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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK COMMERCIAL DIVISION

DECLARATION OF DR. HENRIK SØRENSEN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Filed: September 20, 2024

I, Dr. Henrik Sørensen, hereby declare, under penalty of perjury pursuant to Section 2106 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), that I am not a resident of the State of New York, that the following statements are true and correct, and that I make this declaration based upon my personal knowledge, my professional education, training, and experience, and my review of the documents and materials identified herein:

I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

A. Identity and Professional Background

1. My name is Dr. Henrik Sørensen. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and am competent to make this declaration. I am a citizen and resident of the Kingdom of Denmark. My business address is Amaliegade 33, 1256 Copenhagen K, Denmark. I am the Principal and founding partner of Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS ("NMCG"), a maritime engineering consulting firm headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark, which I established in 2006. NMCG provides expert consulting services in the fields of marine engineering, machinery failure analysis, classification society standards, vessel maintenance assessment, and related technical maritime disciplines to shipowners, charterers, classification societies, insurers, and legal counsel worldwide.

2. I have been retained by Calderwood & Harkness LLP, counsel for defendants Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL") and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL" and, together with TSL, "Defendants"), to provide expert opinions in connection with the above-captioned action. My engagement letter with Calderwood & Harkness LLP is dated February 1, 2024, and my retention commenced on that date.

3. I submit this declaration in support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Northwind Maritime Corporation's ("Northwind" or "Plaintiff") claims arising from the turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 ("Incident 1") on the ground that the failure was caused by a latent defect and that Defendants exercised due diligence in the maintenance of the vessel.

B. Education and Credentials

4. I hold a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Marine Engineering from the Technical University of Denmark (Danmarks Tekniske Universitet), which I was awarded in 1997. My doctoral thesis concerned the fatigue failure mechanisms of rotating components in marine propulsion systems, with a particular focus on turbocharger and turbine blade metallurgy. I also hold a Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Technical University of Denmark (1993) and a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) degree in Mechanical Engineering from the same institution (1991).

5. My areas of specialization include vessel propulsion systems, marine machinery failure analysis, classification society standards and survey protocols, planned maintenance system design and assessment, and the identification and characterization of latent defects in marine machinery. Over the course of my career, spanning more than twenty-seven (27) years, I have provided consulting services in connection with more than two hundred and sixty (260) matters involving marine machinery failures, vessel maintenance disputes, and classification society proceedings.

6. Prior to founding NMCG in 2006, I served for nine (9) years as a machinery surveyor and subsequently as a senior surveyor with Det Norske Veritas (now DNV), one of the world's leading classification societies. During my tenure at DNV, from 1997 to 2006, I conducted annual, intermediate, and special surveys on a range commercial vessels, including dry bulk carriers, crude oil and product tankers, container vessels, and specialized offshore support vessels. I am thoroughly familiar with the survey protocols, classification rules, and technical requirements of all major international classification societies, including the Global Maritime Classification Bureau ("GMCB"), the classification society relevant to the vessel at issue in this proceeding.

7. My experience encompasses extensive work with Supramax and Handymax dry bulk carriers, including vessels of similar vintage and specifications to the M/V Aegean Fortuna. I have investigated and analyzed turbocharger failures on dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels on more than forty (40) occasions throughout my career, including failures involving the same manufacturer and model line as the turbocharger installed on the M/V Aegean Fortuna.

C. Prior Expert Testimony and Publications

8. I have been qualified as an expert witness and provided testimony in maritime disputes in courts and arbitration proceedings in Denmark, the United Kingdom (London Maritime Arbitrators Association proceedings and the English High Court, Admiralty Division), Norway, the United States (including the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the District of Connecticut), Singapore, and Hong Kong. In total, I have provided deposition or trial testimony in approximately thirty-five (35) maritime disputes and have submitted expert reports or declarations in an additional forty-two (42) matters. The subject matter of my prior testimony has included turbocharger failure analysis, main engine component failures, latent defect identification, classification society survey adequacy, and the assessment of vessel maintenance compliance.

9. I have authored or co-authored twenty-one (21) peer-reviewed articles in marine engineering journals, including the Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Marine Structures, Ocean Engineering, and the Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA). Among my publications are articles directly relevant to the opinions expressed in this declaration, including: "Subsurface Inclusion-Initiated Fatigue Failure in Marine Turbocharger Bearing Races: A Statistical and Metallurgical Analysis" (Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019); "Classification Society Survey Protocols and the Detection of Latent Defects in Rotating Machinery: Limitations and Best Practices" (Marine Structures, Vol. 64, 2019); and "Planned Maintenance System Adequacy in the Commercial Fleet: An Empirical Assessment Against Classification Society and Manufacturer Standards" (Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2022).

10. A true and correct copy of my current curriculum vitae, which sets forth my complete educational background, professional experience, publications, and prior expert testimony, is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein.

D. Compensation.

11. I am being compensated for my work in this matter through Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS at my customary hourly consulting rate. My hourly rate for expert consulting and report preparation is €475 per hour, and my hourly rate for deposition and trial testimony is €575 per hour. These rates are consistent with the rates I charge in other engagements of comparable complexity.

12. Through the date of this declaration, the total professional fees billed by NMCG in connection with this engagement are approximately $285,000 (United States Dollars), inclusive of report preparation, document review, travel, and time spent in consultation with counsel. My compensation is in no way contingent upon the outcome of this litigation or the substance of my opinions.

II. SCOPE OF ASSIGNMENT

A. Engagement Scope

13. I have been retained by counsel for Defendants to provide expert opinions on the following issues:

(a) Whether the turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 (Incident 1) constituted a latent defect within the meaning of the charter-party and applicable maritime law—that is, a defect that was not discoverable by the exercise of due diligence on the part of the vessel owner and its crew;

(b) Whether Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. exercised due diligence in maintaining the M/V Aegean Fortuna in a seaworthy condition, as required by Clause 6 of the charter-party agreement between the parties (based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended, Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203);

(c) Whether the vessel's maintenance regime throughout the charter period (commencing January 15, 2021) was consistent with classification society requirements, manufacturer specifications, and generally accepted industry standards for the maintenance of Supramax dry bulk carriers; and

(d) To the extent appropriate, to respond to and rebut the opinions expressed by Plaintiff's expert, Capt. Julian Blackmore (Ret.), of Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., as set forth in his expert report served on August 19, 2024.

B. Materials Reviewed

14. In forming the opinions expressed in this declaration, I have reviewed and considered the following documents and materials, among others:

(a) The Charter-Party dated December 3, 2020 (Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203), based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended, between Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. (as Owner), including all riders, addenda, and amendments thereto;

(b) The vessel specifications for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, IMO Number 9847231, a Supramax dry bulk carrier of 58,200 deadweight tonnes ("DWT"), built in 2016 by Dalian Prosperity Shipyard Co. (Dalian, People's Republic of China), registered under the flag of the Republic of Liberia;

(c) GMCB classification records and survey reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna covering the period from the vessel's delivery in 2016 through 2024, including annual survey reports, intermediate survey reports, the special survey report, and all related conditions of class documentation;

(d) Planned Maintenance System ("PMS") records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, including the complete maintenance history for the main engine, turbocharger, auxiliary machinery, and hull systems for the period from January 2021 through January 2024;

(e) Engine room logbooks for the M/V Aegean Fortuna for the period from January 2021 through December 2022, with particular attention to the entries from January through March 2022 relating to turbocharger operational parameters;

(f) The manufacturer's specifications and maintenance manuals for the main engine (Kestrel Enterprises 6S50MC-C8, or equivalent), and the turbocharger (including the OEM-specified maintenance and inspection intervals for all turbocharger subcomponents);

(g) Repair records from the emergency repair conducted at Colombo, Sri Lanka in connection with Incident 1 (March–April 2022), including the repair facility's inspection reports, photographs of the failed components, and the metallurgical analysis report;

(h) Repair records from Richards Bay, South Africa in connection with Incident 2 (July 2022), relating to the ballast water treatment system malfunction and auxiliary boiler failure;

(i) Drydock records from Keppel Verolme Shipyard, Rotterdam, Netherlands in connection with Incident 3 (November–December 2022), relating to the cylinder liner failure and associated repairs;

(j) The deposition transcript of Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos, taken on June 28, 2024, in its entirety;

(k) The deposition transcript of Captain Nikolaos Giannopoulos (Master of the M/V Aegean Fortuna), taken on May 10, 2024, in its entirety;

(l) The expert report of Capt. Julian Blackmore (Ret.), Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., served on behalf of Plaintiff on August 19, 2024 (reviewed for rebuttal purposes);

(m) Correspondence between the TSL technical management department and GMCB regarding classification surveys, survey planning, and conditions of class for the M/V Aegean Fortuna;

(n) Port State Control inspection reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna from the charter period (January 2021–January 2024); and

(o) Relevant provisions of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, SOLAS regulations, and GMCB Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships.

15. The opinions expressed in this declaration are consistent with, and are supported by, the more detailed analyses set forth in my full expert report served on August 5, 2024, and my rebuttal report served on September 9, 2024, which together contain over one hundred and seventy-five (175) pages of technical analysis, figures, and supporting references. This declaration summarizes my principal opinions for purposes of Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.

III. VESSEL BACKGROUND AND MAINTENANCE FRAMEWORK

A. Vessel Particulars

16. The M/V Aegean Fortuna (IMO Number 9847231) is a Supramax dry bulk carrier with a deadweight tonnage of 58,200 DWT. The vessel was constructed in 2016 at the Dalian Prosperity Shipyard Co. in Dalian, People's Republic of China. The vessel is flagged under the Republic of Liberia and is classed with the Global Maritime Classification Bureau (GMCB). The registered owner is Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL"), a single-purpose ship-owning entity incorporated in Liberia under Registration Number LR-C-20167845. AFSL is a wholly owned subsidiary of Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL"), which provides commercial and technical management services for the vessel.

17. The vessel is powered by a slow-speed, two-stroke marine diesel main engine, coupled with a turbocharger system designed to supply pressurized air to the main engine's combustion cylinders. The turbocharger is a critical component of the vessel's propulsion system; its failure renders the main engine inoperable or operable only at severely reduced capacity, necessitating repair before the vessel can resume normal commercial service.

18. At the time of the charter-party's commencement on January 15, 2021, the vessel was approximately five (5) years old—a relatively modern vessel by industry standards. The vessel held a clean GMCB class designation with no outstanding conditions of class, no deferred items, and no Port State Control detentions. The vessel's most recent annual survey prior to the charter commencement had been completed in September 2020, with no deficiencies noted.

B. Maintenance Obligations Under the Charter-Party

19. The charter-party at issue in this proceeding is dated December 3, 2020, Reference Number NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203, and is based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended by the parties. Under the charter-party, the vessel was time-chartered by Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) from Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. (as Owner) for a period of thirty-six (36) months, commencing January 15, 2021 and expiring January 14, 2024. The daily hire rate was set at $14,750 per day, resulting in an approximate total charter value of $16,166,000 over the full charter period.

20. Clause 6 of the charter-party, consistent with the standard NYPE 2015 form, imposes upon the Owner the obligation to "maintain the vessel in a thoroughly efficient state of hull, machinery, and equipment" throughout the charter period. This clause further requires the Owner to maintain the vessel's classification with GMCB and to comply with all classification society requirements. The Owner's obligation under Clause 6 is an obligation of due diligence—it does not render the Owner strictly liable for every mechanical failure that may occur during the charter period. In particular, it is well-established in maritime law and practice that a vessel owner is not liable for vessel breakdowns caused by latent defects, provided that the owner has exercised due diligence to make and keep the vessel seaworthy.

21. The foregoing understanding of the Owner's obligations is material to the opinions expressed in this declaration. The question is not whether the turbocharger failed—it plainly did—but whether the failure was caused by a defect that was discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, or whether it was a latent defect that eluded detection despite the Owner's reasonable efforts to maintain the vessel in accordance with applicable standards.

C. TSL's Maintenance Regime

22. Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA operates a fleet of approximately thirty-four (34) commercial vessels, including dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels. TSL's technical management department, headquartered in Piraeus, Greece, maintains a comprehensive fleet-wide planned maintenance system (PMS) that is applied uniformly across all vessels under TSL's management. The PMS system used by TSL is a commercially available, industry-standard software platform that tracks all scheduled and completed maintenance tasks for each vessel, generates maintenance alerts and work orders, and maintains a digital record of all maintenance activities performed.

23. The PMS records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, which I have reviewed in their entirety for the charter period, demonstrate that TSL implemented and maintained a systematic and documented maintenance program for the vessel. The PMS records reflect that maintenance tasks were scheduled in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended service intervals for the main engine and all ancillary machinery, including the turbocharger, and in accordance with GMCB classification requirements.

24. The regular GMCB surveys for the M/V Aegean Fortuna were completed on schedule throughout the charter period. The vessel underwent its annual survey in August 2021, its intermediate survey in September 2022, and additional condition-of-class-related inspections as directed by GMCB. At no point during the charter period was the vessel's GMCB class suspended, withdrawn, or made subject to conditions of class relating to the turbocharger or main engine prior to Incident 1.

25. Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos, who served aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna from December 2020 through September 2022, provided deposition testimony on June 28, 2024, in which he confirmed, under oath, that he and his engine room crew adhered to the PMS schedule and the manufacturer's maintenance manual with respect to all main engine and turbocharger maintenance tasks. Chief Engineer Vlahos further testified that daily rounds of the engine room included visual inspection of the turbocharger, monitoring of turbocharger exhaust gas temperatures, turbocharger RPM, bearing temperatures, and lubricating oil pressure, and that all such readings were recorded in the engine room logbook. He testified that he observed no anomalous readings or operational irregularities with respect to the turbocharger in the weeks and months preceding the failure on March 12, 2022. Relevant excerpts from Chief Engineer Vlahos's deposition transcript are attached hereto as Exhibit H.

IV. INCIDENT 1 — MAIN ENGINE TURBOCHARGER FAILURE (MARCH 12 – APRIL 2, 2022): LATENT DEFECT ANALYSIS

A. Factual Summary

26. On March 12, 2022, at approximately 0342 hours (ship time), while the M/V Aegean Fortuna was transiting the Indian Ocean en route from the port of Paradip, India to the port of Mombasa, Kenya, laden with a cargo of approximately 53,800 metric tonnes of iron ore fines, the vessel's main engine turbocharger suffered a catastrophic failure. The failure was sudden and without warning. Chief Engineer Vlahos testified that the turbocharger had been operating normally during the preceding watches, with all monitored parameters within normal ranges, and that the failure manifested as a sudden, violent metallic noise from the turbocharger casing, accompanied by an immediate loss of turbocharger boost pressure and a rapid decline in main engine performance.

27. As a result of the turbocharger failure, the main engine could not operate at its normal service output. The vessel's Master, Captain Nikolaos Giannopoulos, made the determination, in consultation with the Chief Engineer and the TSL technical management department, to divert the vessel to the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, which was the nearest port equipped with adequate repair facilities for a turbocharger replacement of this nature.

28. The vessel arrived in Colombo on March 16, 2022. Emergency repairs were conducted by a qualified repair facility in Colombo, which included the removal of the failed turbocharger, disassembly and inspection of the failed components, procurement and installation of a replacement turbocharger, and sea trials. The repair was completed on April 1, 2022, and the vessel departed Colombo and resumed her voyage on April 2, 2022. The total off-hire period attributable to Incident 1 was twenty-two (22) days (March 12 through April 2, 2022). At the charter hire rate of $14,750 per day, the off-hire claim for Incident 1 amounts to $324,500.

B. Physical Examination and Failure Analysis

29. In connection with the repair at Colombo, the failed turbocharger was disassembled, and the failed components were subjected to visual and metallurgical examination by the repair facility's engineering staff. The repair facility prepared a detailed inspection report and a metallurgical analysis report, copies of which were provided to me for review. Additionally, high-resolution photographs of the failed turbocharger components were taken at the repair facility, and I have reviewed these photographs in detail. True and correct copies of representative photographs of the failed turbocharger bearing race components are attached hereto as Exhibit B. A true and correct copy of the metallurgical analysis report from the Colombo repair facility is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

30. Based on my review of the available evidence—including the metallurgical analysis report, the photographs of the failed components, the repair facility's inspection report, the engine room logbook entries, and the PMS records—I have determined that the failure mode was as follows: The turbocharger failure was initiated by a fracture of the internal bearing race of the turbocharger's main bearing assembly. The fracture propagated from a subsurface metallurgical flaw—specifically, a non-metallic inclusion (oxide inclusion) embedded within the bearing race material at a depth of approximately 1.8 to 2.2 millimeters below the bearing surface. This inclusion acted as a stress concentration point under the cyclical loading conditions experienced during normal turbocharger operation. Over time, a fatigue crack initiated at the inclusion site and propagated slowly through the bearing race material until the remaining cross-section was insufficient to withstand the operational loads, at which point catastrophic fracture occurred.

31. The metallurgical analysis report from the Colombo repair facility, prepared by a metallurgist with experience in marine component failure analysis, confirmed the presence of the subsurface non-metallic inclusion at the fracture initiation site. The report characterized the inclusion as consistent with a manufacturing-origin defect—that is, an impurity introduced during the steel-making or forging process used to produce the bearing race. The report concluded, and I concur, that the inclusion was present in the bearing race from the time of its manufacture.

32. It is critical to understand the nature and detectability of this type of defect. A subsurface non-metallic inclusion located approximately 2 millimeters below the surface of a turbocharger bearing race is not detectable through any of the standard non-destructive testing ("NDT") methods that are available to, or used by, vessel owners, crews, or classification society surveyors during routine maintenance inspections. The standard NDT methods applicable in a shipboard maintenance context include visual inspection, magnetic particle inspection (MPI), dye penetrant inspection (DPI), and ultrasonic testing (UT). Visual inspection, MPI, and DPI are surface or near-surface inspection methods and are incapable of detecting subsurface flaws at the depth at which this inclusion was located. While ultrasonic testing can in principle detect subsurface flaws, the application of UT to turbocharger bearing races is not a standard practice in shipboard maintenance, is not required by any classification society survey protocol for a vessel of this age and type, and would require specialized equipment and expertise not ordinarily available aboard a commercial vessel or at most ports of call.

33. Moreover, the subsurface inclusion and the fatigue crack propagating from it did not produce any externally observable symptoms prior to the catastrophic failure event. Specifically, the defect did not manifest through abnormal vibration, elevated bearing temperatures, anomalous turbocharger RPM fluctuations, unusual noise, or measurable degradation in turbocharger or main engine performance. The absence of precursor symptoms is consistent with the metallurgical characteristics of this type of failure: a subsurface fatigue crack propagating from a small inclusion in a rotating component will typically not produce detectable vibration anomalies or other externally observable symptoms until the crack has reached a critical size, at which point catastrophic failure occurs rapidly—often within a matter of hours or even minutes. This phenomenon is well-documented in the marine engineering and materials science literature, including in my own published research. (See Sørensen, "Subsurface Inclusion-Initiated Fatigue Failure in Marine Turbocharger Bearing Races: A Statistical and Metallurgical Analysis," J. Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019, at pp. 217–232.)

34. I have reviewed the engine room logbook entries for the M/V Aegean Fortuna for the period from January 1, 2022 through March 12, 2022. The entries record turbocharger exhaust gas temperatures, turbocharger RPM, bearing temperatures, and lubricating oil pressures at regular intervals, consistent with standard watchkeeping practice. I found no anomalous or abnormal readings for any turbocharger parameter in the weeks and months preceding the failure. All recorded values fell within the normal operating ranges specified by the turbocharger manufacturer. Excerpts from the engine room logbook for this period are attached hereto as Exhibit G.

C. Classification Society Records

35. I have reviewed the GMCB classification records and survey reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna from the vessel's construction in 2016 through 2024. Relevant excerpts of the GMCB survey reports are attached hereto as Exhibit E.

36. The GMCB conducted all required annual and intermediate surveys on the vessel's main engine and turbocharger during the period in question. The annual survey conducted in August 2021—approximately seven (7) months prior to the turbocharger failure—included an examination of the turbocharger in accordance with GMCB's applicable survey requirements. The GMCB surveyor's report from the August 2021 annual survey reflects that the turbocharger was examined and found to be in satisfactory condition, with no deficiencies or recommendations noted.

37. It is significant that the GMCB survey protocols applicable to turbochargers on dry bulk carriers of this type and age (built 2016, approximately six years old at the time of the failure) do not require invasive disassembly of the turbocharger bearing assembly, metallurgical testing of bearing race components, or specialized subsurface NDT of turbocharger bearings as part of routine annual or intermediate surveys. The GMCB survey requirements for the turbocharger at this stage of the vessel's life are consistent with the survey protocols of other major classification societies, including Meridian Industries, DNV, Bureau Veritas, and the American Bureau of Shipping. These protocols typically require external visual examination of the turbocharger, review of operational parameters and logbook records, and, at certain intervals, opening of the turbocharger casing for examination of the rotor, blading, and bearing clearances. Even when casing opening is performed, the examination is limited to visual assessment, dimensional measurement of bearing clearances, and surface-level NDT (if warranted by observed conditions)—not subsurface metallurgical testing of bearing race components.

38. The GMCB class for the M/V Aegean Fortuna was maintained continuously throughout the relevant period. No conditions of class were imposed relating to the turbocharger or main engine prior to the Incident 1 failure. This is a strong indication that the GMCB—an independent third-party classification society—found the vessel's machinery to be maintained in accordance with its rules and requirements.

D. Due Diligence by the Owner

39. The PMS records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, which I have reviewed in their entirety, demonstrate that all manufacturer-recommended maintenance and inspection tasks for the turbocharger were performed on schedule throughout the charter period. Excerpts from the PMS records pertaining to the turbocharger maintenance history are attached hereto as Exhibit D. The manufacturer's maintenance manual specifies a series of routine inspections, lubricating oil analyses, filter changes, and, at longer intervals, casing openings and bearing clearance measurements. The PMS records confirm that each of these tasks was completed at or before the prescribed interval.

40. Excerpts from the turbocharger manufacturer's maintenance manual are attached hereto as Exhibit F. The manufacturer's recommended inspection and service intervals do not include subsurface metallurgical testing of bearing race components. The manufacturer's manual directs that bearing clearances be measured at specified intervals, that bearing surfaces be visually inspected for signs of wear, pitting, or discoloration, and that bearings be replaced when clearances exceed specified limits or when visible damage is observed. None of these recommended procedures would have detected a subsurface non-metallic inclusion of the type that caused the failure on March 12, 2022.

41. Chief Engineer Vlahos's deposition testimony (June 28, 2024) corroborates the PMS records. Chief Engineer Vlahos testified that he personally supervised and, in many cases, performed the scheduled turbocharger maintenance tasks, and that he followed the manufacturer's maintenance manual and the PMS schedule in doing so. He testified that the most recent turbocharger maintenance activity prior to the failure was a scheduled lubricating oil analysis and filter change completed in February 2022, approximately three weeks before the failure, and that the results of that oil analysis were within normal limits. He further testified that at no time prior to the failure did he observe any indication—whether through operational parameters, visual inspection, or any other means—that the turbocharger bearing was in anything other than satisfactory condition. (See Exhibit H.)

42. Based on the foregoing, it is my professional opinion that the type of subsurface metallurgical defect identified as the root cause of the March 12, 2022 turbocharger failure is, by definition, a latent defect. A latent defect is one that could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence using reasonable means of inspection available to the vessel owner and crew. The defect in this case was subsurface, was present from manufacture, did not produce externally observable symptoms, and was not detectable through any standard NDT method, manufacturer-recommended inspection procedure, or classification society survey protocol applicable to a vessel of this type and age. No industry-standard maintenance protocol for a Supramax dry bulk carrier built in 2016 and approximately six years old at the time of the failure would have required the level of invasive metallurgical testing necessary to detect this flaw. To require such testing as a condition of the "due diligence" standard would impose an obligation far beyond what is recognized in maritime engineering practice, classification society rules, or equipment manufacturer specifications.

E. Expert Opinion on Incident 1

43. Based on my review of the evidence described above and my professional training, education, and experience, it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that:

(1) The turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 was caused by a latent defect—specifically, a subsurface non-metallic inclusion in the turbocharger bearing race material, originating from the manufacturing process, which initiated a fatigue crack that propagated to catastrophic fracture under normal operational loading conditions.

(2) The defect was not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence by Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA, Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd., or the vessel's crew, using standard maintenance procedures, non-destructive testing methods, classification society surveys, or any other reasonable means of inspection available to the vessel owner.

(3) Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and its crew exercised due diligence in maintaining the turbocharger in accordance with the turbocharger manufacturer's maintenance manual, the vessel's planned maintenance system schedule, and GMCB classification requirements. All scheduled maintenance and inspection tasks were performed on time, and the turbocharger was monitored through appropriate operational parameters throughout the relevant period.

(4) The turbocharger failure on March 12, 2022 does not reflect a failure by the Owner to maintain the vessel in a "thoroughly efficient state of hull, machinery, and equipment" as required by Clause 6 of the charter-party. The failure was caused by a manufacturing-origin latent defect that existed despite the Owner's exercise of due diligence, and therefore falls within the well-recognized latent defect exception to the Owner's maintenance obligation.

F. Response to Opposing Expert (Capt. Blackmore)

44. I have reviewed the expert report of Captain Julian Blackmore (Ret.), of Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., served on behalf of Plaintiff on August 19, 2024 ("Blackmore Report"). Captain Blackmore opines that the turbocharger failure could have been prevented through more frequent inspections of the turbocharger bearing assembly than were in fact performed by TSL, and that continuous vibration monitoring equipment should have been installed on the turbocharger and would have detected precursors to the failure. I respectfully disagree with Captain Blackmore's opinions for the following reasons.

45. First, as to Captain Blackmore's opinion that more frequent inspections would have prevented the failure: Captain Blackmore suggests that the turbocharger bearing assembly should have been inspected at intervals of every 4,000 running hours, rather than the manufacturer-recommended interval of every 8,000 running hours. Captain Blackmore provides no engineering basis for this proposed inspection frequency. The manufacturer's maintenance manual—the most authoritative source of guidance on the appropriate inspection intervals for this specific turbocharger model—specifies the 8,000-hour interval for bearing clearance measurement and visual inspection. This interval is consistent with the manufacturer's recommended practice for turbochargers of this model installed on comparable vessels. GMCB's classification requirements do not mandate a more frequent inspection interval. No major classification society mandates a 4,000-hour inspection interval for turbocharger bearings on vessels of this type and age. The inspection frequency recommended by Captain Blackmore exceeds manufacturer recommendations and GMCB requirements and is not consistent with standard industry practice for Supramax dry bulk carriers of this vintage.

46. Moreover, even if the turbocharger bearing assembly had been inspected at 4,000-hour intervals—or even more frequently—such inspections would have consisted of the standard procedures: visual examination of the bearing surfaces and measurement of bearing clearances. These procedures would not have detected the subsurface non-metallic inclusion that caused the failure. The defect was located approximately 2 millimeters below the bearing surface and did not produce any surface manifestation—no pitting, scoring, discoloration, or abnormal wear—that would have been observable during a visual inspection. The bearing clearance measurements, likewise, would have been within normal limits, as the fatigue crack had not progressed to the point of affecting bearing geometry or clearances until immediately prior to the catastrophic failure event.

47. Second, as to Captain Blackmore's opinion regarding vibration monitoring: Captain Blackmore suggests that the installation of continuous vibration monitoring equipment on the turbocharger would have detected precursor vibration signatures indicative of the developing fatigue crack. This opinion is not supported by the engineering evidence or the published literature. As discussed above, and as I have demonstrated in my published research, a subsurface fatigue crack propagating from a small non-metallic inclusion in a turbocharger bearing race does not produce detectable vibration anomalies until the crack has reached a critical length—a point at which catastrophic failure is imminent (typically within hours or less). Prior to reaching this critical length, the crack is too small relative to the bearing dimensions and rotational dynamics to produce measurable changes in vibration frequency or amplitude. This is a well-established principle in the field of rotating machinery failure analysis and has been confirmed in controlled laboratory studies and in analyses of real-world turbocharger failures. (See Sørensen, J. Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019, at pp. 224–228; see also Dalmqvist & Berg, "Vibration-Based Condition Monitoring of Marine Turbocharger Bearings: Capabilities and Limitations," Ocean Engineering, Vol. 196, 2020.)

48. Furthermore, the installation of continuous vibration monitoring on turbochargers is not a standard requirement for Supramax dry bulk carriers built in 2016. While continuous vibration monitoring is increasingly common on certain types of high-value or critical rotating machinery (such as main turbines on LNG carriers or gas turbines in offshore installations), it is not yet standard practice on the turbochargers of dry bulk carriers of this class. GMCB does not require continuous vibration monitoring on the turbocharger of a vessel of this type. Captain Blackmore does not cite any classification society rule, industry standard, or regulatory requirement mandating such equipment on the M/V Aegean Fortuna.

49. Finally, I note that Captain Blackmore's professional background is as a retired Master Mariner—a maritime operations expert rather than a marine engineer specializing in machinery failure analysis and metallurgy. While I do not question Captain Blackmore's competence in matters of vessel navigation, maritime operations, and maritime safety management, the opinions he offers regarding turbocharger failure mechanisms, metallurgical defect detection, and vibration monitoring capabilities fall outside his area of professional specialization. The analysis of a subsurface metallurgical defect in a turbocharger bearing race and the assessment of available detection methods is a matter of marine engineering and materials science, not maritime operations.

V. THALASSA'S OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS

A. Assessment of the Maintenance Regime Across the Charter Period

50. While the primary focus of this declaration is the latent defect analysis pertaining to Incident 1, I have also been asked to assess, and have assessed, the overall adequacy of TSL's maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna across the full charter period (January 15, 2021 through January 14, 2024). This assessment is relevant to Defendants' motion insofar as Plaintiff has alleged that the turbocharger failure was part of a broader pattern of maintenance neglect.

51. Based on my comprehensive review of the PMS records, GMCB survey records, engine room logbooks, repair records, Port State Control inspection reports, and correspondence between TSL and GMCB for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period, it is my professional opinion that TSL maintained a systematic and documented maintenance program that was consistent with industry best practices for a fleet operator of TSL's size and scope (approximately 34 vessels). The maintenance program was supported by adequate shore-side technical management, regular supervisory oversight, and a functional PMS system that tracked and documented maintenance compliance.

52. The vessel's GMCB class was maintained throughout the charter period without suspension or withdrawal. At no point during the charter period was the vessel's class suspended for failure to comply with classification society survey or maintenance requirements.

53. During the charter period, the M/V Aegean Fortuna was subjected to Port State Control inspections at multiple ports. While individual Port State Control inspections occasionally identified minor deficiencies—as is common for virtually all commercial vessels operating in international trade—no Port State Control inspection during the charter period identified systemic maintenance deficiencies, and the vessel was not detained by any Port State Control authority during the charter period.

B. Incident 2 — Ballast Water Treatment System and Auxiliary Boiler Failure (July 8–29, 2022)

54. While the primary focus of this declaration is Incident 1, I briefly address Incident 2 for completeness and to rebut Plaintiff's contention that Incident 2 reflects a pattern of maintenance neglect by TSL.

55. Incident 2 occurred on or about July 8, 2022, when the vessel's ballast water treatment system ("BWTS") malfunctioned while the vessel was alongside at Richards Bay, South Africa. The BWTS malfunction prevented the vessel from conducting required ballast water exchange operations, resulting in a delay. Additionally, during the same port call, the vessel's auxiliary boiler experienced a failure requiring repair.

56. Based on my review of the available evidence, including the repair records from Richards Bay and the vessel's ballast water management records, the BWTS malfunction was consistent with contamination introduced through ballast water loaded at a prior port of call—specifically, elevated sediment levels in the ballast water that exceeded the BWTS's design filtration capacity and caused fouling of the UV treatment modules. This is a recognized operational issue with UV-type BWTS units and is attributable to the quality of the ballast water loaded during the vessel's commercial operations, which are directed and controlled by the Charterer (or the Charterer's agents), not by the Owner. The BWTS manufacturer's maintenance guidelines were followed by TSL, and there is no evidence that the BWTS malfunction was caused by the Owner's failure to maintain the equipment in accordance with applicable standards.

57. The auxiliary boiler failure was a secondary event that occurred during the same port call. The boiler failure involved a malfunction of the boiler's combustion control system, which required replacement of a control valve and recalibration of the combustion management unit. This repair was completed within the 21-day off-hire period at Richards Bay (July 8–29, 2022). While the auxiliary boiler failure is of lesser significance than the Incident 1 turbocharger failure, I note that the available evidence does not establish that the boiler failure was the result of TSL's failure to follow its maintenance schedule. The PMS records reflect that the auxiliary boiler was maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines and the GMCB requirements.

C. Incident 3 — Cylinder Liner Failure (November 15 – December 10, 2022)

58. Incident 3 involved a cylinder liner failure that was discovered on or about November 15, 2022, necessitating an emergency drydocking at Keppel Verolme Shipyard in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The vessel was off-hire for a period of twenty-five (25) days (November 15 through December 10, 2022) during the drydocking and repair.

59. Defendants have conceded that the cylinder liner failure in Incident 3 was a maintenance-related failure—that is, a failure attributable to insufficient monitoring and preventive replacement of the cylinder liner, which had reached the end of its serviceable life. I concur with this assessment. Cylinder liners are components with known and predictable wear patterns that can be monitored through routine cylinder liner measurements (bore gauging) and through analysis of cylinder lubricating oil condition. The PMS records suggest that, with respect to this particular cylinder liner, the preventive replacement that should have been scheduled based on running hours and wear measurements was not carried out in a timely manner.

60. It is important to note, however, that this concession does not bear upon the motion for partial summary judgment presently before the Court, which concerns Incident 1 (the latent defect in the turbocharger) and not Incident 3. Defendants are not seeking summary judgment with respect to the claims arising from Incident 3. The cylinder liner failure in Incident 3 is fundamentally distinguishable from the turbocharger failure in Incident 1: the cylinder liner failure involved a component with a known, predictable wear pattern that could and should have been monitored and addressed through preventive maintenance, whereas the turbocharger failure involved a subsurface manufacturing defect that was not detectable through any reasonable maintenance or inspection effort.

D. Overall Opinion on Maintenance Compliance

61. Notwithstanding the conceded Incident 3 cylinder liner failure, it is my professional opinion that the overall maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period was consistent with the Owner's obligations under Clause 6 of the charter-party. TSL maintained the vessel in accordance with GMCB classification requirements, manufacturer specifications, and generally accepted industry standards for the maintenance of Supramax dry bulk carriers. The vessel's class was maintained without interruption, no systemic maintenance deficiencies were identified by GMCB or Port State Control authorities, and the PMS records reflect a comprehensive and generally well-executed maintenance program.

62. A single conceded maintenance failure (Incident 3) does not establish a pattern of unseaworthiness or systemic maintenance neglect. Isolated maintenance failures can and do occur even in well-managed fleets. The relevant inquiry is whether the Owner maintained a reasonable and diligent maintenance regime overall—and the evidence demonstrates that it did.

63. With respect to the three incidents at issue in this litigation: Incident 1 was caused by a latent manufacturing defect that was not attributable to negligent maintenance. Incident 2 was caused by external contamination of the ballast water treatment system, a cause attributable to the conditions of the vessel's commercial operations rather than to the Owner's maintenance program. Only Incident 3 involved a maintenance-related failure, and Defendants have conceded liability as to that incident.

VI. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

64. In summary, and based on my education, training, professional experience, and my review of the documents and materials described herein, I hold the following opinions to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty:

(1) The turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 (Incident 1) was caused by a latent metallurgical defect—specifically, a subsurface non-metallic inclusion in the turbocharger bearing race, originating from the manufacturing process—which was not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence by the vessel's Owner or crew using standard maintenance procedures, non-destructive testing methods, classification society surveys, or any other reasonable means of inspection.

(2) Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and the crew of the M/V Aegean Fortuna exercised due diligence in maintaining the turbocharger in accordance with all applicable standards, including the turbocharger manufacturer's specifications and recommended service intervals, the vessel's planned maintenance system schedule, and GMCB classification requirements.

(3) The latent defect defense is applicable to Incident 1. The twenty-two (22) day off-hire period attributable to Incident 1 should not be treated as a breach of the Owner's maintenance and seaworthiness obligations under Clause 6 of the charter-party, because the failure was caused by a latent defect that existed despite the Owner's exercise of due diligence.

(4) Thalassa's overall vessel maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period (January 15, 2021 through January 14, 2024) was consistent with classification society requirements and industry standards for the maintenance of Supramax dry bulk carriers, with the exception of the conceded Incident 3 (cylinder liner failure), which is not at issue on this motion.

(5) The contrary opinion expressed by Plaintiff's expert, Captain Julian Blackmore (Ret.), regarding Incident 1 is unsupported by the engineering evidence and the published literature. Captain Blackmore's opinion relies on inspection standards that exceed the turbocharger manufacturer's recommendations, GMCB classification requirements, and standard industry practice, and his analysis of turbocharger failure mechanisms and vibration monitoring capabilities falls outside his area of professional specialization.

VII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO SUPPLEMENT

65. I reserve the right to supplement, amend, or modify this declaration and the opinions expressed herein in the event that additional information, documents, or materials become available, including but not limited to additional deposition testimony, documents produced in discovery, or supplemental expert reports served by any party.

66. This declaration is submitted in support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and summarizes the principal opinions set forth in greater detail in my full expert report, served on August 5, 2024, and my rebuttal report, served on September 9, 2024. Those reports contain more detailed technical analysis, additional figures and diagrams, and comprehensive references to the supporting engineering literature. To the extent that there is any inconsistency between this declaration and my full reports, the full reports should be consulted for the complete and detailed statement of my opinions and the bases and reasons therefor.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and CPLR § 2106, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, and that I am aware that this declaration is being submitted to a court of the State of New York in connection with a pending action, and that if any of the foregoing statements are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.

Executed at Copenhagen, Denmark, this 20th day of September, 2024.

________________________________________

Dr. Henrik Sørensen Principal Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS Amaliegade 33 1256 Copenhagen K, Denmark

EXHIBITS

The following exhibits are attached to and incorporated by reference in this declaration:

NORTHWIND MARITIME CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,	Index No. 655421/2023
– against –	Assigned Justice:

Hon. Lorraine K. Chen, J.S.C.

THALASSA SHIPPING & LOGISTICS SA and AEGEAN FORTUNA SHIPHOLDING LTD.,

Defendants.

Exhibit	Description
Exhibit A	Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Henrik Sørensen
Exhibit B	Photographs of failed turbocharger bearing race components (Incident 1, Colombo repair, March–April 2022)
Exhibit C	Metallurgical analysis report from Colombo repair facility (Incident 1)
Exhibit D	Excerpts from M/V Aegean Fortuna Planned Maintenance System records — turbocharger maintenance history (January 2021 – March 2022)
Exhibit E	GMCB survey reports for M/V Aegean Fortuna — relevant annual and intermediate surveys (2016–2022)
Exhibit F	Manufacturer's maintenance manual excerpts — turbocharger inspection and service intervals
Exhibit G	Engine room logbook excerpts (January–March 2022) — turbocharger operational readings
Exhibit H	Excerpts from deposition transcript of Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos (June 28, 2024)

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK COMMERCIAL DIVISION
DECLARATION OF DR. HENRIK SØRENSEN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Filed: September 20, 2024
I, Dr. Henrik Sørensen, hereby declare, under penalty of perjury pursuant to Section 2106 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), that I am not a resident of the State of New York, that the following statements are true and correct, and that I make this declaration based upon my personal knowledge, my professional education, training, and experience, and my review of the documents and materials identified herein:
I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS
A. Identity and Professional Background
1. My name is Dr. Henrik Sørensen. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and am competent to make this declaration. I am a citizen and resident of the Kingdom of Denmark. My business address is Amaliegade 33, 1256 Copenhagen K, Denmark. I am the Principal and founding partner of Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS ("NMCG"), a maritime engineering consulting firm headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark, which I established in 2006. NMCG provides expert consulting services in the fields of marine engineering, machinery failure analysis, classification society standards, vessel maintenance assessment, and related technical maritime disciplines to shipowners, charterers, classification societies, insurers, and legal counsel worldwide.
2. I have been retained by Calderwood & Harkness LLP, counsel for defendants Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL") and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL" and, together with TSL, "Defendants"), to provide expert opinions in connection with the above-captioned action. My engagement letter with Calderwood & Harkness LLP is dated February 1, 2024, and my retention commenced on that date.
3. I submit this declaration in support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which seeks dismissal of Plaintiff Northwind Maritime Corporation's ("Northwind" or "Plaintiff") claims arising from the turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 ("Incident 1") on the ground that the failure was caused by a latent defect and that Defendants exercised due diligence in the maintenance of the vessel.
B. Education and Credentials
4. I hold a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Marine Engineering from the Technical University of Denmark (Danmarks Tekniske Universitet), which I was awarded in 1997. My doctoral thesis concerned the fatigue failure mechanisms of rotating components in marine propulsion systems, with a particular focus on turbocharger and turbine blade metallurgy. I also hold a Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Technical University of Denmark (1993) and a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) degree in Mechanical Engineering from the same institution (1991).
5. My areas of specialization include vessel propulsion systems, marine machinery failure analysis, classification society standards and survey protocols, planned maintenance system design and assessment, and the identification and characterization of latent defects in marine machinery. Over the course of my career, spanning more than twenty-seven (27) years, I have provided consulting services in connection with more than two hundred and sixty (260) matters involving marine machinery failures, vessel maintenance disputes, and classification society proceedings.
6. Prior to founding NMCG in 2006, I served for nine (9) years as a machinery surveyor and subsequently as a senior surveyor with Det Norske Veritas (now DNV), one of the world's leading classification societies. During my tenure at DNV, from 1997 to 2006, I conducted annual, intermediate, and special surveys on a range commercial vessels, including dry bulk carriers, crude oil and product tankers, container vessels, and specialized offshore support vessels. I am thoroughly familiar with the survey protocols, classification rules, and technical requirements of all major international classification societies, including the Global Maritime Classification Bureau ("GMCB"), the classification society relevant to the vessel at issue in this proceeding.
7. My experience encompasses extensive work with Supramax and Handymax dry bulk carriers, including vessels of similar vintage and specifications to the M/V Aegean Fortuna. I have investigated and analyzed turbocharger failures on dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels on more than forty (40) occasions throughout my career, including failures involving the same manufacturer and model line as the turbocharger installed on the M/V Aegean Fortuna.
C. Prior Expert Testimony and Publications
8. I have been qualified as an expert witness and provided testimony in maritime disputes in courts and arbitration proceedings in Denmark, the United Kingdom (London Maritime Arbitrators Association proceedings and the English High Court, Admiralty Division), Norway, the United States (including the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and the District of Connecticut), Singapore, and Hong Kong. In total, I have provided deposition or trial testimony in approximately thirty-five (35) maritime disputes and have submitted expert reports or declarations in an additional forty-two (42) matters. The subject matter of my prior testimony has included turbocharger failure analysis, main engine component failures, latent defect identification, classification society survey adequacy, and the assessment of vessel maintenance compliance.
9. I have authored or co-authored twenty-one (21) peer-reviewed articles in marine engineering journals, including the Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Marine Structures, Ocean Engineering, and the Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA). Among my publications are articles directly relevant to the opinions expressed in this declaration, including: "Subsurface Inclusion-Initiated Fatigue Failure in Marine Turbocharger Bearing Races: A Statistical and Metallurgical Analysis" (Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019); "Classification Society Survey Protocols and the Detection of Latent Defects in Rotating Machinery: Limitations and Best Practices" (Marine Structures, Vol. 64, 2019); and "Planned Maintenance System Adequacy in the Commercial Fleet: An Empirical Assessment Against Classification Society and Manufacturer Standards" (Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2022).
10. A true and correct copy of my current curriculum vitae, which sets forth my complete educational background, professional experience, publications, and prior expert testimony, is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated by reference herein.
D. Compensation.
11. I am being compensated for my work in this matter through Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS at my customary hourly consulting rate. My hourly rate for expert consulting and report preparation is €475 per hour, and my hourly rate for deposition and trial testimony is €575 per hour. These rates are consistent with the rates I charge in other engagements of comparable complexity.
12. Through the date of this declaration, the total professional fees billed by NMCG in connection with this engagement are approximately $285,000 (United States Dollars), inclusive of report preparation, document review, travel, and time spent in consultation with counsel. My compensation is in no way contingent upon the outcome of this litigation or the substance of my opinions.
II. SCOPE OF ASSIGNMENT
A. Engagement Scope
13. I have been retained by counsel for Defendants to provide expert opinions on the following issues:
(a) Whether the turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 (Incident 1) constituted a latent defect within the meaning of the charter-party and applicable maritime law—that is, a defect that was not discoverable by the exercise of due diligence on the part of the vessel owner and its crew;
(b) Whether Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. exercised due diligence in maintaining the M/V Aegean Fortuna in a seaworthy condition, as required by Clause 6 of the charter-party agreement between the parties (based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended, Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203);
(c) Whether the vessel's maintenance regime throughout the charter period (commencing January 15, 2021) was consistent with classification society requirements, manufacturer specifications, and generally accepted industry standards for the maintenance of Supramax dry bulk carriers; and
(d) To the extent appropriate, to respond to and rebut the opinions expressed by Plaintiff's expert, Capt. Julian Blackmore (Ret.), of Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., as set forth in his expert report served on August 19, 2024.
B. Materials Reviewed
14. In forming the opinions expressed in this declaration, I have reviewed and considered the following documents and materials, among others:
(a) The Charter-Party dated December 3, 2020 (Reference No. NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203), based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended, between Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) and Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. (as Owner), including all riders, addenda, and amendments thereto;
(b) The vessel specifications for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, IMO Number 9847231, a Supramax dry bulk carrier of 58,200 deadweight tonnes ("DWT"), built in 2016 by Dalian Prosperity Shipyard Co. (Dalian, People's Republic of China), registered under the flag of the Republic of Liberia;
(c) GMCB classification records and survey reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna covering the period from the vessel's delivery in 2016 through 2024, including annual survey reports, intermediate survey reports, the special survey report, and all related conditions of class documentation;
(d) Planned Maintenance System ("PMS") records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, including the complete maintenance history for the main engine, turbocharger, auxiliary machinery, and hull systems for the period from January 2021 through January 2024;
(e) Engine room logbooks for the M/V Aegean Fortuna for the period from January 2021 through December 2022, with particular attention to the entries from January through March 2022 relating to turbocharger operational parameters;
(f) The manufacturer's specifications and maintenance manuals for the main engine (Kestrel Enterprises 6S50MC-C8, or equivalent), and the turbocharger (including the OEM-specified maintenance and inspection intervals for all turbocharger subcomponents);
(g) Repair records from the emergency repair conducted at Colombo, Sri Lanka in connection with Incident 1 (March–April 2022), including the repair facility's inspection reports, photographs of the failed components, and the metallurgical analysis report;
(h) Repair records from Richards Bay, South Africa in connection with Incident 2 (July 2022), relating to the ballast water treatment system malfunction and auxiliary boiler failure;
(i) Drydock records from Keppel Verolme Shipyard, Rotterdam, Netherlands in connection with Incident 3 (November–December 2022), relating to the cylinder liner failure and associated repairs;
(j) The deposition transcript of Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos, taken on June 28, 2024, in its entirety;
(k) The deposition transcript of Captain Nikolaos Giannopoulos (Master of the M/V Aegean Fortuna), taken on May 10, 2024, in its entirety;
(l) The expert report of Capt. Julian Blackmore (Ret.), Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., served on behalf of Plaintiff on August 19, 2024 (reviewed for rebuttal purposes);
(m) Correspondence between the TSL technical management department and GMCB regarding classification surveys, survey planning, and conditions of class for the M/V Aegean Fortuna;
(n) Port State Control inspection reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna from the charter period (January 2021–January 2024); and
(o) Relevant provisions of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, SOLAS regulations, and GMCB Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships.
15. The opinions expressed in this declaration are consistent with, and are supported by, the more detailed analyses set forth in my full expert report served on August 5, 2024, and my rebuttal report served on September 9, 2024, which together contain over one hundred and seventy-five (175) pages of technical analysis, figures, and supporting references. This declaration summarizes my principal opinions for purposes of Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.
III. VESSEL BACKGROUND AND MAINTENANCE FRAMEWORK
A. Vessel Particulars
16. The M/V Aegean Fortuna (IMO Number 9847231) is a Supramax dry bulk carrier with a deadweight tonnage of 58,200 DWT. The vessel was constructed in 2016 at the Dalian Prosperity Shipyard Co. in Dalian, People's Republic of China. The vessel is flagged under the Republic of Liberia and is classed with the Global Maritime Classification Bureau (GMCB). The registered owner is Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. ("AFSL"), a single-purpose ship-owning entity incorporated in Liberia under Registration Number LR-C-20167845. AFSL is a wholly owned subsidiary of Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA ("TSL"), which provides commercial and technical management services for the vessel.
17. The vessel is powered by a slow-speed, two-stroke marine diesel main engine, coupled with a turbocharger system designed to supply pressurized air to the main engine's combustion cylinders. The turbocharger is a critical component of the vessel's propulsion system; its failure renders the main engine inoperable or operable only at severely reduced capacity, necessitating repair before the vessel can resume normal commercial service.
18. At the time of the charter-party's commencement on January 15, 2021, the vessel was approximately five (5) years old—a relatively modern vessel by industry standards. The vessel held a clean GMCB class designation with no outstanding conditions of class, no deferred items, and no Port State Control detentions. The vessel's most recent annual survey prior to the charter commencement had been completed in September 2020, with no deficiencies noted.
B. Maintenance Obligations Under the Charter-Party
19. The charter-party at issue in this proceeding is dated December 3, 2020, Reference Number NW-TSL-CP-2020-1203, and is based on the NYPE 2015 form, as amended by the parties. Under the charter-party, the vessel was time-chartered by Northwind Maritime Corporation (as Charterer) from Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd. (as Owner) for a period of thirty-six (36) months, commencing January 15, 2021 and expiring January 14, 2024. The daily hire rate was set at $14,750 per day, resulting in an approximate total charter value of $16,166,000 over the full charter period.
20. Clause 6 of the charter-party, consistent with the standard NYPE 2015 form, imposes upon the Owner the obligation to "maintain the vessel in a thoroughly efficient state of hull, machinery, and equipment" throughout the charter period. This clause further requires the Owner to maintain the vessel's classification with GMCB and to comply with all classification society requirements. The Owner's obligation under Clause 6 is an obligation of due diligence—it does not render the Owner strictly liable for every mechanical failure that may occur during the charter period. In particular, it is well-established in maritime law and practice that a vessel owner is not liable for vessel breakdowns caused by latent defects, provided that the owner has exercised due diligence to make and keep the vessel seaworthy.
21. The foregoing understanding of the Owner's obligations is material to the opinions expressed in this declaration. The question is not whether the turbocharger failed—it plainly did—but whether the failure was caused by a defect that was discoverable by the exercise of due diligence, or whether it was a latent defect that eluded detection despite the Owner's reasonable efforts to maintain the vessel in accordance with applicable standards.
C. TSL's Maintenance Regime
22. Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA operates a fleet of approximately thirty-four (34) commercial vessels, including dry bulk carriers, tankers, and container vessels. TSL's technical management department, headquartered in Piraeus, Greece, maintains a comprehensive fleet-wide planned maintenance system (PMS) that is applied uniformly across all vessels under TSL's management. The PMS system used by TSL is a commercially available, industry-standard software platform that tracks all scheduled and completed maintenance tasks for each vessel, generates maintenance alerts and work orders, and maintains a digital record of all maintenance activities performed.
23. The PMS records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, which I have reviewed in their entirety for the charter period, demonstrate that TSL implemented and maintained a systematic and documented maintenance program for the vessel. The PMS records reflect that maintenance tasks were scheduled in accordance with the manufacturer's recommended service intervals for the main engine and all ancillary machinery, including the turbocharger, and in accordance with GMCB classification requirements.
24. The regular GMCB surveys for the M/V Aegean Fortuna were completed on schedule throughout the charter period. The vessel underwent its annual survey in August 2021, its intermediate survey in September 2022, and additional condition-of-class-related inspections as directed by GMCB. At no point during the charter period was the vessel's GMCB class suspended, withdrawn, or made subject to conditions of class relating to the turbocharger or main engine prior to Incident 1.
25. Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos, who served aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna from December 2020 through September 2022, provided deposition testimony on June 28, 2024, in which he confirmed, under oath, that he and his engine room crew adhered to the PMS schedule and the manufacturer's maintenance manual with respect to all main engine and turbocharger maintenance tasks. Chief Engineer Vlahos further testified that daily rounds of the engine room included visual inspection of the turbocharger, monitoring of turbocharger exhaust gas temperatures, turbocharger RPM, bearing temperatures, and lubricating oil pressure, and that all such readings were recorded in the engine room logbook. He testified that he observed no anomalous readings or operational irregularities with respect to the turbocharger in the weeks and months preceding the failure on March 12, 2022. Relevant excerpts from Chief Engineer Vlahos's deposition transcript are attached hereto as Exhibit H.
IV. INCIDENT 1 — MAIN ENGINE TURBOCHARGER FAILURE (MARCH 12 – APRIL 2, 2022): LATENT DEFECT ANALYSIS
A. Factual Summary
26. On March 12, 2022, at approximately 0342 hours (ship time), while the M/V Aegean Fortuna was transiting the Indian Ocean en route from the port of Paradip, India to the port of Mombasa, Kenya, laden with a cargo of approximately 53,800 metric tonnes of iron ore fines, the vessel's main engine turbocharger suffered a catastrophic failure. The failure was sudden and without warning. Chief Engineer Vlahos testified that the turbocharger had been operating normally during the preceding watches, with all monitored parameters within normal ranges, and that the failure manifested as a sudden, violent metallic noise from the turbocharger casing, accompanied by an immediate loss of turbocharger boost pressure and a rapid decline in main engine performance.
27. As a result of the turbocharger failure, the main engine could not operate at its normal service output. The vessel's Master, Captain Nikolaos Giannopoulos, made the determination, in consultation with the Chief Engineer and the TSL technical management department, to divert the vessel to the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, which was the nearest port equipped with adequate repair facilities for a turbocharger replacement of this nature.
28. The vessel arrived in Colombo on March 16, 2022. Emergency repairs were conducted by a qualified repair facility in Colombo, which included the removal of the failed turbocharger, disassembly and inspection of the failed components, procurement and installation of a replacement turbocharger, and sea trials. The repair was completed on April 1, 2022, and the vessel departed Colombo and resumed her voyage on April 2, 2022. The total off-hire period attributable to Incident 1 was twenty-two (22) days (March 12 through April 2, 2022). At the charter hire rate of $14,750 per day, the off-hire claim for Incident 1 amounts to $324,500.
B. Physical Examination and Failure Analysis
29. In connection with the repair at Colombo, the failed turbocharger was disassembled, and the failed components were subjected to visual and metallurgical examination by the repair facility's engineering staff. The repair facility prepared a detailed inspection report and a metallurgical analysis report, copies of which were provided to me for review. Additionally, high-resolution photographs of the failed turbocharger components were taken at the repair facility, and I have reviewed these photographs in detail. True and correct copies of representative photographs of the failed turbocharger bearing race components are attached hereto as Exhibit B. A true and correct copy of the metallurgical analysis report from the Colombo repair facility is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
30. Based on my review of the available evidence—including the metallurgical analysis report, the photographs of the failed components, the repair facility's inspection report, the engine room logbook entries, and the PMS records—I have determined that the failure mode was as follows: The turbocharger failure was initiated by a fracture of the internal bearing race of the turbocharger's main bearing assembly. The fracture propagated from a subsurface metallurgical flaw—specifically, a non-metallic inclusion (oxide inclusion) embedded within the bearing race material at a depth of approximately 1.8 to 2.2 millimeters below the bearing surface. This inclusion acted as a stress concentration point under the cyclical loading conditions experienced during normal turbocharger operation. Over time, a fatigue crack initiated at the inclusion site and propagated slowly through the bearing race material until the remaining cross-section was insufficient to withstand the operational loads, at which point catastrophic fracture occurred.
31. The metallurgical analysis report from the Colombo repair facility, prepared by a metallurgist with experience in marine component failure analysis, confirmed the presence of the subsurface non-metallic inclusion at the fracture initiation site. The report characterized the inclusion as consistent with a manufacturing-origin defect—that is, an impurity introduced during the steel-making or forging process used to produce the bearing race. The report concluded, and I concur, that the inclusion was present in the bearing race from the time of its manufacture.
32. It is critical to understand the nature and detectability of this type of defect. A subsurface non-metallic inclusion located approximately 2 millimeters below the surface of a turbocharger bearing race is not detectable through any of the standard non-destructive testing ("NDT") methods that are available to, or used by, vessel owners, crews, or classification society surveyors during routine maintenance inspections. The standard NDT methods applicable in a shipboard maintenance context include visual inspection, magnetic particle inspection (MPI), dye penetrant inspection (DPI), and ultrasonic testing (UT). Visual inspection, MPI, and DPI are surface or near-surface inspection methods and are incapable of detecting subsurface flaws at the depth at which this inclusion was located. While ultrasonic testing can in principle detect subsurface flaws, the application of UT to turbocharger bearing races is not a standard practice in shipboard maintenance, is not required by any classification society survey protocol for a vessel of this age and type, and would require specialized equipment and expertise not ordinarily available aboard a commercial vessel or at most ports of call.
33. Moreover, the subsurface inclusion and the fatigue crack propagating from it did not produce any externally observable symptoms prior to the catastrophic failure event. Specifically, the defect did not manifest through abnormal vibration, elevated bearing temperatures, anomalous turbocharger RPM fluctuations, unusual noise, or measurable degradation in turbocharger or main engine performance. The absence of precursor symptoms is consistent with the metallurgical characteristics of this type of failure: a subsurface fatigue crack propagating from a small inclusion in a rotating component will typically not produce detectable vibration anomalies or other externally observable symptoms until the crack has reached a critical size, at which point catastrophic failure occurs rapidly—often within a matter of hours or even minutes. This phenomenon is well-documented in the marine engineering and materials science literature, including in my own published research. (See Sørensen, "Subsurface Inclusion-Initiated Fatigue Failure in Marine Turbocharger Bearing Races: A Statistical and Metallurgical Analysis," J. Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019, at pp. 217–232.)
34. I have reviewed the engine room logbook entries for the M/V Aegean Fortuna for the period from January 1, 2022 through March 12, 2022. The entries record turbocharger exhaust gas temperatures, turbocharger RPM, bearing temperatures, and lubricating oil pressures at regular intervals, consistent with standard watchkeeping practice. I found no anomalous or abnormal readings for any turbocharger parameter in the weeks and months preceding the failure. All recorded values fell within the normal operating ranges specified by the turbocharger manufacturer. Excerpts from the engine room logbook for this period are attached hereto as Exhibit G.
C. Classification Society Records
35. I have reviewed the GMCB classification records and survey reports for the M/V Aegean Fortuna from the vessel's construction in 2016 through 2024. Relevant excerpts of the GMCB survey reports are attached hereto as Exhibit E.
36. The GMCB conducted all required annual and intermediate surveys on the vessel's main engine and turbocharger during the period in question. The annual survey conducted in August 2021—approximately seven (7) months prior to the turbocharger failure—included an examination of the turbocharger in accordance with GMCB's applicable survey requirements. The GMCB surveyor's report from the August 2021 annual survey reflects that the turbocharger was examined and found to be in satisfactory condition, with no deficiencies or recommendations noted.
37. It is significant that the GMCB survey protocols applicable to turbochargers on dry bulk carriers of this type and age (built 2016, approximately six years old at the time of the failure) do not require invasive disassembly of the turbocharger bearing assembly, metallurgical testing of bearing race components, or specialized subsurface NDT of turbocharger bearings as part of routine annual or intermediate surveys. The GMCB survey requirements for the turbocharger at this stage of the vessel's life are consistent with the survey protocols of other major classification societies, including Meridian Industries, DNV, Bureau Veritas, and the American Bureau of Shipping. These protocols typically require external visual examination of the turbocharger, review of operational parameters and logbook records, and, at certain intervals, opening of the turbocharger casing for examination of the rotor, blading, and bearing clearances. Even when casing opening is performed, the examination is limited to visual assessment, dimensional measurement of bearing clearances, and surface-level NDT (if warranted by observed conditions)—not subsurface metallurgical testing of bearing race components.
38. The GMCB class for the M/V Aegean Fortuna was maintained continuously throughout the relevant period. No conditions of class were imposed relating to the turbocharger or main engine prior to the Incident 1 failure. This is a strong indication that the GMCB—an independent third-party classification society—found the vessel's machinery to be maintained in accordance with its rules and requirements.
D. Due Diligence by the Owner
39. The PMS records for the M/V Aegean Fortuna, which I have reviewed in their entirety, demonstrate that all manufacturer-recommended maintenance and inspection tasks for the turbocharger were performed on schedule throughout the charter period. Excerpts from the PMS records pertaining to the turbocharger maintenance history are attached hereto as Exhibit D. The manufacturer's maintenance manual specifies a series of routine inspections, lubricating oil analyses, filter changes, and, at longer intervals, casing openings and bearing clearance measurements. The PMS records confirm that each of these tasks was completed at or before the prescribed interval.
40. Excerpts from the turbocharger manufacturer's maintenance manual are attached hereto as Exhibit F. The manufacturer's recommended inspection and service intervals do not include subsurface metallurgical testing of bearing race components. The manufacturer's manual directs that bearing clearances be measured at specified intervals, that bearing surfaces be visually inspected for signs of wear, pitting, or discoloration, and that bearings be replaced when clearances exceed specified limits or when visible damage is observed. None of these recommended procedures would have detected a subsurface non-metallic inclusion of the type that caused the failure on March 12, 2022.
41. Chief Engineer Vlahos's deposition testimony (June 28, 2024) corroborates the PMS records. Chief Engineer Vlahos testified that he personally supervised and, in many cases, performed the scheduled turbocharger maintenance tasks, and that he followed the manufacturer's maintenance manual and the PMS schedule in doing so. He testified that the most recent turbocharger maintenance activity prior to the failure was a scheduled lubricating oil analysis and filter change completed in February 2022, approximately three weeks before the failure, and that the results of that oil analysis were within normal limits. He further testified that at no time prior to the failure did he observe any indication—whether through operational parameters, visual inspection, or any other means—that the turbocharger bearing was in anything other than satisfactory condition. (See Exhibit H.)
42. Based on the foregoing, it is my professional opinion that the type of subsurface metallurgical defect identified as the root cause of the March 12, 2022 turbocharger failure is, by definition, a latent defect. A latent defect is one that could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence using reasonable means of inspection available to the vessel owner and crew. The defect in this case was subsurface, was present from manufacture, did not produce externally observable symptoms, and was not detectable through any standard NDT method, manufacturer-recommended inspection procedure, or classification society survey protocol applicable to a vessel of this type and age. No industry-standard maintenance protocol for a Supramax dry bulk carrier built in 2016 and approximately six years old at the time of the failure would have required the level of invasive metallurgical testing necessary to detect this flaw. To require such testing as a condition of the "due diligence" standard would impose an obligation far beyond what is recognized in maritime engineering practice, classification society rules, or equipment manufacturer specifications.
E. Expert Opinion on Incident 1
43. Based on my review of the evidence described above and my professional training, education, and experience, it is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that:
(1) The turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 was caused by a latent defect—specifically, a subsurface non-metallic inclusion in the turbocharger bearing race material, originating from the manufacturing process, which initiated a fatigue crack that propagated to catastrophic fracture under normal operational loading conditions.
(2) The defect was not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence by Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA, Aegean Fortuna Shipholding Ltd., or the vessel's crew, using standard maintenance procedures, non-destructive testing methods, classification society surveys, or any other reasonable means of inspection available to the vessel owner.
(3) Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and its crew exercised due diligence in maintaining the turbocharger in accordance with the turbocharger manufacturer's maintenance manual, the vessel's planned maintenance system schedule, and GMCB classification requirements. All scheduled maintenance and inspection tasks were performed on time, and the turbocharger was monitored through appropriate operational parameters throughout the relevant period.
(4) The turbocharger failure on March 12, 2022 does not reflect a failure by the Owner to maintain the vessel in a "thoroughly efficient state of hull, machinery, and equipment" as required by Clause 6 of the charter-party. The failure was caused by a manufacturing-origin latent defect that existed despite the Owner's exercise of due diligence, and therefore falls within the well-recognized latent defect exception to the Owner's maintenance obligation.
F. Response to Opposing Expert (Capt. Blackmore)
44. I have reviewed the expert report of Captain Julian Blackmore (Ret.), of Blackmore Maritime Advisory Ltd., served on behalf of Plaintiff on August 19, 2024 ("Blackmore Report"). Captain Blackmore opines that the turbocharger failure could have been prevented through more frequent inspections of the turbocharger bearing assembly than were in fact performed by TSL, and that continuous vibration monitoring equipment should have been installed on the turbocharger and would have detected precursors to the failure. I respectfully disagree with Captain Blackmore's opinions for the following reasons.
45. First, as to Captain Blackmore's opinion that more frequent inspections would have prevented the failure: Captain Blackmore suggests that the turbocharger bearing assembly should have been inspected at intervals of every 4,000 running hours, rather than the manufacturer-recommended interval of every 8,000 running hours. Captain Blackmore provides no engineering basis for this proposed inspection frequency. The manufacturer's maintenance manual—the most authoritative source of guidance on the appropriate inspection intervals for this specific turbocharger model—specifies the 8,000-hour interval for bearing clearance measurement and visual inspection. This interval is consistent with the manufacturer's recommended practice for turbochargers of this model installed on comparable vessels. GMCB's classification requirements do not mandate a more frequent inspection interval. No major classification society mandates a 4,000-hour inspection interval for turbocharger bearings on vessels of this type and age. The inspection frequency recommended by Captain Blackmore exceeds manufacturer recommendations and GMCB requirements and is not consistent with standard industry practice for Supramax dry bulk carriers of this vintage.
46. Moreover, even if the turbocharger bearing assembly had been inspected at 4,000-hour intervals—or even more frequently—such inspections would have consisted of the standard procedures: visual examination of the bearing surfaces and measurement of bearing clearances. These procedures would not have detected the subsurface non-metallic inclusion that caused the failure. The defect was located approximately 2 millimeters below the bearing surface and did not produce any surface manifestation—no pitting, scoring, discoloration, or abnormal wear—that would have been observable during a visual inspection. The bearing clearance measurements, likewise, would have been within normal limits, as the fatigue crack had not progressed to the point of affecting bearing geometry or clearances until immediately prior to the catastrophic failure event.
47. Second, as to Captain Blackmore's opinion regarding vibration monitoring: Captain Blackmore suggests that the installation of continuous vibration monitoring equipment on the turbocharger would have detected precursor vibration signatures indicative of the developing fatigue crack. This opinion is not supported by the engineering evidence or the published literature. As discussed above, and as I have demonstrated in my published research, a subsurface fatigue crack propagating from a small non-metallic inclusion in a turbocharger bearing race does not produce detectable vibration anomalies until the crack has reached a critical length—a point at which catastrophic failure is imminent (typically within hours or less). Prior to reaching this critical length, the crack is too small relative to the bearing dimensions and rotational dynamics to produce measurable changes in vibration frequency or amplitude. This is a well-established principle in the field of rotating machinery failure analysis and has been confirmed in controlled laboratory studies and in analyses of real-world turbocharger failures. (See Sørensen, J. Marine Engineering and Technology, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2019, at pp. 224–228; see also Dalmqvist & Berg, "Vibration-Based Condition Monitoring of Marine Turbocharger Bearings: Capabilities and Limitations," Ocean Engineering, Vol. 196, 2020.)
48. Furthermore, the installation of continuous vibration monitoring on turbochargers is not a standard requirement for Supramax dry bulk carriers built in 2016. While continuous vibration monitoring is increasingly common on certain types of high-value or critical rotating machinery (such as main turbines on LNG carriers or gas turbines in offshore installations), it is not yet standard practice on the turbochargers of dry bulk carriers of this class. GMCB does not require continuous vibration monitoring on the turbocharger of a vessel of this type. Captain Blackmore does not cite any classification society rule, industry standard, or regulatory requirement mandating such equipment on the M/V Aegean Fortuna.
49. Finally, I note that Captain Blackmore's professional background is as a retired Master Mariner—a maritime operations expert rather than a marine engineer specializing in machinery failure analysis and metallurgy. While I do not question Captain Blackmore's competence in matters of vessel navigation, maritime operations, and maritime safety management, the opinions he offers regarding turbocharger failure mechanisms, metallurgical defect detection, and vibration monitoring capabilities fall outside his area of professional specialization. The analysis of a subsurface metallurgical defect in a turbocharger bearing race and the assessment of available detection methods is a matter of marine engineering and materials science, not maritime operations.
V. THALASSA'S OVERALL COMPLIANCE WITH MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS
A. Assessment of the Maintenance Regime Across the Charter Period
50. While the primary focus of this declaration is the latent defect analysis pertaining to Incident 1, I have also been asked to assess, and have assessed, the overall adequacy of TSL's maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna across the full charter period (January 15, 2021 through January 14, 2024). This assessment is relevant to Defendants' motion insofar as Plaintiff has alleged that the turbocharger failure was part of a broader pattern of maintenance neglect.
51. Based on my comprehensive review of the PMS records, GMCB survey records, engine room logbooks, repair records, Port State Control inspection reports, and correspondence between TSL and GMCB for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period, it is my professional opinion that TSL maintained a systematic and documented maintenance program that was consistent with industry best practices for a fleet operator of TSL's size and scope (approximately 34 vessels). The maintenance program was supported by adequate shore-side technical management, regular supervisory oversight, and a functional PMS system that tracked and documented maintenance compliance.
52. The vessel's GMCB class was maintained throughout the charter period without suspension or withdrawal. At no point during the charter period was the vessel's class suspended for failure to comply with classification society survey or maintenance requirements.
53. During the charter period, the M/V Aegean Fortuna was subjected to Port State Control inspections at multiple ports. While individual Port State Control inspections occasionally identified minor deficiencies—as is common for virtually all commercial vessels operating in international trade—no Port State Control inspection during the charter period identified systemic maintenance deficiencies, and the vessel was not detained by any Port State Control authority during the charter period.
B. Incident 2 — Ballast Water Treatment System and Auxiliary Boiler Failure (July 8–29, 2022)
54. While the primary focus of this declaration is Incident 1, I briefly address Incident 2 for completeness and to rebut Plaintiff's contention that Incident 2 reflects a pattern of maintenance neglect by TSL.
55. Incident 2 occurred on or about July 8, 2022, when the vessel's ballast water treatment system ("BWTS") malfunctioned while the vessel was alongside at Richards Bay, South Africa. The BWTS malfunction prevented the vessel from conducting required ballast water exchange operations, resulting in a delay. Additionally, during the same port call, the vessel's auxiliary boiler experienced a failure requiring repair.
56. Based on my review of the available evidence, including the repair records from Richards Bay and the vessel's ballast water management records, the BWTS malfunction was consistent with contamination introduced through ballast water loaded at a prior port of call—specifically, elevated sediment levels in the ballast water that exceeded the BWTS's design filtration capacity and caused fouling of the UV treatment modules. This is a recognized operational issue with UV-type BWTS units and is attributable to the quality of the ballast water loaded during the vessel's commercial operations, which are directed and controlled by the Charterer (or the Charterer's agents), not by the Owner. The BWTS manufacturer's maintenance guidelines were followed by TSL, and there is no evidence that the BWTS malfunction was caused by the Owner's failure to maintain the equipment in accordance with applicable standards.
57. The auxiliary boiler failure was a secondary event that occurred during the same port call. The boiler failure involved a malfunction of the boiler's combustion control system, which required replacement of a control valve and recalibration of the combustion management unit. This repair was completed within the 21-day off-hire period at Richards Bay (July 8–29, 2022). While the auxiliary boiler failure is of lesser significance than the Incident 1 turbocharger failure, I note that the available evidence does not establish that the boiler failure was the result of TSL's failure to follow its maintenance schedule. The PMS records reflect that the auxiliary boiler was maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's guidelines and the GMCB requirements.
C. Incident 3 — Cylinder Liner Failure (November 15 – December 10, 2022)
58. Incident 3 involved a cylinder liner failure that was discovered on or about November 15, 2022, necessitating an emergency drydocking at Keppel Verolme Shipyard in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The vessel was off-hire for a period of twenty-five (25) days (November 15 through December 10, 2022) during the drydocking and repair.
59. Defendants have conceded that the cylinder liner failure in Incident 3 was a maintenance-related failure—that is, a failure attributable to insufficient monitoring and preventive replacement of the cylinder liner, which had reached the end of its serviceable life. I concur with this assessment. Cylinder liners are components with known and predictable wear patterns that can be monitored through routine cylinder liner measurements (bore gauging) and through analysis of cylinder lubricating oil condition. The PMS records suggest that, with respect to this particular cylinder liner, the preventive replacement that should have been scheduled based on running hours and wear measurements was not carried out in a timely manner.
60. It is important to note, however, that this concession does not bear upon the motion for partial summary judgment presently before the Court, which concerns Incident 1 (the latent defect in the turbocharger) and not Incident 3. Defendants are not seeking summary judgment with respect to the claims arising from Incident 3. The cylinder liner failure in Incident 3 is fundamentally distinguishable from the turbocharger failure in Incident 1: the cylinder liner failure involved a component with a known, predictable wear pattern that could and should have been monitored and addressed through preventive maintenance, whereas the turbocharger failure involved a subsurface manufacturing defect that was not detectable through any reasonable maintenance or inspection effort.
D. Overall Opinion on Maintenance Compliance
61. Notwithstanding the conceded Incident 3 cylinder liner failure, it is my professional opinion that the overall maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period was consistent with the Owner's obligations under Clause 6 of the charter-party. TSL maintained the vessel in accordance with GMCB classification requirements, manufacturer specifications, and generally accepted industry standards for the maintenance of Supramax dry bulk carriers. The vessel's class was maintained without interruption, no systemic maintenance deficiencies were identified by GMCB or Port State Control authorities, and the PMS records reflect a comprehensive and generally well-executed maintenance program.
62. A single conceded maintenance failure (Incident 3) does not establish a pattern of unseaworthiness or systemic maintenance neglect. Isolated maintenance failures can and do occur even in well-managed fleets. The relevant inquiry is whether the Owner maintained a reasonable and diligent maintenance regime overall—and the evidence demonstrates that it did.
63. With respect to the three incidents at issue in this litigation: Incident 1 was caused by a latent manufacturing defect that was not attributable to negligent maintenance. Incident 2 was caused by external contamination of the ballast water treatment system, a cause attributable to the conditions of the vessel's commercial operations rather than to the Owner's maintenance program. Only Incident 3 involved a maintenance-related failure, and Defendants have conceded liability as to that incident.
VI. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
64. In summary, and based on my education, training, professional experience, and my review of the documents and materials described herein, I hold the following opinions to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty:
(1) The turbocharger failure aboard the M/V Aegean Fortuna on March 12, 2022 (Incident 1) was caused by a latent metallurgical defect—specifically, a subsurface non-metallic inclusion in the turbocharger bearing race, originating from the manufacturing process—which was not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence by the vessel's Owner or crew using standard maintenance procedures, non-destructive testing methods, classification society surveys, or any other reasonable means of inspection.
(2) Thalassa Shipping & Logistics SA and the crew of the M/V Aegean Fortuna exercised due diligence in maintaining the turbocharger in accordance with all applicable standards, including the turbocharger manufacturer's specifications and recommended service intervals, the vessel's planned maintenance system schedule, and GMCB classification requirements.
(3) The latent defect defense is applicable to Incident 1. The twenty-two (22) day off-hire period attributable to Incident 1 should not be treated as a breach of the Owner's maintenance and seaworthiness obligations under Clause 6 of the charter-party, because the failure was caused by a latent defect that existed despite the Owner's exercise of due diligence.
(4) Thalassa's overall vessel maintenance regime for the M/V Aegean Fortuna during the charter period (January 15, 2021 through January 14, 2024) was consistent with classification society requirements and industry standards for the maintenance of Supramax dry bulk carriers, with the exception of the conceded Incident 3 (cylinder liner failure), which is not at issue on this motion.
(5) The contrary opinion expressed by Plaintiff's expert, Captain Julian Blackmore (Ret.), regarding Incident 1 is unsupported by the engineering evidence and the published literature. Captain Blackmore's opinion relies on inspection standards that exceed the turbocharger manufacturer's recommendations, GMCB classification requirements, and standard industry practice, and his analysis of turbocharger failure mechanisms and vibration monitoring capabilities falls outside his area of professional specialization.
VII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO SUPPLEMENT
65. I reserve the right to supplement, amend, or modify this declaration and the opinions expressed herein in the event that additional information, documents, or materials become available, including but not limited to additional deposition testimony, documents produced in discovery, or supplemental expert reports served by any party.
66. This declaration is submitted in support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and summarizes the principal opinions set forth in greater detail in my full expert report, served on August 5, 2024, and my rebuttal report, served on September 9, 2024. Those reports contain more detailed technical analysis, additional figures and diagrams, and comprehensive references to the supporting engineering literature. To the extent that there is any inconsistency between this declaration and my full reports, the full reports should be consulted for the complete and detailed statement of my opinions and the bases and reasons therefor.
VIII. CERTIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and CPLR § 2106, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, and that I am aware that this declaration is being submitted to a court of the State of New York in connection with a pending action, and that if any of the foregoing statements are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.
Executed at Copenhagen, Denmark, this 20th day of September, 2024.
________________________________________
Dr. Henrik Sørensen Principal Nordic Maritime Consulting Group ApS Amaliegade 33 1256 Copenhagen K, Denmark
EXHIBITS
The following exhibits are attached to and incorporated by reference in this declaration:
NORTHWIND MARITIME CORPORATION,
Plaintiff, | Index No. 655421/2023
– against – | Assigned Justice:
Hon. Lorraine K. Chen, J.S.C.
THALASSA SHIPPING & LOGISTICS SA and AEGEAN FORTUNA SHIPHOLDING LTD., | Part 49
Defendants.
Exhibit | Description
Exhibit A | Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Henrik Sørensen
Exhibit B | Photographs of failed turbocharger bearing race components (Incident 1, Colombo repair, March–April 2022)
Exhibit C | Metallurgical analysis report from Colombo repair facility (Incident 1)
Exhibit D | Excerpts from M/V Aegean Fortuna Planned Maintenance System records — turbocharger maintenance history (January 2021 – March 2022)
Exhibit E | GMCB survey reports for M/V Aegean Fortuna — relevant annual and intermediate surveys (2016–2022)
Exhibit F | Manufacturer's maintenance manual excerpts — turbocharger inspection and service intervals
Exhibit G | Engine room logbook excerpts (January–March 2022) — turbocharger operational readings
Exhibit H | Excerpts from deposition transcript of Chief Engineer Petros Vlahos (June 28, 2024)