy design, or the implementation of compliance measures.
The declarants' statements about AMA's corporate knowledge and intent are speculative and inadmissible. A lay employee may testify about what she personally observed in the workplace; she may not testify about the subjective knowledge or intent of corporate officers and executives with whom she had no direct communication on the relevant topics. The question of whether AMA acted knowingly or intentionally is a factual question that must be established through competent evidence—such as the testimony of AMA's decision-makers, corporate documents reflecting the decision-making process, or other direct evidence of corporate knowledge—not through the speculation of hourly employees who were not involved in and had no knowledge of AMA's management decisions.
VII. REQUEST
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc. respectfully requests that the Court:
1. Sustain each of the foregoing eighteen evidentiary objections (Objection Nos. 1 through 18);
2. Exclude and disregard the identified statements in the declarations of Marisol Fuentes, Derek Halloran, and Yesenia Padilla in ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification; and
3. Consider these objections in connection with AMA's Opposition to Motion for Class Certification, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition, and supporting declarations and exhibits, all filed concurrently herewith.
Dated: June 16, 2023
CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP
By: ________
Devon Archer (SBN 301462)
Renata Vasquez (SBN 224578) Devon Archer (SBN 301462) 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200 Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 555-7200 Facsimile: (213) 555-7201
Attorneys for Defendant Aurelius Media Americas Inc.
PROOF OF SERVICE
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, declare as follows:
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to the within action. My business address is Calderwood & Harkness LLP, 777 South Flower Street, Suite 4200, Los Angeles, California 90017.
On June 16, 2023, I caused to be served the foregoing document described as:
DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, AND YESENIA PADILLA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
on all parties in this action by serving a true copy thereof via electronic service through the Court's electronic filing and service system, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 2.251, and the parties' agreement to accept electronic service, on the following counsel of record:
Marco Castellano Diane Salas Trevor Kim CASTELLANO BYRNE & SALAS LLP 11755 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900 Los Angeles, California 90025 Telephone: (310) 555-4400
Email: mcastellano@inlawlaw.com; dsalas@inlawlaw.com; tkim@inlawlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Sandra Higuera VELTRANO EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP PC 350 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 555-8100
Email: shiguera@ridgemontlaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 16, 2023, at Los Angeles, California.
________________________________________
Alyssa Chen
MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, and YESENIA PADILLA, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, | DEFENDANT AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC.'S EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS MARISOL FUENTES, DEREK HALLORAN, AND YESENIA PADILLA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
v.
AURELIUS MEDIA AMERICAS INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, | Date: July 28, 2023
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Defendants. | Dept.: 34

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I. INTRODUCTION

II. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

III. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF MARISOL FUENTES

IV. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF DEREK HALLORAN

V. OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF YESENIA PADILLA

VI. GENERAL OBJECTIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL THREE DECLARATIONS

VII. REQUEST

CALDERWOOD & HARKNESS LLP

PROOF OF SERVICE

PROOF OF SERVICE

Record

Parties

Dates

Amounts