PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Cross-Examination Outlines — Kestrel Dynamics GmbH Witnesses
Friedrich Brenner (Managing Director / Geschäftsführer) Luisa Erdmann (Commercial Director) Dr. Stefan Voss (Head of Quality Assurance)
ICC Case No. 27914/MHM
Whitmore Aerospace LLC (Respondent) v. Kestrel Dynamics GmbH (Claimant)
Prepared by:
Simone Laroche, Senior Associate Jeffrey Park, Associate
For:
Theodore Langston, Partner (Responsible Partner) Vivienne St. Claire, Partner (Billing Partner)
Calderwood & Harkness LLP 600 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022
Engagement Number: 1019-00001
January 2024
Hearing Dates: January 8–12, 2024 ICC Hearing Centre, New York, New York
Tribunal: Prof. Dame Eleanor Fitzwilliam (Presiding Arbitrator) Dr. Hans-Ulrich Perren (Claimant's Nominee) Hon. Robert A. Castillo (Respondent's Nominee)
Opposing Counsel: Dr. Maximilian Haber and Katrin Schäfer Haber Reinhardt Schlosser Partnerschaft mbB
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I. Introduction and General Notes
A. Purpose
This document constitutes an internal attorney work product containing detailed cross-examination outlines prepared for the January 2024 evidentiary hearing in ICC Case No. 27914/MHM. The outlines cover the three Kestrel Dynamics GmbH ("Kestrel" or "Claimant") fact witnesses scheduled to appear at the hearing:
1.  Friedrich Brenner — Managing Director / Geschäftsführer of Kestrel Dynamics GmbH;
2.  Luisa Erdmann — Commercial Director of Kestrel Dynamics GmbH; and
3.  Dr. Stefan Voss — Head of Quality Assurance of Kestrel Dynamics GmbH.
The cross-examination outlines have been designed to accomplish two interconnected objectives. First, the outlines support Respondent Whitmore Aerospace LLC's ("WAL" or "Respondent") defense against Kestrel's claims of material breach of the Master Supply Agreement dated June 15, 2018 (Document Reference WAL-KDG-MSA-2018-0615) (the "MSA"), as amended by Amendment No. 1 dated February 10, 2020 and Amendment No. 2 dated September 3, 2021 (collectively, the "Amendments"). Second, the outlines support WAL's counterclaim of €5.17 million for replacement-component costs incurred as a result of WAL's procurement of substitute turbine housings from Valkyr Precision Components Inc. ("Valkyr") following the termination of the MSA for Persistent Quality Failure under Section 14.2(b) of the MSA.
This document is privileged and confidential, and has been prepared solely for the internal use of the Calderwood & Harkness LLP team representing Respondent. It should not be distributed, disclosed, or referenced in any filing or communication with opposing counsel, the Tribunal, or any third party.
B. Overarching Cross-Examination Objectives
The cross-examination of the three Kestrel fact witnesses is directed at establishing the following overarching themes, each of which is critical to Respondent's defense and counterclaim:
1. Kestrel Was Aware of the Porosity Failures and the Failures Were Genuine. Across all three witnesses, the cross-examination must establish that Kestrel was aware of porosity failures in the rejected lots and that the failures were genuine non-conformances — not fabricated or exaggerated by WAL. Internal Kestrel communications obtained in document production under Procedural Order No. 2 (dated March 17, 2023) reflect contemporaneous acknowledgment of quality issues by each of the three witnesses. The cross-examination will confront each witness with these documents and establish the fundamental inconsistency between Kestrel's contemporaneous acknowledgment of quality problems and its litigation position that all rejected lots conformed to specification.
2. Kestrel's Cure Efforts Were Insufficient. The cross-examination must demonstrate that Kestrel's cure efforts, to the extent any were undertaken, were insufficient in both scope and timeliness. Amendment No. 2 extended the cure period from 30 to 45 calendar days. Despite this extension, Kestrel failed to cure seven of the fourteen lot rejections within the amended cure period. The cross-examination of all three witnesses — each of whom had distinct responsibilities for the cure process — will establish the factual basis for Respondent's position that the Persistent Quality Failure threshold under Section 8.4 of the MSA was exceeded.
3. The Porosity Specification Was Clear and Unambiguous. A central pillar of Kestrel's case is the contention that WAL applied an "unpublished" porosity standard of ≤0.15% rather than the contractual standard of ≤0.25% specified in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. The cross-examination must expose the inconsistency of this position. None of the three Kestrel witnesses has been able to identify any WAL document, communication, or instruction establishing a ≤0.15% standard. Moreover, even applying the contractual ≤0.25% standard, a significant number of rejected lots exceeded the specification, as confirmed by Dr. Raymond Chow of Arclight Materials Science Inc., whose expert analysis found porosity levels ranging from 0.19% to 0.38% across the fourteen rejected lots.
4. The Valkyr Replacement Theory Is Unsupported by Evidence and Commercially Implausible. Kestrel has advanced the narrative that WAL's true motive in rejecting lots and terminating the MSA was to replace Kestrel with Valkyr Precision Components Inc. as a lower-cost domestic supplier. This theory is both factually unsupported and commercially implausible. The cross-examination will establish that (a) no Kestrel witness has personal knowledge of when WAL first contacted Valkyr, (b) WAL's engagement with Valkyr occurred after the quality failures commenced, as a mitigation measure, and (c) Valkyr's unit price of €8,432.92 significantly exceeds Kestrel's CY4 price of €5,222.92, rendering the "lower-cost replacement" theory irrational on its face.
5. Kestrel's Damages Claim of €47.3 Million Is Unsupported. The cross-examination must challenge the credibility and quantum of Kestrel's damages claim across its principal components: (a) lost profits for the remaining MSA term (€12.83 million), (b) lost profits for the two one-year renewal periods (€27.15 million), (c) unreimbursed rework costs (€3.42 million), and (d) reputational damages (€3.90 million). In particular, the 22.4% margin assumed by Prof. Dieter Langfeld of Rheinsberg Advisory AG must be tested against Kestrel's actual historical margins, and the renewal-period claim must be shown to rest on the unfounded assumption that WAL would have exercised both discretionary renewal options.
C. Key Evidentiary References
The following evidentiary references are central to the cross-examination outlines and will be used across multiple witnesses. Counsel should ensure familiarity with each document and have physical or electronic copies readily accessible during the hearing.
Contract Documents:
•  MSA dated June 15, 2018 (WAL-KDG-MSA-2018-0615), including all schedules, appendices, and exhibits
•  Amendment No. 1 dated February 10, 2020
•  Amendment No. 2 dated September 3, 2021
•  Key MSA provisions:
•  Section 4.1 (Volume Commitments)
•  Section 5.2 (Pricing and Escalation)
•  Section 8.4 (Rejection, Cure, and Persistent Quality Failure)
•  Section 8.7 (Exclusive Remedy and Consequential Damages Waiver)
•  Section 14.2 (Termination for Cause)
Technical Specifications:
•  WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3 (porosity specification ≤0.25%)
•  WAL-SPEC-TH-401 through WAL-SPEC-TH-410 (full suite of engineering specifications)
•  WAL-QCP-100 (incoming inspection procedures)
•  AS9100 Rev D certification requirements
Lot Information:
•  Lot numbers: KDG-2022-0307 (first rejected lot, March 7, 2022) through KDG-2022-0919 (last rejected lot, September 19, 2022)
•  Total rejected lots: 14
•  Total rejected units: 1,680
Expert Reports:
•  Dr. Raymond Chow, Arclight Materials Science Inc. (Respondent's metallurgical expert): porosity range of 0.19%–0.38% in rejected lots
•  Dr. Martina Kessler, Albrecht Prüftechnik GmbH (Claimant's metallurgical expert)
•  Dr. Nadia Ostrovsky, Ridgeline Economic Consulting LLC (Respondent's damages expert)
•  Prof. Dieter Langfeld, Rheinsberg Advisory AG (Claimant's damages expert): 22.4% margin assumption
Documents Obtained in Production:
•  Internal Kestrel communications produced pursuant to Procedural Order No. 2 (March 17, 2023), including emails and memoranda among Brenner, Erdmann, and Voss regarding lot rejections, quality concerns, root-cause analysis, and corrective actions
D. General Examination Strategy Notes
All three Kestrel witnesses will be examined by Claimant's counsel — Dr. Maximilian Haber and/or Katrin Schäfer of Haber Reinhardt Schlosser Partnerschaft mbB — on direct examination before Respondent's cross-examination. The cross-examination order will follow the order of direct examination. The estimated total cross-examination time for all three witnesses is to be confirmed per Respondent's Pre-Hearing Organizational Submissions filed in December 2023. As a general matter, Respondent should request the maximum time available under the Tribunal's Procedural Order No. 4 and the equal-time allocation framework adopted at the case management conference.
Tone and Approach — Witness-Specific Guidance:
•  Friedrich Brenner: Measured and methodical. Brenner is the most senior witness, co-founder of Kestrel, and the company's managing director. He will be cautious, well-prepared, and reluctant to make concessions. The approach should be structured, building incrementally from uncontroversial foundational questions to documents and data points that compel concessions. Avoid confrontational tone in the early stages; let the documents speak. Reserve more assertive questioning for the impeachment sections (quality awareness, Valkyr theory, and damages).
•  Luisa Erdmann: More assertive. Erdmann is the commercial director and was the primary point of contact for WAL. Her contemporaneous correspondence is the most fertile ground for impeachment. She is likely to have made admissions in emails to WAL's Gerald Huang that are inconsistent with Kestrel's litigation position. The cross-examination should move quickly from context-setting to document confrontation. Use paired questions: first establish the litigation position, then present the contemporaneous document that contradicts it.
•  Dr. Stefan Voss: Technical and precise. Voss is Kestrel's quality expert and must be pinned to specific data points. The cross-examination should proceed with scientific rigor, asking precise questions about testing methodologies, measurement results, calibration records, and corrective action reports. Any attempt to equivocate on data should be met with requests for specific numbers, dates, and documents. The contrast between Kestrel's internal test data and Dr. Chow's independent findings is the central impeachment opportunity.
Language Considerations: The language of the arbitration is English. All three Kestrel witnesses are German-speaking. Claimant may request interpretation services, and the Tribunal has indicated it will accommodate such requests. If an interpreter is used, counsel should adjust pacing accordingly. Questions should be short, declarative, and unambiguous to minimize translation issues. Avoid compound questions and idiomatic English expressions. Where German-language documents are used, ensure certified English translations are available and confirm with the witness which version he or she is reading from.
Coordination with Expert Team: Sandra Gillespie of Canfield & Thorpe LLP (forensic accountant retained by Respondent) will be present in the hearing room to provide real-time support on financial and damages-related lines of cross-examination, particularly during the examination of Erdmann and, to a lesser extent, Brenner. Any financial data points or margin calculations elicited from the witnesses should be flagged in real time for Ms. Gillespie's verification.
II. Cross-Examination Outline: Friedrich Brenner (Managing Director / Geschäftsführer)
A. Witness Background and Credibility Foundations
The initial phase of Brenner's cross-examination should establish his seniority, his personal involvement in the key events, and his status as the ultimate decision-maker at Kestrel. This foundational segment serves two purposes: it prevents Brenner from later claiming ignorance or lack of authority, and it establishes for the Tribunal that Brenner's testimony carries particular weight because of his position.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, you are the co-founder of Kestrel Dynamics GmbH, correct?
Confirm that Brenner co-founded Kestrel in 2004 and has served as Geschäftsführer (managing director) continuously since that date.
2.  As Geschäftsführer, you are the most senior executive decision-maker at Kestrel, are you not?
Confirm that Brenner has ultimate responsibility for all commercial and operational matters at Kestrel. He should not be permitted to characterize himself as merely one of several decision-makers if the corporate structure shows him as sole Geschäftsführer or as the senior among co-managing directors. If he claims shared authority, establish the specific governance structure and his predominant role.
3.  You were personally involved in negotiating the Master Supply Agreement with Whitmore Aerospace LLC, executed on June 15, 2018?
Confirm personal involvement. Brenner's first witness statement (¶¶ 4–12) describes his role in the MSA negotiations. Use his own witness statement as the anchor for this confirmation.
4.  You signed the MSA on behalf of Kestrel, did you not?
Confirm execution. The MSA signature page should be available to present if needed.
5.  Before signing the MSA, you reviewed and approved the quality requirements, including the engineering specifications referenced in the MSA?
Confirm that Brenner personally reviewed the quality requirements, including WAL-SPEC-TH-401 and its appendices, before executing the MSA. This is essential for the porosity-specification line of questioning that follows.
6.  You were personally involved in Kestrel's decisions regarding how to respond to Whitmore Aerospace's lot rejections beginning in March 2022?
Confirm personal involvement in the rejection response process. This prevents any later attempt to deflect responsibility to Erdmann or Voss.
B. Knowledge of the Porosity Specification
This segment is designed to establish, through Brenner's own admissions, that the contractual porosity specification was clear, unambiguous, and set at ≤0.25% — not at the ≤0.15% level that Kestrel contends WAL "unpublishedly" applied. This is a critical line because it goes to the heart of Kestrel's defense on the merits.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, I'd like to direct your attention to a document in your binder. This is WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. Do you recognize this document?
Present WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3. Confirm that Brenner recognizes the specification. Confirm that this document was part of the package of engineering specifications incorporated by reference into the MSA at the time of execution on June 15, 2018.
2.  Table 3 sets forth the maximum permissible porosity for Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings at ≤0.25%, correct?
This is a document-driven question; the answer is contained in Table 3 itself. Brenner should confirm. If he attempts to qualify or contextualize, redirect to the plain text of Table 3.
3.  You reviewed and approved this specification before Kestrel entered into the MSA, correct?
This follows from the foundation established in Section A. If Brenner claims he did not personally review Appendix C, Table 3, follow up: As managing director, you had access to all specifications incorporated into the MSA, did you not? And you had the opportunity to review them before you signed the agreement?
4.  After the MSA was executed on June 15, 2018, was any amendment, side letter, or other written instrument ever executed between WAL and Kestrel that changed the porosity specification from ≤0.25% to any other level?
Expected answer: No. Confirm that Amendment No. 1 and Amendment No. 2 did not modify the porosity specification. If Brenner suggests an oral modification or course of dealing, note that MSA Section 22.3 requires all amendments to be in writing signed by both parties.
5.  Mr. Brenner, Kestrel's position in this arbitration is that Whitmore Aerospace applied an "unpublished" standard of ≤0.15% porosity to reject the lots at issue. You are aware of that pleading position?
Confirm awareness.
6.  Have you ever seen any Whitmore Aerospace document — a specification, a memorandum, an email, a letter, or any other writing — that states a porosity requirement of ≤0.15%?
Expected answer: No. If Brenner claims he has seen such a document, demand that he identify it with specificity (date, author, recipient, document number). This document has not appeared in the production and does not appear in the record. If he cannot identify it, note the failure for the record.
7.  If the contractual porosity standard was ≤0.25%, and Dr. Raymond Chow's independent analysis found porosity levels ranging from 0.19% to 0.38% in the fourteen rejected lots, then a number of those lots exceeded the contractual limit — do you agree?
This is an arithmetic question. Brenner may resist, but the math is straightforward: any lot with porosity above 0.25% exceeded the specification. Note that Dr. Chow found a range; lots at the lower end of the range (0.19%–0.25%) may have been within specification, but lots at the upper end (above 0.25% through 0.38%) clearly exceeded it.
8.  I'd like to show you [document reference — internal Kestrel communication obtained in production]. This is an email dated [date] from you to Dr. Voss in which you acknowledge that certain lots exhibited porosity levels above 0.25%. Do you recognize this email?
Key document: Any internal Kestrel communication (obtained in document production under Procedural Order No. 2) in which Brenner acknowledged porosity levels above the contractual specification. The specific document reference should be inserted once the final hearing bundle is assembled. This is the critical impeachment point: Brenner's own contemporaneous acknowledgment contradicts Kestrel's litigation position.
C. Awareness of Quality Failures
This segment establishes that Brenner was personally aware of the quality failures as they accumulated over the six-month period from March through September 2022 and that he failed to take effective corrective action despite his awareness.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, I'd like to walk through the chronology of the lot rejections. The first rejected lot was Lot KDG-2022-0307, rejected by WAL on or about March 7, 2022. Do you recall that?
Establish the starting point. Then walk through the chronology of all 14 lot rejections from Lot KDG-2022-0307 through Lot KDG-2022-0919. The goal is to impress upon the Tribunal the volume and frequency of the rejections over a six-month period.
2.  You received WAL's rejection notices for each of these fourteen lots, did you not?
Confirm receipt. If Brenner claims the notices went to Erdmann or Voss rather than directly to him, follow up: But you were informed of each rejection, were you not? As managing director, lot rejections of this magnitude were brought to your attention?
3.  I'd like to show you [document reference — internal Kestrel email/memorandum]. This is a [date] communication in which you discuss the quality problems with the rejected lots. Do you recognize this document?
Present any internal Kestrel emails or memoranda in which Brenner acknowledged quality issues, discussed root-cause analysis, or expressed concern about the pattern of rejections. Walk through each relevant document chronologically.
4.  After the first rejections in March 2022, did you direct any specific corrective action to address the porosity issues?
If yes, ask what specific corrective actions were directed. Follow up by asking why those actions failed to prevent subsequent rejections. If no, establish that the managing director failed to direct corrective action after the first sign of quality problems.
5.  Between March and September 2022, Kestrel had fourteen lots rejected — a total of 1,680 units. Over that six-month period, did you implement any effective corrective measures that stopped the pattern of rejections?
The answer must be no, because the rejections continued through September 2022. Regardless of what corrective measures Brenner claims were taken, the objective fact is that the rejections did not stop.
6.  Was Kestrel's AS9100 Rev D certification ever at risk due to these quality failures?
This question probes the severity of the quality issues from a regulatory/certification perspective. If Brenner says no, follow up: Fourteen lot rejections in six months — representing 1,680 non-conforming units — and Kestrel's AS9100 certification was never at risk? Were there any internal audit findings related to these quality failures?
D. Cure Efforts and the 45-Day Period
This segment addresses the sufficiency and timeliness of Kestrel's cure efforts, which is the core contractual issue underlying WAL's termination for Persistent Quality Failure.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, you are familiar with Amendment No. 2 to the MSA, dated September 3, 2021?
Confirm familiarity.
2.  Amendment No. 2 extended the cure period for rejected lots from 30 calendar days to 45 calendar days, correct?
Confirm. This extension was actually a concession negotiated by Kestrel, which underscores that Kestrel understood the importance of the cure mechanism and sought additional time.
3.  Despite the extended 45-day cure period, Kestrel failed to replace or rework seven of the fourteen rejected lots within 45 calendar days. You are aware of that, are you not?
Confirm. If Brenner disputes the number, present the cure-tracking spreadsheet or rejection-response correspondence for each of the seven uncured lots.
4.  For each of those seven uncured rejections, can you tell the Tribunal what specific steps Kestrel took to attempt to cure?
This is an open question designed to test the depth and credibility of Brenner's account of cure efforts. For each uncured rejection, probe: Was a replacement lot manufactured? Was the rejected lot reworked? What was the timeline? Why did the cure fail? What resources were allocated?
5.  Mr. Brenner, you are familiar with Section 8.4 of the MSA, which defines "Persistent Quality Failure"?
Confirm familiarity.
6.  Section 8.4 provides that a Persistent Quality Failure exists when there are three or more uncured rejections in any rolling twelve-month period. You understood that provision, correct?
Confirm understanding.
7.  Seven uncured rejections in a six-month period far exceeded the three-rejection threshold, did it not?
This is an arithmetic question. Seven exceeds three. Brenner must concede.
8.  Before WAL issued its Notice of Termination for Cause on October 3, 2022, did Kestrel ever communicate to WAL — in writing or otherwise — that Kestrel disputed the applicability of Section 8.4?
Expected answer: No. If Brenner claims there was such a communication, ask him to identify it with specificity. The absence of any contemporaneous challenge to the applicability of § 8.4 is a powerful point: Kestrel raised this objection only after filing for arbitration.
E. Motive and Valkyr Replacement Theory
This segment addresses and dismantles Kestrel's narrative theory that WAL's true motive was to replace Kestrel with Valkyr as a lower-cost domestic supplier.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, it is Kestrel's position in this arbitration that Whitmore Aerospace's true motive in rejecting the lots and terminating the MSA was to replace Kestrel with a lower-cost domestic supplier — Valkyr Precision Components Inc. in Tucson, Arizona. You are aware of that position?
Confirm awareness. Brenner's first witness statement advances this theory.
2.  Do you have personal knowledge of when WAL first contacted Valkyr Precision Components?
Expected answer: No. If Brenner claims to have such knowledge, ask the basis — did he see a document? Was he told by someone at WAL? By whom, and when?
3.  I'd like to show you [WAL timeline document]. WAL's records show that its first contact with Valkyr occurred on [date], which was after the quality failures began in March 2022. Is there anything in Kestrel's possession that contradicts this timeline?
Establish that WAL's engagement with Valkyr was a mitigation measure undertaken in response to Kestrel's quality failures, not a preexisting plan to replace Kestrel.
4.  Mr. Brenner, you are aware that Valkyr's unit price for the same turbine housings is €8,432.92 per unit?
Confirm.
5.  And Kestrel's price in Contract Year 4 was €5,222.92 per unit, correct?
Confirm.
6.  That is a difference of approximately €3,210 per unit — Valkyr charges more than 61% more than Kestrel charged in CY4. You would agree with that arithmetic?
Confirm. The math is straightforward: (€8,432.92 − €5,222.92) / €5,222.92 = approximately 61.5%.
7.  Valkyr offered WAL an introductory discount of 4.2%, bringing the effective price to approximately €8,078.74 per unit. Even with that discount, Valkyr's price is still approximately €2,855.82 per unit more than Kestrel's CY4 price. You would agree?
Confirm. Calculation: €8,432.92 × 0.958 = approximately €8,078.74; €8,078.74 − €5,222.92 = approximately €2,855.82.
8.  Mr. Brenner, would it be commercially rational for a company to replace a supplier charging €5,222.92 per unit with a supplier charging more than €8,000 per unit if the motivation were simply to reduce costs?
Expected answer: reluctant concession that it would not be rational, or an attempt to explain around the pricing. Either way, the pricing differential speaks for itself.
F. Damages and Commercial Position
This segment challenges the credibility and quantum of Kestrel's damages claim, with particular focus on the renewal-period lost-profits component and the reputational damages claim.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, the MSA provides for an initial five-year term with two one-year renewal options. You are aware of that?
Confirm.
2.  Those renewal options are exercisable solely at WAL's discretion — WAL has the unilateral right to decide whether to renew. Correct?
Confirm. MSA Section [specific section] provides that the renewal options are exercisable by written notice from WAL, at WAL's sole discretion. There is no corresponding right on Kestrel's part to compel renewal.
3.  Did WAL ever communicate to you — in writing or orally — an intent to exercise either renewal option?
Expected answer: No. If Brenner claims there was such a communication, demand specifics: when, by whom, in what form.
4.  Yet Kestrel's damages claim includes €27.15 million in lost profits for the two renewal periods. That figure assumes WAL would have exercised both renewal options, does it not?
Confirm that the renewal-period claim is premised on an assumption of renewal that is unsupported by any binding commitment or express communication of intent.
5.  Prof. Langfeld's damages analysis assumes a 22.4% profit margin for Kestrel's production of turbine housings under the MSA. Are you familiar with that assumption?
Confirm familiarity.
6.  What were Kestrel's actual profit margins on the WAL contract for Contract Years 1 through 4?
Probe actual vs. assumed margins. If Brenner does not know the specific numbers, note that he is the managing director and should be familiar with the profitability of a major contract. If the actual margins differ from the 22.4% assumption, highlight the discrepancy.
7.  Kestrel's total annual revenue for fiscal year 2022 was approximately €312 million. You can confirm that?
Confirm.
8.  What percentage of Kestrel's total annual revenue was attributable to the WAL contract?
Probe revenue concentration. At a CY4 price of €5,222.92 per unit and assuming volumes between 2,400 and 3,600 units, the WAL contract generated between approximately €12.5 million and €18.8 million in annual revenue — representing between approximately 4% and 6% of Kestrel's total revenue. This context is relevant to both the lost-profits and reputational damages claims.
9.  Kestrel claims €3.90 million in reputational damages. Mr. Brenner, can you identify any specific customer that Kestrel lost as a direct result of WAL's termination of the MSA?
Expected answer: vague or no specific identification. If Brenner identifies a customer, demand the name, the date of the lost business, the value of the lost contract, and any documentation of the customer's stated reason for not doing business with Kestrel. If he cannot provide specifics, note the insufficiency of the reputational damages claim.
G. The Termination Notice
This final segment of Brenner's cross-examination addresses the circumstances surrounding WAL's termination of the MSA and Kestrel's rapid filing of the Request for Arbitration, which suggests pre-planned litigation rather than good-faith efforts to resolve the dispute.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Mr. Brenner, you received WAL's Notice of Termination for Cause, dated October 3, 2022?
Confirm receipt.
2.  The notice cited Persistent Quality Failure under Section 14.2(b) as the basis for termination?
Confirm.
3.  After receiving that notice, did Kestrel respond with any proposal to cure the quality failures or to resolve the dispute commercially?
Expected answer: No, or at most a brief acknowledgment letter. The key point is the absence of any cure proposal or commercial resolution effort.
4.  Kestrel filed its Request for Arbitration with the ICC on November 7, 2022 — just 35 days after the termination notice. Correct?
Confirm the timeline.
5.  In those 35 days, rather than attempting to cure the outstanding quality failures or engage in commercial discussions with WAL, Kestrel retained Haber Reinhardt Schlosser, prepared a Request for Arbitration, and filed it with the ICC. Is that a fair characterization of what happened in those 35 days?
The point is clear: Kestrel prioritized litigation over cure. This is consistent with the broader theme that Kestrel's quality failures were genuine and that Kestrel recognized it could not cure them.
6.  Mr. Brenner, is it fair to say that by the time WAL issued the termination notice, Kestrel had already concluded that it could not cure the quality problems and that its best course was to dispute the termination through arbitration?
This is a characterization question that Brenner will likely resist, but it frames the issue for the Tribunal. His answer is less important than the question itself.
III. Cross-Examination Outline: Luisa Erdmann (Commercial Director)
A. Witness Background and Role
The foundational segment for Erdmann's cross-examination establishes her role as the primary commercial interface between Kestrel and WAL and her responsibility for day-to-day contract administration. This is essential because Erdmann's contemporaneous correspondence is the richest source of impeachment material.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, you serve as the Commercial Director of Kestrel Dynamics GmbH, correct?
Confirm role.
2.  In that capacity, you are responsible for international sales and contract management at Kestrel?
Confirm scope of responsibilities.
3.  During the term of the MSA with Whitmore Aerospace, you were the primary commercial point of contact for WAL — the person at Kestrel who communicated most frequently with WAL's representatives on commercial and operational matters?
Confirm. Erdmann's witness statement identifies her as the primary contact. Her counterpart at WAL was Gerald Huang, WAL's Director of Supply Chain.
4.  Your responsibilities included contract administration, pricing discussions, delivery scheduling, and — relevant to this case — communicating with WAL regarding lot rejections and cure efforts?
Confirm each element of her responsibilities.
B. Contract Negotiations and Specification Awareness
This segment establishes Erdmann's familiarity with the MSA terms and specifications, preventing any later claim of ignorance regarding the porosity specification or cure obligations.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, you participated in the negotiation of the MSA, executed June 15, 2018?
Confirm participation.
2.  You were also involved in negotiating Amendment No. 1, dated February 10, 2020?
Confirm. Amendment No. 1 added WAL-SPEC-TH-410 to the applicable engineering specifications and increased the maximum annual volume from 3,600 to 4,000 units. Establish that Erdmann understood these changes and their commercial implications.
3.  And you were involved in negotiating Amendment No. 2, dated September 3, 2021?
Confirm. Amendment No. 2 extended the cure period from 30 to 45 calendar days and added a force majeure/pandemic carve-out provision. Establish that Erdmann understood these changes — particularly the extension of the cure period, which was a concession Kestrel specifically sought.
4.  Let me confirm your understanding of the pricing structure. The CY1 base price was €4,850 per unit, with a 2.5% annual escalator compounded annually. The MSA established a minimum annual volume of 2,400 units and a maximum of 3,600 units — later increased to 4,000 units by Amendment No. 1. Is that correct?
Confirm each element of the pricing structure. This will be relevant to the damages segment.
5.  You were familiar with the quality requirements incorporated into the MSA, including WAL-SPEC-TH-401 through WAL-SPEC-TH-410 and the porosity limit of ≤0.25% per WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3?
Confirm. If Erdmann claims she was not familiar with the technical specifications because she is a commercial rather than technical executive, point out that the specifications were part of the contract she helped negotiate and that they define the product Kestrel was obligated to deliver.
C. Contemporaneous Correspondence Regarding Lot Rejections
This is the most important segment of Erdmann's cross-examination. The contemporaneous correspondence between Erdmann and WAL's Gerald Huang is the primary source of impeachment material, because it is expected to reveal admissions and acknowledgments that are inconsistent with Kestrel's litigation position.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, when WAL rejected a lot of turbine housings, it sent a formal rejection notice. You received copies of those rejection notices, correct?
Confirm receipt.
2.  And you communicated with WAL's Gerald Huang regarding those rejection notices — by email, correct?
Confirm.
3.  I'd like to show you [document reference — Erdmann email to Gerald Huang, specific date]. This is an email you sent to Mr. Huang on [date] in response to WAL's rejection of Lot [number]. Do you recognize this email?
Present each key email in chronological order. For each email, establish: (a) Erdmann wrote it; (b) it was sent in response to a specific lot rejection; (c) it contains language acknowledging receipt of the rejection and, critically, any language acknowledging quality concerns or requesting additional time.
4.  In this email, you wrote: [quote specific language acknowledging quality concerns or requesting an extension to the cure period]. Do you see that?
Pin Erdmann to her own words. If she acknowledges writing the email but attempts to recharacterize its meaning, the Tribunal can read the document for itself.
5.  Ms. Erdmann, at the time you wrote this email, you were acknowledging that there were quality issues with this lot, were you not?
This is the key admission. Erdmann's contemporaneous acknowledgment of quality issues contradicts Kestrel's litigation position that all rejected lots conformed to specification.
6.  Each rejection notice from WAL included the specific porosity test results from WAL's incoming inspection under WAL-QCP-100. You were aware of those test results at the time?
Confirm that Erdmann saw the specific porosity numbers reported by WAL with each rejection notice.
7.  At the time — in your contemporaneous correspondence with Mr. Huang — did you ever dispute the accuracy of WAL's incoming inspection results under WAL-QCP-100?
Expected answer: No. If Erdmann claims she did dispute the results, ask her to identify the specific communication in which she challenged WAL's testing methodology or accuracy. The key point is the distinction between contemporaneous silence (or acceptance) and after-the-fact litigation challenges.
8.  Ms. Erdmann, Kestrel's position in this arbitration is that all fourteen rejected lots conformed to specification and that WAL fabricated or exaggerated the quality failures. But in your contemporaneous correspondence, you acknowledged quality issues and requested extensions to the cure period. How do you reconcile those two positions?
Key focus: the inconsistency. This is the central impeachment point for Erdmann. Her contemporaneous position (acknowledging issues) is irreconcilable with Kestrel's litigation position (denying all quality failures). Let the inconsistency speak for itself; do not argue with the witness's response.
D. Cure Efforts — Commercial Dimension
This segment explores the commercial steps Erdmann took (or failed to take) to arrange cure of the rejected lots, complementing the technical dimension of cure that will be explored with Dr. Voss.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, as the Commercial Director responsible for contract management, what commercial steps did you take to arrange replacement or rework of the rejected lots?
Open question. Let Erdmann describe what she did. Then probe the adequacy of each claimed step.
2.  For each of the seven uncured rejections, can you explain to the Tribunal why Kestrel failed to deliver replacement units within the 45-calendar-day cure period provided by Amendment No. 2?
Walk through each of the seven uncured rejections. For each: What happened? Was a replacement order placed? Was rework attempted? What was the timeline? Why was the deadline missed?
3.  Did Kestrel have production capacity constraints during this period that prevented timely cure?
Probe whether Kestrel lacked the manufacturing capacity to produce replacement units in time. If Kestrel had capacity constraints, this undermines Kestrel's claim that all lots were conforming — if the lots were conforming, why would capacity be needed for rework or replacement? If Kestrel did not have capacity constraints, then the failure to cure becomes even more difficult to explain.
4.  Did Kestrel source or attempt to source alternative titanium feedstock to address the porosity issues in the rejected lots?
If yes, this is an implicit admission that the feedstock was contributing to porosity problems. If no, establish that Kestrel failed to take a basic corrective step.
5.  I'd like to show you [document reference — internal Kestrel communication]. This is an email you sent to [recipient] on [date] discussing the commercial implications of the repeated lot rejections. Do you recognize this email?
Present any internal Kestrel communications in which Erdmann discussed the commercial consequences of the rejections — risk to the contract, cost of rework, reputational concerns, or the risk of triggering the Persistent Quality Failure threshold.
6.  By the time of the seventh uncured rejection, you were aware that the uncured rejections had accumulated well past the Persistent Quality Failure threshold of three uncured rejections in a rolling twelve-month period. Correct?
Confirm awareness. If Erdmann claims she was not aware of the threshold, that itself is an admission of inadequate contract management.
E. Relationship with WAL and Alternative Supplier Narrative
This segment tests Kestrel's narrative theory that WAL was seeking a pretext to switch suppliers, using Erdmann's firsthand knowledge of the commercial relationship.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, during the period of lot rejections — March through September 2022 — you communicated regularly with Gerald Huang at WAL regarding quality concerns?
Confirm regular communications.
2.  WAL communicated its dissatisfaction with the quality of Kestrel's deliveries through formal rejection notices, correct?
Confirm.
3.  And also through informal communications — emails, phone calls — expressing concern about the quality problems?
Confirm. The point is that WAL's quality concerns were communicated repeatedly and through multiple channels, not sprung on Kestrel without warning.
4.  Before October 3, 2022 — the date of WAL's termination notice — were you aware of any communication from WAL mentioning Valkyr Precision Components?
Expected answer: No. If Erdmann claims she was aware, ask for the specific communication.
5.  Ms. Erdmann, if Kestrel's position is that WAL was seeking a pretext to switch to Valkyr as a lower-cost supplier, can you identify the specific evidence that supports this claim?
This is a direct challenge to the theory. Erdmann must either identify specific evidence or concede that the theory rests on inference and speculation.
6.  You are aware that Valkyr's unit price is €8,432.92, compared to Kestrel's CY4 price of €5,222.92 — a premium of approximately €3,210 per unit, or more than 61%?
Confirm.
7.  Is that pricing consistent with a cost-saving motive on WAL's part?
Expected answer: reluctant concession or attempt to explain. The pricing differential is the strongest single point against the Valkyr theory.
F. Damages Quantification — Commercial Inputs
This segment probes the commercial inputs that Erdmann provided to Prof. Langfeld's damages analysis and challenges the assumptions underlying the damages claim.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, you provided financial data and commercial inputs to Prof. Langfeld of Rheinsberg Advisory AG for his damages analysis. Correct?
Confirm her role in the damages quantification process.
2.  Prof. Langfeld's analysis assumes a profit margin of 22.4% on Kestrel's production of turbine housings for WAL. Did you provide the data underlying that margin assumption?
Confirm. Then probe: Does 22.4% reflect Kestrel's actual historical margins on the WAL contract, or is it a projection? What period does it cover? Is it a gross or net margin?
3.  Can you confirm Kestrel's actual unit cost of production for the Ti-6Al-4V ELI turbine housings supplied under the MSA?
Pin down the actual cost of production. Compare to the assumed cost implied by the 22.4% margin and the contract price.
4.  Prof. Langfeld's analysis calculates lost profits of €12.83 million for the remaining MSA term. Does that calculation assume WAL would have ordered the maximum annual volume of 3,600 units, or the minimum of 2,400 units?
If the calculation assumes maximum volume, challenge: Did WAL consistently order at maximum volume during the contract term? If not, why should the lost-profits calculation assume maximum volume for the remaining term? If the calculation assumes some intermediate volume, ask the basis for the assumption.
5.  Kestrel claims €3.42 million in unreimbursed rework costs. Can you tell the Tribunal which specific lots were reworked, what rework was performed, and what documentation supports the claimed costs?
Probe the specifics. For each claimed rework cost, ask: Which lot? What rework? Who performed it? What did it cost? Is there an invoice, purchase order, or internal cost record? The goal is to test whether the €3.42 million figure is supported by adequate documentation.
6.  Kestrel claims €3.90 million in reputational damages. Ms. Erdmann, can you identify any specific customer communication — an email, a letter, a recorded phone call — in which a customer referenced WAL's termination of the MSA as a reason for not doing business with Kestrel?
Expected answer: No, or at most vague references. If Erdmann identifies a customer, demand specifics: the customer's name, the date, the nature of the communication, and the value of the lost business.
7.  Can you identify any specific contract or business opportunity that Kestrel lost as a direct result of WAL's termination? Please provide the counterparty, the approximate date, and the approximate value.
Press for specifics. The reputational damages claim is particularly vulnerable because it requires Kestrel to demonstrate a causal link between WAL's termination and specific lost business — a link that Kestrel has not established in its submissions.
G. Renewal Options
This segment targets the foundation of Kestrel's largest damages component: the €27.15 million renewal-period lost-profits claim.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Ms. Erdmann, the MSA provides for two one-year renewal options. You negotiated those provisions. You understand that those options are exercisable solely at WAL's discretion?
Confirm.
2.  WAL had no obligation to exercise either renewal option. Kestrel had no right to compel renewal. Correct?
Confirm. This is a pure contract-interpretation point that should be uncontroversial.
3.  Did WAL ever communicate to you — orally or in writing — an intent to exercise either renewal option?
Expected answer: No. If Erdmann claims there was an informal expression of intent, probe: When? By whom? In what context? Is there any record?
4.  I'd like to show you [document reference — internal Kestrel budget/forecast]. This is an internal Kestrel financial planning document dated [date]. In this document, the WAL contract renewal is characterized as [uncertain/possible/not assumed]. Do you see that?
Present any internal Kestrel documents showing that renewal was treated as uncertain — not certain — in Kestrel's own financial planning. If Kestrel's internal budgets did not assume renewal as certain, then it is inconsistent to claim €27.15 million in lost profits based on an assumption of renewal.
5.  So the €27.15 million renewal-period lost-profits claim rests entirely on the assumption that WAL would have exercised both renewal options — an assumption that is unsupported by any binding commitment, any express communication of intent from WAL, and inconsistent with Kestrel's own internal financial planning. Is that a fair characterization?
This is a summary question. Erdmann will resist the characterization, but the factual predicate has been established. Let the record speak.
IV. Cross-Examination Outline: Dr. Stefan Voss (Head of Quality Assurance)
A. Witness Background and Technical Credentials
The foundation for Dr. Voss's cross-examination must establish his technical qualifications and his specific responsibilities for quality assurance at Kestrel, including his role in overseeing the production and testing of the rejected lots. This prevents any later attempt to deflect responsibility and ensures the Tribunal understands that Voss was the person most directly responsible for the quality of the turbine housings.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Dr. Voss, you serve as the Head of Quality Assurance at Kestrel Dynamics GmbH?
Confirm role.
2.  Can you describe for the Tribunal your educational background and professional experience in aerospace quality assurance?
Establish qualifications: university education (likely in materials science, metallurgy, or mechanical engineering), professional certifications, years of experience in aerospace quality, tenure at Kestrel. The purpose is not to build up the witness but to establish that he has the expertise to understand porosity specifications and the responsibility for ensuring compliance.
3.  You are Kestrel's primary fact witness on quality matters in this arbitration?
Confirm.
4.  You were responsible for Kestrel's AS9100 Rev D compliance during the relevant period — March through September 2022?
Confirm.
5.  And you oversaw the production and quality testing of all lots of turbine housings shipped to WAL, including the fourteen lots that were rejected — Lots KDG-2022-0307 through KDG-2022-0919?
Confirm. If Voss claims that other personnel handled day-to-day testing, establish that he had supervisory authority and responsibility for the quality of every lot shipped.
B. Porosity Specification — Technical Understanding
This segment parallels the porosity-specification questioning of Brenner but goes deeper into the technical significance of the specification. Voss, as a quality professional, cannot credibly claim ignorance of what the porosity specification means or why it matters.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Dr. Voss, you are familiar with the contractual porosity specification for the Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings supplied under the MSA?
Confirm.
2.  That specification is set forth in WAL-SPEC-TH-401, Appendix C, Table 3, and it requires porosity of no more than 0.25% — that is, ≤0.25%. Correct?
Confirm. Present the document.
3.  As a quality assurance professional with expertise in aerospace materials, can you explain to the Tribunal what porosity means in the context of Ti-6Al-4V ELI titanium alloy turbine housings and why the porosity specification exists?
Allow Voss to explain. The expected explanation is that porosity refers to microscopic voids or pores within the alloy structure, which can act as stress concentrators and reduce the fatigue life and mechanical performance of the component. The specification exists because excessive porosity can compromise the structural integrity of the turbine housing, which is a safety-critical component in aerospace applications.
4.  You would agree that porosity exceeding the ≤0.25% limit can compromise the fatigue life and mechanical performance of the turbine housings?
Confirm. This is a technical fact that Voss, as a quality expert, cannot credibly deny.
5.  And you would agree that this is a safety-critical specification — not merely a cosmetic or aesthetic requirement?
Confirm. This frames the quality failures as safety-related, which adds gravity to WAL's decision to reject the lots and terminate the MSA.
6.  Dr. Voss, Kestrel's position in this arbitration is that WAL applied an "unpublished" porosity standard of ≤0.15% — stricter than the contractual ≤0.25% standard. Are you aware of any WAL document, specification, instruction, email, or other communication that states a ≤0.15% porosity requirement?
Expected answer: No. This is the same question posed to Brenner, but Voss's answer carries additional weight because he is the quality expert who would be expected to know of any such specification.
7.  You can confirm that the only contractual porosity standard is the ≤0.25% limit in Appendix C, Table 3?
Confirm.
C. Kestrel's Internal Quality Testing of Rejected Lots
This is the most technically detailed segment of any witness's cross-examination and must be conducted with precision. The goal is to establish what testing Kestrel performed, what results Kestrel obtained, and whether Kestrel's own internal data shows porosity above the contractual limit in lots that were nevertheless shipped to WAL.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Dr. Voss, what quality testing did Kestrel perform on each lot of turbine housings before shipment to WAL?
Establish the testing regime. Expected answer: Kestrel performed non-destructive testing (NDT) on each lot, which may have included radiographic testing (RT), ultrasonic testing (UT), and/or other methods.
2.  Specifically, what non-destructive testing methods did Kestrel use to assess porosity in the turbine housings?
Pin down the specific NDT methods: radiographic (X-ray), ultrasonic, computed tomography (CT), or other. This is important because different methods have different sensitivity and detection limits, which may explain discrepancies between Kestrel's internal results and WAL's incoming inspection results.
3.  For each of the fourteen rejected lots, what were Kestrel's own porosity measurements?
This is the critical question. If Kestrel's own measurements showed porosity within specification (≤0.25%) for all lots, the discrepancy with Dr. Chow's findings (0.19%–0.38%) must be explored — potentially suggesting that Kestrel's testing methods were less sensitive or less accurate than WAL's incoming inspection methods. If Kestrel's measurements showed porosity above specification for some lots, then the impeachment is direct: Kestrel shipped lots it knew were non-conforming.
4.  I'd like to show you [document reference — Kestrel internal test records obtained in production]. These are Kestrel's internal quality test records for Lot [number]. Do you recognize these records?
Present Kestrel's internal test records. Focus on any lots where the recorded porosity exceeded ≤0.25%. If such records exist, this is devastating impeachment: Kestrel's own data shows non-conformance, yet the lots were shipped.
5.  Dr. Voss, these records show a porosity measurement of [specific number above 0.25%] for Lot [number]. That exceeds the contractual limit of ≤0.25%, does it not?
Pin Voss to the data. He must either confirm the measurement or challenge the accuracy of Kestrel's own records.
6.  If all lots passed Kestrel's internal testing at the time of shipment, can you explain the discrepancy between Kestrel's internal test results and Dr. Chow's independent analysis, which found porosity levels of 0.19% to 0.38%?
If Voss claims all lots passed Kestrel's testing, the discrepancy with Dr. Chow must be explored. Possible explanations include: (a) Kestrel's testing equipment was less sensitive than the methods used by Dr. Chow; (b) Kestrel's testing was performed incorrectly; (c) Kestrel's testing equipment was not properly calibrated; or (d) Kestrel's testing measured something different. Each of these explanations undermines Kestrel's quality assurance process.
7.  When was Kestrel's porosity testing equipment last calibrated before the rejected lots were tested? Can you provide calibration records?
If calibration records show recent calibration and proper procedures, the discrepancy with Dr. Chow is harder to explain and suggests the testing methodology itself was inadequate. If calibration records are missing or show lapsed calibration, this is a quality-management failure.
8.  What are the sensitivity and detection limits of Kestrel's testing methods for porosity measurement?
Technical precision question. If Kestrel's methods had higher detection limits (i.e., could not detect porosity below a certain threshold), this would explain why Kestrel's results were systematically lower than Dr. Chow's — but it would also mean Kestrel's testing was insufficient to verify compliance with the contractual specification.
9.  Dr. Voss, I want to be precise about the data. Some of the lots tested by Dr. Chow showed porosity of 0.19%, which is within the ≤0.25% specification. But other lots showed porosity well above 0.25%, up to 0.38%. Of the fourteen rejected lots, can you identify which specific lots had porosity within the contractual specification and which did not?
This nuance is important. Not all rejected lots necessarily exceeded the specification. But the seven lots with uncured rejections were sufficient to trigger Persistent Quality Failure, and those lots must have included a sufficient number above 0.25% to support WAL's position. Establish the specific lot-by-lot data.
D. Comparison with Dr. Martina Kessler's Expert Analysis
This segment explores the relationship between Kestrel's internal test data and the analysis performed by Kestrel's retained metallurgical expert, Dr. Martina Kessler of Albrecht Prüftechnik GmbH, who was engaged for purposes of this arbitration.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Dr. Voss, you have reviewed Dr. Kessler's expert report, filed on October 16, 2023?
Confirm.
2.  Do you agree with Dr. Kessler's testing methodology?
If yes, proceed to compare her results with Kestrel's internal data and with Dr. Chow's findings. If no, identify the specific disagreements — which would be unusual, since Dr. Kessler is Kestrel's own expert.
3.  Do you agree with Dr. Kessler's conclusions?
Confirm or probe disagreements.
4.  Are there any differences between Kestrel's own internal test results — the results you obtained at the time of production — and the results Dr. Kessler obtained in her analysis?
If there are differences, explore them. Different results from different testing at different times raise chain-of-custody and methodology questions. If the results are consistent, then the comparison with Dr. Chow becomes the focal point.
5.  Dr. Kessler was retained after the fact — after the lots were rejected, after the MSA was terminated, and after this arbitration was commenced. She was engaged specifically for purposes of this litigation, correct?
Confirm. The point is that Dr. Kessler did not test the lots at the time of delivery and does not have contemporaneous testing data independent of Kestrel's own records.
6.  Did you provide samples or data to Dr. Kessler for her analysis?
Confirm. Follow up: How were the samples selected? Were they representative of the full lots? Were they the same units that WAL tested? Are there any chain-of-custody issues — could the samples have been altered, reworked, or replaced between the time of WAL's rejection and Dr. Kessler's testing?
7.  Specifically, can you confirm whether the samples Dr. Kessler tested were the same physical units that WAL rejected, or different units from the same production lots?
This is a critical chain-of-custody question. If Dr. Kessler tested different units from the same lots, her results do not directly contradict WAL's testing of the specific rejected units.
E. Cure Efforts — Technical Dimension
This segment explores the technical corrective actions Kestrel undertook (or failed to undertake) in response to the lot rejections. It complements the commercial cure dimension covered with Erdmann.
Line of Questioning:
1.  Dr. Voss, for each of the seven uncured rejections, what specific technical corrective actions did Kestrel undertake?
Walk through each of the seven uncured rejections. For each: Was root-cause analysis performed? Was the production process modified? Was feedstock changed? Was testing enhanced? Were corrective action reports (CARs) issued?
2.  After the first lot rejections in March 2022 — Lot KDG-2022-0307 — did Kestrel perform a root-cause analysis?
If yes: What were the findings? What corrective actions were implemented? Why did subsequent lots continue to fail?
If no: Establish that this represents a significant quality-management failure. Under AS9100 Rev D, non-conformances typically require root-cause analysis and documented corrective action.
3.  If root-cause analysis was performed, what was identified as the root cause of the porosity issues?
Common root causes for porosity in Ti-6Al-4V ELI castings or forgings include: (a) contaminated or improper feedstock; (b) inadequate vacuum or atmosphere control during melting/casting; (c) incorrect heat treatment parameters; (d) insufficient hot isostatic pressing (HIP); or (e) process drift. Ask Voss to identify the specific root cause and the corrective action taken.
4.  If corrective actions were implemented after the first rejections in March 2022, why did lot rejections continue through September 2022 — a full six months?
This is the key question. If corrective actions were taken but failed to stop the rejections, either the root-cause analysis was incorrect, the corrective actions were insufficient, or both. Six months of continued rejections after corrective actions suggests a systemic failure.
5.  Under AS9100 Rev D, non-conformances are required to be documented through corrective action reports — CARs. Did Kestrel issue CARs for each of the fourteen lot rejections?
If yes: Request to see them (they should be in the production). Each CAR should document the non-conformance, the root-cause analysis, the corrective action, the verification of effectiveness, and the closure date.
If no: Establish